



ATTALID ASIA MINOR

Money, International Relations
and the State

Edited by PETER THONEMANN

OXFORD

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and the State*

EDITED BY
PETER THONEMANN

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Preface

Few epochs in the history of western Asia Minor are as well documented, or as poorly understood, as the 'short' second century BC. In 188 BC, the treaty of Apameia brought an end to Seleukid rule north of the Tauros mountains. The prosperous Seleukid territories in Asia Minor were divided by Roman *fiat* between the inhabitants of the island *polis* of Rhodes (who received Karia south of the Maeander river) and King Eumenes II of Pergamon, the ruler of a tiny, semi-independent principality on the far northern periphery of the vast Seleukid realm. The curtain fell on Attalid Asia Minor a mere fifty-five years later, in 133 BC, with the death of Eumenes' son Attalos III and the bequest of his kingdom to the Roman people.

Before Apameia, the Attalid kingdom had been a relatively small player in Hellenistic great power politics. In Chapter 3 of this volume, Boris Chrubasik shows that down to the 190s, the Attalid dynasts had never in fact enjoyed any real independence from the Seleukid state, acting instead as local power-holders within a Seleukid administrative framework. Their gradual disentanglement from the Seleukids was completed in 188, when the Attalids saw tremendous swathes of territory bestowed on them at the stroke of a Roman pen. Eumenes was the chief beneficiary of a set of careful and pragmatic Roman calculations of self-interest, persuasively analysed by Philip Kay in Chapter 4.

Eumenes' Faustian pact with Rome brought its own problems. As I argue in Chapter 1, the ideological and bureaucratic structures of the Attalid kingdom after Apameia developed in a manner quite unlike those of the other major Hellenistic territorial states. Not only were the late Attalid monarchs obliged to develop a new, non-charismatic royal style and ideology; large parts of the tributary economy and royal administration were progressively devolved to civic actors and local power-holders. The military needs of the expanded second-century Attalid kingdom were met with an extensive programme of military settlement in rural Lydia and Phrygia, as John Ma describes in Chapter 2. The landscape of western Asia Minor was permanently transformed by the experience of Attalid rule.

At some point in the early second century, and by the mid-160s at the latest, the Attalid monarchs introduced a new reduced-weight silver currency (the ‘cistophoros’), which circulated only within the Attalid dependent territories in Asia Minor. In stark contrast to all other Hellenistic royal coin-issues, this coinage bore neither the name nor the image of any member of the Attalid dynasty. In Chapter 6, François de Callataÿ shows quite how startling a jump in Attalid monetary production the introduction of the cistophoric coinage represented: as de Callataÿ’s quantitative studies demonstrate, the annual production of silver coinage by the last three Attalid monarchs more than matched that of their former Seleukid masters. A particular problem here is raised by the so-called ‘wreathed’ coinages, a group of large and beautiful silver coin-issues struck by cities on the western fringe of the Attalid kingdom in vast quantities around the middle of the second century BC. As Selene Psoma establishes in Chapter 8, these wreathed issues should be understood as a surrogate Attalid ‘export’ coinage, used in particular to fund Attalid geopolitical interests in Seleukid Syria.

How the new cistophoric economy actually functioned in western Asia Minor has never been convincingly explained. In Chapter 5, Andrew Meadows offers a compelling new reconstruction of the operation of the Attalids’ ‘epichoric’ currency system, which, he argues, should be seen as closely connected to wider economic and ideological imperatives on the part of the Attalid state. The workings of this system on the peripheries of the kingdom are the subject of Chapter 7, in which Richard Ashton shows how the currency-systems of the two great powers of western Asia Minor, Rhodes and the Attalids, exercised a strong gravitational pull on the local coinages of small cities even outside their immediate zones of control.

The kingdom of Eumenes and his successors has long been the Cinderella among the major Hellenistic territorial states. If the city of Pergamon and the artistic and cultural legacies of the Attalid dynasty have been relatively well served by recent scholarship—one thinks of the work of Erich Gruen, Wolfgang Radt, Hans-Joachim Schalles, Andrew Stewart, and Biagio Virgilio, among others—the same cannot be said for the material, economic, and institutional foundations of Attalid success. Hence the focus of this volume on the political economy of the second-century Attalid kingdom, and in particular the three major themes of money, international relations, and the

state. Culture and ideology are not neglected; but this is first and foremost a book about power.

All but two of the papers published here were originally delivered in a seminar series, 'The Attalids and their Neighbours, 188–133 BC', held under the auspices of the Oxford Ancient History sub-faculty every Tuesday afternoon during Trinity Term (April–June) 2010. I am grateful to Riet van Bremen, Beate Dignas, Chris Howgego, Jack Kroll, and Robert Parker for their contributions to the original seminar series; to Andrew Meadows and the American Numismatic Society for help with images; to Nicholas Evans, of Wadham College, for compiling the index; to the Faculty of Classics, Wadham College, The Robinson Charitable Trust, and the Heberden Coin Room for financial support; and to Hilary O'Shea at Oxford University Press for her commitment to the project.

Peter Thonemann
Oxford, March 2012

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Abbreviations

ANS	American Numismatic Society
ANSMN	<i>American Numismatic Society Museum Notes</i>
BE	<i>Bulletin épigraphique</i> , annually in REG.
BM	The British Museum, London
BMC Aeolis	W. W. Wroth, <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins [in the British Museum] of Troas, Aeolis and Lesbos</i> . London, 1894.
BMC Caria	B. V. Head, <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins [in the British Museum] of Caria, Cos, Rhodes, &c.</i> London, 1897.
BnF	Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris
CAH	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i> . Cambridge, 1923–.
CH	<i>Coin Hoards</i> , Vols. I–IX: London, 1975–2002; Vol. X: New York, 2010.
CIG	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>
CNG	<i>Classical Numismatic Group</i> (sale catalogues)
FD III	<i>Fouilles de Delphes, Tome III : Épigraphie</i> . Paris, 1909–.
FGrHist	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . Berlin and Leiden, 1923–.
Gorny	Gorny and Mosch Giessener Münzhandlung GmbH (sale catalogues)
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
IGCH	M. Thompson, O. Mørkholm, and C. Kraay (eds.), <i>An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards</i> . New York, 1973.
IOSPE I ²	V. Latyshev, <i>Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini graecae et latinae</i> , Vol. 1, 2nd edn., <i>Inscriptiones Tyriae, Olbiae, Chersonesi Tauricae</i> . St. Petersburg, 1916.
ISE	<i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche</i>
IThrAeg	L. D. Loukopoulou, M.-G. Parissaki, S. Psoma, and A. Zournatzi, <i>Επιγραφές της Θράκης του Αἰγαίου</i> . Athens, 2005.
IvP	M. Fränkel, E. Fabricius, and K. Schuchhardt, <i>Die Inschriften von Pergamon</i> (2 vols.). Berlin, 1890–1895.

- I.Assos* R. Merkelbach, *Die Inschriften von Assos*. IGSK 4. Bonn, 1976.
- I.BurdurMus* G. H. R. Horsley, *RECAM V: The Greek and Latin Inscriptions in the Burdur Archaeological Museum*. Ankara, 2007.
- I.Cos* M. Segre, *Iscrizioni di Cos* (2 vols.). Rome, 1993.
- I.Cret.* M. Guarducci, *Inscriptiones Creticae* (4 vols.). Rome, 1935–50.
- I.Délos* *Inscriptions de Délos*
- I.Didyma* A. Rehm, *Didyma, II Teil: Die Inschriften*. Berlin, 1958.
- I.Ephesos* H. Wankel, R. Merkelbach et al., *Die Inschriften von Ephesos* (7 vols.). IGSK 11–17. Bonn, 1979–81.
- I.Erythrai* H. Engelmann and R. Merkelbach, *Die Inschriften von Erythrai* (2 vols.). IGSK 1–2. Bonn, 1972–3.
- I.Iasos* W. Blümel, *Die Inschriften von Iasos* (2 vols.). IGSK 28. Bonn, 1985.
- I.Ilion* P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Ilion*. IGSK 3. Bonn, 1975.
- I.Kibyratis* N. P. Milner, *RECAM III: An Epigraphical Survey in the Kibyra-Olbasa Region Conducted by A. S. Hall*. Ankara, 1998.
- I.Knidos* W. Blümel, *Die Inschriften von Knidos*. IGSK 41. Bonn, 1992.
- I.Kyme* H. Engelmann, *Die Inschriften von Kyme*. IGSK 5. Bonn, 1976.
- I.Lampsakos* P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Lampsakos*. IGSK 6. Bonn, 1978.
- I.Laodikeia* T. Corsten, *Die Inschriften von Laodikeia am Lykos. I*. IGSK 49. Bonn, 1997.
- I.Magnesia* O. Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander*. Berlin, 1900.
- I.Milet* *Milet. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahr 1899. Band 6: Inschriften von Milet* (3 vols.), ed. P. Herrmann et al. Berlin, 1997–2006.
- I.Pessinous* J. Strubbe, *The Inscriptions of Pessinous*. IGSK 66. Bonn, 2005.
- I.Priene* F. Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen, *Die Inschriften von Priene*. Berlin, 1906.
- I.Prusa ad Olymum* T. Corsten, *Die Inschriften von Prusa ad Olymum* (2 vols.). IGSK 39–40. Bonn, 1991–3.

- I.Sestos* J. Krauss, *Die Inschriften von Sestos und der thrakischen Chersones*. IGSK 19. Bonn, 1980.
- I.Smyrna* G. Petzl, *Die Inschriften von Smyrna* (2 vols. in 3). IGSK 23–4. Bonn, 1982–90.
- I.Sultan Dağı* L. Jonnes, *The Inscriptions of the Sultan Dağı*. I. IGSK 62. Bonn, 2002.
- I.Tralleis* F. B. Poljakov, *Die Inschriften von Tralleis und Nysa*. I. IGSK 36.1. Bonn, 1989.
- Lanz* Numismatik Lanz München (sale catalogues)
- Leu* Bank Leu (sale catalogues)
- MAMA* Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua
- McCabe, Chios* D. F. McCabe and J. V. Brownson, *Chios Inscriptions: Texts and List*. Princeton, 1986.
- Milet* *Milet. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahr 1899*.
- Münzzentrum Köln* Münzzentrum Köln (sale catalogues)
- NAC* Numismatica Ars Classica (sale catalogues)
- NC* Numismatic Chronicle
- OGIS* W. Dittenberger, *Orientalis Graecae Inscriptiones Selectae* (2 vols.). Leipzig, 1903–5.
- P.Cair.Zen.* C. C. Edgar (ed.), *Catalogue général des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée du Caire, Zenon Papyri*. 4 vols. Cairo, 1925–31. Vol. 5, O. Guéraud and P. Jouguet (eds.), Cairo, 1940.
- Rauch* H. D. Rauch Auktionen (sale catalogues)
- RBN* Revue Belge de Numismatique
- RC* C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period*. New Haven, 1934.
- RDGE* R. K. Sherck, *Roman Documents from the Greek East. Senatus Consulta and Epistulae to the Age of Augustus*. Baltimore, 1969.
- RE* Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft
- RN* Revue Numismatique
- Robert, OMS* L. Robert, *Opera Minora Selecta. Epigraphie et antiquités grecques* (7 vols.). Amsterdam, 1969–90.
- RRC* M. H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* (2 vols.). Cambridge, 1974.
- SC* *Seleucid Coins: A Comprehensive Catalogue*, A. Houghton and C. C. Lorber, *Part I: Seleucus I to Antiochus III* (2 vols.); A. Houghton, C. C. Lorber, and O. D. Hoover, *Part II: Seleucus IV to Antiochus XIII* (2 vols.) New York and Lancaster, Pa., 2002–8.

SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
SGDI	F. Bechtel, H. Collitz et al., <i>Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften</i> (4 vols.). Göttingen, 1884–1915.
SGO	R. Merkelbach and F. Stauber, <i>Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten</i> (5 vols.). Munich and Leipzig, 1998–2004.
SNG	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum</i>
<i>Syll.</i> ³	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd edn. (4 vols.). Leipzig, 1915–24.
TAM	<i>Tituli Asiae Minoris</i>
TN	J. Melville Jones, <i>Testimonia Numaria</i> . Vol. I, Texts and Translations; Vol. II, Commentary. London, 1993 and 2007.
UBS	<i>UBS Numismatics</i> , Zurich (sale catalogues)
Waddington	E. Babelon, <i>Inventaire sommaire de la collection Waddington</i> . Paris, 1898.
Walbank, <i>HCP</i>	F. W. Walbank, <i>A Historical Commentary on Polybius</i> (3 vols.). Oxford, 1957–79.

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Notes on Contributors

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Andrew Meadows is Deputy Director of the American Numismatic Society. He is currently finishing a history of the city of Alabanda in Karia.


Selene Psoma teaches Ancient Greek history and Greek Numismatics at the University of Athens. She is the author of *Olynthe et les*

Chalcidiens de Thrace (2001), and co-author of *Inscriptiones antiquae partis Thraciae quae ad ora maris Aegaei sita est* (2005) and *The Coins from Maroneia and the Classical City at Molyvoti: A Contribution to the History of Aegean Thrace* (2008).

Peter Thonemann teaches Greek and Roman history at Wadham College, Oxford. He is the author of *The Birth of Classical Europe* (with Simon Price, 2010) and *The Maeander Valley: A Historical Geography from Antiquity to Byzantium* (2011).



Map 1. The west coast of Asia Minor in the second century BC.



Map 2. Asia Minor in the second century BC.



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The Attalid State, 188–133 BC

Peter Thonemann

INTRODUCTION

For the last fifty-five years of its history, the Attalid state was one of the great powers of the Mediterranean world. It was not always so. On the eve of the battle of Magnesia in winter 190 BC, the Attalid kingdom of Pergamon was just one of dozens of tiny semi-independent principalities on the outer fringes of the vast Seleukid kingdom. For all the cultural pretensions of Attalos I (reigned 241–197 BC), his territorial resources were little more than those of an unusually large and powerful Greek *polis*. The core of Attalos' kingdom was Pergamon and its hinterland, the fertile Kaïkos river plain in the central north-west of the Asia Minor peninsula: an area of perhaps 1,000 km², comparable to the territory of ancient Corinth, or modern Greater Manchester. The Yüntdağ mountain range, on the southern fringe of the Kaïkos valley, marked the southern limit of the Attalid domain. On the lofty crag of Yaylakale, a mere 30 km east-south-east of Pergamon, an Attalid border fortress controlled the pass over the Yüntdağ connecting the Kaïkos valley to the open plains of Lydia to the south. Not until 188 BC did the Attalids achieve secure dominance over the middle Lykos valley, less than two days' march from Pergamon.¹

¹ Yaylakale fortress: Müller 2010. Middle Lykos valley: Robert 1962: 37–40. For an Attalid military settlement at Mernouphyta, near Thyateira, dating to the last years of the reign of Attalos I, see TAM V 2, 959, with Cohen 1995: 218–19. For Attaleia, in the upper Lykos valley, see below, pp. 27–8.

Polybios makes dramatic claims for the magnitude of the conquests of Attalos I from the Seleukids between the late 230s and 223 BC ('all of the *dynasteia* of the land on this side of the Tauros'). The real extent of Attalos' newly expanded realm is hard to judge; secure evidence of Attalid rule in the 220s comes only from coastal Aeolis and the inland regions of Mysia and Phrygia Epiktetos.² In the face of the revival of Seleukid power under Antiochos III, an extended campaign of reconquest by Attalos I in 218 seems to have been restricted to much the same regions, Aeolis, Mysia, and the Hellespont.³ On a realistic estimate, Attalos is unlikely ever to have exercised meaningful control over an area of more than perhaps 10,000 km², roughly the size of Yorkshire. Much of his kingdom, in particular the mountainous uplands of Mysia and Phrygia Epiktetos, was as poor and thinly populated in antiquity as these districts are today.⁴

All that changed in 188 BC. Under the terms imposed on Antiochos III by the Roman senate in 189 BC and implemented by a ten-man commission at Apameia-Kelainai in early 188, the former Seleukid territories in Asia Minor were carved up between Rome's eastern Mediterranean allies. The lion's share passed to Attalos' successor, Eumenes II (reigned 197–159 BC). At the senatorial debate of 189 BC, as recounted by Polybios, the Rhodians are said to have claimed that if the Romans were to cede Lykaonia, Hellespontine Phrygia, Pisidia, the Chersonese, and the neighbouring parts of Europe to Eumenes (and in the event Eumenes received even more than that), his kingdom would be expanded tenfold.⁵ This estimate is in fact not far off. The Anatolian territories which Eumenes eventually received from Rome in 188 BC spanned perhaps 80,000 km², a realm as large as Ireland, including the densely populated lowland valleys of the Hermos, Kaystros, and Maeander rivers, the rolling pastures of central and southern Phrygia, and the rich coastal plains along the Propontis.⁶ In the words of Polybios again: 'when Eumenes inherited his kingdom from his father, it was restricted to a few wretched little

² Polyb. 4.48.7, with Ma 2002: 45–7. The easternmost town at which we have evidence of Attalid rule in the 220s is Aizanoi (Wörle 2009: 426 n. 74).

³ Holleaux 1938–69: II 17–42; Robert 1937: 185–98; Allen 1983: 39–65; Ma 2002: 58–60.

⁴ Mitchell 1993: I, 165–70.

⁵ Polyb. 21.22.14–15; Gruen 1984: 547–8.

⁶ Cf. Mileta 2008: 62 (who estimates 100,000 km²).

towns, but he made his own realm one to rival the greatest powers of his day'.⁷

Polybios rightly underlines the fundamental change in character undergone by the Attalid state in 188 BC. What had been, in the third and early second centuries BC, effectively a city-state masquerading as a Hellenistic great power was transformed overnight into a territorial state on the scale of a modern European nation-state. It seems a priori unlikely that the political institutions and ideological apparatus of the kingdom of Attalos I could have been effectively adapted to the administration of this vast territory. The history of the Attalid state 188–133 BC is, therefore, best treated as a problem of *state-formation*.

It should already be clear that the greater Attalid state of the second century BC was formed under circumstances not of its own choosing. The creation of the post-Apameian Attalid state was the result of the precocious Roman victory over the Seleukids—precocious in the sense that it would be another half-century before the Romans were ready to move from an informal empire of domination to a true territorial empire in the eastern Mediterranean. As a result of Rome's unwillingness to impose direct rule in the former Seleukid territories of western Asia, the vastly expanded post-188 Attalid realm was the first major Hellenistic territorial state—arguably, the first major territorial state in world history—for which the process of state-formation was entirely exogenous. Far from being won by the spear of the Attalid king, the new Attalid territories in Asia Minor had been gained as a result of a pragmatic calculation of self-interest made 800 miles away by an obscure council of barbarian elders. The geographical limits of Attalid rule were determined in what must have felt to the inhabitants of western Asia Minor like an insultingly arbitrary manner; the southern boundary of the new kingdom, the Maeander river, had all too evidently been plucked out of the air.⁸ Equally serious, the 'process' of state-formation was not a process at all; one morning in 188 BC, the inhabitants of Tralleis awoke to find themselves subjects of a Pergamene king by Roman *fiat*. Under these circumstances, the institutions and ideological state apparatuses through which the second-century Attalid monarchs administered their dependent territories necessarily differed radically from those of the other major Hellenistic dynasties. In this chapter, I shall

⁷ Polyb. 32.8.3, cf. 23.11.7–8.

⁸ Polyb. 21.46.8; Liv. 37.56.2–6; Thonemann 2011a: 45–6.

examine how the exceptionally fragile territorial legitimacy of the second-century Attalid state impelled the Attalid monarchs to develop an entirely new and original framework of state institutions to entrench their power. For convenience of exposition, the three dimensions of state power, ideological, economic, and coercive, will be treated separately—in fact, of course, all three aspects are interdependent.⁹ First, in the sphere of *coercive* power, I shall argue that the second-century Attalid monarchs engaged in a process of institutional devolution unparalleled in the Hellenistic world before 188 BC, and prefiguring—arguably serving as the model for—later Roman modes of provincial administration. Political authority in the Attalid kingdom was largely devolved to pre-existing local power-holders ('power-sharing'), who were co-opted into the Attalid administration as regional officials (city-governors and district *stratēgoi*). Paradoxically, as a result of this creation of strong 'provincial' structures, the intrusiveness of the state at ground-level was far greater than it had been under the Seleukid monarchs. While the Seleukid state had remained, as it were, suspended balloon-like in mid-air, the Attalid state consciously and deliberately attempted to rewire the circuits of local authority.¹⁰

Secondly, in the sphere of *economic* power, I shall suggest that the increased administrative 'legibility' of Attalid territory was accompanied by a new set of extractive imperatives, based on maximizing the fiscal legibility of their landed resources. There is, I shall argue, a large and growing dossier of evidence that the second-century Attalid monarchs vigorously pursued both the transferral of former tributary land to pre-existing cities and city-territories, and, where such cities did not exist, the foundation of new cities, primarily in order that they could take over the administration of villages and tributary land from the state. An extensive programme of city-foundations and military settlements projected the authority of the Attalid state into isolated rural parts of Lydia and Phrygia which had been left entirely untouched by the Seleukid monarchs.

Thirdly, and finally, I shall argue that the radically decentralized Attalid state apparatus was mirrored on the *ideological* plane in a

⁹ I retain the Weberian three-dimensional model of social power, as defended by Runciman 1989: 12–20, against the four-dimensional model of Mann 1986: 1–33 (on which see Wickham 1988).

¹⁰ Boone 2003: 11–42.

consciously non-charismatic style of rule. The fragility of their territorial claims encouraged the later Attalid monarchs to develop a new and highly innovative non-charismatic royal style and ideology: it is no coincidence that only a single verifiable portrait of Eumenes II survives, and none of Attalos II or III.¹¹ In certain contexts—in particular, in the sphere of coin-production—the second-century Attalid monarchs represented their state not as an absolutist monarchy but as a federal association of free communities. The role of the king *vis-à-vis* this association was that of common benefactor and patron rather than despot; the coercive power of the Attalid dynasty was justified in relation to the ethical values and filial, marital, and fraternal solidarity of the immediate royal family.

THE MEANS OF COERCION: THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE STATE

Shortly after the conference at Apameia, the inhabitants of a small Seleukid garrison-town in the wilds of central Anatolia dispatched an embassy to Eumenes II. Toriaion was an obscure indigenous settlement in eastern Phrygia, lying on the southern fringe of the Anatolian plateau astride the main military highway across central Asia Minor, and dominated by a small fortress probably built in the early years of Seleukid rule in Asia Minor.¹² The ambassadors offered Eumenes their congratulations on his territorial windfall, and assured him of their enthusiasm for the Attalid cause. The aim of the embassy was to persuade Eumenes that the small mixed community of Toriaion—the Greeks, Macedonians, and Galatians of the old Seleukid garrison, and the native Phrygian population living alongside them—should be ‘upgraded’ to the status of a *polis*. Eumenes agreed to the request, albeit with a curiously circuitous justification.¹³

¹¹ Gans 2006, criticizing Queyrel 2003. For the coin-portrait of Eumenes II, see Meadows, below pp. 173–4, with Fig. 5.9.

¹² Jonnes and Ricl 1997 (SEG 47, 1745); *I.Sultan Dağı* 393; Bencivenni 2003: 333–56; Müller 2005. For the fortress, see Thonemann 2008.

¹³ ἐγὼ δὲ θεώρουμι μὲν οὐκ εἰς μικρὰ διαφέρον ἔμοι τὸ συγχωρῆσαι τὰ ἀξιούμενα, πρὸ[s] με[ί]ζονα δὲ καὶ πολλὰ πράγματα ἀνήκον· καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὑμ[ῖν] γένοιτ’ ἂν βεβαία παρ’ ἐμοῦ δο[θ]εῖσα, ἐκτεμένου κυρ[ί]ως διὰ τὸ παρὰ τῶν κρατησάντων καὶ πολέμωι

I took into consideration the fact that to grant your request would be a matter of no small importance to me, but would have an impact on several more significant matters; for you would find a grant coming from me to be secure, since I exercise possession with full authority, having received it from the Romans who have been victorious in war and treaties. This would not be true of a grant written by those who did not exercise authority; for that apparent act of favour would correctly be judged by all to be empty and deceitful.

The insecurity of Eumenes' position is startlingly evident: he seems almost literally unable to believe his luck. Even when responding to an obsequious petition from a tiny community like Toriaion, Eumenes feels obliged to explain where he has obtained the authority to make a grant of this kind: his effective possession of the region, he concedes, derives solely from the fact that Rome has chosen to delegate authority to him. Eumenes goes on to contrast the efficacy of his own grants with the inefficacy of a hypothetical grant from any other monarch, as if he were worried that the inhabitants of Toriaion might simultaneously be sending secret petitions to Antiochos III or Ariarathes IV. It is hard to avoid the feeling that Eumenes protests too much. If he really *did* possess a universally acknowledged claim over the whole of inner Anatolia, the defensive tone of his letter to the inhabitants of Toriaion would be inexplicable.

I suggest, then, that we ought to interpret Eumenes' grant of civic status to Toriaion not as a sign of his unchallenged authority in eastern Phrygia after Apameia but as a preliminary and speculative *assertion* of it. This reading would help to explain why Eumenes begins his reply by alluding to the wider consequences of a grant of civic status to Toriaion ('an impact on several more significant matters'). The point here is that a grant of civic status to a community on the fringe of the Anatolian plateau would represent a clear 'statement of intent' by Eumenes II: the Attalids intended to extend their territorial claims at least as far as the region of Toriaion. The ramifications of such a claim remained to be seen: would the other powers in central Anatolia—primarily the Galatians and the Ariarathid dynasty of Kappadokia—recognize Eumenes' authority over the region?

It is all too evident from the hesitant tone of the Toriaion correspondence that Eumenes had received a poisoned chalice. The

καὶ σ[υν]θήκαις ἐιληφέναι Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἡ γραφείσα ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ κυριεύόντων·
κενὴ γὰρ ἡ χάρις αὕτη καὶ δόλ[ι]α κρίνουτ' ἂν ὑπὸ πάντων ἀληθῶς (II. 17–24).

territory assigned to the Attalid monarchs had clear boundaries to the west (the Aegean sea, with certain stated coastal cities and their territories excepted) and the south-west (the course of the Maeander river), but the eastern limits of Eumenes' sphere of influence were left appallingly vague. In the western parts of the expanded kingdom (Lydia and northern Karia), the Attalids' claim to authority, such as it was, rested purely on Roman *fiat*; in the east (Phrygia, Pisidia, Lykaonia, Paphlagonia) not even that could be relied on. The immediate problem for Eumenes in the years after 188 was deciding how best to bring some unifying political order to this disparate, resentful, centrifugal bundle of different cultural zones: in short, *what kind of state* could be salvaged from the Seleukid shipwreck in Asia Minor?

Very little is known about the administrative structures of the small state ruled by Attalos I in the late third century BC. To all appearances, the late third-century Attalid kingdom was a relatively simple, centralized state with very little in the way of bureaucratic hierarchy. In 208 BC, the city of Magnesia on the Maeander wrote to Attalos I asking that both he 'and the cities under him' (τὰς ὑπ' ἐμὲ πόλει[s]) should recognize the Panhellenic status of their festival of Artemis Leukophryene. Attalos replies positively, both on his behalf and that of his subject cities: 'I accept the contest, just as you request . . . and the cities that obey me will do likewise, for I have written to them calling on them to do so.'¹⁴ The fact that Attalos writes directly to the cities implies that there was no intermediate bureaucratic stratum between the royal court at Pergamon and its subject *poleis*. There is a suggestive contrast here with the Seleukid state of the late third century, with its multilayered hierarchy of provincial officials (vice-roy, satrap, hyparch, and so forth) and characteristic vertical cascades of 'orders-to-give-orders'.¹⁵ The tiny Attalid state of the late third century simply did not need this kind of ostentatious administrative apparatus: the state's reach was sufficiently short that the Attalid bureaucracy could operate (as it were) out of a single central office at Pergamon.

After Apameia, this changed very quickly. Faced with the challenge of administering his vast new territory in western Asia Minor,

¹⁴ *I. Magnesia* 22; *RC* 34; Rigsby 1996: 193–5, no. 68. English translation in Austin 2006: no. 189d. ll. 17–21: τὸν τε ἀγῶνα ὥσπερ παρα[καλεῖ]τε ἀποδέχομαι . . . καὶ αἱ πόλεις δὲ αἱ π[ειθόμε]ναι ἐμοὶ ποιήσουσιν ὁμοίως. [ἔγραψα] γὰρ αὐταῖς παρακαλῶν.

¹⁵ Ma 2002: 122–50; Capdetrey 2007: 344–59. See e.g. Antiochos III to Magnesia, *I. Magnesia* 18 (*RC* 31; Rigsby 1996: 195–6, no. 69), ll. 25–8: γεγράφαμεν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τεταγμένοις, ὅπως καὶ αἱ πόλεις ἀκολουθῶς ἀποδέξωνται.

Eumenes seems—like Alexander III in the early years of the Macedonian conquest of the Achaemenid empire—to have taken over large parts of the old Seleukid structures of provincial administration more or less unchanged. The cardinal item of evidence here is an inscription from the sanctuary of Apollo Pleurenos on the northern shore of Lake Gygaia/Koloe (modern Marmara gölü), just north of Sardeis.¹⁶

When Euthydemos was high-priest (*archiereus*), and Kadoas son of Pleri was priest. Memorandum to Euthydemos the high-priest from Kadoas, the long-standing priest of Apollo in Pleura: I earlier asked Nikanor, under Antiochos the king, for permission to put up in the shrine a stele on which I should record his name, and mine, and that of the initiates, and now I ask you, if it seems appropriate to give that order, to write to Asklepiades the *oikonomos* to give me a place in which I may set up the stele on which I may record your name and mine and that of the initiates. Diophantos to Attinas: I have joined a copy of the letter from Euthydemos the high-priest. Euthydemos to Asklepiades: of the memorandum given to me from Kadoas the priest of Apollo in Pleura, let it be for him as he asks. [List starts:] Menekrates son of Hermogenes, Metrodoros son of Mithres . . .

The inscription dates very shortly after the Attalid takeover of the region in 188 BC. Probably in 190 BC, Kadoas had applied to the Seleukid official Nikanor, who had been appointed by Antiochos III as high-priest of the shrines in Asia Minor in 209 BC, for permission to set up a list of initiates in the sanctuary of Apollo Pleurenos. After the expulsion of the Seleukids from Asia Minor, Kadoas repeated his request to the new Attalid authorities in the region. The two officials concerned—Euthydemos the *archiereus* and Asklepiades the *oikonomos*—hold posts which have been carried over directly from Seleukid rule in Lydia. Euthydemos occupies the office previously held by Nikanor (*archiereus* with general oversight of the sanctuaries of Asia Minor); and Asklepiades has taken over the Seleukid office of regional *oikonomos*, an office which seems to have involved the administration of royal estates within a particular district (a Seleukid *oikonomia* of the region around Sardeis is attested).¹⁷

¹⁶ SEG 46, 1519; Ma 2002: 371–2, no. 49 (whose translation I quote here); Müller 2000; Herrmann 2004.

¹⁷ Seleukid *archiereus*: Müller 2000; Capdetrey 2007: 322–7. Seleukid *oikonomos* and *oikonomiai*: Gauthier 1989: 132–4; Ma 2002: 135–6; Capdetrey 2007: 310–12. The Attalid *archiereus* and *oikonomos* both also appear in SEG 52, 1197 (Pergamon),

The impression which this document gives is of strong bureaucratic continuities: new Attalid officials have been put in place, but the offices themselves remain unchanged from the Seleukid era. The same appears to have been true of much of the personnel of the second-century Attalid fiscal administration. At Toriaion, in the immediate aftermath of the treaty of Apameia, the means of financing a supply of olive oil for the new city's gymnasium was to be seen to by Heroides the *hemiolios*, holder of a high financial office taken over directly from the Seleukid bureaucracy.¹⁸ In another inscription from the sanctuary of Apollo Pleurenos, dating probably to 150/49 BC, the priest and initiates honour an Attalid official 'in charge of the sacred revenues' (*ho epi tōn hierōn prosodōn*), apparently the direct successor to a Seleukid official with responsibility for the revenues of sanctuaries (the *epi tōn hierōn*).¹⁹ The second-century Attalid financial officials the *dioikētēs* and the *eklogistēs* also share their titles with Seleukid financial officers.²⁰

The civil and military administration of the second-century Attalid kingdom also seems (although the evidence is rather less clear) to have followed the Seleukid pattern. The highest official of the Seleukid administration was the 'viceroy', literally 'the one in charge of affairs' (*ho epi tōn pragmatōn*); an official with the same title is also attested in the Attalid kingdom after 188 BC, a former *sōmatophylax* of Eumenes II by the name of Menogenes son of Menophantos.²¹ The expanded Attalid kingdom in Asia Minor was subdivided into a

ll. 9–11, with Müller and Wörrle 2002: 220–1, 230. I withdraw my identification of the *oikonomos* Asklepiades with Asklepiades son of Theophilos, *syntrophos* of Attalos II (Thonemann 2003: 103–4); the post of *oikonomos* is too humble an office for a major Pergamene aristocrat like Asklepiades son of Theophilos.

¹⁸ *I. Sultan Dağı* 393, line 44 (see above, n. 12), with Müller 2005; Capdetrey 2007: 316–17. The office of *hemiolios* is also attested at Pergamon in the mid-160s: SEG 52, 1197, l. A10.

¹⁹ SEG 32, 1236, with Müller 2000: 523–5, 530 n. 62; Cotton and Wörrle 2007: 197–8; for the date, Herrmann 2004: 278–9, 283. I withdraw my objection (Thonemann 2003: 103 n. 42) to a second-century date for this text. The title *ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶν προσόδων* is also attested at Attalid Pergamon in the *astynomoi*-inscription (OGIS 483, l. 166).

²⁰ SEG 52, 1197 (Pergamon), ll. 10–11, with Müller and Wörrle 2002: 228–30. Both officials also appear in a Seleukid-era inscription from Apollonia under Salbake: Robert and Robert 1954: 285–302, no. 166; Ma 2002: 364–6, doc. 44.

²¹ Seleukid *epi tōn pragmatōn*: Capdetrey 2007: 280–2, 294–300. Menogenes: OGIS 291–6 (title); Robert 1962: 71–6; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 135–7 (*sōmatophylax* of Eumenes II).

number of smaller districts, each under the authority of a provincial governor with the title of *stratēgos*. These districts seem on the whole to have reflected the old Seleukid satrapies in Asia Minor (themselves calqued on the Achaemenid satrapies), whose governors had also been known as *stratēgoi*. In the far north of the Attalid kingdom, a ‘*stratēgos* of the districts around the Hellespont’ is attested under Eumenes II, and a ‘*stratēgos* of the Chersonese and the Thracian districts’ appears under Attalos II or III, both apparently reproducing third-century Seleukid satrapies.²²

Only in the far south-west of the kingdom can we be certain that the Attalid regional administration differed from its Seleukid precursor, and here the differences can be explained on pragmatic grounds. An Attalid district official (probably based at Tralleis) carried the title of ‘*stratēgos* of Karia and the parts of Lydia around Ephesos’: that is to say, presumably, the north bank of the Maeander river valley—the only part of Karia which ever formed part of the Attalid kingdom—and the Ephesian hinterland, perhaps including the entire Kaystros river valley, the southernmost third or so of Lydia.²³ This large Karo-Lyidian administrative district had no Seleukid antecedent, and seems to have been created ad hoc to deal with the problem of the partition of the old Seleukid satrapy of Karia between the Attalid kingdom and the Rhodian zone of control south of the Maeander river. There is some reason to think that the Attalids subsequently decided that this new administrative district was unmanageably large. In an honorific inscription from Ephesos dating to the reign of Attalos II or III, a certain Demetrios son of Apollonios carries the title of ‘*stratēgos* over Ephesos and the places around Ephesos, the Kaystros plain, and the

²² *στρατηγὸς τῶν καθ’ Ἑλλάσποντον τόπων*: Holleaux 1938–69: II 73–125 (see below, n. 34), ll. 3–4. *στρατηγὸς τῆς Χερρονήσου καὶ τῶν κατὰ Θράκιαν τόπων*: OGIS 339 (*I.Sestos* 1), l. 13, with Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulou 1987: 67–72. Seleukid antecedents: Capdetrey 2007: 237–8. In the late third century, a Ptolemaic governor administered both shores of the Propontis (*στρατηγὸς τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης τόπων*, IG XII 8, 156.3–4), reflecting the naval orientation of Ptolemaic power in the Aegean: land powers like the Seleukids and Attalids administered the two shores separately.

²³ *στρατηγὸς Καρίας καὶ Λυδίας τῶν κατὰ Ἐφεσον τόπων*: SEG 46, 1434, with Savalli-Lestrade 2001: 82–6; Müller and Wörrle 2002: 223–4. Ph. Gauthier (*BE* 1997, 526) suggests reading *Καρίας καὶ Λυδίας (καὶ) τῶν κατὰ Ἐφεσον τόπων*. But the administrative district would be very large, and a governor with authority over the whole of Lydia, however defined, would hardly be based south of the Messogis. Hence I understand the genitive *Λυδίας* as partitive.

Kilbianon'. Demetrios seems to have taken over responsibility for the northern, 'Lydian' half of the Karo-Lyidian district: the city of Ephesos and its hinterland, the lower and upper Kaystros valley.²⁴

Below the level of the regional *stratēgos* were the various city-governors (*ho epi tēs poleōs*), widely attested (with slight variations in titulature) throughout the second-century Attalid kingdom. The office of city-governor is very poorly attested in Seleukid Asia Minor—indeed only a single city-governor is known from the whole century or so of Seleukid rule in western Asia Minor (Chionis, governor of Alinda under Antiochos III). However, there is no real reason to think that the post was an Attalid innovation, since the office is well attested elsewhere in the Seleukid kingdom.²⁵

All the evidence, then, appears at first sight to point towards very strong institutional continuities between the Seleukid administrative and fiscal state apparatus in Asia Minor and its Attalid successor. However, the survival of particular titles and offices need not mean that the Attalid bureaucracy worked in exactly the same way as the Seleukid administration. I would like to suggest that in the transition from Seleukid to Attalid rule, the relative importance of the 'central' and 'provincial' officials of the royal administration was inverted. John Ma has emphasized quite how little we know about the local officials of the Seleukid bureaucracy, the *stratēgoi*, hyparchs, and city-governors; these men seem not to have played a particularly important role in the Seleukid administration of Asia Minor. By contrast, the high-ranking 'central' Seleukid officials at Sardeis are very familiar figures in the surviving documentary evidence: the viceroy Zeuxis, the

²⁴ στρατη[γόν] ἐπὶ τε Εφέσου καὶ τῶν κατ'Ἐ[φεσο]ν τόπων καὶ Καύστρου πε[δίον] καὶ τὸ Κιλβιανόν. I.Ephesos 201; SEG 26, 1238; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 131–2. The Kilbianon is the upper Cayster valley, distinguished from the lower alluvial 'plain of the Kaystros' (cf. Thonemann 2011a: 295). In a letter of Eumenes II granting financial subsidies to the city of Temnos, copies of the stele are to be set up at Pergamon and at Ephesos (RC 48, l. D26; Bencivenni 2011: 158); it is hard to see the rationale behind the Ephesian copy, since Temnos seems far too far north to have formed part of an Ephesian administrative district.

²⁵ Attalid *epi tēs poleōs*: Müller and Wörrle 2002: 223–7 (Pergamon, Olbasa, Tralleis, Aigina, and Abydos). Seleukid precursors: Ma 2002: 156–7; Capdetrey 2007: 300–6. Chionis: Robert and Robert 1983: 146–54, nos. 14–15. Separation of Attalid regional *stratēgos* and city-governor: SEG 46, 1434 (Tralleis); SEG 44, 1108 (Olbasa). It is surprising to find that Demetrios had authority both over the city of Ephesos and over the surrounding region: see Savalli-Lestrade 2001: 85–6, although her specific proposal (Ephesos 'detached' at indeterminate date from regional administration) is arbitrary.

high-priest Nikanor, and various central financial officials. Ma interprets this pattern as reflecting ‘the centralization of cis-Tauric Asia Minor under Antiochos III (this may have been the case under earlier Seleukid rulers as well) . . . Laodikeia on the Lykos addressed itself directly to Zeuxis, *qua* viceroy of the province, rather than to the *stratēgos* of Phrygia; likewise, Apollonia under Salbake dealt with the financial officials at Sardeis, not with any local officials or governors.’²⁶ This bureaucratic and spatial centralization of political authority resulted in a state that was ‘suspended balloon-like’ above the urban and rural communities of western Asia Minor, with a complete absence of strong political institutions and networks at the regional level.²⁷

This is emphatically not what the half-century of Attalid rule in Asia Minor looks like. We have very little evidence for the communication of provincial communities with royal officials at Pergamon at all; the letter to the Attalid *archiereus* Euthydemos from the priest of Apollo Pleurenos in 188 BC is highly exceptional in this regard. When responding to petitions, the Attalid kings preferred to communicate directly with subject communities: in sharp contrast to surviving Seleukid documents, the correspondence of the second-century Attalid monarchs includes very few letters either from or to royal officials (*prostagmata*, ‘orders to give orders’).²⁸ We have virtually no evidence at all for high-ranking ‘central’ Attalid functionaries at Pergamon; the Attalid *epi tōn pragmatōn* under Eumenes II, Menogenes son of Menophantos, is a very obscure figure indeed.²⁹ However, we do have—once again, in stark contrast to the Seleukid period—an extremely rich body of evidence for the activities of ‘local’ Attalid officers, in particular city-governors and regional *stratēgoi*. The spatial decentralization of state authority and political institutions in Attalid Asia Minor is very striking. Below the level of the king

²⁶ Ma 2002: 140 (citing *I.Laodikeia* 5; Robert and Robert 1954: 285–302, no. 166).

²⁷ Boone 2003: 177–9, 213–16.

²⁸ Virgilio 2010: 111–12; on the terminology, Bencivenni 2011: 152 n. 13. For an exception, see Segre 1938 (Eumenes to Artemidoros, concerning the Kardakoi near Telmessos); however, the procedure here may be influenced by Ptolemaic practice (Savalli-Lestrade 2003b: 33).

²⁹ His title is only attested on the base of a statue-group of the Attalid royal family on the acropolis at Pergamon (OGIS 291–6); he was honoured (without the title *epi tōn pragmatōn*) in his capacity as *sōmatophylax* of Eumenes II by the inhabitants of Akrasos in the upper Kaikos valley (Robert 1962: 71–6; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 135–7).

himself, the coercive power of the state was primarily exercised not through high-ranking officials at Pergamon, but middle-ranking state actors embedded in local communities.

The way in which Attalid rule was experienced at the local level will have depended on whether these newly-empowered ‘provincial’ officials of the royal administration were dispatched from the Pergamene court or co-opted from among the members of the local elite. The cardinal item of evidence here is an inscription from the Milyas, in the far south-east of Attalid territory in western Asia Minor. In 138/7 BC, the inhabitants of the small city of Olbasa in the Milyas sent an embassy to Attalos II asking the king for validation of the honours which they had voted for two local officers of the royal administration, Aristarchos the *stratēgos* (probably the regional governor of the Milyas) and Sotas the city-governor at Olbasa (ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως).³⁰

Resolved by the council and the people, on the motion of the *stratēgoi* Hermogenes son of Thearides, Moles son of Menandros, Artimes son of Arapias, when Eumenes son of Menandros was secretary of the people: Since Sotas son of Patroklos, previously a neighbour to the city, was of great help to the citizens in the difficult circumstances during the Pisidian war, always taking in refugees from those citizens who had been saved from the enemy and providing distributions for those who had been driven from their homes; and showing himself well-disposed towards the king’s affairs, he made clear the [attitude] which he held [towards] . . . (several lines missing) . . . the treasurer is to provide the funds for these things from the public revenues, and the city’s *stratēgoi* are to provide for the erection (of the statue); ambassadors to the king are to be chosen, who, when they arrive before him, are to give him a copy of the decree and call on him to ratify the decisions. Menis and Pisdes were chosen. King Attalos to the council and people of Olbasa, greetings. Menis and Pisdes, the ambassadors whom you sent, gave me two decrees in which you wrote that you wished to honour Aristarchos the *stratēgos* and Sotas your city-governor and asked that this be permitted to you; since I too judge that they are worthy, implement your decisions as you have presented them to me. Farewell. Year 21, in the month Dios.

³⁰ Kearsley 1994; *SEG* 44, 1108; *I.BurdurMus* 326; *BE* 1997, 563 (date); Savalli-Lestrade 2001: 86–9.

The civic decree in honour of the city-governor Sotas begins by recording his services to Olbasa during a war with the Pisidians, probably during the 140s BC. There is no indication here that Sotas was already an official of the Attalid administration at the time of the Pisidian war. On the contrary, the decree clearly states that he was ‘previously a neighbour to the city’ (πρότερόν τε γειτνιῶν τῇ πόλει, ll. 4–5)—that is to say, Sotas was a large-scale independent landowner in the region with estates bordering on the territory of Olbasa. It seems only to have been as a result of his good services towards the Olbaseis and loyalty to the Attalid cause during the Pisidian war that this local ‘dynast’ was appointed to the office of Attalid city-governor at Olbasa.

Was this model of regional administration—whereby the governance of the city of Olbasa was entrusted to a prominent and wealthy member of the local landed aristocracy (although not, we should note, to a citizen of Olbasa), rather than to a Pergamene official—applied elsewhere in the kingdom? A suggestive parallel case has emerged near Tralleis, a major Attalid administrative centre in the middle Maeander valley. A large and lavish marble *ostothēkē*, discovered some 7 km east of Tralleis, carries the names of three Attalid officials and their wives.³¹

(Column A) This is the *ostothēkē* of Dionysios, son of Dionysios, grandson of Theophilos, *stratēgos* of the military camp and city-governor, and of his wife Hegeanassa, daughter of Pyrrhos.

(Column B) This is the *ostothēkē* of Dionysios, son of Theophilos, *stratēgos* of Karia and the parts of Lydia around Ephesos, and of his wife Melitene daughter of Gaudotos, and of Athenomoiros, son of Demarchos, the city-governor, and of his wife Tatis, daughter of Mithradates.

The eldest of the three is presumably Dionysios son of Theophilos, Attalid *stratēgos* of Karia and the parts of Lydia around Ephesos. His son Dionysios acted as commander of the military camp at Tralleis (στρατηγὸς τοῦ ὑπαίθρου) and city-governor (ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως) at Tralleis; Athenomoiros son of Demarchos also held the office of city-governor at Tralleis. The only conceivable reason why Athenomoiros should have been buried along with these other two local officials of the Attalid royal administration is that all three men were members of the same extended family. Equally significant is the

³¹ SEG 46, 1434 (see above, n. 25).

location of this ‘family-tomb’, at the modern village of Kocağur, around 7 km east of the site of Tralleis—that is to say, too far from the urban centre of Tralleis to be directly associated with the city’s cemeteries. Why were all three officials and their wives buried here, rather than at Tralleis or Pergamon? At nearby Miletos, the second century BC saw the emergence of impressive monumental tombs in locations far removed from the urban centre, reflecting the burial of large-scale landowners on their own vast properties in the Milesian *chōra*; similar behaviour can also be seen among the local elites at Kyaneai in Lykia.³² The strong likelihood must be that Athenomoiros and the elder and younger Dionysios were part of the local land-holding aristocracy in the Maeander valley, resident on an estate situated at or near Kocağur.³³

Just as in the case of Sotas at Olbasa, it seems that the representatives of the Attalid state at Tralleis were pre-existing local power-holders who were already ‘neighbours to the city’, rather than members of the Attalid court or Pergamene elite. The same may well have been true of another high-ranking Attalid ‘provincial’ official, Korrhagos son of Aristomachos the Macedonian, *stratēgos* of the Hellespont during the reign of Eumenes II.³⁴ Korrhagos was honoured by an unknown civic community in Hellespontine Phrygia (perhaps Apollonia on the Rhyndakos) for, among other things, providing the city with sacrificial animals for public sacrifices at his own expense. The likelihood is that Korrhagos, too, was a major local landowner in Hellespontine Phrygia, perhaps the descendant of one of the Macedonians who received large landed estates in western Asia Minor in the aftermath of the late fourth-century Macedonian conquest.³⁵

A particularly striking example of the absorption of existing strongmen into the Attalid system appears in a recently published letter of Eumenes II to the city of Tabai in Karia, probably dating to 166 BC.³⁶ The letter concerns a royal *philos* of Eumenes II, Koteies of

³² Lohmann 2004: 348; Kolb and Thomsen 2004: 34–41; Thonemann 2011a: 250.

³³ For another large land-owning family in the Maeander valley near Tralleis, resident at a country estate called Siderous, see Thonemann 2011a: 206–8 (Chairemon of Nysa); Jones 2011.

³⁴ Holleaux 1938–69: II. 73–125; SEG 2, 663; *I.Prusa ad Olympum* 1001; English translation in Austin 2006: no. 235.

³⁵ Savalli-Lestrade 2001: 88–9. Macedonian estate-holders: Thonemann 2009; for Hellespontine Phrygia, see SGDI 5533d–e (Zeleia: civic grants of estates abandoned by Persian sympathizers).

³⁶ Guizzi 2006; Guizzi *ap.* Ritti 2008: 50–7, no. 7 (SEG 57, 1109).

Tabai, who in the course of a war against the Galatians (apparently that of 168–166 BC) had raised a military force of young men (*neaniskoi*) from among his own *oikeioi* (his wider ‘clan’) and marched them to the Attalid administrative centre of Apameia-Kelainai in southern Phrygia, apparently just in time to protect the city from an anticipated Galatian attack. What is startling about this sequence of events is that Tabai was situated *outside* the nominal bounds of the Attalid kingdom, in the wild and bellicose uplands of north-eastern Karia.³⁷ Since the Tabai plateau lay outside the Attalid zone of control, Koteies (presumably the local warlord at Tabai) could hardly be co-opted by Eumenes as regional *stratēgos* or city-governor. Instead, Eumenes chose to dignify him with the title of *philos*, ‘royal friend’, in return for (presumably) mutual guarantees of military support at times of crisis. One could hardly ask for a better example of a pragmatic power-sharing alliance with a local Anatolian baron.

What is new and striking about the second-century Attalid state is this systematic co-option of pre-existing local power-holders as officers of the royal administration.³⁸ The contrast is stark with the officials of the Seleukid bureaucracy in Asia Minor. It is true that we know of at least two Seleukid apparatchiks in Asia Minor who ‘went native’, Olympichos in Karia and Philomelos in south-east Phrygia, both of whom became sufficiently entrenched in their respective localities that they effectively ended their careers as hereditary ‘barons’.³⁹ But local strongmen seem seldom if ever to have been co-opted into the Seleukid *nomenklatura*. Instead, the Seleukid administration in Asia Minor was overwhelmingly made up of members of the dominant Greco-Macedonian ‘ethno-class’, many of them natives of the far-off Seleukid royal cities of Antiocheia by Daphne,

³⁷ Robert and Robert 1954: 39–43, 80–95 (quoting Liv. 38.13, who describes the inhabitants of Tabai in the early second century BC as *feroces ad bellandum viri*).

³⁸ The one part of the Attalid kingdom where this administrative model certainly did not apply is the island of Aigina, governed in succession by two ‘disembedded’ officials, Hikesios of Ephesos (*Syll.*³ 642) and Kleon of Pergamon (*IG IV* 1² 749). But Aigina was one of the very few ‘overseas’ territories possessed by the Attalids *before* 188, and so it is no surprise to see a different model of governance applied here.

³⁹ Olympichos, Seleukid governor under Seleukos II, defected to Antigonos Doson: Kobes 1996: 80, 109–11, 136–45, 193–5. Philomelids, Seleukid *stratēgoi*, subsequently independent ‘dynasts’: Holleaux 1938–69: III 357–63; Malay 2004 (*SEG* 54, 1353). On the difficulty of assessing the status of local power-holders in Seleukid Asia Minor, see Ma 2002: 175–6.

Seleukeia in Pieria, and Laodikeia by the sea.⁴⁰ In only a very few instances do we find natives of the Greek cities of Asia Minor acting as Seleukid officials in the region (Menestratos of Phokaia, Seleukid *epistatēs* of the Artemision at Amyzon; Menodoros of Adramytteion, Seleukid financial official at Eriza, north of Kibyra); tellingly, the individuals concerned are always ‘disembedded’, operating in districts far removed from their home cities.⁴¹

The Attalid bureaucracy ought, I suggest, to be understood as an exercise in *power-sharing*.⁴² The exogenous character of Attalid state-formation resulted in an unusually weak political centre; the Attalid monarchy could not rely on the kind of charismatic authority enjoyed by Antiochos III. For Eumenes II, the Seleukid model of the highly centralized state, with weak political institutions at the local level and an overwhelmingly non-indigenous governmental class, was simply not an option. Instead, the power-structure of the second-century Attalid state was radically decentralized. Existing social alignments and local power-relationships were absorbed into the structures of government: it was far easier to reclassify Sotas, the local strongman in the Milyas, as an Attalid governor, and to co-opt Koteies, the local strongman on the Tabai plateau, as an Attalid royal *philos*, than it would have been to try to usurp their authority wholesale. The vertical power relationships which characterized the Seleukid administration in Asia Minor were replaced after 188 BC by an extensive ‘cellular’ system, in which political authority was very largely devolved to the local level.

THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION: THE ECONOMIC POWER OF THE STATE

The fundamental challenge for each of the great Hellenistic territorial states was that of maximizing the fiscal and administrative ‘legibility’ of their vast subject territories.⁴³ Compared to the Greek city-states

⁴⁰ Briant 1982: 227–79; Gauthier 1985: 169–75; Ma 2002: 124 n. 60, 206–11; Ma 2003: 187.

⁴¹ Menestratos at Amyzon: Robert and Robert 1983: 151–4, no. 15. Menodoros ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων at Eriza: OGIS 238; Ma 2002: 115 n. 31; Capdetrey 2007: 260, 300–1.

⁴² Boone 2003: 34–7, 67–83.

⁴³ I here draw heavily on Scott 1998: 11–52.

(or Macedonian tribal societies) of the Classical period, the Hellenistic territorial states—including the Attalid state of 188–133 BC—were stupendously large. State authority could not possibly have been evenly projected across the whole of their nominal zone of authority; taxes on economic activity cannot have been enforced with equal success everywhere. The reason why so many of the Hellenistic territorial states were concerned to win the allegiance of the Greek *poleis* on the western seaboard of Asia Minor was precisely their perfect administrative and fiscal accessibility: these highly stratified, highly centralized city-state cultures were unusually easy to tax and bully. By contrast, the greater part of the population of inland Anatolia, in particular the dispersed upland village communities of Phrygia, eastern Lydia, Pisidia, and Lykaonia, was effectively inaccessible to the Attalid state in any meaningful sense.

For each Hellenistic state, the Attalids included, the potential benefits accruing from the political, fiscal, and ideological integration of the vast non-urban periphery of their kingdom had to be weighed up against the formidable practical difficulties of enforcing that integration. ‘How much tax’, thinks a Hellenistic state, ‘am I likely to be able to collect on an annual basis from (say) the villages of the upland steppe between Ankyra and Konya? What institutions do I need to put in place at a local level to secure the regular collection of taxes—a regional governor, tax-collectors, a garrison, new city-foundations? Is wholesale monetization of the regional economy practicable, or can I realistically only levy proportional taxes in kind? Is the effective incorporation of (say) the western Anatolian steppe actually worth the trouble at all?’ Not all Hellenistic states answered that last question in the same way; as we shall see, in rural parts of Lydia and southern Phrygia, the Seleukids and the Attalids came up with different answers (‘No’, and ‘Yes’, respectively).

The chief productive resource of all ancient territorial states was agricultural land, and the Attalid kingdom was no exception. But much of its agricultural land in inland Asia Minor was effectively worthless to the Attalid state. Even if a surplus could have been extracted in kind (grain, oil), this surplus was useless if the land concerned was situated too far from the site of consumption (the ‘friction of distance’). A team of oxen, pulling a cartload of grain over flat terrain (and western Asia Minor is, to put it mildly, far from flat)

will have eaten the equivalent of its entire cartload within 250 km.⁴⁴ A grain-producing village at, say, Toriaion, 400 km distant from Pergamon as the crow flies (over some very stiff mountain ranges), far out of reach of any navigable river, separated from the south coast of Asia Minor by the Taurus mountain range, would have been effectively valueless to the Attalid state however much grain it produced.

Once the relatively modest nutritional needs of the court and army had been met, the state had no interest in the further accumulation of foodstuffs *per se*. Hence the fundamental concern of the Attalid state (again, like any ancient tributary state) was how to transform the greatest possible quantity of surplus produce into cash, as close as possible to the site of production. Different pre-Attalid Near Eastern territorial states had solved this problem in any number of different ways. In some cases, the state continued to collect surplus produce in kind, taking on itself the responsibility for selling or redistributing the foodstuffs; in others, it devolved this responsibility to the tribute-payers by demanding its tribute in monetary form. In Achaemenid Babylonia, where tribute was assessed and collected in silver, private companies such as the Murašû firm at Nippur specialized in the conversion of agricultural produce into cash at urban markets (devolution); in late Achaemenid and early Hellenistic Asia Minor, where tribute was largely collected in kind from primary producers, the royal administration itself was responsible for selling on vast quantities of grain to various Ionian and Aeolian Greek city-states in the eastern Aegean (state oversight).⁴⁵

In this section, I shall suggest that the Attalids met the problem of maximizing the value of their landed resources by large-scale fiscal devolution. In practice, this meant that the burden of extracting surplus produce from tributary land, and converting it into cash, was transferred to local urban communities wherever possible. In regions where there was a pre-existing network of cities or military *katoikiai* (e.g. Lydia), the Attalids systematically offloaded former tributary land onto those towns, thereby expanding their dependent territories; in regions where such cities did not exist (e.g. Phrygia), the Attalids engaged in a large-scale programme of city-foundations, at least in part (I suggest) in order to facilitate the transformation of

⁴⁴ Scott 2009: 40–50; cf. Mann 1986: 137–42.

⁴⁵ Babylonia: Stolper 1985. Asia Minor: Briant 1994; Descat 2006.

local agricultural surplus into state revenues.⁴⁶ This programme of fiscal decentralization is precisely parallel to the administrative decentralization which we have already noted in the political sphere.

One of the most important new documents to emerge from the second-century Attalid kingdom in recent years is a petition to Eumenes II (165/4 BC) from the small town of Apollonioucharax in central Lydia, published for the first time in 2007.⁴⁷ Apollonioucharax—‘Fort of Apollonios’—was a small Attalid or Seleukid military settlement (*katoikia*), consisting of the eponymous fort (*charax*) and a small surrounding settlement (*proastion*).⁴⁸ Situated high on the westernmost spur of the Keçi Dağı mountain-range, the fort commanded a magnificent view over the ancient lake Gygaia/Koloe (modern Marmara gölü) and the plain of Sardeis from the north. One of the functions of Apollonioucharax was to control the important highway running south-east to north-west from Sardeis through Thyateira to Pergamon, which passes through the valley of Gölmar-mara (ancient Iulia-Maibozanoi), immediately to the west of the site.⁴⁹ The town and its territory seem to have been seriously damaged in the course of the Galatian invasion of Phrygia and Lydia between 168 and 166 BC.⁵⁰ The surviving text of the petition begins midway through:

‘... of these ... registered ... (we request that) these privileges should persist, and (we request that you) annul the [punishments?] of those reported as having deserted from the army in Year 32 (166/5 BC), and that they should have the same (privileges) as the others. (We request that) there should be inviolability for Zeus Stratios, and instead of the seven stadia previously granted, it should extend to ten stadia. In order that the priest Bacchios might make a golden wreath, (we request that) our registered debts, both in silver and grain, should be remitted until the third year, unless anyone has already exacted and sequestered them. Concerning the houses in the suburb (of Apollonioucharax) which were burned and pulled down, (we request that you) take care that, because

⁴⁶ Hopkins 2002 [1995/6]: 209, 216–17; Aperghis 2005.

⁴⁷ Herrmann and Malay 2007: 49–58, no. 32 (SEG 57, 1150), with the corrections of Thonemann 2011b.

⁴⁸ The town is attested in the Flavian period: *I.Ephesos* 13 I.13 (Ἀπολλωνιαχαράκειται), with Habicht 1975: 74. For this settlement-type, cf. Thonemann 2008: 46–7 (Toriaion).

⁴⁹ For the geography, see Robert 1987: 296–335.

⁵⁰ Thonemann 2011a: 172–3. The neighbouring town of Sardeis ‘escaped the greatest danger’ around the same time: *OGIS* 305.10–11.

we are poor, some grant be given for their reconstruction. (We request that) the village of Sibloë, which was formerly ours—concerning which it is written that ‘it will be restored when we repay to Meleagros the price at which he bought it, [.]448 drachmae, 1.5 obols’—that we should now receive this village without repayment, in order that the revenues from it might be used for the sacrifices we perform for Zeus Stratios and on your behalf, and that we might retain it sacred and free from taxation; (we request that) the money to pay for the village should be given to Meleagros from the royal treasury. (We request that) villages should be granted to meet the shortfall of klēroi and associated buildings. Since those (villages) which were previously taken from us have not been restored in the way in which you promised, (we request that you) mark out for this purpose Thileudos and Plazeira as hunters’ settlements, and move the inhabitants of these villages to whatever settlements Lykinos the land-distributor may decide.’ (Royal official)—‘For we have ordered him to look into the matter and mark them out.’

On the other face of the stone, Eumenes’ response to the petition is preserved, in the form of a sequence of instructions to a local royal official. He begins by granting all of the requests of the ambassadors from Apollonioucharax; in true royal euergetic style, he then goes on to append a series of additional favours and grants to the struggling community.

... Kournoubeudos ... [made] demonstrations [sc. of their loyalty] in the war; [I was intending] to move the Mysians living in this place to Kastollos, since fresh land certainly exists there in an uncultivated condition. But [ambassadors] from Apollonioucharax came to meet me, and said that they were grateful for the [...] of their territory; they also said that, since the Mysian settlers at Kournoubeudos [were...] and had become well-acquainted/friendly with them, they wished to [...], in whatever way they might decide among themselves. And so, in recognition of their good sense and moderation, I have granted this just as they have requested. I have also ordered Lykinos the land-distributor to [take thought] whence we might be able to add a further stretch of land to their territory. Since they deserve great consideration, having been destroyed last year by the enemy, I grant another five years’ exemption from customs-dues in addition to the five years granted previously, just as I have done for the Mysians at Kadooi. Registration for compulsory military service will fall only on one man in three, for I know that if some emergency occurs, they will provide more soldiers of their own accord because of their eagerness and goodwill. They shall all be exempted from the collection of the tithe on produce

for the current year, and those on whom poll-taxes (?) are levied are also exempted for the current year. Since they are making a start on the rebuilding of the settlement, I have also agreed to provide masons for them.

Apollonioucharax had clearly been in financial trouble for some time. Quite apart from the recent destruction of the 'suburb' (*proasteion*)—that part of the settlement that lay outside the walls of the eponymous fortress (*charax*)—the inhabitants appear already to have enjoyed five years' exemption from customs-dues, for reasons unknown. Moreover, the town had been forced to mortgage parts of its territory to raise cash: the usufruct of the village of Sibloë had been sold to a certain Meleagros, subject to redemption by the inhabitants of Apollonioucharax on repayment of the capital.⁵¹ The inhabitants of the town claimed that they had also lost control of certain other villages on their territory, which Eumenes had allegedly failed to 'restore' to them as promised.⁵²

In recognition of the town's difficulties, Eumenes II granted her a number of temporary fiscal exemptions and privileges. She was exempted from customs-dues for a second five-year period, the rate of conscription was reduced to a third of adult able-bodied males, and the tithe on produce and a poll-tax were remitted for the current year. Interest-payments due to the crown (presumably on earlier unpaid taxes), both in cash and grain, were also remitted for a two-year period. The royal treasury was willing to pay for the redemption of the village of Sibloë from Meleagros, and to declare the village tax-exempt in future, with the *quid pro quo* that Sibloë was to be considered as 'sacred' and its revenues were to be used for cultic purposes only.⁵³ Most importantly for our purposes, substantial stretches of tributary land in the Keçi Dağı mountain range were attached to the territory of Apollonioucharax in order to set the town on a more secure financial footing. Two 'huntsmen's villages', Thileudos and Plazeira, were transferred to Apollonioucharax on the request of the town's inhabitants themselves. The population of these villages was resettled elsewhere, in order that the villages' land could be carved up as 'lots' for the inhabitants of Apollonioucharax.

⁵¹ For the procedure, see Thonemann 2009: 385–6.

⁵² B20–1: ἐπ(ε)ὶ αἱ πρότερον ἀφαιρεθεῖσαι ἡμῶν (sc. κῶμαι) οὐκ ἀποκατεστάθησαν ὃν τρόπον συνεκεχωρήκεις.

⁵³ Wörle 2009: 429 n. 81, with parallels.

Eumenes went on to instruct the land-distributor Lykinos to identify a further parcel of tributary land which could be attached to the territory of Apollonioucharax.⁵⁴

In granting a package of temporary tax-remissions to Apollonioucharax and rolling over the town's debts, Eumenes was doing nothing that would have been unfamiliar to his Seleukid or Achaemenid predecessors. Glancing back into the period of Seleukid rule in western Asia Minor, we see comparable packages of fiscal exemptions being granted by Antiochos III to the city of Sardeis in 213 BC, in the aftermath of the crushing of the revolt of Achaïos; to an unknown city in Lydia, probably in 197 BC; and to the city of Herakleia under Latmos, some time between 196 and 193 BC.⁵⁵ Throughout the third and second centuries BC, if a town found itself in financial difficulties, tax-remissions were the 'benefaction of least resistance' for the royal administration.⁵⁶ What is out of the ordinary here is the direct transfer of substantial stretches of royal land to Apollonioucharax: the two huntsmen's villages, and the additional third parcel of real estate which Eumenes orders Lykinos to mark out for them. We do not know of a single instance in which a Seleukid monarch transferred tributary land directly to a subject or allied community.⁵⁷ When Herakleia under Latmos was suffering from a comparable financial crisis in the mid-190s BC, the Seleukid governor Zeuxis ruled that the import of goods from royal land should be exempt from tax, but seems not to have considered transferring any royal land to the city's hands.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ A12–14: Λυκίνῳ δ[ε] τῷ γεωδότηι συνετάξαμεν [φροντίξ]ειν ὅθεν δ[υ]ναίμεθα χώραν προσορίσαι αὐτοῖς. The verb προσορίσαι is a technical term signifying the extension of the 'boundaries' of a town's dependent territory by the attachment of a parcel of former tributary land: see Thonemann 2009: 375; Thonemann 2011a: 248.

⁵⁵ Sardeis: Gauthier 1989: nos. 1 and 3 (SEG 39, 1283 and 1285; Ma 2002: nos. 1 and 3). Lydian city: Gauthier 1989: 171–8 (Ma 2002: no. 36). Herakleia: Wörrle 1988 (SEG 37, 859; Ma 2002: no. 31). See further Capdetrey 2007: 420–2 (who does not distinguish Seleukid and Attalid practice).

⁵⁶ Fiscal remissions for Pisidian Amlada by the future Attalos II, c.160 BC: RC 54; English translation in Austin 2006: no. 241.

⁵⁷ Seleukid grants of royal land to individual relatives and dependants: RC 10–13 (c.277–261 BC: Aristodikides of Assos); *I.Priene* 18, with Gauthier 1980: 45–7 (c.270 BC: the Seleukid officer Larichos); RC 18 (254/3 BC: Laodike); Aperghis 2004: 99–107; Thonemann 2011a: 248. So far as I know, no such grants are known from the Attalid kingdom.

⁵⁸ SEG 37, 859 III ll. 8–9: ἵνα οἱ ἐξάγοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἰδίας χρείας καὶ εἰς πρᾶσιν ἀτελεῖς ὦσιν.

At least four further instances of transfers of royal land to the territory of *poleis* and *katoikiai* are known from the half-century of Attalid rule in western Asia Minor (188–133 BC). First, a very fragmentary letter of Eumenes II (unfortunately not precisely datable) to the inhabitants of Temnos in Aeolis provides for the sale or grant of a plot of royal land to the city of Temnos, in order that the revenues from this land could be used for the civic administration of Temnos ([εἰς τὴν διο]ίκησιν τῆ[s] πόλεως, D4). Eumenes has written to the local royal official, Pyrrhos, in order that the estate could be accurately surveyed and transferred to the city as rapidly as possible (ἡ καταμέτρησις [δὲ τῆς] χώρας ὅπως γένη[ται τὴν ταχίστην], D18–19).⁵⁹ Second, a very fragmentary royal letter addressed to the city of Olbasa in the Milyas, almost certainly to be attributed to one of the second-century Attalid monarchs, is concerned with the extension of citizen-rights to two or more formerly disenfranchised groups. The document appears to provide for the transfer of a stretch of royal land in the Milyas to the city of Olbasa, and the inhabitants of this estate were apparently to be granted Olbasan citizenship.⁶⁰ Third, in the decree of (perhaps) Apollonia on the Rhyndakos in honour of the Attalid governor Korrhagos under Eumenes II, the city praised him for having furnished individual landless citizens with real estate ‘from the royal treasury’ (ἐκ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ, l. 20)—that is to say, by the transfer of former royal land to individual citizens of Apollonia.⁶¹

A slightly different scenario is envisaged in a fourth document, dating to 181 BC, informing us of a financial crisis at the ‘village of the Kardakoi’ (*Kardakōn kōmē*) near Telmessos in western Lykia.⁶² The Kardakoi, a group of former Seleukid military settlers, were suffering from poor harvests and a declining population, apparently as a result of large-scale emigration from the village. On the recommendation of the local royal official, Artemidoros (presumably the city-governor at

⁵⁹ *IvP* 157; *RC* 48. For royal subventions (by Seleukids and Attalids) to fund civic administration, see Schuler 2005: 400–3; on the meaning of διοίκησις τῆς πόλεως, see also Rhodes 2007. Relations between Attalids and Temnos: Ma 2002: 143–4.

⁶⁰ *I.Kibyratīs* 145 (*SEG* 48, 1532), ll. 3–5, ὑμῖν συνχωρῶ[- -] πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ [- -] τόπους τε βασιλικούς; l. 8, πλέθρα δίδωμι ὑμῖν; ll. 13–15, συνχωρῶ δὲ κα[ὶ] - -] μένους πολιτεύεσθαι[- -] ἐξ ἐτέρων τόπων.

⁶¹ Above, n. 34; see Holleaux 1938–69: II 106–9; Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 275–8.

⁶² Segre 1938; Ma 2002: 94 n. 151; Capdetrey 2007: 161 n. 169. English translation in Austin 2006: no. 238.

Telmessos), Eumenes II decided to exempt the villagers from payment of the poll-tax (*syntaxis*) for the previous year (182/1 BC), and reduced the rate of the poll-tax for the current year. Émigrés from the village were encouraged to return with the promise of two years' exemption from all taxation, and new settlers were offered three years' exemption. Most importantly from our perspective, at some point in the recent past, the settlers had bought on credit a plot of land from the dynast Ptolemaios son of Lysimachos.⁶³ The entire estate of Ptolemaios had subsequently been annexed as Attalid royal land, and Eumenes had thus inherited the status of creditor. In view of their financial difficulties, rather than reclaiming the estate, Eumenes agreed to write off the debt altogether. Once again, Eumenes appears to have been quite happy to divest himself of royal land, even to the detriment of the royal treasury, in order to support a struggling community.⁶⁴

One further inscription from Lydia can, with some caution, be added to this already substantial dossier. As we have seen, Eumenes' grants of royal land to the settlers at Apollonioucharax in central Lydia, dating to 165/4 BC, were administered by the land-distributor (*geōdotes*) Lykinos. Three years later, in 162/1 BC, a group of Mysian settlers at Emoddi, near Saittai in eastern Lydia, set up a votive monument on behalf of the same royal official.⁶⁵

In the 36th year of the reign of King Eumenes, in the month Apellaios. The Mysians at Emoddi (dedicated this) to Zeus Beudenos, on behalf of the land-distributor Lykinos son of Hegesias, for the sake of his benefaction and goodwill.

It seems highly likely that the concrete act which underlay the 'benefaction and goodwill' shown by Lykinos the land-distributor towards the Mysians at Emoddi was a grant of royal land of a similar kind to those seen at Apollonioucharax. Significantly, the post of

⁶³ Ptolemaios: Kobes 1996: 145–56.

⁶⁴ Another settlement near Telmessos received a comparable set of fiscal exemptions from Eumenes around the same time: Wörrle 1979, with *BE* 1980, 484 (*SEG* 29, 1516).

⁶⁵ *SEG* 40, 1062 (Enckler): βασιλεύοντος Εὐμένου | ἔτους ἑκτῶ κ[α] τριακοστού, | μὴνὸς Ἀπελλαίου· οἱ ἐκ Εμοδδὶ | Μυσοὶ ὑπὲρ [ρ Α]γκίν[ο]υ Ἡγησίου | (5) γεωδότο[υ] εὐεργ[εσίας] ἔνεκεν | καὶ εὐνοίας [τῆς] εἰς ἑαυτοὺς | Διὶ Βευδηνώϊ. The reading [Α]γκίν[ο]υ in l. 4 ([.]YM...Y, *ed. pr.*) is clear on the photograph published by Malay 1990. Eumenes Year 36 = 162/1 BC, assuming that Eumenes Year 1 = 197/6, Year 40 (*ultimo*) = 158/7; see Petzl 1978: 264–7; Müller and Wörrle 2002: 194, 216.

geōdotes is unattested outside of the Attalid kingdom; the notion of having an official specifically in order to manage the redistribution of state assets presumably reflects the particular Attalid concern to transfer tributary land from the *basilikon* to fiscally autonomous communities.

This dossier is sufficiently substantial to make it clear that we are dealing with a deliberate royal policy of redistributing tributary royal land to existing *poleis* and *katoikiai*; the existence of a royal land-distributor, the *geōdotes*, tends to the same conclusion. However, it is important to remember that we are dealing here with a rational process of revenue maximization, not a firesale of state assets. Where Eumenes *could* dispose of the produce of tributary land directly, there was no incentive for him to devolve the land to civic administration. Eumenes' gifts of 280,000 *medimnoi* of grain to Rhodes in 161/0 BC and of 160,000 *medimnoi* of grain to Miletos in the mid-160s BC assume the continued existence of vast stretches of royal land near the Asia Minor coast.⁶⁶

Yet even these huge grain-grants to Rhodes and Miletos may help us to understand exactly why Eumenes was so keen to transfer productive tributary land to cities and *katoikiai* within the kingdom. The huge gifts provided to Miletos and Rhodes were not gifts of grain *qua* foodstuffs; in both cases, they were explicitly gifts of grain *qua* saleable commodity. The Milesian gift of 160,000 *medimnoi* of grain was 'for the construction of the gymnasium', and the Rhodian gift of 280,000 *medimnoi* of grain was provided 'in order that the proceeds from the sale (of the grain) could be loaned out, and the interest used for the salaries of the tutors and teachers of their sons'. Eumenes was effectively using royal grain as a surrogate currency, with the onus for realizing its value transferred onto the cities' shoulders.⁶⁷ But the mere fact that Eumenes had spare grain *available* in these vast quantities suggests that he was having serious problems offloading his

⁶⁶ Rhodes: Polyb. 31.31.1–3, with Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 242–4. Miletos: *I.Milet* (VI 3) 1039 I.6–7. There are few parallels for gifts of grain on this scale: cf. Polyb. 5.89.7 (227/6 BC: Chryseis, wife of Antigonos III Doson, gives 100,000 *medimnoi* of grain to Rhodes); Diod. Sic. 31.36 (156 BC: Demetrios I gives 200,000 *medimnoi* of wheat and 100,000 *medimnoi* of barley to Rhodes).

⁶⁷ Bringmann 2000: 174–5, 188–97; Capdetrey 2007: 423–5. Cf. e.g. Ma 2002: 329–31, doc. 26 (*I.Iasos* 4): grant of 1,000 *medimnoi* of wheat p.a. by Laodike to Iasos, for a period of ten years, with the intention that the grain be sold and the revenues be spent on dowries for the poor.

annual surplus from his tributary land in western Asia Minor. Certainly, rather than having tons of grain rotting in royal silos (or, worse still, being forced to reduce rates of tribute), it was preferable in the short term to dump the excess on friendly cities with access to Aegean markets, and leave them with the problem of finding a buyer. But *ad hoc* grants of this kind (for all their undoubted diplomatic benefits) are not a sustainable way of dealing with a recurrent annual excess of produce. It may not be a coincidence that both of these large ‘grain-dumps’ date to exactly the period (the late 160s) when Eumenes was starting to divest himself of royal land in significant quantities—and, perhaps, beginning to have serious trouble with his silver-supply.⁶⁸

The extensive programme of city-foundations undertaken by Eumenes II and Attalos II in inland Asia Minor can be explained as a response to the same economic imperatives. The geographical distribution of Attalid city-foundations in Asia Minor is quite different from that of Seleukid foundations.⁶⁹ The new Seleukid cities in western and central Asia Minor were almost without exception strung along the main east–west roads: no fewer than nine third-century Seleukid city-foundations, refoundations, synoikisms, and garrison-towns are known from the military highway between Magnesia on the Maeander and Ikonion alone. By contrast, the new Attalid city-foundations—apparently mostly dating to the latter years of Eumenes’ reign—were widely distributed across rural Lydia and Phrygia: in southern Phrygia, Eumeneia and Dionysopolis, both situated in rich agricultural territory in the upper Maeander plain; in south-east Lydia, Philadelpheia, in the heart of the fertile Kogamos river valley; in north-east Lydia, Apollonis, in the middle Lykos valley.⁷⁰ Only in the case of Eumeneia, situated on a steep crag overlooking a major pass through central Phrygia, can any real military function be identified.

This pattern of non-strategic city-foundations may not have been a post-Apameian innovation. As Louis Robert wrote of the foundation of Attaleia in the upper Lykos valley (probably the earliest of all the

⁶⁸ See Kay, below pp. 141–4; Meadows, below pp. 197–9, 204–5.

⁶⁹ Debord 1985: 347–8; Thonemann 2011a: 174.

⁷⁰ Eumeneia: Thonemann 2011a: 130–77. Dionysopolis: Robert 1962: 127–49. Philadelpheia: Cohen 1995: 227–30. Apollonis: Robert 1962: 31–7, 246–60.

Attalid city-foundations, dating to the reign of Eumenes I back in the mid-third century):⁷¹

The site of Attaleia, situated near Selçikli on a hillock at the foot of the valley, has no strategic value; she served neither as a fortress, nor as a watchpost to dominate the region; this was not a military establishment at all. Furthermore, the town is located in an isolated valley . . . It could never have played a commercial rôle of the slightest importance; the upper Lykos valley was never a well-travelled route; the valley abuts on a high mountain range, which acts as a powerful barrier separating it from the valley of the Makestos . . . On visiting the site, one is struck by the exclusively agricultural character of this settlement. The Attalid military colonies were not fortresses, but rural centres; they were created, not in order to guard this or that defile or as a 'counter' to this or that Seleukid foundation, but in order to furnish land to military colonists. Attaleia was founded because here, in the fertile valley of the Lykos, it was possible to provide the *katoikoi* with good arable land, and land suitable for olives and vines.

This assessment applies equally well to the second-century city-foundations of Eumenes II and Attalos II, with the caveat that the later Attalid foundations, at least, were not always populated by new settlers occupying virgin soil. In the case of Apollonis in Lydia, founded at some point during the reign of Eumenes II by one of his three brothers, we can be certain that the 'foundation' took the form of a synoikism of pre-existing local village communities (some of which may well have been Macedonian military *katoikiai*), thanks to an honorific inscription dating shortly after the synoikism:⁷²

. . . honoured [Attalos or Philetairos or Athenaios], son of King [Attalos], founder and benefactor, who saw to the synoikism of the *polis* and [fulfill]ed the programme (*prothesis*) of his brother [King] Eumenes, granting both [grain and] money to those being synoikized, and also being responsible for other benefits [to them], tending towards their [security] and prosperity, [because of his outstanding] goodwill [towards] them.

If the 'foundation' of Apollonis was in fact a synoikism of pre-existing *katoikiai* and *kōmai*, what function was the new *polis* intended to

⁷¹ Robert 1934: 89–92.

⁷² TAM V 2, 1187, with Robert 1962: 32 n. 2, 257–60. For the euergetic activities of Eumenes' brothers, see Gauthier 2006. Macedonian *katoikiai* in the middle Lykos valley: TAM V 2, 1188–90.

serve? I find it hard to believe that Eumenes had a general ideological preference for one type of settlement (the nucleated *polis*) as opposed to others. I suggest that we should understand the Attalid city-foundations of the mid-second century as quasi-colonial institutions connecting the state to the countryside. Villages which had previously been directly taxed (ineffectually) by the state could be far more effectively exploited by devolving responsibility for them to a local urban centre. The synoikism of Apollonis would, on this model, be an attempt to increase the fiscal and administrative 'legibility' of rural society in the middle Lykos valley by adding an extra institutional layer between primary producers and the state.

It is very difficult to say whether this mid-second-century '*polis*-ification' of the west-Anatolian countryside was accompanied by an increase in the number of non-*polis* colonial settlements (*katoikiai*) in Lydia and Phrygia. The trouble here is that it is usually impossible to tell whether any given west-Anatolian Macedonian *katoikia* was founded by the Seleukids or the Attalids.⁷³ However, the late 160s and 150s see a very striking cluster of honorific monuments set up by Macedonian and Mysian military *katoikiai* in northern and eastern Lydia both for royal officials and members of their own communities. In 163/2, the Macedonians at Kobdyle (near Kastollos, in south-east Lydia) honoured their fellow-citizen Philo- son of Polemaios; in 161/0, the Macedonians at Doidye (near Apollonis, in the Lykos valley) honoured an unknown individual; in 159/8, an unknown community near Apollonis, probably another Macedonian settlement of this kind, honoured a certain Herodes; in 153/2, the Macedonians at -espoura (near Apollonis), honoured their general Derdas son of Derkylides.⁷⁴ Furthermore, at unknown dates during the reign of Eumenes II (188–158 BC), the Macedonians at Agatheira (near Hyrkanis, in the lower Hermos plain) honoured one Seleukos son of Menekrates, and the Macedonians at Akrasos (in the upper Kaikos valley) honoured Menogenes son of Menophantos, *somatophylax* of King Eumenes (and subsequently *epi tōn pragmatōn* of the Attalid kingdom).⁷⁵

⁷³ Cohen 1995: 223–5 (predominantly Seleukid); Daubner 2011 (predominantly Attalid); Debord 1985: 348 (agnostic).

⁷⁴ Kobdyle: TAM V 3, 1423. Doidye: TAM V 2, 1188. Settlement near Apollonis: TAM V 2, 1189. If Herodes is a royal official rather than a local, he may be identical to the Attalid *hemiolios* Herodes, attested at Toriaion some 25 years earlier: *I. Sultan Dağı* 393, line 44, with Müller 2005. -espoura: TAM V 2, 1190.

⁷⁵ Agatheira: TAM V 2, 1307. Akrasos: Robert 1962: 71–6; Cohen 1995: 196–7; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 135–7 (with new restorations).

The clustering of these monuments in the late 160s and 150s—the period in which the majority of the new Attalid cities in Phrygia and Lydia were founded—is unlikely to be a coincidence. However, since these are in each case the earliest surviving documents from the settlements concerned, it is impossible to say what kind of changes in status (if any) might underlie this cluster of inscriptions. On the parallel of Eumenes' land grants to Apollonioucharax and the Mysians at Emoddi, both of which also date to the late 160s, it is possible that we are dealing with a generalized phenomenon of increasing fiscal and administrative independence for military *katoikiai* in Lydia, but this is little more than speculation.

On any interpretation, Eumenes' activities in the economic sphere are clearly analogous to his political restructuring of the Attalid state. Here, too, we can see a large-scale decentralization of authority, primarily taking the form of a transfer of tributary land to local communities, whether they be old Greek *poleis* like Temnos, military *katoikiai* (some on their way to *polis*-status) like Apollonioucharax, or—we may reasonably assume—new city-foundations like Apollonis or Dionysopolis. In each case, the result was an *intensification* of state penetration of rural society. By devolving the extraction of surpluses in kind to a deconcentrated network of state outposts, the central Attalid state increased the effectiveness with which it exploited its periphery.

THE MEANS OF PERSUASION: THE IDEOLOGICAL POWER OF THE STATE

We have already seen that the second-century Attalid state depended on an extensive infrastructure of territorial administration, based on power-sharing with pre-existing local élites and the large-scale devolution of economic and political activities to 'middling' urban centres strung across the kingdom. This cellular system formed the basis for the decentralized production of a new reduced-weight silver coinage, the 'cistophoros' (below, Fig. 5.1), introduced by Eumenes II to replace the old 'Philetairos' coinage. The date of introduction remains controversial (see Meadows and Ashton in this volume), but ought probably to be placed in the early 160s BC. The obverse and reverse

types remain unchanged throughout the coinage's history. The new tetradrachms depict on the obverse a wicker basket (*cista mystica*) with its lid half open, and a snake emerging from it to the left, all encircled by an ivy wreath; on the reverse are two snakes with raised heads and forked tongues, coiling around an ornamented bow case. The cistophoric didrachms and drachms show a club draped with a lionskin on the obverse, again encircled by an ivy wreath, while the reverse carries a bunch of grapes on an ivy wreath. In neither case is there any explicit reference to the Attalid royal house, and only by means of some rather tortuous arguments can the iconography of the coinage be connected to the dynasty at all.⁷⁶

The only inscriptions to appear on the earliest cistophoroi are abbreviated city-ethnics, which are placed on the reverse of the coins at centre left (the names of local mint-magistrates also appear on later issues). In the period from their introduction to the end of Attalid rule in 133 BC, cistophoroi were regularly struck in the names of six cities: Pergamon, Sardeis, Ephesos, Tralleis, Laodikeia on the Lykos, and Apameia-Kelainai. These ought not really to be described as 'mints', since the cistophoroi in the name of Sardeis and Apameia seem in fact to have been struck at Pergamon. Ephesos and Tralleis certainly had independent workshops, and Laodikeia may have done (although the Laodikeian issues could also have been produced at Tralleis).⁷⁷ The overwhelming bulk of the small-denomination coinage was struck at Tralleis, which ought to warn us against inferring too much about the coinage's actual circulation from the geographical distribution of the 'mints'. Some very small issues were also struck in the names of other cities in more out-of-the-way parts of the kingdom: Adramyttion in coastal Mysia, Kormasa in the Milyas, perhaps the 'Hellespont', and conceivably a cluster of cities in central Phrygia (Blaundos, Dionysopolis, Lysias, and Dioskome).⁷⁸

The monetary character and functions of the cistophoric coinage are examined in detail elsewhere in this volume.⁷⁹ But however we

⁷⁶ Kosmetatou 1998.

⁷⁷ Kleiner and Noe 1977: 120–2; for Apameia, Le Rider and Drew-Bear 1991: 361–5; Ashton and Kinns 2004: 103–4.

⁷⁸ Adramyttion: Bauslaugh 1990: 48. Kormasa and 'Hellespont': Thonemann 2008: 53–8. Central Phrygia: Le Rider 1990; Thonemann 2011a: 170–4.

⁷⁹ Whether or not we regard the cistophoric currency system as 'closed' (Meadows and Ashton, Chs. 5 and 7 below), the introduction of an artificially tariffed 'epichoric' state currency can only have served to increase the effective state penetration of social

think the cistophoric coinage functioned as a currency system, what is striking from the ideological perspective is that the coinage in no way explicitly proclaims itself as the product of an absolutist royal state. The pre-cistophoric Attalid coinage (the 'Philetairoi') carried entirely standard Hellenistic royal images: on the obverse, a portrait of the founder of the dynasty wearing a diadem or wreath; and on the reverse, a seated Athena and Nike figure flanked by the name of Philetairos. In stark contrast, the cistophoroi do not carry the name or image of any member of the Attalid dynasty; there is not even anything about the coinage to suggest that Pergamon had any special status *vis-à-vis* the other minting 'authorities' (Laodikeia, Apameia, Sardeis, and the rest).⁸⁰ Of course, the coinages of Hellenistic monarchs had been struck at provincial 'civic' mints for centuries by this point, but no earlier royal coinage had played down the position of the king to anything like this extent. From the iconography of the cistophoroi alone, no one would have guessed that the coinage was the product of a centralized kingdom at all.

Instead, the cistophoric coinage is ostentatiously eager to present itself as if it were the product of a free and autonomous federation of cities: not a *basileia* or an *archē*, but a *koinon*. The 'federal' character of the cistophoric types was widely (and correctly) recognized in the earlier scholarship on this coinage. It is only as a result of close analysis of the control-marks and die-links of the earliest cistophoroi that more recent work has swung away from this conception, emphasizing instead the compulsory character of cistophoric production.⁸¹ As Kleiner and Noe wrote in 1977: 'In appearance these tetradrachms, didrachms and drachms are the issues of independent states joined by common consent in a monetary confederation. Yet the cistophoric coinage is not what it appears to be . . . The cistophori may lack the king's portrait and his title, but in every other sense they are the king's money.'⁸² Of course, no one would wish to deny that the cistophoric coinage was minted with Pergamene silver under royal direction.

life (since the state necessarily monopolizes the infrastructures of exchange). The cistophoric currency system thus fits well with my argument for a generalized growth in state infrastructural power under the Attalids (see below).

⁸⁰ The king's portrait was seldom used on the coinage of Antigonid Macedonia (for rather different reasons), but it would have been quite unthinkable for his name to be omitted.

⁸¹ Contrast e.g. Seyrig 1963a: 24 with Kleiner and Noe 1977: 120–5.

⁸² Kleiner and Noe 1977: 125.

However, none of that invalidates the notion that the coinage was intended to *appear* to have a ‘federal’ character—indeed, the projection of this ‘pseudo-federal’ ideology was presumably one of the main reasons for the cessation of the Philetairoi and the introduction of the new cistophoric coinage in the first place.

Formally, the closest comparanda for the cistophoric obverse and reverse types are furnished by the second-century federal silver and bronze coinages of the Achaean *koinon* and the Lykian league. In each case, the coins carry common obverse and reverse types, with the individual city-mint indicated by means of an abbreviated ethnic.⁸³ The cistophoric and Lykian league coinages seem to be almost precisely contemporary (if we accept the ‘low’ dating for the cistophoroi proposed by Meadows in this volume), with the Achaean *koinon* coinage beginning somewhat earlier, perhaps as early as the late third century BC. It is, indeed, highly likely that in his designs for the ‘pseudo-federal’ cistophoric coinage, Eumenes II was deliberately imitating the federal coinage of the Achaean *koinon*.⁸⁴ Eumenes had cultivated his alliance with the Achaean *koinon* since early in his reign: a formal alliance was struck between the two states in 191, under which the Achaeans contributed a contingent to the Attalid forces at Magnesia.⁸⁵ It is likely that this alliance was in fact a renewal of an existing arrangement, since in 185 Eumenes renewed his ‘ancestral alliance’ with the Achaean *koinon*.⁸⁶ The relationship seems to have undergone a rocky patch in the mid-170s, when the Achaeans, on the advice of Rhodian arbitrators, revoked all the honours paid to Eumenes over the preceding two decades; by 170, relations between the two parties had improved, since the *koinon* was willing to be persuaded to restore most of the honours.⁸⁷ As Polybios notes, the common types used by the various cities of the Achaean *koinon* were explicitly a part of the federal ideology of the second-century

⁸³ Achaean league silver triobols (laureate Zeus/A-X monogram in wreath; abbreviated city-ethnic and mint official): Thompson 1968: 85–104; Walker 2006: 106–9; Warren 2007: 148 (before 171–168 BC); Achaean league bronzes (Zeus Homarios/personified Achaea; *Ἀχαίων*, city-ethnic and mint official): Warren 2007 (perhaps from 167 BC); Lykian league silver drachms (laureate Apollo/kithara in incuse square; *Λυκίων* and abbreviated city-ethnic): Troxell 1982; Ashton 1987 (from 167 BC).

⁸⁴ Already suggested by Head 1911: 534.

⁸⁵ Polyb. 21.3b1–2, with *IvP* 64=Syll.³ 606; Bastini 1987: 79–83.

⁸⁶ Polyb. 22.7.8, with Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 114–16.

⁸⁷ Liv. 42.67.8; Polyb. 27.18; 28.7.8–14; Ager 1996: 319–20. For these honours, see e.g. *IG* IV² 2, 1237 (Kalaurea).

Achaean: 'in our times there has been a remarkable growth of power and political union among the Achaeans . . . not only do they form an allied and friendly commonwealth (*koinonia*), but they also use the same laws, weights, measures and coinage, as well as the same magistrates, councillors and jurors, and the whole Peloponnese falls short of being a single city only by not having a single walled enclosure for all its inhabitants'.⁸⁸

This was, I suggest, precisely the ideology that Eumenes was trying to project through his 'cistophoric' coinage. In the years after 188, as we have seen, Eumenes was unable to legitimize his rule by reference to his own personal charisma. In the absence of the traditional ideological justifications for rule, the late Attalid monarchs necessarily sought to establish an alternative, non-charismatic, non-absolutist state ideology. In this particular institutional sphere, Eumenes used the model of the Achaean League to project a federal ideology of free and equal alliance, not a *basileia* or an *archē* but a *koinon*.⁸⁹ This way of conceptualizing the Attalid state had long-lasting effects, as attested, among other things, by the continuation of the pseudo-federal cistophoroi (at an increasing number of civic 'mints') for almost a century after the end of the Attalid dynasty. It seems highly likely, for instance, that the Late Republican 'koinon of the Hellenes in Asia', a formal organization of 'the cities and peoples and tribes in Asia' established in the first years of the Roman province of Asia, was informed by this aspect of Attalid ideology; the inhabitants of the new Roman province of Asia were already well accustomed to seeing themselves (or being encouraged to see themselves) as members of a quasi-federal alliance.⁹⁰

The cistophoric coinage, then, was only part of a wider, highly innovative royal ideological programme. If the Attalid state was 'really' a *koinon*, an alliance of free Greek cities and peoples in Asia, the position of the Attalid kings themselves became unclear: how did the individual absolute monarch fit into this cosy league of Asiatic Hellenes? The late Attalid kings responded to this problem by creating a novel royal *persona* which, while affirming their individually

⁸⁸ Polyb. 2.37.8–11.

⁸⁹ For the terms ἀρχή and βασιλεία as used of Hellenistic royal states, see Bikerman 1938: 3–7. The Attalid kingdom is ἡ Ἀτταλικὴ βασιλεία in SEG 39, 1244 (decree for Menippos of Kolophon), ll. A16–17 (an outsider's perspective).

⁹⁰ Late Republican *koinon* of Asia: Drew-Bear 1972: 447–50, 460–6; Wörrle 2000: 569–71; Mitchell 2008: 183–7.

dominant position in western Asia, was none the less compatible with the federalist ideology being projected as a justification for the existence of the Attalid state. Crucially, Eumenes II and his successors largely abandoned the ‘charismatic’ style of kingship, premised on the outstanding individual military prowess and godlike power of the king, which had characterized all of the successor monarchies since the days of Alexander III.⁹¹ The individual charismatic authority of the king was dramatically played down: as remarked earlier, we have only a single verifiable image of Eumenes II, in the form of a very small and highly exceptional tetradrachm-issue carrying his portrait on the obverse, and not a single securely attributed portrait of Attalos II or III survives.⁹²

The new *persona* adopted by the late Attalid monarchs had two main strands. The *first* strand was their role as champions, defenders, and benefactors of the Greeks of Asia. Euergetism had, of course, been an important element of the royal ideology of all the Hellenistic dynasties well before 188 BC.⁹³ However, Eumenes II was the first monarch to proclaim his support for the Greek cities of Asia as a fundamental principle of his rule and justification of his royal title. His dynasty’s consistent defence of the Greeks of Asia and their autonomy—especially against an often rather nebulous Galatian threat—enabled him to claim the status of ‘common benefactor’ to the Greeks.⁹⁴

The earliest evidence for the Attalids’ new emphasis on their exemplary philhellenic euergetism comes from a decree passed by the city of Telmessos in Lykia, precisely dated to December 184 BC.⁹⁵ In late 184, Eumenes was engaged in a poorly attested war against Prousius I of Bithynia and a Galatian confederacy led by Ortiagon of the Tolistobogii tribe. It is difficult to see how the Telmessians, situated on the opposite side of the Asia Minor peninsula from Prousius’ kingdom, could conceivably have had any direct interest in this conflict. None the less, the Telmessians dutifully describe the

⁹¹ Bikerman 1938: 11–17; Gehrke 1982; Austin 1986; Ma 2003; Chaniotis 2005: 57–77.

⁹² Gans 2006, criticizing Queyrel 2003. For the coin-portrait of Eumenes II, see Gans 2006: 17–18, and Meadows, below pp. 173–4 with Fig. 5.9.

⁹³ Erskine 1994: 71–6.

⁹⁴ Gruen 2000.

⁹⁵ Segre 1932; Habicht 1956: 99–100; Mitchell 1993: I 24–5.

war as one undertaken on behalf both of Eumenes' own subjects and of all the other inhabitants of Asia:

When Eumenes Soter was King, Year 14... oros was priest, on the second day of the month Audnaios, at a sovereign assembly, it seemed good to the city and magistrates of the Telmessians... oros, Daparas and Hermophantos: Since King Eumenes, our benefactor and saviour, who has taken on the war not only on behalf of those under his command (τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸν τασσομένων) but also on behalf of the others dwelling in Asia ([ἄ]λλων τῶν κατοικούντων τὴν Ἀσίαν), and has endured the danger, calling on the gods for aid and fighting against Prousius and Ortiagon and the Galatians and their allies—since he has now won a glorious and splendid victory, just as we pray for from the gods, with good fortune, let it be resolved by the city and the magistrates: given the good things that have occurred, the priests and priestesses are to open all the temples and pray that victory and power should be given to King Eumenes both by land and sea in the future too, and also to his mother Queen Apollonis and his brothers; and the citizens and all the others are to wear wreaths, and having sacrificed in gratitude to the gods they are to hold a banquet in the [assembly?], and in future the magistrates are to sacrifice every month on the day preceding that of the king's victory to Zeus Genethlios and Athena N[ikephoros]...

Two years later, in 182 BC, Eumenes sent ambassadors around the Greek world seeking recognition of the inviolability of the shrine of Athena Nikephoros at Pergamon, and proclaiming Panhellenic status for a newly reorganized quadrennial Nikephoria festival, the first celebration of which fell in 181.⁹⁶ Eumenes' ambassadors to the Delphic Amphictyony are said to have 'recounted the goodwill which the king continually holds towards all the Greeks in common and individually towards the cities'; the Amphictyony replied with an even more explicit statement of Eumenes' actions on the Greeks' behalf.⁹⁷

Since King Eumenes... always continues to be responsible for some good to the Greeks, and having shared in their dangers on behalf of the common security, he has made gifts to many Greek cities in order that their existing autonomy might be preserved—for which reason the

⁹⁶ Robert, *OMS* I 151–65; Rigsby 1996: 363–77; Jones 2000.

⁹⁷ *Syll.*³ 630; *FD* III.3 261; Rigsby 1996: 375–7, no. 179. English translation in Austin 2006: no. 237 (who reads Holleaux's [αὐταῖς ἐν]ομίαν rather than Robert's [αὐτον]ομίαν in l. 6).

Romans, observing his policy, have augmented his kingdom, believing that all the kings who plot against the Greeks should receive the appropriate punishment, while those responsible for no evil deserve to enjoy their greatest trust.

As an account of Rome's motives in 189/8, this is tendentious to say the least. Indeed, in 189 BC, according to Polybios, Eumenes had specifically argued *against* any grant of freedom or autonomy to the Greeks of Asia (as proposed by the Rhodians), on the grounds that it would greatly increase the power of Rhodes while harming his own interests.⁹⁸ But by the winter of 167/6 BC, when Eumenes was honoured by the *koinon* of Ionians, this story had evidently become an absolutely standard part of the Attalid claim to royal authority in Asia. 'You began', says Eumenes, 'by saying that I had chosen from the start the most beautiful deeds, and showed myself to be the common benefactor of the Greeks (κοινὸν . . . εὐεργέτην τῶν Ἑλλήνων); and that I had faced many great battles against the barbarians, applying all eagerness and foresight in order that the inhabitants of the Greek cities might continue to live in peace and the best state of affairs in perpetuity.'⁹⁹

The title of 'common benefactor' (*koinos euergetēs*) is particularly telling here. In the second and first centuries BC, the Romans were widely referred to by Greek cities as the 'common benefactors' of the Greek world. It is unclear whether the title was first applied to Rome or to Eumenes II, but the chronological priority does not matter hugely one way or the other. The point is that this title, and the ideas underlying it, have no real Hellenistic precedents, but represents a novel way of thinking about power in the early second century BC. As one modern scholar has put it, 'Clearly the Greeks felt that the Romans were something new, not just a substitute for the familiar hellenistic kings'.¹⁰⁰ Exactly the same argument applies to the self-presentation of Eumenes II after 188 BC. The point of the conception of the 'common benefactor' seems to have been that Eumenes' euergetism, like that of Rome, was not targeted at specific communities as part of a reciprocal relationship of mutual advantage (the bilateral *do*

⁹⁸ Polyb. 21.18–23, with Gruen 1984: 547.

⁹⁹ OGIS 763; *Milet* I 9, no. 306; RC 52; English translation in Austin 2006: no. 239.

¹⁰⁰ Erskine 1994: 70, 82. I am not, however, persuaded that the title was primarily intended to evoke the universal and unquestioned hegemony of Rome (Erskine 1994: 85–7).

ut des of Seleukid benefactions).¹⁰¹ Instead, Eumenes' benefactions, like those of the Romans, were generalized and unconditional: benevolence towards the Greeks was treated as a universal good rather than an instrumental one. Unlike Antiochos, Eumenes would protect you from the Galatians even if you forgot to set up a statue of him in return.

This desire to downplay the individual charismatic authority of the king can also be seen in the *second* strand of late Attalid royal ideology, the emphasis placed by the Attalid monarchs on familial solidarity and the domestic virtues.¹⁰² The notion of a uniquely unified and harmonious Attalid royal family was already present under Attalos I; his supposed love-match with the bourgeois Apollonis of Kyzikos was no doubt intended to contrast with Seleukid and Ptolemaic marital behaviour, much as the homely public image of the British monarchy in the 1930s and 1940s was deliberately cultivated to contrast with the despotic regimes of Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini.¹⁰³ However, Attalid domesticity was elevated to the status of a claim to rule only by Eumenes II and Attalos II.¹⁰⁴ As we have seen, in the decree of Telmessos for Eumenes II (December 184 BC), his mother Apollonis and his brothers were included in the Telmessians' prayers for victory. This association of the entire royal family with the reigning king becomes a standard element in second-century monuments set up by, and on behalf of, the Attalid kings. The *hegemon* at a Mysian military *katoikia* in Lydia set up a votive monument on behalf of 'King Eumenes Soter and Euergetes and his brothers and Queen Apollonis'; at Bisanthe in Thrace, seven dedicatory inscriptions are known for various groupings of the second-century Attalid royal family ('King Eumenes Soter and Euergetes, founder of the city, and his brothers and Queen Stratonike'; 'King Attalos Philadelphos and Queen Stratonike', and so forth).¹⁰⁵ In the Aiginetan decree for the city-governor Kleon of Pergamon, Kleon is praised for his goodwill 'towards King Eumenes and King Attalos Philadelphos

¹⁰¹ Seleukid euergetism as reciprocity: Ma 2002: 179–94.

¹⁰² Virgilio 1993: 44–52; Leschhorn 1996; Kosmetatou 2003a: 168–9; Polyb. 18.41 (Attalos I), 22.20 (Apollonis, Eumenes II, Attalos II), 23.11.6–7 (contrast with Antigons), 32.8 (Eumenes II and his brothers).

¹⁰³ Williamson 2007: 237–43.

¹⁰⁴ Bielman Sánchez 2003: 48.

¹⁰⁵ Lydia: TAM V 1, 690. Bisanthe: Sayar 1999 (OGIS 301–4; SEG 49, 875–7).

and Queen Stratonike and Attalos the son of King Eumenes'.¹⁰⁶ An uncertain city in the Attalid kingdom, accepting an invitation to the Leukophryena festival at Magnesia on the Maeander, did so 'for the salvation of King Attalos Philadelphos and Athenaios the brother of the king and Queen Stratonike and Attalos the son of King Eumenes'.¹⁰⁷ Even the notoriously antisocial Attalos III was officially known as 'King Attalos Philometor and benefactor, son of the god King Eumenes Soter', thereby inserting him firmly into a wider family grouping.¹⁰⁸

The self-conscious filial, fraternal, and conjugal 'values' of Eumenes II and his successors formed the basis of a new ethical discourse of monarchy. Particularly telling here is the place occupied in late Attalid royal ideology by the 'queen mother', Apollonis of Kyzikos, widow of Attalos I. The richest individual document is a long posthumous decree in honour of Apollonis from Hierapolis in southern Phrygia.¹⁰⁹

Decision of the generals Apollonios son of Matron, Apollonios son of Hermogenes, Apollonides son of Phalangites: Since Queen Apollonis Eusebes, wife of the god King Attalos, mother of King Eumenes Soter, has departed to the gods, having made a glorious and fitting display among men of her individual virtue, because she behaved piously towards the gods and with reverence towards her parents, and likewise lived together with her husband in a distinguished manner and behaved towards her children with all harmony; having had beautiful children born in wedlock, she left behind great sources of praise, tending to her own glory, while also having earned outstanding gratitude from her children—and so, having sought throughout her life all those things that tend towards honour and glory, she has made the course of her life fine and fitting, having reared children with good fortune and consorted nobly with King Eumenes Soter and Attalos Philadelphos and Philetairos and Athenaios, and through a magnificent act has left no small marker of her piety towards the gods, and through her sympathy and harmony towards her children has left a most beautiful and praiseworthy sign of her individual excellence, and has always behaved with goodwill in all matters

¹⁰⁶ IG IV 1² 749, ll. 37–9.

¹⁰⁷ *I.Magnesia* 87 (Rigsby 1996: 278–9, no. 131), ll. 15–17; compare the Attalid familial rosters in *I.Magnesia* 83 (Rigsby 1996: 274–5, no. 128) and *I.Magnesia* 86 (Rigsby 1996: 277–8, no. 130).

¹⁰⁸ OGIS 332 (Pergamon), with Robert 1987: 460–77; Hamon 2004.

¹⁰⁹ OGIS 308.

towards Queen Stratonike, the wife of King Eumenes Soter, considering the partner of her son to be the partner of her own affection; and living up to... she has received immortal glory... and among all the Greeks ... [King] Eumenes Soter and her [other children]...

What is so startling about this sample of royal public language is not the rather conventional package of ethical values on display (exemplary behaviour towards gods, parents, husband, and children, even extending to her daughter-in-law), but the fact that these are—to all appearances—the *only* qualities or actions for which Apollonis is considered worthy of praise. Apollonis' *private* actions towards other members of her immediate family here serve as a justification for *public* honours at a city at the far end of the Attalid kingdom.

This blurring of the private and public spheres in second-century Attalid royal ideology is at its clearest in the transformation of one of the key spaces of Attalid dynastic self-representation, the sanctuary of Athena at Pergamon. Under Attalos I, the sanctuary of Athena had acted as a showcase for the military successes of the Attalid monarchy: at least two massive statue-groups, dominating the open space of the Athena *temenos*, commemorated the repeated victories of Attalos I over the Galatians and the Seleukids.¹¹⁰ At some point in the early second century BC, the *temenos* of Athena received a new statue of Apollonis, set up by her son, the future King Attalos II:¹¹¹

Attalos (set up this statue of) Queen Apollonis, his mother, for the sake of her affection (*philostorgia*) towards him.

The status of this monument (public or private?) is deliberately ambiguous. The placement of a statue of 'Queen' (*basilissa*) Apollonis in a space—the sanctuary of Athena—already bristling with the victory-monuments of Attalos I serves to emphasize the royal status of both dedicator and dedicatee. However, the future Attalos II himself is defined in purely 'domestic' terms, as the loyal son of a loving mother; he is not even furnished with a patronym ('son of King Attalos') to remind the viewer of his exact position in the royal line. The viewer of Apollonis' statue is thereby encouraged to understand the political power of the Attalid dynasty (vividly exemplified by the

¹¹⁰ Hoepfner 1997: 129–34; Marszal 2000 ('long base' and 'round base').

¹¹¹ OGIS 307: Ἀτταλος βασίλισσαν Ἀπολλωνίδα τῇ μητέρα φιλοστοργίας ἔνεκα τῆς πρὸς αὐτόν. See Robert 1962: 258 n. 1.

nearby victory monuments of Attalos I in the Athena *temenos*) as deriving from the family's exemplary ethical values (*philostorgia*) and collective solidarity.¹¹²

The same message is projected by a second post-Apameian Attalid monument in the Pergamene sanctuary of Athena. At some point in the late 170s, the Attalid *epi tōn pragmatōn*, Menogenes son of Menophantos, set up a huge semicircular base carrying bronze statues of seven members of the Attalid royal family, the deceased Attalos I, his wife Queen Apollonis, his eldest son King Eumenes II and his wife Queen Stratonike, and his other three sons, Attalos, Philetairos, and Athenaios.¹¹³ Albeit on a much larger scale, this base appears to be a monumental imitation of a monument-type just beginning to come into favour among élite civic families in the early second century BC, the semicircular bench-*exedra* with familial portrait group.¹¹⁴

Both monuments, set alongside the spectacular victory dedications of Attalos I, instruct the viewer to attribute the political and military successes of the Attalid kings to the morals of the royal family rather than to the king's individual charisma. This ethical argument may also underlie a well-known bit of political theatrics laid on by Eumenes II for the benefit of the citizens of Kyzikos. In spring or summer 183 BC, after Eumenes' victory over Prousius and Ortiagon, Eumenes and his brother, the future king Attalos II, accompanied their mother, Apollonis, on a tour of her native city of Kyzikos, one walking on either side holding her by the hand. In Polybios' account of this *coup de théâtre*, he implies that the visit of the Attalid royal family to Kyzikos was in some way connected to the recent conclusion of the war against Prousius and the Galatians, which was presumably fought out in the regions immediately to the east and south-east of Kyzikos.¹¹⁵ This is plausible enough: the long-standing Attalid 'special relationship' with Kyzikos was based on both parties' desire to

¹¹² For Attalid *philostorgia*, compare Polyb. 22.20.3 (Apollonis' *eunoia* and *philostorgia* towards her sons); OGIS 248, ll. 18–19 (Eumenes' and Attalos' *eunoia* and *philostorgia* towards Antiochos IV); OGIS 331, l. 43 (Attalos III's *philostorgia* towards a royal *philos*). The notion is not unprecedented: Ma 2002: 354–6, no. 37 (cult of Laodike), with van Bremen 2003: 327.

¹¹³ OGIS 291–6; Schalles 1985: 135 n. 776; Bielfeldt 2010: 165.

¹¹⁴ Dillon 2010: 32–3; von Thüngen 1994: 32–6; e.g. 91–3 no. 54 (late third-century semicircular *exedra* of Pamphilidas at Lindos).

¹¹⁵ Polyb. 22.20.4–8: 'This happened at Kyzikos after the peace with King Prousius'. For the comparison with Kleobis and Biton, cf. *Anth. Pal.* 3.18 (temple of Apollonis at Kyzikos); Kuttner 2005: 179–81.

claim a special role in the Anatolian resistance to the Galatians. We would, in that case, be dealing with a startlingly original way of representing Hellenistic military victory: not as something which flowed from the godlike power and charisma of the individual commander, but which derived from his status as a good family man.

Although the self-conscious ‘domesticity’ of the Attalid monarchs has long been recognized, the significance of this persona has not been properly understood. In his classic 1867 essay on the English Constitution, Walter Bagehot astutely observed that the Victorian era had seen a transformation of the English monarchy from an individual into a family. ‘A *family* on the throne is an interesting idea also. It brings down the pride of sovereignty to the level of petty life. No feeling could seem more childish than the enthusiasm of the English at the marriage of the Prince of Wales . . . A royal family sweetens politics by the seasonable addition of nice and pretty events. It introduces irrelevant facts into the business of government, but they are facts which speak to “men’s bosoms” and employ their thoughts.’¹¹⁶ This notion—that the projection of sentimental family values will tend to be particularly appealing to what Bagehot calls ‘the vacant many’—is still echoed by some historians of the Attalids. ‘The image that emerges [of the Attalids]’, claims one modern scholar, ‘is that of a virtuous family with habits to which the common man could relate . . . they became popular partly because they appealed to the common man, while retaining their royal status.’¹¹⁷ The problem here is not just the startlingly patronizing assumption that ‘the common man’ tends to be particularly keen on family values—there is no particular reason to think that the man on the Thyateira omnibus got all misty-eyed over Eumenes II being nice to his mother. It also assumes exactly what needs to be proved, namely that the Attalids were in fact particularly appealing to ‘the common man’, rather than (say) civic élites or mercenary soldiers.

The Attalid emphasis on familial solidarity and domestic virtues can, I suggest, helpfully be set in the context of the wider Attalid decentralization and devolution of state institutions. As we have seen, the Attalids systematically devolved the political administration and economic exploitation of their realm to pre-existing local power-

¹¹⁶ Bagehot 1867: 62–3. Key subsequent studies of the British monarchy and ‘popular values’: Shils and Young 1953; Cannadine 1983; Olechnowicz 2007.

¹¹⁷ Kosmetatou 2003a: 169.

holders and semi-independent urban communities; where such cities did not already exist, they were simply created from scratch. I have characterized this ‘cellular’ system as an exercise in power-sharing between the central authority and local power-actors. The Attalid ideology of kingship, therefore, emphasized not those qualities which *distinguished* the king from the local élites who were the real holders of power at the local level (godlike charisma, military excellence), but those qualities which he *shared* with them (ethical exemplarity, hereditary values).

Attalid royal domesticity, then, should be seen as an attempt to support, foster, and reproduce a particular power-structure and set of class relationships at a local level.¹¹⁸ As is well known, the second half of the second century BC saw a fundamental shift in the dynamics of public life in the cities of the Aegean world. The late third and early second century BC had seen the emergence of a new class of extremely rich landowners in western Asia Minor (and elsewhere in the Greek world). Over the course of the second century, but particularly in the late second and first centuries, the Aegean *poleis* became increasingly dependent on the services furnished by these civic notables to their communities (embassies, cash gifts and loans to their cities, distributions of grain or olive oil, and so forth), all of which were provided in a private capacity, bypassing the traditional political institutions of the Greek *polis*.¹¹⁹ By the late second century, as a result of the privatization and depoliticization of Greek public life, female members of wealthy families (hitherto largely excluded from political activity) took on newly prominent roles as members of this depoliticized ‘euergetic class’.¹²⁰ This class justified its dominant position on grounds of ethical excellence, often expressed in familial terms, rather than popular consent: the late Hellenistic ruling class was a hereditary élite, not an office-holding one.¹²¹

This new ethical discourse of civic politics is nicely exemplified by two statue bases for a female member of this newly dominant class

¹¹⁸ Cf. Cannadine 1998: 22–3, 124–5, on the role of the British monarchy in reproducing the elaborate hierarchies of British society.

¹¹⁹ De Ste. Croix 1981: 300–26, 518–37; Gauthier 1985: 7–75; Debord 1987; Savalli-Lestrade 2003a; Thonemann 2011a: 242–51. The notion of a second-century ‘break’, and the emergence of a new late-Hellenistic ‘Honoratiorenregime’, challenged by Habicht 1995, is powerfully reaffirmed by Hamon 2007.

¹²⁰ Thonemann 2010.

¹²¹ Gauthier 1985: 56–9; Hamon 2007; Fernoux 2007 (a slightly later period).

from the temple of Demeter at Pergamon, dating to the late second or first century BC.¹²²

(1) The *demos* honoured Philotera daughter of Limnaios, because of the benefactions (*euergesiai*) of her father Limnaios towards the *demos* and because of the virtue (*aretē*) of her husband Kyniskos and his goodwill (*eunoia*) towards the *demos* and because of the piety (*eusebeia*) of Philotera herself towards the gods and her affection (*philostorgia*) towards her husband Kyniskos and towards her children.

(2) [– –], Demetrios and Diogenes, her sons, (set up this statue of) Philotera, their mother, for the sake of her affection (*philostorgia*) towards them.

The public honours for Philotera—like the posthumous honours for Apollonis at Hierapolis—are dependent not on any public actions but on a whole cluster of ethical qualities possessed by her and her family (virtue, piety, affection). Her dominant position in Pergamene public life is thereby attributed to her superior morals rather than to her superior wealth. The very same quality (*philostorgia*) which, in the private sphere, led her to be valued and honoured by her sons—with a monument startlingly similar in form and content to the base set up by Attalos for Apollonis—is presented as the justification for her prominent position in the public sphere.¹²³

What we are seeing here is the ethical discourse of power promoted by the Attalid kings in the years after 188 BC being adopted, a generation or so later, by civic elites as a justification for their own hereditary monopoly on power and authority at a local level. The time lapse is significant. Attalid royal domesticity was not the result of Eumenes II deciding to tap into some putative pre-existing ‘sentimental’ moral consensus. Rather, that consensus was something that the Attalid kings aimed to *create*, in order to ensure the future social reproduction of the new, decentralized power-structures of the Attalid state.

¹²² Hepding 1910: 465–6, nos. 47–8; Dillon 2010: 38–9, 45.

¹²³ Cf. also *I.Priene* 108 (honours for Moschion, c.120 BC), ll. 14–17: *eusebeia* towards the gods, *hosiotes* towards his parents and his household (τοὺς συμβιοῦντας); identical motifs to *OGIS* 308 (decree for Apollonis from Hierapolis), ll. 6–7: *eusebeia* towards the gods, *hosiotes* towards her parents, and ‘distinguished co-habitation’ (συνβιβιωκέναι μεγαλομερώς) with her husband.

CONCLUSION

In his obituary of Eumenes II, Polybios offers a very carefully phrased assessment of the success of the second-century Attalid monarchs. 'When Eumenes inherited his kingdom from his father, it was restricted to a few wretched little towns, but he made his own realm one to rival the greatest powers of his day. It was not more that he had Fortune on his side, or that he benefited from a reversal of fortune, than that he owed his success to his own intelligence, industry and political skill.'¹²⁴ Polybios here accepts the notion of multiple causality in world-historical development, without imposing a causal hierarchy. He does not claim that Eumenes' successes were *not* owed to *tyche*, or to his and Antiochos' sudden reversals of fortune in 190–188 BC; *tyche* had all too evidently played its part. But the flourishing of the second-century Attalid state was also *just as much* due to the individual political skill (*praxis*) with which Eumenes had handled his gift of fortune.¹²⁵ Establishing in what precise respects Eumenes' *praxis* differed from that of his contemporaries and predecessors has been the chief object of this paper.

As will have been obvious, I have throughout been working with a largely undifferentiated model of 'other Hellenistic states', providing a putative homogeneous norm from which the second-century Attalid kingdom diverges. In practice, the Normal Hellenistic State which I have in mind is usually the Seleukid state of the late third century BC. A reader could, while (hopefully) accepting the specific contrasts which I have drawn between the third-century Seleukid state and the second-century Attalid state in western Asia Minor, quite reasonably reject the notions of Seleukid typicality and Attalid divergence. Space forbids extended justification; I here defend this position in the briefest possible compass.

¹²⁴ Polyb. 32.8.3–4: ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν παραλαβὼν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν συνησταμένην τελέως εἰς ὀλίγα καὶ λιτὰ πολισμάτια ταῖς μεγίσταις τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν δυναστεῶν ἐφάμιλλον ἐποίησε τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχήν, οὐ τύχη τὸ πλεῖον συνεργῶ χρώμενος, οὐδ' ἐκ περιπετείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγχινοίας καὶ φιλοπονίας, ἔτι δὲ πράξεως τῆς αὐτοῦ.

¹²⁵ For the phrase οὐ τὸ πλεῖον χ... ἀλλά γ, cf. e.g. Thuc. 1.83, ἔστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλεον ἀλλὰ δαπάνης. Thucydides is not denying that war is a matter of arms; he is claiming that it is not *more* a matter of arms than of money. See Westlake 1969: 161–7; Hornblower 1994: 157 ('specifically and characteristically Thucydidean').

The Attalids aside, all three of the major Hellenistic imperial states (Seleukids, Ptolemies, Antigonids) and most of the smaller principalities on the fringes of Seleukid rule (the Bactrian and Indo-Greek kingdoms; the monarchies of Pontos, Media, Armenia, Bithynia, Cappadocia) were the direct linear descendants of the Achaemenid Persian empire. None of these Persian 'successor states' had any reason to make significant innovations to the Near Eastern imperial *koine*.¹²⁶ The Seleukid kingdom can usefully be treated as the quintessential Achaemenid successor state for three reasons: its vast geographical scale, which in the early third century came close to matching that of the Persian empire at its height; its 'centre of gravity' in the old Achaemenid heartlands of southern Mesopotamia and western Iran; and the sheer abundance of empirical evidence for institutional continuities, in the fiscal sphere and elsewhere.¹²⁷

The 'short' Attalid second century BC, I suggest, marked the real end of the Achaemenid style of imperial domination in Asia Minor. Under the Achaemenids and their Seleukid successors, most inhabitants of western Asia Minor (and certainly those fortunate enough to live outside the territories of the Greek cities) had enjoyed a remarkable freedom from the state. The Attalids, by contrast, came creeping into their subjects' lives in a new and intrusive way. The non-charismatic style of rule fostered by the Attalid dynasty is, perhaps counter-intuitively, entirely consonant with this bureaucratic invasiveness. I would like to suggest that what we are seeing in the Attalid kingdom between 188 and 133 BC is a precise inversion of the traditional power-structure of ancient Near Eastern empires. In his well-known study of the autonomous power of the state, Michael Mann argued that state power takes two distinct forms.¹²⁸ *Despotic power* is the range of actions that a ruler and his agents can take or attempt to take unilaterally against individuals and groups within his domain: does the king have the right to cut off your head? *Infrastructural power*, by contrast, denotes the capacity of the state actually to penetrate wider society and implement its decisions effectively: can the king collect taxes from you every year? The despotic power

¹²⁶ For the notion of a Near Eastern imperial *koine*, see Briant 1982: 291–330, 405–30 (*koine* 'impériale-tributaire'); Mann 1986: 130–78, 231–49 ('militaristic early empires'); Bedford 2009: 59–61.

¹²⁷ Briant 1982: 95–135, Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993; Briant 2006; on fiscal matters, Thonemann 2009.

¹²⁸ Mann 1984; Mann 1986: 169–70, 240, 246–7.

exercised by the state over civil society in ancient empires, from Akkad to the Seleukids, was notoriously strong: Xerxes could happily decide to cut you in half and march an army between you. However, from the perspective of infrastructural power, ancient empires of domination were for the most part pathetically feeble. (Egypt, as so often, is an exceptional case in this regard.) Such infrastructural power as existed was vested in relatively autonomous local élites, without whose collaboration the ruler was effectively helpless: if Aristagoras of Miletos decided to stop paying tribute, there was not a great deal the king could do about it.

The second-century Attalid kingdom inverted these power dynamics. As a result of the rapid exogenous process of state-formation between 190 and 188 BC, the ideological authority of the Attalid kings was unusually low, and hence the Attalid state was unable to mobilize despotic power in the traditional manner of Achaemenid or Seleukid monarchs. The Attalids therefore had particularly strong practical reasons for wishing to build up the infrastructural power of the state. Unable to claim the kind of absolute rule-making authority that characterized their predecessors, Eumenes II and his successors instead systematically aimed to increase their independent capacity to penetrate and co-ordinate local society in western Asia Minor. This penetration was effected through (a) mass administrative decentralization and the co-option of local élites into the Attalid bureaucracy; (b) the progressive devolution of large parts of a state-run tributary economy to civic actors; and (c) the promotion of 'consensual' royal ideologies which emphasized horizontal alliance rather than vertical dominance. In ideal-type terms, the traditional 'despotic/federal' power structure of Near Eastern imperial states was replaced by a new 'consensual/bureaucratic' structure. Herein, I suggest, lies the chief claim of the short-lived second-century Attalid state in western Asia Minor to world-historical significance.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ I am indebted to Andrew Meadows for discussion and criticism. The arguments of this paper were developed in dialogue with my Oxford students for the course 'The Hellenistic World: Societies and Cultures'; I am particularly grateful to Beatrice Cernuta, James Neale, and James Allen.

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The Attalids: A Military History

John Ma

Πέργαμος οὐχ ὅπλοις κλεινὴ μόνον
Pergamos is not famed for arms only.

Arkesilaos of Pitane, quoted in Diogenes Laertius, 6.30

νῦν δὲ κατ' ἄκρα πόλης ἀπορθήτοιο βεβηκώς
Περγαμῆς μεγάλους ῥύεο Τηλεφίδας
And now, descending onto the citadel of the unsacked city of
Pergamon, save the great Telephidai.

Anth. Plan. 16.91

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE ATTALIDS

What was the nature of the monarchy of the Attalids? Various answers might be proffered: a cultured, learned, artistic monarchy; a Greek, rather than Macedonian, monarchy; a bourgeois, familial monarchy, with a taste for benefaction in land or in buildings in Asia Minor but also in prestigious sites in Greece (Athens, Delphi, the valley of Helikon).¹ Yet the military nature of the monarchy is also only too clear to see. The Akropolis was a working fortress, with arsenals, barracks, granaries, and heavy artillery; the last refuge of the dynasty when it was hard pressed, it resisted Achaïos, Philip V,

¹ e.g. Hansen 1971; Schalles 1985; Virgilio 1993.

Antiochos III, and Prousius II.² The library stood in a precinct adorned with images of weapons taken as booty of defeated enemies—the Macedonian and post-Macedonian heavy equipment of the Seleukid armies, the characteristic long shields of Hellenistic medium infantry, or of Celtic spearmen and swordsmen, fighting as mercenaries or as the warrior bands of the Galatian polities of central Anatolia.³ The shrine of Athena was structured around victory monuments of Attalos I (notably a sculptural group representing, precisely, defeated Celtic swordsmen), and works of art seized in Greece. The Great Altar, in representing the Gigantomachy, alludes to the wars of the Attalids.⁴ The religious life of the city was shaped, and affected, by war. The festival of the Nikephoria celebrated victory-bringing Athena; the shrine of this Athena, outside the walls, was damaged by Philip, as was the shrine of Asklepios, whose cult statue, a masterpiece by Phyromachos, was stolen by the impious Prousius II.⁵

An equally striking image of the centrality of military means, and military action, to the Attalids' exercise of kingship emerges from the dossier of secret correspondence, later published epigraphically at Pessinous. One of the letters gives a startlingly Polybian image of the king directly involved in military operations, especially in the form of a *coup de main*;⁶ strikingly, the sacred nature of 'Pessongoi' means that it is all the more desirable for the ruler, and hence the object of especial military attention on the part of Attalid forces.

σαι [- - - - -] διὸ καὶ νῦν τὴν τα-
 χίστην π[αραγ]ερόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς τό-
 πους καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος πάντα σα-
 φῶς διασάφισόμ μοι, πόσων ἔτι χρεί-
 αν ἔξεις στρατιωτῶν. καὶ τοὺς Περ-
 σόγγους δὲ ἐὰν δύνῃ πραξικοπήσῃς,
 γράφε μοι τίνων ἐστὶ χρεία. ἱεροῦ γὰρ τοῦ
 χωρίου ὄντος ληπτέον ἐστὶ πάντως.
 ἔρρωσο. δλ' Γορπιαίου ζ' ἀπιόν(τος).

² von Szalay and Boehringer 1937; Marsden 1969: 81 on the catapult balls.

³ Bohn 1885.

⁴ Launey 1950 [1987]: 942–5 ('presque toute l'histoire militaire des Attalides sous Attale I, Eumène II et Attale II peut se suivre dans les offrandes à Zeus et Athéna'); Mitchell 2003; Queyrel 2003; Queyrel 2005; Stewart 2004.

⁵ *IvP* 167, decree for Metris, 149 BC (9th Nikephoria): Jones 1974; Diod. Sic. 31.5; Rigsby 1996: 362–6.

⁶ *RC* 55, also *I.Pessinous* 1.

Therefore, visit the area as quickly as possible, and inspect everything, and tell me clearly how many soldiers you will need. And if you can capture Pessongoi by surprise, write me what you need. The place is sacred, and must be seized at all costs.

These images, and others which it would be easy to multiply, evoke the military nature of the Attalid monarchy. The point here is not to offer a military history in the old style, centred on battles and tactics, or a 'new military history' structured around the experience of combat, or logistics (or whatever else). In trying to pin down the nature more precisely, in time and in space, in its details and its workings, we may find answers about the Attalid state as Hellenistic formation—answers to profound questions about motives, choices, identity, and resources and capacities, as mapped out on a particular set of spaces: western Asia Minor, Lydia, Mysia, Phrygia.⁷

All the same, it may be useful to give a narrative sketch of the Attalid wars, to establish the shape of the military phenomenon: this sketch will consider the whole of the kingdom, and provide background for the post-188 focus of this present volume. If the literary sources are poor for the crucial early decades (281–226), and for the last two decades (154–133), there is good, detailed narrative for the period covered by Polybios and Livy; the epigraphical sources are relatively plentiful, varied, and informative. Together, these sources allow for a sketch of the political and military history of the Attalids.⁸

The story starts with the very beginning of the dynasty. Philetairos, the dynast of Pergamon, whatever his exact position under or within Lysimachos' kingdom, then the Seleukid state, had military means which he drew on during the Galatian invasion: he is said by an epigram of unclear date to have driven the Galatians beyond his borders (though in fact, he probably also paid them ransom to keep them away). In addition, he sent modest military help and funds to Kyzikos; he was able to donate 600 bronze-faced *peltai* to Kyme, out of 1,000 shields produced by a military workshop, closed at the time of the donation. Finally, he may have founded two cities/towns/forts in the territory under his control; he employed mercenaries, to whom,

⁷ Austin 1986; Ma, forthcoming c.

⁸ Habicht 1956; Habicht 1957; Hansen 1971; McShane 1964; Will 1979–82; Hopp 1977; Kosmetatou 2003a; Wörrle 2009: 426–7. The sources will not be repeated here extensively.

in 269 BC (year 44) he granted some form of *ateleia*.⁹ These military means were part of his place within the Seleukid space: as Boris Chrubasik shows in this volume, the Seleukid state sub-contracted various military functions out to the dynast in Pergamon. This privilege was renewed under his successor, Eumenes, who worked out a settlement with mercenaries in revolt; Eumenes or Philetairos wrote a letter, now fragmentary, concerning military colonists; an epigram probably celebrates his military victories—the only one known is the momentous victory over Antiochos I, in a battle at Sardeis, early in Eumenes' reign, and confirming his independence from the Seleukid state; Phylarchos may have written about the conflict.¹⁰

Eumenes' successor, Attalos, fought against the Galatians (taking the royal title), the Galatians and Antiochos Hierax, the generals of Seleukos II; his victories (in the 230s–220s) are celebrated in a series of dedications on the Akropolis at Pergamon, including the great circular base in the middle of the shrine of Athena, and the 'long base' with multiple sculptural offerings;¹¹ over thirty years after his Galatian victories, Attalos I also commemorated them with a sculptural dedication on the Akropolis of Athens.¹² Attalos' victories, coinciding with dynastic strife in the Seleukid house, led to the temporary collapse of Seleukid control in trans-Tauric Asia Minor, followed by a campaign by Seleukos III and, especially, the governor appointed over the area and future breakaway king, Achaïos, who in 222 and later rolled back Attalos' conquests and shut him in Pergamon. In 218, while King Achaïos was busy with a south Anatolian campaign, Attalos I undertook a campaign in Aiolis, Mysia, and the Troad, with Galatian auxiliaries brought over from Europe, the Aigosages (the campaign is documented in detail by Polybios); it was followed by an energetic military reaction by Achaïos. In 216, Achaïos was defeated and captured by Antiochos III, who had concluded an understanding, *koinopragia*, with Attalos I. In 209 BC, Attalos I participated in the

⁹ Kyzikos: OGIS 748 with Launey 1944. Kyme: SEG 50, 1195. Foundations, mercenaries: OGIS 266 (Philetaireia, Attaleia).

¹⁰ RC 16; IvP 15 (with SEG 28, 963, restorations by W. Peek); Strabo 13.4.2; FGrHist 81T1 (Jacoby assigns this to Eumenes II and Antiochos III, rather than Eumenes I and Antiochos I, but the latter solution is perfectly possible: see Chrubasik, below p. 93).

¹¹ IvP 20–9, 33–9.

¹² Stewart 2004.

First Macedonian War, as an ally of the Aitolians. Attalid troops fought before Lamia; the king was nearly captured in a skirmish.¹³ Attalid troops further helped capture Aigina, and the island was sold by the Aitolians, for 30 T, to the king. Finally, Attalid troops are attested at Lilaia, where they may have helped expel an Antigonid garrison, and certainly protected the city, in return for which service they were granted citizenship by the Lilaians.¹⁴ In 208, Prousius I invaded the kingdom, and Attalos I returned to Asia Minor for the first of several conflicts between Bithynian and Attalid states. In 201 BC, Attalos I and the Rhodians fought against the expedition of Philip V in Asia Minor; in 200 BC, Attalos I assisted Athens against Philip V. During the Second Macedonian war, Attalid troops (and Attalid ships) seized Andros, attacked the Chalkidike, and (after a quick return by Attalos I to Pergamon in 198), Euboia and Corinth.

Attalos' successor, Eumenes II, participated in the two, post-197, Flamininus-inspired, wars against Nabis, the 'tyrant' of Sparta (as known by dedications related to these wars):¹⁵ the first expedition took place in 195, the second in 192. Eumenes and his troops were still in Greece when Antiochos III disembarked, and joined in the Seleukid-Macedonian war, fighting before Athens and at Delion, but not, it seems, at Thermopylai. Attalid forces played an important part in the second phase of the conflict, in Asia, both at sea and on land, notably at the battle of Magnesia in winter 190/89. In 189, the king's brother, Attalos, participated in Manlius Vulso's campaign in Galatia. In the following years, war broke out between Eumenes II and Prousius I, over a part of Mysia, probably disputed between the two states since 208 BC, granted by Rome to Eumenes after Apameia, but also guaranteed to Prusias before Magnesia.¹⁶ The exact course of events is unclear, but the war ended with an Attalid victory, celebrated in the reorganization and expansion of the festival of the Nikephoria, whose recognition as a penteteric Panhellenic festival Eumenes requested from the Greek states in 182, for the first celebration in 181.¹⁷ The victory led to Attalid control, in some form, over Galatia—and to conflict with Pharnakes of Pontos (182–179), fought in the east, but also on sea (the Attalid fleet attempted to blockade the

¹³ Liv. 28.7.6.

¹⁴ ISE 81 (FD III.4 132–5).

¹⁵ IvP 60–3.

¹⁶ Wörle 2009: 426–7, with further bibliography.

¹⁷ See above n. 5; Jones 1974.

Hellespont, before Rhodian intervention).¹⁸ The conflict ended with Attalid victory. Eumenes II participated in the Third Macedonian war: his troops fought on land in the inconclusive campaign in Thessaly in 171, and in Thrace and Greece the following year (when Attalid troops were also sent to assist Kydonia in a local, Cretan, war);¹⁹ in 169, the Attalid fleet attacked the Chalkidike and Demetrias; in 168, the Macedonian fleet inflicted sharp reverses on the Attalids in the Aegean, off Chios (destroying a convoy of Galatian cavalry) and off Delos. Before the end of the Third Macedonian war, Eumenes II faced the Galatians, in an extremely difficult conflict, at the same time as his relations with Rome worsened (in a famous incident, Eumenes II was rebuffed at Brundisium when he tried to appeal personally to Rome). Livy mentions the Galatians at Synnada; a recently published letter of Eumenes II shows the Galatians arriving close to Apameia. The successful conclusion of the Galatian war was celebrated by the foundation of a festival, the *Herakleia kai Sōteria*, in 165.²⁰ In spite of the Roman guarantee of Galatian autonomy, the secret correspondence between the Attalid rulers and the priest of Pessinous (quoted above) proves Attalid involvement in the area. It is further very likely that these years also saw conflict with Selge, a warlike city of Pisidia, and perhaps other Pisidian communities, as the letters of Eumenes II and Attalos (the future Attalos II) to the Pisidian city of Amlada suggest.²¹

As Eumenes' successor, Attalos II had to fight a war against Prousius II (156–154), where the latter gained the advantage, shutting Attalos II in Pergamon, ravaging the area; Attalos II fought back, with mercenaries and a fleet of Attalid, Rhodian, and allied ships, which he used to ravage Bithynia. The conflict was settled by Roman intervention, to the advantage of Attalos II. The 'reckoning' (to speak like W. W. Tarn) between Attalos II and Prousius II followed in 149: Attalos II successfully championed Prousius' son, Nikomedes, to usurp the kingship of Bithynia; ineffectual Roman intervention, a siege of Nikomedeia, and the execution of Prousius, made for a satisfactory ending to the affair—this is the moment of the 'great benefits' mentioned in the decree for the priestess of Athena, Metris.²² This success was followed five years later by an expedition against the

¹⁸ Polyb. 27.7.5.

¹⁹ Polyb. 28.14–15; Liv. 42.57.

²⁰ Wörrle 2000: 561–2.

²¹ Swoboda et al. 1935: no. 74 (RC 54).

²² *IvP* 167.

Thracian king Diegylis, who had assisted Prousius II.²³ In the meantime, the Attalid fleet helped Q. Metellus (the future Macedonicus) against Andriskos in 148; Attalid auxiliaries helped Mummius during the war of Corinth, notably participating in the sack of Corinth. Pausanias saw booty from the sack in Pergamon, three centuries later; inscribed sling bullets found in the shrine of Athena at Stymphalos might come from Attalid troops participating in the mopping-up campaign.²⁴ A decree from Olbasa, passed in the last year of Attalos' reign (139), attests a Pisidian war.²⁵ Finally, Attalos III, the last Attalid king, must have had military activities: a decree from Pergamon describes his return, via Elaia (so a naval-borne expedition to Thrace?), and votes a statue of him in arms, trampling spoils;²⁶ but there are no details about the exact theatres of military activity (the atrocities committed by his mercenaries against his courtiers, which Hopp believes in, do not count).²⁷

Even this quick sketch of the Attalid wars shows the constant presence of war as part of the policy of the kings: twenty-four conflicts in 144 years (277–133), perhaps fifty years of campaigning (though of course the figure depends on how you count, and assumes continuous warfare during the obscure decades of the 230s and 220s). Most of these involved members of the dynasty, and especially the king himself: it is only in the last years of Attalos II that the old king did not take to the field, against Andriskos or at Corinth. Attalos I, Eumenes II, Attalos II (as prince) personally fought in Greece, sometimes for two years in a row; Attalos I was nearly captured during the First Macedonian war, and again during the naval battle of Chios (when his ship and all of his royal finery—cups, cloaks—fell into Philip's hands), and died of a stroke, which happened during the Second Macedonian war as he was speaking before the Thebans.²⁸ Eumenes II, in an anecdote told by Polyainos, personally stops a Galatian attack with his litter stationed before their pursuit, as if his troops were in ambush.²⁹ Less glamorous than the great *événementiel* wars in Greece, or the desperate struggle against the Galatians, Eumenes II was also in Pisidia when a royal letter was addressed to Amlada: the letter ends with a subscription, 'written in Mistheia,

²³ *IvP* 247. ²⁴ Paus. 7.16.1; *SEG* 48, 530.

²⁵ *SEG* 44, 1108 with *BE* 1997, 563. ²⁶ *OGIS* 339.

²⁷ Diod. Sic. 34.3, Just. *Epit.* 36.4.1; Hopp 1977: 116–18.

²⁸ Polyb. 16.6.6. ²⁹ Polyainos, *Strat.* 4.8.

when the king held (*kateichen*) Oasada' – I assume this means that the writer is in fact not the king, but Attalos (future Attalos II), writing in Mistheia camping in the rear and separately from his brother, who is 'holding' a more advanced position in Oasada.³⁰ In the secret correspondence later published at Pessinous, the camp (*stratopedon*) appears, the scene of the king's movements in campaign, the place of diplomacy, and of decision-making. The context for these scenes is that of the regional wars of the Attalids in Anatolia, a constant theme starting already before 188.

Furthermore, the importance of war in the royal culture and the religious life of the Attalids is clear. As mentioned earlier, the major festivals commemorate victories—Athena received the epithet Nikephoros under Eumenes II (first attested clearly in 182, but granted earlier?)—and Attalid art is about Attalid victories. The series of dedications on the Pergamene Akropolis, because of their insistence on contextual precision (enemies and battles are named) in the dedicatory inscriptions, amount to an ongoing, self-conscious narrative of victorious war; the Achaian allies who fought in 190 at Magnesia, when they set up an honorific statue of Attalos (the future Attalos II), phrased their statue in the same celebratory-narrative style.³¹

All this is obvious; what the patchiness of the record obscures is the specific detail of how Attalid rulers got themselves into war (whereas Diodoros for earlier periods, Polybios for bits of the third century, show us decision-making processes, constituencies, pressures, norms, breaches)—such phrases as 'the Attalid rupture with the Seleukids was consummated' or 'Attalos faced Hierax' or 'war broke out between Prousius and Eumenes', written in the eternal language of kings-and-battles history, do not really tell us what happened—the startling, Polybian light shed by the letter of Eumenes to Attis, quoted above, is an exception.

REASONS TO FIGHT: CULTURAL, STRUCTURAL

A culture of victory and of war permeates Attalid Pergamon, the result of the king's practice of warfare—the kings fought because

³⁰ Swoboda et al. 1935: no. 74 (RC 54).

³¹ *IvP* 64.

they could, and it was part of their situational identity. All the same, and beyond this general cultural point, the narrative makes clear that the Attalids fought different types of war. First, they fought local wars in Anatolia—which can be subdivided into three sub-categories: against big threats (Galatians, the Seleukid state, Philip V—though he claimed that the Rhodians and the Attalids had attacked him first);³² against peer rivals (Bithynia, from 208 to 149; Pontos; the Galatians again); against recalcitrant local entities (the Pisidian cities, notably Selge). The different types of rivals depend on the evolving political power and status of the Attalid kingdom: from a sharp-elbowed principality in its earlier history, to important regional power after 188 BC, which plays local power politics, and has to deal with local rebellion. The foundation of Eumeneia, recently elucidated by Peter Thonemann in the *longue durée*,³³ exemplifies the way in which the military needs of the Attalids shaped the regional space of Asia Minor. These local wars were part of the identity and legitimacy of the Attalids. Their stand against the Galatians allowed them to define themselves as the defenders of the Greek cities: this is explicit in the decree of the Ionians, paraphrased by Eumenes II in his reply.³⁴ Koehn has argued that this model, or scheme, allowed the Attalids to cast their regional competitors, the Bithynian kings, as an external threat.³⁵

Secondly, the Attalids participated in wars overseas, to a surprising extent. We know of an intervention in Crete, but, most importantly, the Attalids assisted the Roman wars in mainland Greece, from 209 BC to 146 BC, in eight conflicts (see above). These involvements (which necessitated special arrangements at home)³⁶ reflect Attalid choices, in the realm of high politics—the ‘mid-range power’ choice of involvement with the far-away superpower, the Roman republic, to resist the big players in the Aegean, the Antigonid and the Seleukid states. This was publicly proclaimed by Eumenes II, in his letter to the inhabitants of Toriaion, where he declared that his ownership of Asia Minor was firm, because it came from the Romans, who were victorious in war and in negotiations—a striking affirmation in its newness, and the public choice to locate power in association with Rome, rather than inheritance or conquest.³⁷ The same principle appears

³² Polyb. 18.6.2.

³³ Thonemann 2011a: 172–8.

³⁴ RC 52.

³⁵ Koehn 2007.

³⁶ Gauthier 2006: 500–1.

³⁷ *I. Sultan Dağ* 393 (earlier SEG 47, 1745); Thonemann, above pp. 5–7.

in the negotiations in the court of Attalos II, where some form of military action is decided against, because of fear of Roman disapproval or *schadenfreude* in case of defeat. The Attalid fleet obviously served primarily in this type of wars, ferrying the king, the princes, and troops to Greece (though it also served in local wars, against Pharnakes and against Prousius).

Thirdly, the Attalid pursued policies of power projection, as part of high politics: military involvement in Thrace,³⁸ or the support of the usurper Alexander Balas in the dynastic turmoil in Seleukid Syria.³⁹ This phenomenon is characteristic of the behaviour of the dynasty after 188, when territorial gains established it as a powerful, significant player in its own right. Some conflicts fall in between these categories (local/high)—the war in Asia Minor against Philip V continued the conflict started in the First Macedonian war; Prousius was a local rival, an ally of Macedonia, and a competitor for Roman support; the war against Antiochos was both a war at the side of Rome, and a war against the biggest threat to the Attalid hold in Asia Minor; the war in Thrace was a projection of Attalid power, but also a prolongation of the local conflict with Prousius II.

It would be mistaken to characterize the Attalid kingdom as Rome's lapdog, or the selfless defenders of embattled Hellenism in Asia Minor. The Attalid dynasty continuously pursued an aggressive and acquisitive policy: Attalos I overran Asia Minor in the wake of Seleukid collapse; he kept Aigina and Andros, when they opportunistically fell in his control during the First and Second Macedonian wars. Eumenes II grasped at the prize of cis-Tauric Asia Minor in the aftermath of Antiochos' defeat, entering conflict with the Rhodians; he aimed at control of Galatia. Attalid control of the enclave of Telmessos, and of Pamphylia, surrounded by insubordinate Pisidia, led to clashes and conflict. Control of Thrace led to conflict with Philip V over Ainos and Maroneia; the Rhodians complained about encroachment by Attalid officers on their Peraia,⁴⁰ and the Attalids fought in Pisidia against Selge⁴¹—a good illustration of the way in which enclaves and frontiers, in Thrace, in southern Anatolia, were pressure-points for Attalid expansion and aggression. Involvement in the game of high politics, opportunism and luck in foreign policy, a

³⁸ Sayar 1999, on Thracian involvement; SEG 49, 875.

³⁹ Diod. Sic. 31.32; McShane 1964: 189–90; Ehling 2008: 145.

⁴⁰ Polyb. 27.7.6. ⁴¹ Polyb. 32.1.5–6.

culture of victory, the evolution of the high political constellation—under all these lies the constant feature of acquisitiveness, pursued with available means, dynamically, throughout changes in scale of the scene in which the Attalids moved.

THE ATTALIDS AT WAR

Attalid troops performed well during the Macedonian wars, especially during the Third Macedonian war in Thessaly, or against the great Seleukid army at Magnesia, or during Manlius Vulso's Galatian campaign. However, in spite of the many years of war, it is not quite possible to say how the Attalids won or lost their battles—for instance against Prousius, the Galatians, or, earlier on, against Seleukid troops, including Antiochos I. Even so, it may be possible to discern some specificities of the Attalid army, especially compared with other Hellenistic armies.

A few broad issues emerge from the military narrative. The first is the relatively modest size of the Attalid army. The largest known contingent is the 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry which fought in the Third Macedonian war. This is an overseas involvement, and enough troops stayed in Asia Minor for Korrhagos, the *strategos* of Hellespontine Phrygia, to cross the Straits and attack Kotys, the Thracian ruler allied to Perseus.⁴² At Magnesia, the Attalid contingent was made up of 2,000 infantry and 700 cavalry—the small size is explained by the need to garrison Pergamon, and the unfavourable conditions of the arrival of Eumenes and Attalos, who were not able to land at Elaia because of adverse winds. These figures are strikingly small, an order of magnitude lower than the figures known for the great dynasties. No figures are known for the Anatolian wars after 188: we do not know if the great territorial increase of the kingdom was matched by a severalfold increase in active military means. The Attalid state also maintained full-time garrisons in strategic points, as attested in a fragmentary letter of (probably) Eumenes II, and by a recently published list of members of a cultic association of Asklepiasts: the association was founded by the garrison commander (*phourarchos*)

⁴² Launey 1950 [1987]: 320.

in charge of a mountain guardpost on the strategic direct route between Lydia and Pergamon.⁴³ Such forces, however, might have been concentrated in time of 'hot' conflict to produce war-fighting contingents.

In spite of the thinness of the evidence, I would suggest that the Attalid military resources were constantly small, or rather respectably regional in scale. For the earlier period, I propose something like 12,000 men, in all arms, as a *wartime* maximum, including the royal campaigning army, any 'second front' or diversionary columns, temporary forces of mercenaries, and stay-behind garrisons. Even after the acquisition of Asia Minor, the Attalid forces do not seem to have been much stronger. Attalid armies consistently yielded before concentrated threats, such as Achaïos' offensive, Philip V in 201, the Seleukid army in 190, the Galatians in 168, or Prousius II in 156—in all of these cases, except the Galatian war, enemy troops were able to march up to the walls of Pergamon itself, and ravage Pergamene territory. The failure of Attalid forces to resist the Galatian attacks in 168 is the more striking for having taken place twenty years after the acquisition of the former Seleukid holdings in Asia Minor. The impregnability of the citadel only underlines the inability of the Attalid army to resist, or, in the case of the post-188 conflicts, to mobilize in an effective and timely manner. The frontier (if that is the right word) was staved in by foreign invasion, in 168, and again in 156. The recently published inscription (kept in Pamukkale but of uncertain provenance) relating to the Galatian war seems to indicate that an individual set out to fight with a privately raised army (comparable to the militia raised by Sotas, a citizen of Priene, in the first Galatian invasion in 277)—perhaps a confirmation of the slowness and ineffectiveness of the Attalid mobilization.⁴⁴ Much of the Attalid armies seem to have been constituted of light troops, such as those who fought against the Seleukids at Magnesia or the Galatians at Mt Olympos, or who protected the Roman road-builders in Thrace in 170, or who preserved Attalos I from capture by a sudden

⁴³ RC 51, ll. 29–30; Müller 2010.

⁴⁴ Guizzi 2006; Ritti 2008: no. 7 (SEG 57, 1109). Guizzi (*ed. pr.*) interprets the document, a letter of Eumenes II, as addressed to Tabai (followed, cautiously, by Thonemann, above pp. 15–16), but this city is located in Eastern Karia, under Rhodian control at the time of the Galatian war. Perhaps the city of Sala? (on which see Thonemann 2008: 50–1). The city was located in Eastern Lydia (Thonemann: Derbent), and a stone from the site could have travelled to the Pamukkale museum.

surge of Macedonian troops;⁴⁵ in addition, cavalry seems to have made up a high proportion of Attalid armies, or at least of the expeditionary corps sent over to Greece. On the other hand, the last decades of the dynasty suggest that the Attalid forces were larger and capable of successful aggression or even conquest, as in the case of the defeat of Prousius II in 149, or the Thracian expeditions of Attalos II and III.

A second issue is the size of the Attalid fleet: 35 tetreres sailed to Greece in 209; 20 did the same in the Third Macedonian war, and the convoy of Galatian cavalry destroyed by the Macedonians counted 35 horse-transports. At Chios, in 201, the joint fleet of the Rhodians and Attalids counted 65 big ships; the Attalid ships had towers, and in fact Attalos I aligned more kataphract ships than Philip V.⁴⁶ Though the Bithynian fleet is said to have defeated the Attalid (in the war of 184–182) thanks to Hannibal's trick of scorpion- and snake-filled jars used as projectiles during the naval battle, during the war of 156–154, the last phase of the war, a fleet of 80 ships ravaged coastal cities allied to Bithynia—27 Attalid, the rest allies.⁴⁷ The fleet seems very respectable, throughout the history of the dynasty, from 209 to 155 (and 148); its remnants fought (unsuccessfully) for Aristonikos/Eumenes III.⁴⁸ The number of ships is not huge, but is made up of large, top of the range, heavily equipped units: this tendency is characteristic of the Hellenistic east, and the Attalid fleet is in fact in the same range as the Rhodian fleet (which never counted more than about 40 heavy ships of the line).⁴⁹ The ongoing excavation and survey work at Elaia shows, early on, substantial investment in the main harbour of Pergamon⁵⁰—a sign of how important the fleet was for the Attalid state—as a means for strategic projection of force, both to tip the balance in local wars (as when Eumenes tried to blockade the Hellespont against Pharnakes of Pontos),⁵¹ and to participate in 'high-diplomacy' wars abroad (as in the repeated participation in wars in Greece on the side of Rome). In other words, the small size of the land army was balanced by the investment in as large and powerful a fleet

⁴⁵ Liv. 42.67.4.

⁴⁶ Polyb. 16.2–4.

⁴⁷ Polyb. 33.13.

⁴⁸ Strabo 14.1.38.

⁴⁹ Wiemer 2002, specifically 141 and n. 9 with further bibliography.

⁵⁰ Pirson 2004 and current work summarized in *MDAI(A)*.

⁵¹ Polyb. 27.7.5.

as the Attalids could afford, as an important resource to play the great game of high politics which characterizes their military history.

A third issue is that of supply, logistics, and economics. In the case of the Attalid fleet, the supply of timber, pitch, flax, or the hiring and paying of crews, remain obscure questions. In the case of the army, the temporary arms workshop set up by Philetairos, or the mention, in an honorific decree, of the supplying of cash by a citizen of Apameia, during the Galatian war,⁵² hint at the way in which the Attalid army was also an economic phenomenon, as a mass consumer of goods and money, as a mass of men to be paid in coin, as an extractor of agricultural surplus, stimulator of demand, destructor, protector, predator; and at the way in which the wars of the Attalids were an economic phenomenon. The theme is the relation between the famous wealth of the Attalids (which Polybios singles out as the most important resource at the disposal of Attalos I when he succeeded Eumenes I),⁵³ and the military manifestations of the Attalid state (as well as its other manifestations, especially the prestige work of art and architectural euergetism). The military history of the Attalids intersects with the economic history of the Attalids, which is emerging with increasing clarity thanks to the numismatic research on Asia Minor (summarized in this volume). A simpler way of recasting this theme as a problem is to ask how the Attalids afforded all this fighting, as they did throughout their history.

MYSIANS, MACEDONIANS, MILITARY COLONISTS

The, or an, Attalid army takes the field—what does it look like? The same question for the Seleukid army is easy to answer, thanks to detailed evidence, and a sense of Seleukid realities: a standing army of ‘Guard’ units in infantry and heavy cavalry and specialist troops (elephants); a Macedonian phalanx drawn from Seleukid colonies and cities; a variety (sometimes a whole menagerie) of levies from subject communities; and mercenaries fighting as light infantry and also medium-to-heavy, *aspis*- or *thureos*- armed infantry.⁵⁴ What of

⁵² SEG 50, 1195; MAMA VI 173.

⁵³ Polyb. 18.41.

⁵⁴ Bar-Kochva 1976; Sekunda 2007: 336–48.

the Attalid army? The answer, again, changes according to periods: the army of Philetairos, of Attalos I, of Attalos II, reflected the different political situation. To start, it is unclear, for all periods, whether the Attalid state had a small standing army, of the 'Guards' model; the bronze-faced *peltai* given by Philetairos to Kyme were meant for a Macedonian-style phalanx fielded by the dynast, and the 'Macedonian shield' found in the excavation of the Arsenal terrace north of the citadel might have belonged to an Attalid phalangite (though the presence of battle damage to the facing, and of fixation holes for nails, has lead Peltz to interpret it as a piece of booty)⁵⁵—but how recruited? Is the availability of 1,000 shields an indication that the phalanx is 'temporary', recruited for the needs of a specific campaign, or that there exists a permanent phalanx, with reserve equipment at its disposal in order to keep it on a combat footing? The question is not yet answerable—but affects the question of the nature and typicality of the Attalid kingdom. The presence of an open-air camp (*to hypaithron*), next to the city of Tralleis, and under the command of the same *strategos* who acted as the city-governor, is suggestive.⁵⁶ This is perhaps a transit camp for training or refitting, rather than winter quarters under canvas. The location near Tralleis can be interpreted in view of its proximity to Ephesos, whose harbour might have served to ship in mercenaries or ship out seaborne expeditions; furthermore, the Maeander valley might have served both to concentrate troops and as the jumping-off point for eastwards expeditions. However, in itself, the existence of the Tralleis open-air camp does not answer questions about the composition and recruitment of the Attalid armies. We still need to examine the origin and nature of the different types of contingents, from mercenaries to military settlers,⁵⁷ which might have camped near Tralleis.

Like every Hellenistic monarchy, the Attalids clearly employed important numbers of mercenaries.⁵⁸ The mutinous troops with whom Eumenes I negotiated were mercenaries, as shown by their

⁵⁵ Peltz 2001.

⁵⁶ SEG 46, 1434; on troops in the open air, OGIS 229.89–109, with Bickerman 1938: 83–4, and Iossif and Lorber 2010.

⁵⁷ Baldly, in RC 16 and 51; *I.Ilion* 64, with Catling 2004–9, might be the list of an Attalid military colony absorbed by Ilion.

⁵⁸ The garrison attested by a fragmentary royal letter (RC 51) is made up of *μισθοφόροι*.

concerns (notably the length of their contract, and pay).⁵⁹ The origin of these mercenaries was, unsurprisingly, both diverse and shaped by the geography of professionalized warfare in the Hellenistic period. A list of men, probably Attalid mercenaries enfranchised (along with their families) by the city of Ilion, can be traced onomastically as originating in north-western Asia Minor (see below), but also Ionia, Crete, Illyria, and Macedonia (or the post-Alexander Macedonian diaspora), a fairly typical assemblage of Hellenistic fighting men.⁶⁰ One group specifically named is the 'Traleis', members of a Thracian tribe (named in lexicographers as specifically hired by Hellenistic kings for dirty work); seventy odd years later, Traleis fought in Attalid ranks at Magnesia and in the following Galatian campaign.⁶¹ Thracians also appear in the garrison at Aigina, and now in the fort in the Yüntdağ, where the commander, Demetrios son of Seuthes, was at least of Thracian origin, and Eumenes III/Aristonikos depended on a large personal guard of Thracians (who captured and killed the defeated Roman consul P. Licinius Crassus).⁶² The Attalid garrison left at Lilaia in 208 comprised a good number of mercenaries (40 per cent of the total), from as far as Italy, and as near as the cities of Asia Minor, with many Cretans; Cretans are also frequently named in the literary sources, as soldiers and officers, and the Attalids maintained alliances with the Cretan cities (Eumenes II with thirty at a go).⁶³ An alliance with Kydonia even led to the dispatch of 300 Attalid troops to assist the city in 170. Big recruitment drives of mercenaries are mentioned in 167, during the Galatian war, and during the war of 156–154 against Prousius II, when Attalos II trained them hard, both for the conflict, and to demonstrate before Rome his power and independence.⁶⁴ The Galatians mentioned in an unpublished letter of Attalos II (the 'Galatians in Kleonnaeion') under the command of one Aribazos, may belong to the preparations in the run-up to the war against Prousius.⁶⁵ Finally, Galatians were used as

⁵⁹ OGIS 268.

⁶⁰ *I.Ilion* 64 with Catling 2004–9: 431–2.

⁶¹ Launey 1950 [1987]: 73.

⁶² Launey 1950 [1987]: 380, on *IG IV²* 2, 929, 934, 935; *BE* 1951, 95; *ISE* 36 n. 7; Müller 2010: 430 (on Val. Max. 3.2).

⁶³ *ISE* 81, with Launey 1950 [1987]: 71–3; Launey 1950 [1987]: 267.

⁶⁴ Diod. Sic. 31.14.

⁶⁵ *I.Pessinous*, p. 1; *SEG* 55, 1401 (<http://www.archaeology.ugent.be/pessinus/inscription>). I thank Riet van Bremen for the reference, and indeed for knowledge

auxiliaries by Eumenes II in Greece during the Third Macedonian war—they were probably provided by the Galatian communities in their period of subjection after the wars against Prousius I and Pharnakes, but presumably paid, just as Galatians in the troops of Antiochos III in 190 were paid (*mercede conductis*).⁶⁶

Earlier, the only time Galatians are attested (in the admittedly sparse record) in Attalid ranks is in 218 BC, when Attalos I embarked on a vigorous armed tour of north-western Asia Minor during the absence of Achaïos.⁶⁷ The reason for this must be that Achaïos' vigorous campaigning had cut Attalos I off from a vital area for Attalid military needs, namely Mysia.⁶⁸ The campaign of 218 shows the support system, the two lungs of the Attalid monarchy: the support of the old Greek cities of Aiolis, Ionia, and Troad, and the human resources of rural Mysia—which I define as a vast, complex area north-east of Lydia, to the east of the Smooth Mysia of the Balıkesir plain, the Savaştepe valley, and indeed the Kaikos valley. The direction of Attalos' march into the rough upper Makestos valley, towards 'the settlements of the Mysians' (*katoikiai*), even if the word does not designate military colonies, was linked with recruitment needs that could be satisfied by political control—which, of course, was established by the tools of violence provided by the recruitment of troops. Mysians are well attested in the citizenship grants at Lilaia: 45.6 per cent of the Attalid garrison are Mysians, perhaps recruited in the drive of 218 or a subsequent period of control or contact (tolerated by Antiochos III, and perhaps terminated by Prousius' invasion of 208).⁶⁹ The same context (Attalid recruitment and involvement in the mainland Greek war of Attalos I, alongside the Aitolian League) explains the appearance of many Mysians (detectable by their onomastics) in a list of Attalid troops inscribed in the federal shrine of the Aitolian League at Thermon.⁷⁰ Finally, Mysians are present among the military population of Pergamon in 133 BC (along with another

of this document. The *hegemon* has an Iranian name: for parallels, see Phylarchos *FGrHist* 81F2; Robert 1963: 514–19.

⁶⁶ Liv. 37.18.7 (forces under the future Seleukos IV, ravaging the Pergamene countryside).

⁶⁷ Polyb. 5.77; Ma 2002: 58–60.

⁶⁸ On Mysia and Mysians, Debord 2001; on Mysian colonization, Debord 1985; Robert 1987: 138–47, originally *BCH* 102 (1978) 443–51, for 'wooded Mysia'.

⁶⁹ Launey 1950 [1987]: 71–3; Fraser 2009: 94–5.

⁷⁰ Catling 2004–9, on *IG IX* 1² 60.

ethnic group, the Masdyenoi, perhaps a subgroup of Mysians or a local non-Greek community).⁷¹ These Mysians probably served as levies rather than as mercenaries (even if they fought alongside mercenaries, such as Cretans),⁷² i.e. as troops provided for free or sub-market compensation by communities as obligations reflecting dependency or integration, and not freely hired on the market at market rates.

We might imagine the appearance and function of Mysian soldiers from two funerary *stelai* (Figs 2.1 and 2.2), found near the village of Yigitler in the district of Demirci, and now in the Archaeological Museum at Manisa. These monuments almost certainly date to the very late second century BC, after the end of the Attalid dynasty. The first one shows a cavalryman, wearing composite cuirass and chlamys, standing by a heavy charger held by an attendant. The second *stele* shows a family scene including a man wearing a muscle cuirass, and accompanied by a batman carrying a *thyreos* adorned with a winged thunderbolt.⁷³ It is hence probable that Mysians supplied not simply light infantry (javelineers), but also heavy cavalry as well as line infantry to the Attalid state—even if the two *stelai*, with their very high-quality reliefs, allusions to civic institutions (the deceased in the first stele was honoured by four local *poleis*-like communities, whose *demos* is named inside a finely carved crown, as anywhere in the Hellenistic world), or clearly stated cultural claims (the second *stele* contains an elaborate family epigram), reflect the aspirations of communities and individuals in a post-Attalid landscape. These cultural traits constitute another illustration of the Hellenizing impact of the needs and demands of the Attalid state.

This particular landscape is of particular interest to understand the strategies pursued by the Attalid state, and their local impact: the two *stelai* were found in an area of state-managed Mysian colonization,

⁷¹ OGIS 338.

⁷² Liv. 42.57.7.

⁷³ Malay 1983 and pl. 3 a, with the Roberts, *BE* 1984, 385 (but I see no compelling reason to believe that the *stele* commemorates a man who was killed during the war of Aristonikos); Petzl 1991: 83–5, no. 1 and pl. 3 (SGO 04/13/01). The thunderbolt is a Macedonian shield motif, as N. Sekunda points out in his forthcoming Osprey volume on *The Macedonian Army After Alexander* (the subject is also the theme of ongoing research by Nikoronov); in the meantime, see Juhel 2010, in addition to whose references Sekunda directs me to a small terracotta *thyreos* probably from Asia Minor (purchased in the nineteenth century in Smyrna, but this merely reflects the importance of that city in the antiquities trade): Schürman 1989: no. 575.




Fig. 2.1. Funerary *stèle* from Yigitler. Photo courtesy of Cumhur Tanriver.

the so-called Mysia Abbaeitis (the meaning of the name is obscure) which stretched from Aizanoi and the Simav (Makestos) valley all the way into Eastern Lydia. In post-Attalid Asia Minor, Mysia Abbaeitis appears organized as an extensive federal entity regrouping a number of *poleis*, with its own political and religious institutions, as well as a strong military identity at the individual level—these are the features



Fig. 2.2. Funerary *stèle* from Yiğitler. Photo courtesy of Cumhur Tanriver.

illustrated by the Yiğitler *stelai*.⁷⁴ Many of these features were determined by the organization of the region by the Attalid state, namely the massive settlement of Mysians, during the years after the Galatian war of 168–165 BC, in the frontier zone between Mysia, Lydia, and Phrygia, in organized military communities placed in strategic sites and along major routes, living off producers in the countryside.⁷⁵ An important document comes from Sındırgı, located in a rich basin off the Simav valley.⁷⁶ This inscription was set up by soldiers (*stratiōtai*)

⁷⁴ The name was already current at the end of the Attalid dynasty, as shown by a decree from Bargylia passed after the war of Aristonikos, recently republished by Blümel: *SEG* 44, 867 (earlier *I.Iasos* 612). On Mysia Abbaeitis, *OGIS* 446, *SEG* 34, 1198; 53, 1357; Franz 1840; Munro and Anthony 1897; Buresch 1898: 142–4, 155; Imhoof-Blumer 1898; Robert, *OMS* VII 419–20; the Roberts' long essay in *BE* 1984, 384.

⁷⁵ For parallels, and the phenomenon generally, Cohen 1978; Daubner 2011 argues against the notion of military colonization, but the evidence from Taşkuyucak decisively proves its validity.

⁷⁶ *OGIS* 330, with Robert 1962: 76–8, who is the first among modern scholars to have noticed that the so-called 'dédicace de Gelenbe' was first seen in Sındırgı: Sestini 1807: 135–6 (stone seen in 1782 in Gelenbe, but had been brought from 'Sindrië' by the Greek priest in Gelenbe; the priest mentions ancient ruins at Sındırgı; Sestini bought the stone and carried it to Constantinople, where I assume it was acquired by Sestini's patron, Robert Ainslie; Ainslie must have given the inscription to the British Museum).

from a settlement in this area, who crossed to the Chersonese and Thrace, and commemorated their safe return by a dedication in a local shrine. These were almost certainly Mysian settlers living in one of the villages surrounding the Sındırgı basin,⁷⁷ and serving in the Attalid army to fulfil obligations to the state. The dedication from Sındırgı contrasts with the dedications from Pergamon itself: at least on the preserved section of the small *stèle* or base, there is no mention of the ruling king, of struggle and victory, or of specific enemies, and hence no sense of celebration of identity through participation in the Attalid project; but these ex-soldiers use an Attalid regnal year—and, most importantly, they use Greek, and epigraphy, for a cultural gesture back home, another illustration of the ‘Hellenizing’ impact of Attalid military needs.⁷⁸

The aim and modalities of Mysian colonization are illuminated by a recently published document from Lydia (modern Taşkuyucak) as presented above by Peter Thonemann. Notable features of this document are first, the attribution of villages, land, and income to settlements of Mysians in Lydia (likewise the Mysians at Emoddi honour a *geodotes*);⁷⁹ secondly, the Achaemenid-style displacement of population and resettlement of individuals, to fit the state’s needs; and thirdly, the explicit military aims of the colony, and royal measures to foster its military utility. The king explicitly speaks of a reliable supply of ‘more soldiers’, *pleious stratiōtas*; the soldiers are conscripted at a fixed rate (one out of three—whatever the expression means). Members of the colony are punished for desertion (and perhaps cowardice). The military colony itself is supported by land grants, for cultivation but also exploitation: it owns villages of its own, such as the sacred village which the colony has sold off to a local landowner, and which it wishes to buy back with royal support. The sacred village produces income that supports a cult of Zeus Stratios, a suitably military deity. The document thus shows the military purpose of the colony, but also its existence as a self-sustaining

⁷⁷ Robert 1962: 78: 50–60 villages in the district in the seventeenth century (on the basis of the Ottoman geographer Kâtib Çelebi, mentioned by Vivien de Saint-Martin); Philippson 1913: 6 speaks of 72 villages; Sestini 1807: 136, is the only writer I know who mentions ancient remains at Sındırgı.

⁷⁸ Catling 2004–9 hints at the importance Kyzikos seems to have had in the ‘Hellenization’ of Mysia; this role can be imagined in view of the role of Kyzikos as an economic centre, but also as a major power centre in the region.

⁷⁹ SEG 40, 1062 (area of Saittai; under Eumenes II).

community endowed with its own holdings and subordinate villages, and its dynastic culture of ruler cult and soldier cults; this picture confirms the implications of the dedication from Sındırgı, and of the *stelai* from Yiğitler.

The Taşkuyucak *stele* helps us to imagine the details of other military colonies. The same military rationale can be seen in organization of the Mysians at Gordos: these were stationed under an officer (*hegemon*), a commander officer, which perhaps implies that they are liable for call-up and active service.⁸⁰ Gordos is a strategic site, already garrisoned under Antiochos III, as was the fortress at Kad(o)oi (Gediz), where Mysians are mentioned by the Taşkuyucak document, and indeed as Taşkuyucak itself was (near ancient Daldis, on another significant route cutting from Akhisar in the Lydian plain to Philadelphia in the Kogamos valley).⁸¹ The Mysian colonization, however (as well as the Macedonian colonization I shall discuss later), failed to prevent the invasion of 156: its main rationale was not as frontier fortresses, but as reserves of manpower. In addition, it is clear that part of the goal is tax income, as indicated by the temporary exemption. The foundation of military colonies creates a military class, supported by estates and by the income of dependent villages, thus obviating the need for pay that makes the employ of mercenaries so expensive—but also provides surplus that can be taxed by the Attalid state, notably to pay for supplementary military forces. (At least, that seems to be the implication of the unpublished letter of Attalos II, which is said to concern the levying of taxation off plots held by settlers, to produce military *misthos*.) The productive function of military colonies also appears in the fragmentary letter of an early Attalid, mentioned several times already.⁸² Military colonies hence played the role of enabling exploitation and control of the countryside: they were a vital expression of the state's capacities.

The relations between the Attalid kingdom and the Mysians reversed the negotiated hostility that had pertained between the

⁸⁰ TAM V 1, 690, where we might understand that the Mysians, with their officer, are not just a garrison but already a settlement, the ancestors of the 'Mysoi Abbaeitai in Gordos' who pass a decree immediately after the war of Aristonikos (SEG 34, 1198).

⁸¹ Gördes: TAM V 1, 689. Gediz: Buresch 1898: 156–60 (even heroic Buresch seems to have found 'das unwirtliche Gediz' rather hard going); Philippson 1913: 110 (bottleneck, fort). Daldis: Foss 1987: 92–4 (road attested by Peutinger map).

⁸² RC 51.

Achaemenid satrap and Iranian nobility in north-west Asia Minor;⁸³ because of the manpower needs of the Attalid state, driven by its constant involvement in regional and supra-regional warfare, compounded by the lack of an Achaemenid-style military landed aristocracy of 'barons' and settlers, the Attalids kept close relations with the Mysian highland communities. They regularly used their demographic disponibilities in the form of mercenaries and levies, and moving settlers, in a controlled, state-managed *Wanderung* (which led to subsequent ethnogenesis), down from rural Mysia to available land in Mysia Abbaeitis, which we can interpret as a semi-frontier network of roads starting just south of the Upper Rhyndakos valley, leading towards Lydia and the West (Simav valley and branch-offs, Demirci corridor, Gördes). The technique used amounted to the saturation of the connective landscape with military settlements, rather than the foundation of large fortified cities (as took place in other landscapes).⁸⁴ Mysia Abbaeitis was the theatre of difficult military operations during the war of Aristonikos,⁸⁵ which implies the loyalty shown to Eumenes III by some of the Mysian military colonists, in their fortified sites (though others clearly rallied to Rome).⁸⁶ Later, the presence of Mysians in gymnasiarchy lists in post-Attalid Pergamon perhaps reflects the continuity of the attractiveness of Pergamon to the Mysian highlands.⁸⁷

⁸³ Ma 2008.

⁸⁴ Philippson 1913: 6 (traffic from Sındırgı towards Kırkağaç and Smyrna), 20 (road from Demirci to Salihli). Demirci was famous for its carpets, like Gördes; the products of the cottage industry were shipped to Istanbul or Izmir: Quataert 1986. As already mentioned, the dedication by ex-Attalid troops travelled from Sındırgı to the Gelenbe crossroads, down the mountain road towards the Kaikos valley. It is therefore important not to exaggerate the barrier between Lydia and the Simav valley (on which e.g. Watzinger 1944: 188, quoting Th. Wiegand on the mountain 'das wie eine grosse Scheidewand zwischen Mysien und Pergamon steht'; Robert 1955: 313). On the powers of mountains to unite as well as separate, van Berchem 1982.

⁸⁵ As shown by the decree from Bargylia, already mentioned above (SEG 44, 867); Robert 1962: 264–8 splendidly vivid, but seeing the phenomenon as 'révolte des paysans indigènes'; Robert and Robert 1989: 31–4, likewise perhaps overprimitivizing Mysia, since Mysia Abbaeitis is a landscape of roads occupied by an aspirational military ethno-class set up in settlements by the Attalid state. Admittedly, the fighting described in the Bargylian decree took place in the 'upper districts' of Mysia Abbaeitis, which perhaps designates the mountains north and north-east of the valley roads where the military settlements were located.

⁸⁶ SEG 33, 1198; TAM V 1, 444 with BE 1984, 385.

⁸⁷ Robert 1962: 80–1. De Planhol 1952, in an article on seasonal migration and work patterns in twentieth-century rural Turkey, speaks of the attraction of the

Other military elements were left over from the Seleukid apparatus, after 188 BC. The Kyrrians who fought with the Attalid forces in Thessaly in 171 might be a former Seleukid contingent which had been captured or which had surrendered after Magnesia;⁸⁸ they might also be Iranian military colonists, like the inhabitants of the Kardakōn kōmē in Telmessos.⁸⁹ I also wonder if the Masdyenoi, from a place named Masdye (any links with Auramazda, or the mazdo-phoric name of a Persian 'baron?'), are Iranian in origin (comparable to the Maibozanoi near Mermere).⁹⁰ Most importantly, Macedonian communities appear, starting in the reign of Eumenes II, making dedications, always dutifully preceded by the mention of the ruling king and his regnal year, in the form *hoi Makedones ek* . . . In one case, the Makedones honour a *polites*, which implies belonging to a *polis*; in another, they make a dedication on behalf of their *strategos* Derdas, which implies military organization, since the phrasing does not fit a civic magistrate or an Attalid governor.⁹¹ Derdas must be a general commanding active or reserve units, to which a group of Macedonian settlers belong, just as the Mysians at Gordos are still under the command of a *hegemon*, and the *katoikoi* at Amorion (attested in the unpublished letter of Attalos II) are under a *hegemon*, who also commands Galatians in a settlement.⁹² The great city of Philadelphia may also have been, originally, a colony peopled with Macedonian military settlers, as suggested by the Macedonian shield on the city's coinage.⁹³ The Macedonian colonies are concentrated in Lydia, and must be the same sort of communities as the Macedonians in Thyateira who honoured Seleukos I (OGIS 211): military colonists, descendants of Macedonians settled, perhaps by Antigonos Monophthalmos, and taken over by the Seleukids. After 188, they passed under Attalid control, and presumably provided troops for the

Aegean zones (including the Kaikos valley) on what he calls 'Mysia', using the ancient term as geographical shorthand. The extensive Sındırgı basin itself attracts workers from the Upper Simav region, just like the Lydian plain and the Kaikos valley.

⁸⁸ Liv. 42.58.13; H. Weissbach, *RE* 12.205 (Kyrrioi previously attested in Seleukid army: Polyb. 5.52.5, Liv. 37.40).

⁸⁹ Maier 1959–61: no. 76 (*SEG* 19, 867).

⁹⁰ Launey 1950 [1987]: 581.

⁹¹ *TAM* V 2, 1190

⁹² *I.Pessinous*, p. 1 (*SEG* 55, 1401).

⁹³ Thonemann 2011a: 174–5, discussing *BE* 1958, 436; epigraphical evidence in Tatakı 1998: 262 (a man explicitly described as a Macedonian), 305 (Macedonian name), both examples dating to the mid-second century.

wars of Eumenes II, Attalos II, and Attalos III (though they are never mentioned separately in literary sources). Like the Mysians of the Abbaeitis, they rallied to Eumenes III, who struck cistophoroi in the colonies in Lydia, and indeed made his last stand in one of these cities, Stratonikeia on Kaikos; their loyalty to the dynasty indicated their close association with it, and their importance for Attalid military needs.

Attalid Asia Minor was a militarized landscape of mercenaries, Mysians (from Smooth Mysia, rural Mysia, and the managed colonization in Mysia Abbaeitis), Macedonians, and other military settlers. Examples of the last category have already been given; we should also mention the *katoikoi* in Amorion, of unspecified origin, and perhaps the Galatians in Kleonneion, under the command of the *hegemon* Aribazos (known from an unpublished document found near Pessinous). This document, already adduced several times above, shows the diversity of sources for recruitment into the Attalid army, and the impact of the Attalid state's military needs on the landscape of Asia Minor. This diversity, and this impact, are encapsulated in the name of a community in the Upper Kaystros valley, the *Mysomakedones*, almost certainly an Attalid foundation (the Mysian element, and the attention to control of the Kaystros valley are decisive indications).⁹⁴ Conversely, a Macedonian settlement (appearing by the first century AD under the bald name *Makedones*) was implanted somewhere in the Makestos valley, in Mysia Abbaeitis, probably under the Attalids.⁹⁵ The same pattern of fortification and reinforced control can be seen to have taken place in at least two other points of post-188 Attalid Asia Minor. First, Eumeneia, a city founded at a strategic node on the course of the Maeander, tightened control on the frontier with Galatia. Secondly, Pamphylia constituted a frontier zone in contact with Rhodian-held Lykia, Seleukid Kilikia, and recalcitrant yet inextricably close Pisidia; the Attalid presence took the form of the fortification of pre-existing settlements as well as the foundation of a new city, Attaleia.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Debord 1985: 348–9, with bibliography; on the Kaystros valley, SEG 46, 1434 (*strategos* of the district around Ephesos).

⁹⁵ Habicht 1975: 71–2, thus reinterpreting Pliny, NH 5.111, where mention is made of *Macedones*, *Cadieni* (not '*Macedones Cadieni*'), etc., in the *conventus* of Sardeis.

⁹⁶ Thonemann 2011a: 172–8; McNicoll 1997: 118–56.

The last significant component is the Pergamene citizen soldiers. Pergamenes make up a substantial group (just under 20 per cent) of the soldiers sent by Attalos I to garrison Lilaia, and are well attested in the prosopography of Attalid high officers. Apart from the Lilaia lists, there is no explicit evidence for Pergamene soldiers in the Attalid army, but I would argue that if Pergamenes were present in the force taken by the king on his overseas expedition, they would, *a fortiori*, be part of the troops fighting closer to home, against regional threats or competitors such as the Galatians or the Bithynian kingdom. The Attalid armies therefore included citizen soldiers and officers from the city that was the heart of the kingdom—from the town itself, or perhaps from the extensive Pergamene territory.

These are the ‘great Telephidai’ of the epigram containing a prayer to Herakles, which does not have to come from the siege of 156 BC, but could have been written at any moment in Attalid history. The identity of the citizens of Pergamon was shaped by military prowess, a sense of achievement in the face of threats and obstacles. The close link between city and dynasty is very specific to the Attalid kingdom. It is true that it recalls the local rootedness of the other dynasties. The Antigonids were closely supported by the Macedonian cities, whose institutions meshed with the royal state and whose citizens provided the trained conscripts who fought in the phalanx, down to the slaughter at Pydna.⁹⁷ In the Seleukid empire the importance of the cities of northern Syria appears in the presence of *politikoi hippeis* in the procession at Daphne under Antiochos IV, and the participation of citizen soldiers in the eastern expedition of Antiochos VII, and may also be guessed at in the unrest in northern Syria at the accession of Antiochos III and Antiochos I.⁹⁸ These cases remind us that the Hellenistic kingdoms were not purely free-floating personal monarchies, and more than just bundles of roles and commitments, but had essential identities.

But the Attalid dynasty was closely based in a single city, as opposed to the national model espoused by the Ptolemies and Antigonids, or the ‘nomadic’ or ‘chameleon’ model adopted by the Seleukids. Pergamene men and women (as attested by the honorific statues of priestesses) felt associated to the dynasty and its high-political adventure. Even if it is scarcely attested, even if we do not know

⁹⁷ Hatzopoulos 2001.

⁹⁸ Polyb. 30.25.5; OGIS 219.

anything about modalities of recruitment, service, numbers, the participation of Pergamene citizens in the Attalid army is a significant clue to the involvement of a citizen population in the military and political project shaped by the kings. Ideology, culture, and political pressure certainly played a role in this involvement. We might also wonder about the share of Pergamene citizens and generally Pergamene society in the profits of war, namely booty (especially slaves), land, gifts, and pay derived from the constant military activity of the dynasty, both in the form of high-politics (the wars in mainland Greece) and the wars of proximity fought in Anatolia.

THE ATTALIDS AS MILITARY MONARCHY

The continual practice of warfare for a small, or mid-range, kingdom appears as significant as for the three large kingdoms. War and victory was central to Attalid legitimacy in Asia Minor; even more generally, war *was* foreign policy, against local threats and competitors, but also in the arena of high-politics, where involvement in overseas wars allowed contacts with other powers, the Aitolians, and, almost immediately, Rome. Participation in this game was a part of risk-taking and contracts that underlay royal success or simply survival, in a sort of 'high connectivity' of royal politics—which influenced the political landscape during, and after, the period of Attalid power. Hence the activity of the Attalid fleet, maintained at a high level, and enabling involvement in high connectivity. If you had the chance to ask an Attalid ruler why he fought, perhaps he might have answered that he had no choice—for instance, no choice not to attack Philip V—and that his decisions were the carefully considered results of rational calculations of costs and benefit (as reported by Attalos II in his letter to Attis, summarizing debate in the royal council). But Polybios' obituary of Attalos I offers a clear view of the parameters of action: the pursuit of *basileia*, with all that entails—once that was set as an aim, all else followed.⁹⁹ Should we take Polybios' analysis at its word?

⁹⁹ Polyb. 18.41.

As mentioned earlier, Attalid wars also need considering as an economic phenomenon—and raise the problem of the Attalid royal economy. The Attalid kings could afford this level of warfare; Polybios singles out the great wealth of Attalos I as his only starting asset (18.41). How much was funded by the original start-up capital of 9,000 talents, which fell into Philetairos' control after the defeat and death of Lysimachos at Kouropedion in 281? How much was paid for by the efficient extraction of surplus, the successful transformation of political domination into manpower? What difference did post-188 expansion make? A hypothetical historical sketch might run as follows. From 281 to 261, the sums in the treasury, drawn down (but at what rhythm?), and the income from taxation and tribute (a few hundred talents per annum?) in the Attalid heartland of the Kaikos valley, the highlands on both sides, and the coastal strip, were sufficient to enable the dynasts to maintain a force of mercenaries, practise benefaction on a noticeable scale, and interact with the Galatians, through warfare and through tribute. Territorial expansion allowed for increase of revenue, as a very necessary resource to keep the small-scale Attalid operation going. The following two decades saw conflict with the Seleukid state: the Attalids maintained their independence, but at a high price to their finances as a result of ramping up military expenditure to resist Seleukid pressure. This financial factor explains the great Attalid gamble, the refusal to pay tribute to the Galatians, and the subsequent military conflict, at the precise time of dynastic upheaval in the Seleukid realm. The gamble paid off, and allowed for territorial expansion (short-lived), but also wars of plunder and territorial acquisition in the western Aegean and mainland Greece. The end of the third century, with the Seleukid resurgence, must have put pressure on the Attalid treasury again (with the shrinking of the Attalid dominion, but without commensurate scaling-down of military commitments), until the bonanza of 188, whose consequences I might suggest to have been an increase of tribute and taxation revenues to perhaps 1,500–2,000 talents a year, purely as a guess, but also the intensified use of royal land to endow the system of military colonies and settlers which is well attested for the post-188 Attalid state.¹⁰⁰

A slightly different way to consider these issues is to view warfare as a means for legitimacy, cohesion, and hence social control in the

¹⁰⁰ Debord 1985.

Attalid space. The participation of the ‘great Telephidai’ in the wars of the dynasty ensured solidarity and collaboration with the ruling house and its power-holders. The claim of acting as defenders against Galatians belonged to the general euergetical discourse of casting royal power as benefaction: this may have worked with the countryside as well as with the cities. The constant presence, as a given, of foreign wars and regional conflict may have acted as the justification for the extraction of surplus and labour—which, in turn, enabled the continued participation in high-stake politics. War thus bound the disparate elements of the Attalid space into a single social unit, justifying, enabling, and masking the social basis of power.¹⁰¹

APPENDIX: LIST OF EPIGRAPHICAL SOURCES

The present list of epigraphical sources has no pretension; it does not present the documents with full lemmata and bibliography, but simply with minimal pointers to widespread texts (usually the ‘stickiest’, from the classic *corpora*). The documents are described, assigned to a location and a date, often approximate by necessity. A full republication of the texts as a *dossier par thème* would be instructive. In the meantime, this list gives indications on the available evidence, and already provides an overview of the military history of the Attalids and its key moments and structures: the activity of Philetairos, the victorious surge under Attalos I, the extensive work of organization and colonization after 188. Finally, even the enumeration and summary description of documents clearly shows the Attalid obsession with victory, its link with the dynasty’s religious and cultural identity, and the dynasty’s sense of its fortunes and its repute.

1. Decrees of Kyme, and letter of Philetairos, concerning aid from the latter to the city. Kyme, c.270. SEG 50, 1195.
2. List of gifts from Philetairos to Kyzikos, in context of conflict, notably the Galatian invasions. Kyzikos, 270s. OGIS 748.

¹⁰¹ My thanks go to P. Thonemann and the audience in the Attalid seminar in Oxford, and to B. Chrubasik, H. Malay, P. Martzavou, H. Müller, and N. Sekunda. The paper revisits issues which I pressed on graduate students when teaching in Princeton around 1999–2001.

3. Epigram under statue of Philetairos, mentioning victory over Galatians. Delos, third century (exact context unclear). Dürrbach 1921–2: 31 (also *IG XI* 4, 1105, *SEG* 38, 776).
4. Convention between Eumenes I and mercenaries. Pergamon, 260s. *OGIS* 266 (also *IvP* 13, Schmitt 1969: 481).
5. Fragmentary letter of Eumenes I, probably concerning military settlers. Pergamon, 260s? *RC* 16 (also *IvP* 7).
6. Dedicatory epigram of statue by Eumenes I (?) to Athena, mentioning exploits. Pergamon, 260s? *IvP* 15 (also *SEG* 28, 963, with restorations by Peek).
7. Great circular base in shrine of Athena, victory offering of Attalos I over Tolistoagioi. Pergamon, 241/0. *IvP* 20 (also *OGIS* 269).
8. Long base in shrine of Athena, victory offerings of Attalos I, mentioning notably Antiochos Hierax (thrice), the Tolistoagioi (twice), Seleukos (II?) and his generals. Pergamon. *IvP* 21–8 (also *OGIS* 273–9).
9. Offering by Attalos I to Athena out of captured weapons. *IvP* 39 (also *OGIS* 285).
10. Statue of Attalos I set up by officers and men who fought against Antiochos (Hierax) and the Galatians set up statue of Attalos I. Pergamon. *IvP* 29 (also *OGIS* 280).
11. Offerings by Attalos I to Athena out of the booty from Aigina. Pergamon, after 210. *IvP* 47–9 (*OGIS* 281, 286–7).
12. Offerings by Attalos I to Athena out of the booty from Oreos. Pergamon, after 200. *IvP* 38, 50 (also *OGIS* 284, 288).
13. Fragmentary victory dedication by Attalos I to Zeus and Athena, Pergamon, 230s? *SEG* 4, 688.
14. Fragmentary victory dedication by Attalos I to Athena, Pergamon, 230s? *SEG* 4, 689.
15. Equestrian statue of Epigenes set up by Attalos I on Delos. Dürrbach 1921–2: 53 (also *IG XI* 4, 1109).
16. Citizenship grants by Lilaia to Attalid troops. Delphi, c.208. *FD III.3*, 132–5, *ISE* 81.
17. Dedication ὑπὲρ βασιλείως Ἀττάλου by Satyrinos, Kallimachos, and the officers and soliders under their command. Aigina, between 210 and 197. *IG IV*² 2, 765.

18. Treaty between Attalos I and Lato. Late third century. Ducrey 1970: 637–8.
19. Treaty between Attalos I and Lato. Late third century. Ducrey 1970: 638–42, whence Allen 1983: 209–10 no. 3.
20. Dedication by Eumenes II after war against Nabis. Pergamon, 195. *IvP* 60 (also *Syll.*³ 595 A).
21. Dedication of statue of Eumenes II by his troops after war against Nabis. Pergamon, 195. *IvP* 61 (also *Syll.*³ 595 B).
22. Dedication by Eumenes II after second expedition against Nabis. Pergamon, 192. *IvP* 63 (also *Syll.*³ 605 B).
23. Dedication by troops of Eumenes II after second expedition against Nabis. Pergamon, 192. *IvP* 63 (also *Syll.*³ 605 A).
24. Statue of Attalos (future Attalos II) set up by the Achaians who ‘came across in accordance with the alliance with king Eumenes’ and fought at the battle of Magnesia. Pergamon, 189. *IvP* 64 (also *Syll.*³ 606).
25. Decree of unknown city for Korrhagos. Early 180s. *I.Prusa ad Olympum* 1001 (also *SEG* 2, 663).
26. Letters of Eumenes II granting *polis* status to Toriaion. Early 180s. *SEG* 47, 1745 (also *I.Sultan Dağı* 393; Bencivenni 2003: 333–56).
27. Letter of Eumenes II to Kos concerning festival for Athena Nikephoros. Kos, 182/1. Rigsby 1996: no. 176.
28. Decree for benefactor who notably lends money to city to provide grain to the soldiers during wartime. Apameia, 168–165. *MAMA* VI 173 with Thonemann 2003: 104–5.
29. Dedication by Attalos (future Attalos II) to Zeus and Athena, for victory over Bithynians and Galatians. Pergamon, 183. *IvP* 298 (also *OGIS* 298).
30. Treaty between Eumenes II and thirty Cretan cities. Gortyn, 183. *Syll.*³ 627.
31. Decree of Telmessos for thanksgiving after victories of Eumenes II. Telmessos, 184/3. Allen 1983: 211–12, no. 7 (from Segre 1932).
32. Letter of Eumenes II concerning *Kardakōn kōmē* by Telmessos. Telmessos, 181. Maier 1959–61: no. 76.

33. Letter of Eumenes II or royal official to villagers mentioning dispensation of billeting and exemption from artisan tax in return for patrolling. *SEG* 29, 1516, drawing on *BE* 1980, 484.
34. Decree of Larisa for Attalid friends who accompanied Eumenes II and Attalos during Third Macedonian war. Larisa, 171. *SEG* 31, 575.
35. Decree for Kalliphanes of Phyle, 'who campaigned with the Romans and the brothers of King Eumenes, Attalos and Athenaios' and announced the good news of Pydna. Athens, 168. *ISE* 35 (same document Woodhead 1997: 291).
36. Letter of Eumenes II to the Ionians in response to their decree for him, the saviour of the Greek cities. Miletos, winter 167/6. *RC* 52.
37. Delphian decree in response to embassy from Sardeis, after great dangers (Galatian war). Delphi, 166. *OGIS* 305 (also *FD* III.3, 241).
38. Unpublished letters of Eumenes II concerning operations out of Apameia during Galatian war (T. Drew-Bear, P.h.D Harvard 1972, summarized *HSCP* 79 (1975), 357).
39. Letter of Eumenes II to Tabenoi (? or Salenoi) during Galatian war. Guizzi 2006 (*SEG* 57, 1109).
40. Fragmentary honorific decree mentioning incursion of enemies—during Galatian war? *SEG* 49, 1552, with Thonemann 2003: 105–6.
41. Private honorific statues of Eumenes II and Attalos, set up by individual, after victory over Galatians. Pergamon, 165. *IvP* 165.
42. Documents on foundation of the *Herakleia kai Soteria* in 165 (not 154): Robert, *OMS* VI 457–68, Wörhle 2000.
43. Petition and royal letter concerning Mysian colonies. Apollonioucharax, 165/4. Herrmann and Malay 2007: no. 32 (*SEG* 57, 1150); Thonemann, above pp. 20–3.
44. Honorary *stèle* set up by 'the Makedones of Kobedyte' for Philo . . . , their fellow citizen. Modern Bebekli near Kula, 163/2. *TAM* V 1, 221.
45. Dedication by the Mysians from Emoddi, for . . . , *geodotes*. Area of Saittai, 163/2. *SEG* 40, 1062.
46. Dedication by the Macedonians from Doidye. Apollonis, 161/0. *TAM* V 2, 1188.

47. Dedication to Zeus Porottenos by Kleon son of Attinas, ἡγέμων Μυσῶν. Gordos, reign of Eumenes II. *TAM* V 1, 690.
48. The Macedonians from Agatheira honour Seleukos. Halitpaşa (Hyrkanis), reign of Eumenes II. *TAM* V 2, 1307.
49. Honorific statue of Menogenes, set up by the Macedonians around Nakrasos/Akrasos, reign of Eumenes II. *OGIS* 290.
50. Altar dedicated to Eumenes II and Stratonike by officers. Ephesos, reign of Eumenes II. *SEG* 33, 942 (but the text as presented is too short on the right-hand side, since Stratonike must have been named).
51. Victory dedications of Attalos I, reinscribed under Eumenes II? *IvP* 33–7, 51, 53, 58, with Allen 198: 196.
52. Roman-era honorific stele set up by οἱ ἀπὸ βασιλέων Ἀττάλου καὶ Εὐμένους κατοικοῦντες Μερνουφντα Ἑρακληασταί. Thyateira. *TAM* V 2, 959.
53. Letters of Eumenes II and Attalos II to the priest Attis. Pessinous. *RC* 55–61 (also in *I. Pessinous* 1–7).
54. Letters of Eumenes II and Attalos (prince, then king) to Amalada; mention of ‘Galatian war’. *RC* 54 and Swoboda et al. 1935: no. 74.
55. Decree of Aptara for Attalos II, granting honours and the right to recruit mercenaries. *OGIS* 270 (also *I. Cret.* II 3.4).
56. The Macedonians from... espouroi/a make dedication for their *strategos* Derdas. Near Apollonis, 153/2. *TAM* V 2, 1190.
57. Dedication by Attalos II to Zeus and Athena after war. Pergamon. *IvP* 214 (also *OGIS* 328).
58. Victory monument by Attalos II after war against Prousius and siege of Nikomedeia. Pergamon, 149. *IvP* 225 (also *OGIS* 327).
59. Decree for the priestess Metris, under whom happy events occurred. Pergamon, 149. *IvP* 167 with Jones 1974.
60. Dedication by ‘soldiers who passed in year 15 to the region of Chersonese and Thrace’. Sındırgı, 145 BC. *OGIS* 330.
61. Dedication (by courtiers?) at Bizye to Zeus Tropaios. Bizye, 145? Robert, *OMS* I 120–3, with parallels for Zeus Tropaios (*IvP* 247, festival on account of *epiphaneia* of Zeus Tropaios;

- IvP* 237, the dedication of a *nomophylakion* to Zeus Tropaios); also Müller and Wörrle 2002: 216–17, *SEG* 52, 1197.
62. Decree for the governor Sotas, for services during the ‘Pisidian war’. Olbasa, 138/7. *SEG* 44, 1108, with *BE* 1997, 563.
 63. Decree for the governor Kleon, Aigina, reign of Attalos II. *OGIS* 329 (also *IG IV*² 2, 749).
 64. Letter of Attalos III to Pergamon, mentioning the services of Zeus Sabazios ‘in many deeds and in many dangers’. Pergamon, 135. *RC* 67 (also *IvP* 248, *OGIS* 331).
 65. Decree for Attalos III upon his return from war. Pergamon. *OGIS* 332 with Robert 1987: 522–34.
 66. *Ostotheke* of a camp commander and of a regional governor. Tralleis, 188–133. *SEG* 46, 1434.
 67. List of names, perhaps of mercenaries or settlers. Charakipolis, second century. *TAM V* 1, 677.
 68. Fragmentary letter of Attalid ruler to troops, mentioning land grants. Pergamon. *RC* 51.
 69. Epitaphs with Thracian names. Aigina, 209–133. *IG IV*² 2, 929, 934, 935; also *BE* 1951, 95, *ISE* 36 n. 7 (a Mysian).
 70. Epitaph for Mysian who died in war: Attalid wars, or war of Aristonikos? Modern Karaoba (Eastern Lydia/Mysia Abbaeitis). *TAM V* 1, 444.
 71. Decree of Pergamon after the death of Attalos III, integrating military men into the citizen body. 133. *IvP* 249 (also *OGIS* 338).
 72. Decree of Sestos in honour of the benefactor Menas, mentioning invasions and troubles after the death of Attalos III. *OGIS* 339 (also *I.Sestos* 1).
 73. Decree of Bargylia, mentioning services of a benefactor during campaign in upper settlements of Mysia Abbaeitis. 129. *SEG* 44, 867.
 74. Honorific decree of the Mysoi Abbaeitai in Gordos, mentioning rallying to the Romans. 129. *SEG* 34, 1198.

3

The Attalids and the Seleukid Kings, 281–175 BC*

Boris Chrubasik

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the Attalids and the Seleukid kings was long-standing, spanning a period of roughly 130 years. It began with the Seleukid conquest of western Asia Minor in 281, and ended presumably around the time of the last attested interaction between the two kingdoms when, in the late 150s, Attalos II supported Alexander Balas' claims to the Seleukid diadem.¹ In a broadly defined 'long' third century (281–187 BC), the two powers coexisted side by side in Asia Minor. The initial phase of interaction between the Seleukid kings and the Attalid rulers defined their relationship not only in the third century but also during the period when the regulations of the Peace of Apameia had driven the Seleukid kings from this side of the Tauros (187–175 BC and beyond). The history of this relationship, from the third century until the accession of Antiochos IV, is the subject of this chapter.

In considering the developing relationship between the Attalid rulers and Seleukid kings, it is tempting to focus on key events. For example, previous scholarship has often employed the events of 281

* I am grateful to Peter Thonemann, who invited me to write this chapter, and to Elizabeth Ferguson, John Ma, William Mack (all Oxford), and Christian Seebacher (Konstanz), who all also commented on versions of this paper; mistakes are of course entirely my own. All dates, unless otherwise stated, are BC.

¹ For this second-century period, see Psoma, ch. 8 below; Ehling 2008, esp. 139–64.

(the Seleukid annexation of Asia Minor), 262 (the Attalid victory against Antiochos I), 241 (the accession of the future king Attalos I), and 216 (the alliance between Attalos I and Antiochos III against Achaïos) as clear indications of the Attalid struggle for independence, and hence as markers of the relationship between the two powers.² The significance of these dates, however, is not self-evident, and my approach will be different. Instead, this chapter will integrate these events into the broader political dynamics of western Asia Minor in the third century, before assessing whether this account challenges our understanding of the Attalid–Seleukid relationship. In avoiding the diplomatic language of Attalid ‘independence’ versus Seleukid ‘authority’, I hope also to avoid an excessively simplistic bipolar interpretation of Hellenistic politics. In other words, instead of arguing ‘if this place is Attalid, it cannot be Seleukid’, I shall ask ‘if this place is Attalid but *also* Seleukid, what does this tell us about the relationship between the two powers?’

The historical periods this chapter covers are unequal with regard to sources. It is only for the period of Antiochos III and Attalos I that we have a relative wealth of evidence. This is partially thanks to Polybios’ account (known to us both from his own writings and from those of Livy and Appian), as well as to the abundant epigraphy of western Asia Minor during the latter part of the reign of Antiochos III (the period of his reconquest of Asia Minor), which has fostered numerous studies of this particular period.³ The richness of the surviving sources is one of the reasons why my chapter will take the reign of Antiochos III, and more specifically the first encounter between the two kings Antiochos III and Attalos I, as its focal point. Our interpretation of this encounter in 216 will determine not only our understanding of the past relationship between the Seleukid kings and the Attalid rulers but also that of the subsequent Attalid–Seleukid relationship, both before and after the Roman war of Antiochos III.

Polybios and the epigraphy of Asia Minor are not the only reasons why the rule of Antiochos III is used as this chapter’s linchpin. Thanks to Polybios, in the early part of the reign of Antiochos III we have rich evidence for Seleukid administrative practice towards local peripheral rulers and the reaction of Antiochos III to secession within his kingdom. For instance, early in his reign the king

² e.g. Allen 1983: 1–76; Hansen 1971: 14–129.

³ e.g. Schmitt 1964; Ma 2002; Dreyer 2007.

successfully fought against Molon in the Fertile Crescent and, although Molon committed suicide on the battlefield, Antiochos had the usurper's body impaled at the ascent of the Zagros mountains. Later, the king overcame his cousin Achaïos, whose head he had sewn into an ass's skin while his body was impaled.⁴ In contrast to these explicit depictions of royal violence, marking the destruction of dangerous enemies, Polybios also describes the re-insertion of the ruler of Atropatene, as well as the siege and subsequent reappointment of Xerxes of Armenia after his father had stopped paying taxes.⁵ Moreover, the Seleukid king came to an agreement of some kind with the ruler of Parthia, and while he was not able to take the city of Baktra on his Baktrian campaign, he made a treaty with the local king Euthydemos, who subsequently paid contributions to the Seleukid king.⁶

The king's campaigns in Asia Minor provide a particularly good illustration of the powerful force of the Seleukid war-machine when it was set in motion. However, none of the ancient sources suggests that Antiochos III regarded Attalos I in a similar light to Achaïos, nor do they indicate that the Seleukid king was aiming to destroy or take over Attalos I's kingdom. One of course might argue (perhaps rightly) that our sources replicate a self-interested Seleukid interpretation of the events.⁷ Achaïos and Molon could retrospectively be described as traitors because the Seleukid king was able to capture them. By contrast, Euthydemos of Baktria was acknowledged as king because Antiochos was unable to put down the rebel, even after a two-year siege.⁸ Yet for the Attalids in particular there is more to this phenomenon than we find in Polybios' narrative. All these power-holders had seceded from the Seleukid authority either before or during the early years of the reign of Antiochos III. The high power-holders who were defeated were too important to be re-inserted. They were in charge of geopolitically important regions with enormous resources, had been friends of previous Seleukid kings, and were at least official

⁴ Molon: Polyb. 5.54.3–9. Achaïos: Polyb. 8.21.3.

⁵ Artabazanes of Atropatene: Polyb. 5.55.1–10. Xerxes of Armenia: Polyb. 8.23.

⁶ Polyb. 11.34.1–11.

⁷ For Polybios' partial reliance on a pro-Seleukid source, see Schmitt 1964: 175–85; Primo 2009: 126–59, esp. 132–43.

⁸ e.g. Lerner 1999: 52; Wolski 1999: 75–81; this is also indicated by Walbank and Habicht in their new edition of Paton's translation of the Loeb Polybios 11.34.16 (n. 76). For the Baktrian rulers in general, see Coloru 2009.

'Friends' of the present king: for instance, Polybios describes Achaïos as the *syngenes* of Antiochos III (Polyb. 5.48.5).

The other power-holders who were re-inserted under Seleukid authority were geographically and politically peripheral. Although they were powerful in their local regions, and their removal would perhaps have been difficult, I shall argue that they also served a distinct function for the Seleukid monarchs, regardless of their occasional secession. Through a close analysis of Attalid–Seleukid interaction, I shall suggest that we should interpret the Attalid rulers as another example of these regional dynasts, to be placed in the same context as the local rulers of central Asia, as a normal part of Seleukid administrative practice.

If Polybios gives us an account of Seleukid practices under Antiochos III, it is only in the wider context of the whole history of Attalid–Seleukid coexistence that this relationship can be adequately assessed. Hence this chapter will be divided into three main chronological parts. The first section will examine the around fifty-year period of Attalid–Seleukid coexistence in Asia Minor before the Seleukid resurgence under Antiochos III—from the perspective of Antiochos III, therefore, it will describe the 'past'. Although the sources for a large part of this period are fragmentary and scattered, it is none the less possible to get a sense of the political dynamics, setting Attalid–Seleukid interaction within the context of the power politics of western Asia Minor and the wider Seleukid administrative framework. For the second section, on the 'Seleukid and Attalid present' as outlined above, evidence is more abundant. The interaction between the Seleukid kings and the Attalid rulers is mirrored in the diplomatic language of Polybios, who provides us with a full account of the ten-year period from about 203 to 193. I shall argue that this interaction was influenced by the political dynamics of the preceding period, and was shaped by the Seleukid and Attalid interpretation of the administration of third-century Asia Minor. The war between Antiochos III and the Romans, however, brought an abrupt change to the landscape of Asia Minor, and Eumenes II also re-interpreted his relationship with the Seleukid kings on the immediate eve of the war. The last section will examine the Seleukid 'future' from the perspective of these events, covering Seleukid–Attalid politics in the poorly attested period from the accession of Seleukos IV in 187 to the accession of Antiochos IV in 175. I shall consider whether we can detect a change in second-century Seleukid attitudes towards Asia

Minor and the Attalids, either in the aftermath of the treaty of Apameia, or at the accession of Antiochos IV.

This chapter aims to cast new light on the relationship between the Seleukid kings and the Attalid rulers. Moreover, this study will serve as a test-case to reassess the diplomatic character of Hellenistic history, offering a new interpretation for the interaction of political powers, who could simultaneously be under Seleukid control and independent of the Seleukids.

THE SELEUKID AND ATTALID PAST: 281–230s BC

The relationship between the Attalid and Seleukid dynasties was kick-started on the eve of the battle of Kouroupedion. According to Justin, following factional strife in Lysimacheia, ‘the survivors of the blood-bath and the army officers eagerly defected to Seleukos’.⁹ Pausanias’ account allows us to place Philetairos among these seceding courtiers. He writes that:

Philetairos, to whom the property of Lysimachos had been entrusted, was aggrieved at the death of Agathokles and was suspicious at the treatment he would receive at the hands of Arsinoe; he seized Pergamon on the Kaikos and sent a herald offering both the property and himself to Seleukos.¹⁰

Presumably to avoid the same situation as had occurred at Sardeis, where Seleukos I had been besieging Lysimachos’ commander Theodotos (who resolved to open the gates and to hand over the treasures stored in the city), Philetairos sent a herald to hand over his fortress to the Seleukid king. Philetairos had bet on the right horse: Seleukos won the battle against Lysimachos, thereby outliving any other friend or commander of Alexander the Great.¹¹ Although it is not clear what position Philetairos had held under Lysimachos, Seleukos I certainly

⁹ Just. *Epit.* 17.1.7: *itaque et ii, qui caedibus superfuerant, et ii, qui exercitibus praeerant, certatim ad Seleucum deficiunt*. Lysimachos and the road to Kouroupedion: Lund 1992: 184–206. Initiation of Seleukid–Attalid relations: Allen 1983: 9–14. The war: Just. *Epit.* 17.2.1–5; Memnon *FGrHist* 434 F11.5.7; Mehl 1986: 290–9.

¹⁰ Paus. 1.10.4; Allen 1983: 12–13.

¹¹ Sardeis: Polyain. 4.9.4. Death of Seleukos I: Just. *Epit.* 17.2.1–6; Memnon *FGrHist* 434 F11.8.1–2; Mehl 1986: 290–321; cf. Heinen 1972.

seems to have made or acknowledged him as a power-holder in Pergamon. Moreover, Strabo describes Philetairos, in his presumably semi-official administrative position under Seleukid rule, as 'lord of the stronghold and the treasure'.¹²

Philetairos' position as a local power-holder is illustrated by the epigraphic documents. He was active as a benefactor, not only in the direct vicinity of Pergamon but also in other regions of Asia Minor and the Greek mainland. He made dedications to the sanctuaries of Delos and Delphi, and he gave benefactions to a sanctuary of the Muses at Thespiai.¹³ Probably as early as the 280s, Philetairos, his adopted son Attalos and the latter's brother Eumenes were awarded *proxenia* by the Delphians. This honour was also later bestowed on the Phrygian dynast Lysias, son of Philomelos, whose benefactions are similar to those of other local power-holders, albeit not on the same scale as Philetairos.¹⁴

A group of documents from Kyme suggests the different levels of interaction between the local community, Philetairos and the Seleukid king. The dossier consists of three decrees and one letter, which presumably should all be placed within the same context.¹⁵ The city of Kyme sent two envoys asking Philetairos to sell them 600 shields for the defence of the city and its hinterland. Philetairos in return wrote a letter to the community giving the shields as a gift (*δωρεά*) to the demos.¹⁶ The city responded with honours for Philetairos' *euergetism*; this second decree is particularly revealing for the relationship between the city of Kyme and Philetairos. The dynast of Pergamon is said to be a long-standing *euergetes*, and is honoured as a *euergetes* with a golden crown for his gift of 600 shields, which shows his excellence and goodwill towards the city. Moreover, it is decreed that 'an akrolithic statue as fine as possible should be set up in the sacred room of the Philetaireion'. These proceedings were to be announced by the *agonothetes* at the next joint festival of the Dionysia

¹² Strab. 13.4.1: *κύριος ὢν τοῦ φρουρίου καὶ τῶν χρημάτων*; Allen 1983: 13–14.

¹³ Orth 2008: 486; cf. the map in Schalles 1985: 150.

¹⁴ Philetairos at Delphi: *FD* III.1, 432. Lysias: *FD* III.4, 156. For the date of the Lysias decree: Ouhlen 1998: 220. On the Philomelid dynasts in general: Wilhelm 1911; Holleaux 1938–69: III 357–63; Malay 2004.

¹⁵ *SEG* 50, 1195; Manganaro 2000; *BE* 2001, 54 and 373; Gauthier 2003; Hamon 2008.

¹⁶ First decree: ll. 1–13. Letter of Philetairos: ll. 14–19.

and Antiocheia; the decree also mentions processions for the *Soteria* and *Philetaireia*.¹⁷

Philetairos' position within the sacred landscape of Kyme appears to have been a prominent one: his previous contributions had led to the establishment of a festival and a sacred building in his name, in which the new statue is to be set up. Nevertheless, he was clearly acting within a Seleukid structure. Philetairos' recent honours were announced at the *Dionysia* and *Antiocheia*, presumably a major local festival to which Antiochos I's name had been added by the people of Kyme.¹⁸ This mention of the Seleukids was not only a reference to the past, since Kyme maintained her relations with the Seleukid kings. Under Antiochos II, Kyme was the location of a royal mint, as were the neighbouring cities of Myrina and Phokaia. Additionally, a letter from a King Antiochos to Ephesos regarding the Kymaians indicates relations between the city of Kyme and either Antiochos I or Antiochos II.¹⁹ Moreover, Philetairos was a benefactor of the sanctuary of Apollo Chresteros in Aigai, and dedicated land and a *propylon* to the sanctuary while Aigai was apparently under Seleukid control; the city had a Seleukid mint under Antiochos II.²⁰ Although Philetairos acted independently as a local benefactor—in this case helping in difficult times—his incorporation within a Seleukid space is clearly visible.

Why were the Seleukids interested in maintaining a strong dynast in north-western Asia Minor? The geographic position of Pergamon as well as the supply of shields to the people of Kyme provide an answer to this question. The treasure of Pergamon enabled Philetairos to act as a local benefactor and provide security in the wake of

¹⁷ In contrast to the 'Dionysia and Antiocheia', the *Soteria* and the *Philetaireia* appear to be separate festivals: Buraselis 2003; cf. Orth 2008: 489.

¹⁸ An inscription from Aigai (Malay and Riel 2009) illustrates how both Seleukos I and Antiochos II were granted *soteria* (l. 11) and *phylai* with the names Seleukis and probably Antiochis (ll. 24–5), thus inscribing the Seleukid kings into the civic landscape; see also Habicht 1970: 82–105; 147–56.

¹⁹ Kyme: SC 498–501. Myrina: SC 502–5. Phokaia: SC 508–13. Letter from a King Antiochos: RC 17. The editors of SC suggest that all three mints could have been operating under a single mint authority (see SC I.1 p. 179 for references). Royal letter: see Dittenberger's discussion in OGIS 242 and *I.Kyme* 3. For the internal dynamics of Kyme: Hamon 2008: 104–6; BE 2005, 395.

²⁰ Aigai: OGIS 312; Schalles 1985: 33–6; Allen 1983: 13–14; see also SEG 49, 1746. under Eumenes I (=Malay 1999: no. 3). A boundary stone from Aigai, probably dating to the reign of Antiochos II, indicates Seleukid authority: SEG 19, 720; see also SEG 33, 1034; Herrmann 1959: 4–6; Orth 1977: 124–38, 158–72. For the mint: SC 494–6.

the arrival of the Galatians in Asia Minor. The ‘dangers’ repeatedly mentioned in the Greek inscriptions clearly underline that the Seleukid kings were not able to prevent the Galatian tribes from raiding cities in western Asia Minor. While Antiochos I’s famous ‘Elephant battle’ was celebrated not only by the Seleukids but also apparently by the Greek cities, the Seleukid kings could not focus their attention solely on the Galatian question.²¹ Instead, they needed local actors to fulfil these needs. The military colonies Attaleia and Philetaireia under Ida, mentioned in the well-known decree from Eumenes I and most likely founded under Philetairos, exemplify the Seleukid delegation of power to local dynasts.²² The ‘marginal’ position of the Attalid dynasts at Pergamon, between Aiolis and Mysia (and not, for example, in a more ‘central’ position such as Sardeis), also underlines the Seleukid strategy of placing dynasts in key positions which were none the less peripheral.

Philetairos was not the only dynast who was a benefactor and guarantor of local security. As indicated above, the Philomelids of Phrygia also received *proxenia* from the Delphians and it is very likely that this family also acted as an independent benefactor to Rhodes after the earthquake of 227. The Philomelids founded the city of Philomelion, first mentioned in a decree of 209 BC, and were clearly local power-holders in the region of eastern Phrygia. Their position on the military road east of Apameia could enable them to protect western Asia Minor against intruders from the north-east. Moreover, Lysias, the son of Philomelos, and his descendants were clearly acting within a Seleukid framework. They fought in the name of Seleukos III against Attalos I, and Philomelos was certainly integrated into the hierarchy of Seleukid officials, perhaps as a regional *hyparchos*.²³ In 209 BC, the Seleukid chief administrator of Asia Minor Zeuxis advised Philomelos that ‘you would do well by giving orders for your subordinates to obey the orders and carry out things as he [Antiochos III] thinks fit’.²⁴

²¹ For the Galatians in this period: Mitchell 1993: I 13–25; Strobel 1994; Strobel 1996, esp. 153–264; Coşkun 2011.

²² *IvP*13=OGIS 266; Kosmetatou 2001: 113–14. An eponymous city-foundation should be placed in the context of the foundation of Dokimos under Lysimachos: Tcherikover 1927: 35; Robert 1980: 240–4; Lund 1992: 82.

²³ On the Philomelids, see further above, n. 14. Rhodian earthquake: Polyb. 5.90.1. War against Attalos I: OGIS 277. Seleukid *hyparchos* (?): SEG 54, 1353, ll. 16 and 20.

²⁴ SEG 54, 1353, ll. 22–4. For the same phrase in the Pamukçu *stele*, cf. SEG 37, 1010.13–16.

None the less, Philetairos enjoyed both far greater financial resources and a more favourable geographic position than did the Philomelids. Philetairos was apparently allowed to keep Lysimachos' former treasure, albeit now under Seleukid authority, and thus he had far greater resources to act as a local power-holder.²⁵ While the location of Pergamon, among coastal Greek cities with a strong tradition of inscribing honours in stone, surely influenced the survival of Philetairos' dedications on a much larger scale than any other dynast in Asia Minor, Philetairos must also have held an exceptionally prominent position. This is also illustrated by his right to strike coinage. If Meadows' re-interpretation of early Pergamene coinage in this volume is correct (Chapter 5 below), the mint at Pergamon issued coinage in the name of Seleukos I until the king's death (SC 308–9). The subsequent coinage in the name of Philetairos underlines the Attalids' relationship with the house of Seleukos, as outlined in the inscriptions. The obverse depicts a very finely executed portrait of Seleukos I with wavy hair, an upward gaze, and a strong brow ridge, which mirrors the issues of Alexander under Lysimachos.²⁶ By contrast, the reverse (adapted from the royal coinage of Lysimachos) was locally motivated: a seated Athena with the name of Philetairos.

The image projected is that of a local dynast with substantial means under the authority of the Seleukid king. After the death of Seleukos I, Philetairos perhaps briefly reverted to minting in the name of Alexander.²⁷ Even if we adopt the traditional chronology by Newell and place the second series in the name of Seleukos I under Antiochos I, the Pergamene mint seems never to have minted coinage in the name of Antiochos I. The new king was not in Asia Minor when his father was assassinated or at the time of his accession.²⁸ However, after Antiochos I's return to Asia Minor, Philetairos must have been interested in good relations with the new Seleukid king, and his returning of the ashes of Seleukos I to Antiochos I may reflect this intention.²⁹ Hansen stresses the importance of the subsequent

²⁵ 9,000 talents: Strab. 13.4.1; Allen 1983: 13–19.

²⁶ Fleischer 1991: 9.

²⁷ Interim period: SC 306–7. SC 307 is die-linked with SC 308, which still carried the legend of Seleukos; see Newell 1936: 15–22; Newell 1941: nos. 1528–35.

²⁸ As indicated in Memnon of Herakleia *FGrHist* 434 F11.9.1 and probably *OGIS* 219 (= *I.Illion* 32); Jones 1993: 89–90; Ma 2002: 254–9; *contra* Piejko 1991.

²⁹ Philetairos obtained the body of Seleukos I for a large sum of money, had it cremated in Pergamon, and sent the ashes to his son Antiochos I: App. Syr. 63 (335); Allen 1983: 14 n. 19, whose view is perhaps too narrow.

marriage between Philetairos' nephew Attalos and Antiochis, the daughter of Achaïos.³⁰ While she uses the evidence to underline good relations between the Attalids and the Seleukid kings, it could instead be interpreted as a marriage between members of the local elite. Achaïos, a relative of the king and a land-holder in Phrygia, and Philetairos, 'the lord of the stronghold and the treasure', would then have formed an alliance between their families, which was encouraged, or presumably at the very least acknowledged, by the Seleukid king.

The Seleukid king may have granted Philetairos further liberties, if it was indeed under Philetairos that the Pergamene mint started to strike coins with Philetairos' own image. The so-called Group II of the Pergamene silver coinage displayed Philetairos on the obverse (wearing the *strophion* as on the Seleukos I types) and the seated Athena of Pergamon on the obverse.³¹ Traditionally attributed to Eumenes II, this group has been convincingly pushed back to the reign of Philetairos by Le Rider, as part of a general re-dating of the early Pergamene coinage.³² Le Rider's revised chronology is also adopted by Meadows and Callataÿ in this volume.³³

Two scenarios regarding the right to strike coinage can be imagined. It is possible that Antiochos I, perhaps in the context of Seleukid resurgence in Asia Minor, granted the dynast of Pergamon further liberties which included the foundation of his own military colonies and the minting of coinage with his own portrait. It is possible that such a measure also underlies the so-called *fratarāka* coinage in Persis during the same period, if the coinage of Baydād does indeed date to the early third century.³⁴ Alternatively, Philetairos could have begun minting his own coinage, perhaps in the

³⁰ Strab. 13.4.2; Hansen 1971: 27–8.

³¹ For the possibility that the *strophion* might not be connected to a posthumous portrait, see Smith 1988: 74, cf. 35; cf. Krug 1968: 128–30. For the early image of Philetairos: Gans 2006: 12.

³² Le Rider 1992, esp. 237, 241–2, based on Davesne and Le Rider 1989: 238; accepted by Jakobsson 2010: 22; Kosmetatou 2001: 117 is uncertain.

³³ For the old groupings, see Imhoof-Blumer 1884: 26; Fritze 1910: 7–8; Newell 1936: 33–4; Hansen 1971: 22; Allen 1983: 24; Westermarck 1961: 6; Kosmetatou 2003b: 53–60; cf. Kosmetatou 2003a: 161; Capdetrey 2007: 118; Coloru 2009: 165.

³⁴ Klose and Müseler 2008: 16–20, corroborated by the recent find of a Baydād coin struck over a tetradrachm of Demetrios Poliorketes: NAC Auction 59, Lot 653. For the Seleukids, the right to strike coinage apparently did not threaten their control: Wiesehöfer 1994: 115–19; Wiesehöfer 2011.

years when the Seleukid king was absent, in order to underline his independence in northern Asia Minor, a decision which in any event was not opposed. Either way, a break with the Seleukid kings did not occur. A treaty from 269/8 under Eumenes I is dated to the forty-fourth year of the Seleukid era, thus indicating no break with the Seleukid kings.³⁵

Did the relationship between the dynasts of Pergamon and the Seleukids change following the death of Philetairos and the accession of Eumenes I?³⁶ Strabo writes that Eumenes I was the ‘dynast of the places round about [Pergamon], so that he even joined in battle with Antiochos, the son of Seleukos, and defeated him near Sardeis’.³⁷ This battle has traditionally been dated to 262, soon after the accession of Eumenes I and before the death of the Seleukid king in early June 261.³⁸ It is striking that apart from the battle mentioned by Strabo, no Seleukid–Attalid encounter is known until the clashes between Attalos I and Antiochos Hierax more than twenty years later.³⁹ The memory of the successful battle against Antiochos I may have become particularly important for the Attalid kings in the changed context of the second century BC. Yet how this ‘defeat’ was perceived by the Seleukid kings and how it changed Attalid–Seleukid relations remains to be explored.

The new documents from Kyme give us some sense of the dynamics of the first twenty years of Attalid–Seleukid relations. The period following the accession of Attalos I is vividly attested in the monumental dedications of the Attalid dynasty, and suggests continuous

³⁵ *IvP* 13. 10–11; *OGIS* 266, followed by Allen 1983: 24; Kosmetatou 2001: 113.

³⁶ Allen 1983: 20; Capdetrey 2007: 118. Hansen 1971: 21–2 and Cardinali 1906: 13–14 assume Ptolemaic influence: cf. Heinen 1984: 428.

³⁷ Strab. 13.4.2. Hansen argued (following Susemihl 1891–2: I 631 n. 555) that Phylarchos’ τὰ κατὰ Ἀντίοχον καὶ τὸν Περγαμηνὸν Εὐμενῆ (*History of Antiochos and Eumenes of Pergamon*) referred to this battle between Antiochos I and Eumenes I. Since Jacoby’s commentary on *FGrHist* 81 T1.28–37, the standard view has been that Phylarchos’ treatise concerned the encounter between Antiochos III and Eumenes II: Kroymann 1956: 473; Pédech 1989: 395–6; Meister 2000: 982; cf. Schepens 2007: 240. However, while the events of the 190s were surely more significant than the battle in the 260s, Eumenes’ role in the war with Antiochos III (apart from the battle at Magnesia: Liv. 37.43.8–11) was secondary to that of the Romans. A history of a battle in the 260s, perhaps eulogizing Attalid achievements, might also fit better into Phylarchos’ overall *œuvre*.

³⁸ Regnal years of Eumenes I: Allen 1983: 9–11. Death of Antiochos I: Glassner 2004: 4 obv. 2.

³⁹ Mehl 1998a: 251; Hamon 2008: 104–5.

engagements between the Attalids, Seleukids, and Galatians. However, we lack evidence for the crucial period between the death of Antiochos I (261) and the death of Antiochos II (246). While it is possible that accounts of Seleukid–Attalid hostilities over this sixteen-year period are lost, one would have expected the Attalids to make much of any further victories over their Seleukid neighbours (as with the victory over Antiochos I). Antiochos II's campaigns in western Asia Minor were extensive; in particular, it is striking that we have no evidence of any Attalid–Seleukid encounter during the Second Syrian war, given Seleukid military activity on the coast of western Asia Minor and the increase in Seleukid minting activity in Aiolis.

Thus the relationship between Eumenes I and Antiochos II needs to be re-evaluated. Eumenes' position as the dynast of Pergamon was not entirely stable: a well-known decree from Pergamon regarding a mercenary revolt reveals the difficulties of his position. While the wider political context is uncertain, the text probably dates to the early years of Eumenes' rule.⁴⁰ As argued above, the military colonies mentioned in this decree were probably founded by Philetairos and thus tell us nothing about Eumenes' own position.⁴¹ It is striking that the text employed a Seleukid dating formula.⁴² There is little evidence for an expansion of Attalid territory under Eumenes I: Savalli-Lestrade has convincingly argued that the arbitration between Mytilene and Pitane shows that Eumenes I received Pitane from Seleukos II, perhaps at the Seleukid king's accession, implying that Pitane was not Attalid before this date.⁴³

Evidence for a 'break' with the Seleukid kingdom has also been sought in the minting of coinage with a portrait of Philetairos under Eumenes I.⁴⁴ If, however, Le Rider's re-attribution of Group II of the Pergamene mint is correct (see above), the coinage of Eumenes I was far from revolutionary. His coinage would have begun with the Group III Philetairoi, in which the sole innovation was the replacement of the *strophion* on the portrait of Philetairos with a wreath.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ *IvP* 13=OGIS 266; Kosmetatou 2001: 112; Schalles 1985: 31–3.

⁴¹ See above, n. 22.

⁴² See OGIS 266, followed by Allen 1983: 24.

⁴³ SEG 42, 1106; Savalli-Lestrade 1992: 226; Capdetrey 2007: 118; Hamon 2008: 105; *contra* Allen 1983: 21; Virgilio 1993: 15–16.

⁴⁴ See e.g. Capdetrey 2007: 118.

⁴⁵ Westermarck 1961: Group II: V.1–V.10; Group III: V.11–29; see also Callataÿ, below pp. 208–11.

There is certainly no longer any reason to think that the image of the dynasty's founder first appeared on the coinage of Eumenes I.

What picture can be drawn of Seleukid-Attalid relations during the reign of Eumenes I? The coinage in the name of Philetairos had probably been initiated by Philetairos himself; recent analysis of the coinage of the '*fratarāka*' anyway suggests that such minting should be understood not as an indicator of independence but as a Seleukid policy of 'granting' coinages to local dynasts,⁴⁶ in accordance with Achaemenid practice. Eumenes continued the policy of striking coinage with the portrait of Philetairos; early in his reign, he engaged Antiochos I in a battle near Sardeis. If he received Pitane only at the accession of Seleukos II, then we know of no extension of Attalid territory during the early years of his rule. No Seleukid-Attalid antagonism is known in the context of Antiochos II's extensive campaigns against Ptolemaic troops in the region. Most likely, the Attalid *dynasteia* was simply subsumed under the wider Seleukid authority at the time of the Seleukid resurgence in Asia Minor under Antiochos II, as would also occur later under Antiochos III.

I hope to have shown that it is at best questionable that there was a lasting break between the Seleukids and Attalids during the reign of Eumenes I. Moreover, the exchange of territories between Seleukos II and Eumenes I, as analysed by Savalli-Lestrade, likewise demonstrates that their friendly relationship continued until at least the accession of Seleukos II. Therefore, it is very likely that while the dynast of Pergamon acted semi-independently, he also remained under the broad umbrella of Seleukid control in the medium term.

In that case, when did the Attalids break with the Seleukid kings? Although there is no evidence for the relationship between the Attalid dynasts and Seleukos II, it is perhaps not accidental that Attalid resistance to Seleukid control was in fact opposition to Antiochos Hierax, who had been acclaimed king in Asia Minor and had defeated his brother Seleukos II at Ankyra.⁴⁷ It was in this context, along with the raids of the Galatians on the coast of Asia Minor, that Attalos I declared himself king.⁴⁸ The Attalid king claimed his diadem at a

⁴⁶ See above, n. 34.

⁴⁷ Just. *Epit.* 27.2.6–3.12; *FGrHist* 206 F32.8. The 'brothers' war': Will 1979–82: I 291–301; Ma 2002: 43–50; see also Boehringer 1993: 37–47.

⁴⁸ Attalid narrative: Allen 1983: 28–35. Galatian raids: e.g. the raid of Branchidai in *I.Didyima* 426, and the honours for Sotas in *I.Priene* 17 (sacrilegious behaviour,

battle in the Kaikos valley; later Attalid victory monuments on the Pergamene acropolis depicted the battle with Hierax and his Galatian troops.⁴⁹ Although Antiochos Hierax did once reach the walls of Pergamon, both the inscriptions and later literary sources suggest that it was Attalos I who succeeded in pushing Antiochos Hierax out of Asia Minor. The fact that Seleukos III later crossed the Tauros to re-establish Seleukid control (Polyb. 4.48.6) need not mean that Attalos' opposition to Antiochos Hierax' new kingdom was unwelcome. The same could be said for Attalos' wars with Achaïos, who carved out his own kingdom in Asia Minor in the period 220–216.⁵⁰ Attalid resistance to Achaïos can only have been in the interest of Antiochos III.

Throughout the third century the rulers of Pergamon were semi-autonomous dynasts: they fulfilled local needs for administration, security and benefaction, and acted within a Seleukid space, even if they were at times engaged in battle against Seleukid troops. In the period of weakened Seleukid control from c.241 to 213, the Attalids created a kingdom for themselves. Yet it was unclear how Seleukid–Attalid relations would develop with the reappearance of a strong Seleukid king in the area, especially if it was the aim of the king to 'retake' (*ἀνακταῖσθαι*) his ancestral properties.⁵¹ We turn, then, to the period 216–193 BC.

THE SELEUKID AND ATTALID PRESENT: 216–193 BC

Polybios notes that prior to the campaign of Antiochos III against Achaïos in the early summer of 216, the Seleukid king 'came to an agreement with King Attalos and arranged for a joint campaign in the war against Achaïos'.⁵² Many scholars have thought that this

ll. 4–13; murder of the Greeks by barbarians, ll. 13–15). Cf. Polyb. 3.3.5; Liv. 38.16.10; Paus. 10.15.2.

⁴⁹ e.g. *IvP* 20; 21–8.

⁵⁰ Schmitt 1964: 158–75; Ma 2002: 54–63.

⁵¹ Polyb. 18.51.6. Seleukid re-conquest: Ma 2002: 26–33.

⁵² Polyb. 5.107.4: καὶ συνθέμενος πρὸς Ἀτταλον τὸν βασιλέα κοινοπραγίαν ἐνίστατο τὸν πρὸς Ἀχαιοὺς πόλεμον.

agreement (and a possible treaty between Antiochos III and Attalos I) entailed Seleukid recognition not only of the autonomous status of the Attalid territories but also of Attalos' kingship.⁵³ This scenario is possible. Yet if the early Attalids could act so independently while nominally under Seleukid authority, it is at least possible that the *koinopragia* between Antiochos III and Attalos I in 216 might not have the constituting character of independence that has previously been suggested. The twenty-three-year period between 216 and 193 is thus central to understanding the core of Seleukid–Attalid relations.

The two-year Seleukid siege of Sardeis, ending with the mutilation and death of the usurper Achaïos and the victory of Antiochos III, was judged by Polybios as one of the great sieges of his time.⁵⁴ Attalos I must have viewed the destruction of Achaïos' *dynasteia* with mixed feelings.⁵⁵ Achaïos had twice pushed back Attalid frontiers and taken over Attalid territory which had only recently been acquired, during Attalos' wars against Antiochos Hierax. Attalos I had been the ally of Antiochos III in this struggle against a common enemy, but the campaign had also shown the Attalid king the scale of Seleukid military power and the inadequacy of one of the best-fortified strongholds of Asia Minor.⁵⁶ As the campaigns of Seleukos III had underlined, the Attalids had started to extend their kingdom into territories which were of interest to the Seleukids. Although Attalos' position after his arrangement with Antiochos III was presumably stronger than that of his predecessors, the Seleukid resurgence in Asia Minor must have entailed the loss of Attalid territories. In fact, an inscription from Pamukçu near modern Balıkesir shows that at least in the last decade of the third century, Attalid territory was not as extensive as previously assumed.⁵⁷

Moreover, the Attalids were not the only local power-holders in Asia Minor. Attalos' relations with the northern Anatolian dynasts,

⁵³ For Allen (1983: 61), the treaty between Antiochos III and Attalos, mentioned in the peace terms of Apameia (Polyb. 21.17.6; App. Syr. 38 [199]), should be placed in this early period of Seleukid–Attalid interaction; this is possible, but not certain.

⁵⁴ Polyb. 29.12.8.

⁵⁵ Allen 1983: 58–60; cf. Hansen 1971: 43.

⁵⁶ The topography of Sardeis was altered completely by the earthquake of AD 17. However, some remains of the old fortification are still visible: Hanfmann 1983: 110, 115 with fig. 70; 72–3; 79. Strength of Pergamon: Kohl 2004: 177–98.

⁵⁷ SEG 37, 1010 (with SEG 54, 1237); Ma 2002: 60; Dreyer 2007: 251. Moreover, Aizanoi must have been lost by this point at the latest, and probably already under Achaïos: Wörrle 2009: 426 n. 74.

and with Bithynia in particular, were important for his position in the region, exemplified by the ensuing conflicts between the Attalids and the Bithynian and Pontic kings (see below).⁵⁸ In addition to friction over border territories, Prousius I of Bithynia could claim to challenge Attalos I's position in Asia Minor as the defender of Greece against the Galatians.⁵⁹

Both the recent demonstration of Seleukid power and the potential for rivalry with the other dynasts in Asia Minor made it essential that there were good relations between Attalos I and the Seleukid state, particularly with the Seleukid chief administrator of Asia Minor, Zeuxis. In 211, Attalos I joined the Aitolians and the Romans in their war against Philip V; he set sail to Aigina in late 208, only to return to Pergamon in the late summer of 207 to repel Prousius I, who had apparently invaded Pergamene territories.⁶⁰ It is striking to find Attalos I spending such long periods away from Pergamon. His personal involvement in the Aitolian campaign seems to indicate that Greek affairs were of higher priority than the affairs of Asia Minor. This does not suggest hostility between Attalos and Antiochos III;⁶¹ rather the opposite.

Seleukid–Attalid relations do not seem to have been disturbed by Antiochos III's return from his *anabasis* in 204/3. A long inscription from Teos provides some evidence for local perceptions of Seleukid power during this period.⁶² While the people of Teos were still paying taxes to the Attalids (as they had presumably been doing since Attalos I's campaign against Achaïos in 218), they none the less made contact with Antiochos III, while he was still east of Asia Minor. Antiochos is said to have been 'responsible for many advantages' bestowed on them; after crossing to Asia Minor 'he restored the affairs to a profitable conclusion' and lodged in the city before he 'released the city as holy, inviolate, and free from tribute'. According to this Teian

⁵⁸ Polyb. 5.111.5–6.

⁵⁹ Habicht 1957: 1091–2.

⁶⁰ Support of the Aitolians: Liv. 26.24.9; Just. *Epit.* 19.14.7. Aigina: Polyb. 9.30.7; Liv. 27.30.4. Return to Pergamon: Liv. 28.7.10. It has been suggested that Prousius was allied with Philip V: cf. Liv. 29.12.14. On the conflict between Attalos and Prousius: Habicht 1957: 1092–3.

⁶¹ Cf. Allen 1983: 59–60; Kosmetatou 2003a: 163.

⁶² SEG 41, 1003 I. For the date: Herrmann 1965b: 93–100; Ma 2002: 260–5. Ma also discusses the lower dating to 197, but rightly dismisses it. Seleukid perception: Herrmann 1965b: 108–10; Dreyer 2007: 274–8.

narrative, it was advantageous to send embassies to the Seleukid king while he was still away, and later to bestow lavish honours on both Antiochos III and Laodike when they arrived in the city.⁶³ These honours inscribed the Seleukid royal couple into the public memory of the city and into the workings of civic life.⁶⁴

The Teian dossier is a good example of the second phase of the resurgence of Seleukid power in Asia Minor.⁶⁵ Cities which had been in the Attalid sphere at least since the 220s now became Seleukid. The Seleukid king did not stay in Teos (or Asia Minor) for very long, since he was off fighting another war against the Ptolemies in c.202. However, Seleukid power remained visible in the region: Zeuxis and his troops continued to operate from Sardeis, and two inscriptions from Amyzon dating to October/November 202 and November/December 201 suggest that Seleukid troops were still present in Asia Minor.⁶⁶ Yet despite the Seleukid resurgence and the loss of Pergamene territories, Attalos I still did not openly oppose these Seleukid claims.

After Attalos I had assisted the Roman senatorial commission in obtaining a sacred stone from the Magna Mater sanctuary at Pessinus in 205, he and Rhodes sent embassies to Rome in 201 bringing ‘word that the cities of Asia also were being stirred up to discontent’.⁶⁷ While it is possible that the Attalid embassy indicated concerns about Antiochos III’s campaigns in Asia Minor, neither Livy’s narrative nor the later activities of the Roman senate or Attalos actually support this. ‘To these embassies the senate replied that they would look into the matter’—and Livy links this reply to the situation in Macedonia, ‘and the whole question of the Macedonian war was referred to the consuls’.⁶⁸ Appian states that the news of the secret pact between

⁶³ Ma 2002: 214–16, also 71, 201–3; Robert and Robert 1983: 137; Hermann 1965b:

110.

⁶⁴ Chaniotis 2007: 153–71; Hermann 1965b: 143–7.

⁶⁵ Cf. Giovannini 1983, who interprets the dossier not as a Seleukid takeover, but rather as arbitration.

⁶⁶ For Grainger 2002: 26, Zeuxis was without any resources at the time (based on the large army of Antiochos III at Panion). However, Zeuxis’ activities throw doubt on this hypothesis; cf. Bar-Kochva 1976: 7–19. Amyzon: Robert and Robert 1983: nos. 14–15. For the takeover: RC 38; Ma, Derow, and Meadows 1995: 71–80.

⁶⁷ Magna Mater: Liv. 29.11.1–8. Embassy of 201: Liv. 31.2.1; see Dreyer 2007: 109, with references.

⁶⁸ Liv. 31.2.2: *his legationibus responsum est curae eam rem senatui fore; consultatio de Macedonico bello integra ad consules.*

Philip V and Antiochos III was also brought to Rome on this occasion, but it is striking that this information was only provided by the Rhodians.⁶⁹

The sources are clear about the extent of Attalid concerns over Philip V's engagements in the eastern Mediterranean in the spring of 200 BC.⁷⁰ At this time Attalos I set sail to meet the Roman commission in Athens.⁷¹ He composed an address to the assembly which underlined the threat of Philip V, and later in the same year Rome declared war against the Antigonid king.⁷² Attalos I had left Pergamon again, only to return to his kingdom in late 199 (Liv. 31.47.2). He insisted that Philip V was his enemy both in his communications with Roman senators and during his stay in Athens. As Allen writes: 'he was the main advocate—or so it seems—of the renewed war with Macedon.'⁷³

None of these activities suggests any tensions between Attalos and Antiochos III during this period, underlined by the absence of any official Attalid complaints about the Seleukid king. No mention of the Attalid dominions is made either in the context of the Seleukid embassy to T. Quinctius Flamininus in 196 or at the conference at Lysimacheia.⁷⁴ Instead, the emphasis lay on the conflict between Antiochos III and the Ptolemies, as well as Antiochos' seizure of Ptolemaic and Antigonid possessions in Asia Minor and Thrace. Although the Seleukid king took over large parts of Asia Minor, the Attalid king did not react. Attalid–Seleukid relations should be reconsidered in this light.⁷⁵ It is most likely that after the defeat of Achaïos, Antiochos III acknowledged the kingship of Attalos I, and—crucially—the Attalid king also accepted the authority of the

⁶⁹ App. *Mac.* 4.2; Polyb. 3.2.8; see Wiemer 2001: 78–85. For the 'three kings inscription': Ma 2002: 379–82; Dreyer 2002: 122–7. Recent discussions of the pact: Dreyer 2007: 259–72.

⁷⁰ Philip not only conquered Samos (*IG* XII.6.1, 12) after a defeat near Chios (Polyb. 16.2.1–3) and a victory near Lade (Polyb. 16.15), he also invaded Pergamene territory (Polyb. 16.1); Ma 2002: 76–7. For a different sequence of the battles: Wiemer 2001: 85–97; Berthold 1975: 150–63; Walbank 1940: 108–37; Walbank, *HCP* ii, 497–500; Allen 1983: 72.

⁷¹ Polyb. 16.25–6; Liv. 31. 14. 11–15. 5.

⁷² Events of 200 BC: Dreyer 2007: 111–20; Gruen 1984: 382–98.

⁷³ Allen 1983: 73.

⁷⁴ Seleukid envoys at the Isthmian games: Polyb. 18.47.1; Liv. 33.34.2–3. Conference at Lysimacheia: Polyb. 18.48.2–3; 18.49–52; Liv. 33.39–40.

⁷⁵ Dreyer 2007: 290; cf. Grainger 2002: 32–3.

Seleukid king.⁷⁶ The Attalids could of course pursue independent politics, bestow benefactions, and make their own wars, as long as they did not impinge on Seleukid politics. This situation does not seem to change until the death of Attalos I in 197.⁷⁷

This may be the context of a dedication from Pergamon, found on the terrace of the Athena temple: Protas(?), son of Menippos, perhaps a *somatophylax*, dedicated a statue of the 'Great King' Antiochos III.⁷⁸ If Ma's interpretation of Antiochos' adoption of the title of Great King is correct (and bearing in mind that this is a private dedication), then the *terminus post quem* should be Antiochos III's victory against Ptolemaios V at Panion in 200.⁷⁹ This statue, set up in the city of Pergamon by a Seleukid courtier, would necessarily indicate good relations between the Seleukid king and Attalos I. A second Pergamene dedication is even more puzzling. The *demos* of Pergamon dedicated a statue to Zeuxis, son of Kynagos, a Macedonian.⁸⁰ However, the context of these inscriptions was lost with the re-planning of the terrace of Athena under Eumenes II and the levelling of the terrace for the great altar, and hence it is impossible to ascertain the character and frequency of dedications by the *demos* of Pergamon.⁸¹

The shape of Seleukid–Attalid relations began to change in the period following 197, and from 193 onwards their relationship was wholly redefined. The events of 197 to 196 are well known. Antiochos III set out with a large number of decked and lighter vessels to conquer the coast of Asia Minor in the spring of 197. This naval expedition was supported by a land army, which awaited him at Sardeis.⁸² While Antiochos III was on the coast of Kilikia and Pamphylia in negotiations with the Rhodians, news reached him of Philip V's defeat by the Romans at Kynoskephalai.⁸³ Ignoring Rhodian

⁷⁶ Engels 2011: 27–9.

⁷⁷ Polyb. 18.41; Liv. 33.21.1–5. An alleged Seleukid intrusion into Attalid territory (Liv. 33.19.8) should be regarded as an annalistic fabrication: Dreyer 2007: 283–5; Ma 2002: 279–81; *contra* e.g. Schmitt 1964: 269–70; bibliography in Dreyer.

⁷⁸ *IvP* 182=OGIS 240; for the suggestion of *somatophylax*: Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 38–9; Ma 2002: 390.

⁷⁹ Ma 2002: 272–6. The statue may even be linked to Antiochos III's victory.

⁸⁰ *IvP* 189=OGIS 236; cf. the similarity with OGIS 235.

⁸¹ Ma, forthcoming a: ch. 3.4; Kähler 1948: 14; Schober 1940; Radt 1999: 79–81.

⁸² Liv. 33.19.9–11; Hieronymos *FGrHist* 260 F46. For the naval conquest up to the capture of Ephesos: Ma 2002: 82–9; Wörle 2011: 377–415; also Schmitt 1964: 278–88; Dreyer 2007: 285–9. Rhodian rule in Lykia and Pamphylia in this period: Adak 2007.

⁸³ Liv. 33.20.1–13; Wiemer 2002: 222–5. Rhodian narrative: Wiemer 2001: 107–11; Wiemer 2002: 44–5.

requests, Antiochos III continued his naval conquest and by August 197 the Seleukid king arrived in Ephesos, where he wintered.⁸⁴ During the winter Antiochos III took most of the cities on the northern Ionian coastline; apparently only the two cities of Smyrna and Lampsakos were 'contending for their liberty'.⁸⁵ Since his land troops had already taken Abydos at this point, he was able to send them south towards Lampsakos, while Antiochos himself set sail to the Hellespont, crossing into the Chersonesos in spring 196. It was after the re-foundation of Lysimacheia and the king's expedition to Thrace that two Roman commissioners arrived in Lysimacheia.⁸⁶

However, the politics of Asia Minor were no longer a purely Greek affair. Presumably to forestall Roman suspicions about his activities in Asia Minor, Antiochos III sent an embassy to T. Quinctius Flamininus in 196, which was received after the proclamation of the freedom of the Greeks at the Isthmian games.⁸⁷ The Roman commissioners had recently received the embassies from cities on the coast of western Asia Minor, including Smyrna and Lampsakos.⁸⁸ The replies of both T. Quinctius Flamininus and the Commission of Ten were not as Antiochos would have wished: 'They ordered him, with regard to the Asiatic cities, to keep his hands off those which were autonomous, and make war on none of them, and to withdraw from those previously subject to Ptolemy and Philip which he had recently taken.'⁸⁹ When the Roman commissioners arrived at Lysimacheia in the early autumn of 196 they reaffirmed this same position. The senate's concern about Antiochos is further illustrated by the arrival

⁸⁴ Liv. 33.38.1. Ephesos was the last station in Hieronymos' list: *FGrHist* 260 F46. For the importance of Ephesos, cf. Polyb. 18.41a; Ma 2002: 86–8.

⁸⁵ Liv. 33.38.3. This is not the first time Smyrna had asserted its independence. Under Seleukos II, it claimed to act in the name of the king, while the political situation suggests otherwise: *I.Smyrna* 573. Under Attalos I it was praised for its loyalty towards him in resisting Achaïos (in vain): Polyb. 5.77.4–6.

⁸⁶ Abydos, Lampsakos, and the Chersonesos: Liv. 33.38.4; 33.38.8. Lysimacheia and Thrace: Polyb. 18.51.3–4; Liv. 33.38.10–14; App. *Syr.* 1 (3–4); *I.Illion* 45. For Antiochos III's Thracian campaign: Grainger 1996.

⁸⁷ Polyb. 18.47; Liv. 33.34; Gruen 1984: 621; Eckstein 2008: 311–13.

⁸⁸ Lampsakos had sent an embassy to Rome before being threatened by Antiochos: *Syll.*³ 591; Bickerman 1932; Mehl 1990: 147 n. 19. Polybios and Livy mention both cities sending embassies to Lysimacheia, and Appian mentions others who appealed to Flamininus: App. *Syr.* 2 (5), based on Polybios: Brodersen 1991: 81; Polyb. 18.52; Liv. 33.38.3–4.

⁸⁹ Polyb. 18.47.1; Liv. 33.34.2–4.

of L. Cornelius Lentulus at Lysimacheia to reconcile Antiochos and Ptolemy V.⁹⁰

This is the context in which the Attalid politics of the period must be placed. Attalos I died in Pergamon after suffering a stroke at Thebes, perhaps in the summer of 197.⁹¹ Given that Eumenes II had probably already been in charge of the affairs of Pergamon since his father's departure in 200 (with the brief interval of Attalos' return in the winter of 199), the accession of the new king was presumably peaceful.⁹² Nevertheless, dynastic successions in the Hellenistic period were seldom entirely stable. Shortly after Attalos' death, Prousius I seems to have seized the territory of Phrygia Epiktetos, returned to Eumenes only after the treaty of Apameia.⁹³ Eumenes must also have been concerned that cities such as Smyrna and Lampsakos had turned to Rome for help rather than to him or his father before him.⁹⁴ None the less, relations between the new Attalid king and Antiochos III show no immediate signs of change. Antiochos made no advances against the kingdom, nor did Eumenes encourage Rome to act against the Seleukid king. Eumenes left Asia Minor in the summer of 195 to join the Romans in a campaign against Nabis of Sparta.⁹⁵

Relations between Antiochos and the Romans, however, had changed. Eumenes must have been aware of the indecisive outcome at the conference at Lysimacheia and the announced marriage alliance between Antiochos and Ptolemy V.⁹⁶ After the winter of 194–193, when Antiochos married his daughter to Ptolemy V at Raphia, the

⁹⁰ Polyb. 18.49.3; Walbank, *HCP* ii, 620–1; Gruen 1984: 622; cf. Eckstein 2008: 311.

⁹¹ Liv. 33.21.1. Polyb. 18.41. We do not know when Attalos I died, but Ma 2002: 265 has shown that *FD* III.1 336 cannot be taken as a *terminus post quem*, as suggested by Allen 1983: 10 n. 6.

⁹² Eckstein 2008: 310.

⁹³ Habicht 1957: 1096–8; Habicht 1956: 92–5; cf. Wörrle 2009: 426 n. 74.

⁹⁴ Magie 1950: II 947–8, and above n. 88. Eumenes II was allied with Rome and as an ally he received the cities of Oreus and Eretria from the *decemviri* (Liv. 33.34.10). Holleaux's suggestion that Lampsakos and Smyrna were sent by Eumenes seems unlikely: Holleaux 1930: 179; Hansen 1971: 75. Smyrna remained on the Roman side and allegedly founded a temple of Roma in 195: Tac. *Ann.* 4.56. For the Ionian cities' subsequent attitude towards Rome, see Mellor 1975: 51. For *Romaia* on Chios: Salvo, forthcoming; Derow and Forrest 1982.

⁹⁵ Liv. 34.29.4. Return: Liv. 34.40.7.

⁹⁶ Polyb. 18.49–52; Liv. 33.39–41; App. *Syr.* 3–4 (10–17); Gruen 1984: 622–4. Seleukid–Ptolemaic friendship: Liv. 33.33.40; 35.13.4. App. *Syr.* 3 (13).

king returned to Ephesos via the Tauros ridge.⁹⁷ He married another of his daughters, Antiochis, to Ariarathes IV of Kappadokia at around this time, and offered yet another daughter to Eumenes in order to reaffirm Seleukid–Attalid relations. However, Eumenes declined the offer.⁹⁸ The rejection of the Seleukid princess marks a shift in the political position of the Attalid king. The Seleukid embassy to Rome in 193 had failed utterly, and shortly afterwards we find the first public Attalid complaint against Antiochos, trying to urge the Romans into war.⁹⁹

Eumenes knew that his father's kingdom had only emerged as a result of the weakened central authority of the Seleukid empire. Seleukos II may have urged Attalos I to resist Antiochos Hierax, in return for the concession of the diadem to the Attalid rulers; or it may only have been Antiochos III who had acknowledged Attalos I as king. Either way, Attalos I had accepted a degree of Seleukid superiority; the Seleukid resurgence clearly demonstrated that the Pergamene state could not expand its interests without conflict with Antiochos III. Both Livy and Appian (ultimately relying on Polybios) describe the rationale that led Eumenes to break with Antiochos:

Even if some misfortune should befall him, it was better, he thought, to endure whatever fate with the Romans as allies, than by himself either to submit to the sovereignty of Antiochos or, if he refused, to be compelled to do so by force of arms.¹⁰⁰

Eumenes saw Rome as his chance to free himself from Seleukid superiority in Asia Minor. Attalos I had already influenced the Roman decision to go to war with Philip V, and it was from this period that close relations are attested between the Attalid king and the Roman senate. In 192, Eumenes must have taken part in the second war against Nabis of Sparta, although he appears to have been

⁹⁷ Liv. 35.13.4. App. Syr. 5 (18).

⁹⁸ App. Syr. 5 (18); Polyb. 21.20.8; Liv. 37.53.13. Mehl 1998b: 251–3 dates the marriage proposal to 194, while Hansen 1971: 76–7, dates it to 193; however, uncertainties remain: cf. Cohn 1909: 1092. In 212 Antiochos gave his sister Antiochis in marriage to Xerxes of Armenia: Polyb. 8.23.

⁹⁹ Failed embassy: Liv. 34.57–9. Attalid complaint: Liv. 35.13.7–10; cf. Eckstein 2008: 320. For the annalistic invention of a Seleukid intrusion in 198: Liv. 32.8–16, see above n. 77.

¹⁰⁰ Liv. 35.13.9; similarly in App. Syr. 5 (20). Brodersen argues that Appian's phrasing (*βασιλεύσιν βασιλευόμενον*) indicates the possibility of remaining a king under the 'Great King' Antiochos III: Brodersen 1991: 94.

still in Pergamon when Antiochos crossed into Greece. He immediately dispatched his brother, the future Attalos II, to Rome, where Eumenes and Attalos were honoured together. At the onset of the Roman war against Antiochos. Eumenes was duly present with his fleet at Chalkis.¹⁰¹

The Attalid state profited immensely from the treaty of Apameia. Later in the second century, the Attalids underlined their independence from their former Seleukid masters, tracing it back to the battle at Sardeis in 262 and the taking of the diadem under Attalos I. This rewriting of the Attalid past has influenced our historical narratives, distorting Livy's (i.e. Polybios') narrative about Eumenes' decision to go to war against Antiochos III. For the Attalids, 187 and the removal of Seleukid troops and garrisons from Asia Minor was the beginning of a new era. However, as will be shown in the following section, Apameia did not necessarily carry the same significance for Antiochos and his successors.

THE SELEUKID AND ATTALID FUTURE?—c.187–175 BC

The defeat of Antiochos III by Roman and Attalid troops at Magnesia resulted in the treaty of Apameia, which transformed the political landscape of Asia Minor. The Seleukid troops had to withdraw from Asia Minor, and the Roman commission re-drew the territorial boundaries of many of the groups involved.¹⁰² The change-over from a Seleukid to an Attalid (or indeed a Rhodian) Asia Minor was swift, and this should not surprise us. The Seleukid administrative 'footprint' was light, much like other contemporary Hellenistic states such as the Ptolemaic and early Attalid kingdoms, as is amply illustrated by the rapid fluctuations of control over western Asia Minor between Seleukids, Ptolemies, and Attalids. The rapid disintegration of the Achaemenid empire in the fourth century was very similar, and Thonemann argues in this volume that it was only the

¹⁰¹ Eumenes in the war against Nabiz: *IvP* 62. Honours in Rome: Liv. 35.33.1–2. Chalkis: Liv. 35.33.6.

¹⁰² Polyb. 21.43.1–46.11; Liv. 38.38.1–39.16. On the treaty, see the overview in: Gruen 1984: 547–50; Dreyer 2007: 347–62.

Attalid kingdom under Eumenes II and his successor which finally transformed this system of territorial control.¹⁰³

While the treaty of Apameia necessitated the Seleukid expulsion from Asia Minor, I shall argue that Seleukid interest in Anatolia and western Asia Minor did not disappear overnight. Psoma's analysis in this volume shows that there was a strong connection in monetary and economic terms between the lands on both sides of the Tauros.¹⁰⁴ The question that should be asked here is: to what extent did the treaty of Apameia matter to the Seleukid kings in the period following 187, and how did this influence Seleukid–Attalid relations?

In order to assess Seleukid interest in both Asia Minor and the Attalids for this period, it is necessary briefly to consider the reign of Seleukos IV. The surviving fragments do not allow us to ascertain whether Polybios wrote extensively about Seleukos IV, but it seems that events in Macedonia, central Greece, and even Asia Minor, which all led to future engagements with Rome, were more central to the author's interest.¹⁰⁵ However, the lack of sources does not mean that Seleukos IV was 'paralysed' by the Peace of Apameia, as has at times been suggested by previous scholarship.¹⁰⁶

Although accessions in the Hellenistic period could be challenging for the new king, Seleukos' succession was apparently one of the smoother ones. Following the death of his elder brother in 193, Seleukos IV was apparently promoted to the role of his father's heir. Not only did Seleukos IV actively fight in the war against the Romans and lay siege to Pergamon, he also commanded the left wing of the Seleukid army at Magnesia, leaving few doubts about his position within the kingdom. From at least April 189 onwards we see him acting as co-ruler with his father Antiochos III and it is therefore reasonable to assume that he had already established a working relationship with the Seleukid court, leading to an easy

¹⁰³ On the Seleukid footprint: Ma 2002, esp. 122–47; Capdetrey 2007: 227–329, esp. 230–1 and 254–5; see also Thonemann in this volume. This 'light' system of administration, typical of many large territorial empires, stands in strong contrast to that of e.g. imperial China: e.g. Rowe 2009, esp. 31–62.

¹⁰⁴ Psoma, Ch. 8 below.

¹⁰⁵ That Polybios placed less emphasis on the Seleukids may also be indicated by Livy's silence. Of course, the fragments distort the picture.

¹⁰⁶ e.g. Stähelin 1923; Will 1979–82: II 303–4; Primo 2009: 148; see, however, Habicht 1989b: 338–41.

accession and a stable reign.¹⁰⁷ Le Rider has demonstrated that the financial pressures on the post-Apameian Seleukid kingdom were far less serious than previously assumed, and indeed more and more material is emerging for the reign of Seleukos IV. The new Olympiodoros dossier, which describes in a series of three documents the appointment of a certain Olympiodoros, probably to the high priesthood over the shrines of Koile-Syria and Phoinikia, can serve as an example of the king's efforts to reorganize and stabilize Seleukid control over recently acquired territories.¹⁰⁸ II Maccabees shows the king in reciprocal interaction with the Jews in Jerusalem.¹⁰⁹ In Babylonia we can also see Seleukos granting more power to local *hyparchs*; he may have transformed Uruk into a *polis*. The astronomical diaries from Babylon, which also record political events and commodity prices, seem to indicate a stable kingdom with inflation rates similar to previous and subsequent periods.¹¹⁰

Evidence for Seleukid foreign politics in this period is scanty, but Seleukos IV seems to have been active on all fronts of the Greek world.¹¹¹ In c.186–185 BC, Seleukid envoys appeared at the Achaean assembly in Megalopolis, offering the renewal of friendship and promising a flotilla of ten ships.¹¹² Seleukos IV was not the only king who wanted to be allied with the Achaean league. Eumenes II had also sent envoys, offering a very large gift of 120 talents in order to pay the council on the occasion of federal meetings. Ptolemy V had previously renewed the alliance with the Achaeans, and gave a gift of

¹⁰⁷ Pergamon: Polyb. 21.10.13. Magnesia: Liv. 37.41.1; App. Syr. 33. (170). Co-ruler: Sachs and Hunger 1988: 2 188, obv. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Cotton and Wörrle 2007; Gera 2009; Jones 2009. Compare the high priesthood of Nikanor in Asia Minor: SEG 37, 1010; SEG 54, 1353 with Malay 2004.

¹⁰⁹ II Macc. 3: 3.

¹¹⁰ Financial constraints: Le Rider 1993b; Le Rider and Callataÿ 2006: 200–3; see, however, Mittag 2006: 122–3. Seleukos IV's activities in Judaea are best known through the attempt of Heliodoros (or Olympiodoros?) to plunder the temple: II Macc. 3: 2–40. However, the plunder of the temple is only one event in the history of the interaction between the people of Judaea and the Seleukid kings. For the identification of Olympiodoros as the Seleukid official in Jerusalem, see Ma, forthcoming b. Babylonia: Monerie 2012: 343–7. For prices and apparent stability in the astronomical diaries: see R. van der Spek's collation of the data in <http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/babylon.php#top> [accessed 12 December 2011]; cf. van der Spek 2000. In contrast to the First Syrian war, the wars of Antiochos III and Seleukos IV do not seem to have made a major impact on the economy of Babylonia.

¹¹¹ See also Will 1979–82: II 303–4.

¹¹² Polyb. 22.7.4; for the date: Walbank, HCP iii. 9–10; contrast Habicht 1989b: 339.

6,000 bronze shields and 200 talents of coined bronze. Although the Achaeans refused the Seleukid gift of ships, Seleukid interest in the dealings of the Achaean league is obvious. Honours for a Seleukid envoy in Athens dated to April 186 suggest positive Seleukid diplomacy here too.¹¹³

The most striking aspect of Seleukid politics in this period is Seleukid involvement in the wars in Asia Minor, of which we know very little. With the expansion of the Attalid kingdom into the territory of the former Seleukid space north of the Maeander river, Eumenes was confronted in the north with the resurgence of Philip V, who now began to claim Thracian territories.¹¹⁴ Still more serious problems were provided by the other power-holders in Asia Minor, who all questioned the new position of the Attalid kings. In c. 184–182 BC Eumenes was fighting a war against Prousius of Bithynia.¹¹⁵ While Polybios identifies the main protagonists as Eumenes on the one hand and Prousius I (with Antigonid support) on the other, a decree from Lykian Telmessos describes the victory of Eumenes II as one over ‘Prusias and Ortiagon and the Galatians and all the other allies’, implying that the Galatians were fighting on the side of the Bithynian king.¹¹⁶

Trogus’ account suggests that Pharnakes I of Pontos also fought in this Bithynian alliance against Eumenes. This may be correct, and could help to explain the long-term hostility between Eumenes II and Pharnakes; alternatively, Trogus might simply have confused the Bithynian war with the subsequent struggle between Eumenes and

¹¹³ Eumenes II: Polyb. 22.7.3. Ptolemy V: Polyb. 22.3.5–6; 7.1–2; 22.9.3. Achaean refusal: Polyb. 22.9.13; note that they also refused the gift of Eumenes II: Polyb. 22.8.1–9.13. Athens: Meritt and Pritchett 1940: 117–18; Habicht 1989a: 10–20; Habicht 2000: 246.

¹¹⁴ Polyb. 22.6.1–6; cf. Polyb. 23.1.1–6; 3.1.

¹¹⁵ Habicht 1956: 90–100; Habicht 1957: 1098–1103; see also Will 1979–82: II 285–90. For a new date for the war, see Dmitriev 2007: 133–8; cf. Wörrle 2009: 426–7 n. 74; see also Ma, Ch. 2 above.

¹¹⁶ Segre 1932: 446–7, ll. 11–13, with Robert, *OMS* II 1183–4. It should of course be noted that the Attalid monarchs had a strong interest in promoting their continuous victories against the Galatians as their individual struggle against the barbarians: cf. Stewart 2004; Schalles 1985. This is presumably one of the reasons why the Galatians feature so heavily in the inscriptions on the terrace of the Athena sanctuary at Pergamon when they fought for Antiochos Hierax (e.g. *IvP* 23–4; 30). Nevertheless, the provenance of the inscription from Lykian Telmessos and the specific mention of the Galatian leader suggests real Galatian involvement. For Ortiagon: Polyb. 22.21.

Pharnakes.¹¹⁷ According to Polybios, in this war the Galatians also fought against the Attalid king.¹¹⁸ Polybios' discussion of the peace agreement of this war, apparently in 179, underlines the high involvement of other kings and dynasts of Asia Minor in this conflict and also the instability of the region, both resulting from the reorganization of Asia Minor after Apameia.¹¹⁹ Seleukos IV seems to have wanted to play an active role in this second conflict. In one of the fragments of Diodoros' account (presumably relying on Polybios), Seleukos' involvement is described as follows:

Seleukos, leading an army of a considerable size, advanced as if intending to cross the Tauros in support of Pharnakes, but the treaty that his father had made with the Romans occurred to him, the terms of which forbade . . .¹²⁰

Although the passage is corrupt, it is clear that Seleukos IV did not in the end cross the Tauros. Moreover, as has been suggested, if he only thought to take into account the treaty that Antiochos had made with Rome *after* he had assembled his army, some happenstance must have reminded him of the treaty and warned him of the consequences he faced if he partook in the war.¹²¹ This is highly puzzling: should we imagine a Roman commissioner arriving before the start of the campaign and giving Seleukos IV a similar ultimatum to that which was given to his brother in 169 at Eleusis, or was the king preparing an attack and was only eventually persuaded by his councillors?¹²²

Regardless of what (or who) made Seleukos IV halt his expedition, it seems that he was ready to assist Pharnakes. Niese long ago assigned a fragment in the *Suda* to this context, describing a king Seleukos as full of caution (εὐλάβεια) and inaction (ἀπραγία), who could only be persuaded to send troops by an offer of 500 talents.¹²³

¹¹⁷ Trog. *Prol.* 32; see Habicht 1957: 1099; cf. Hopp 1977: 41 n. 37.

¹¹⁸ Polyb. 24.14.1–11. For the war: Polyb. 24.14.1–15.13; 25.2.1–15; see also 24.1.1–3; 5.1–8. For a narrative see Ma, Ch.2 above; also Habicht 1989b: 328–30.

¹¹⁹ Polyb. 25.1–15.

¹²⁰ Diod. Sic. 29.24: Ὅτι ὁ Σέλευκος ἀξιόλογον δύναμιν ἀναλαβὼν προῆγεν ὡς ὑπερβησόμενος τὸν Ταῦρον ἐπὶ τὴν βοήθειαν τοῦ Φαρνάκου· ἔννοιαν δὲ λαβὼν τῶν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους τῷ πατρὶ γενομένων συνθηκῶν, καθ' ἃς οὐκ ἐξήν . . .

¹²¹ Stähelin 1923: 1243.

¹²² For Antiochos IV and the 'Day of Eleusis': Polyb. 29.27.1–8; Liv. 45.12.3–8; see also Mittag 2006: 214–24.

¹²³ Polyb. frg. 96; Niese 1903: iii, 76 n. 1, accepted by Stähelin 1923: 1243; Walbank, *HCP* iii. 271; Habicht 1989b: 339; Primo 2009: 147.

Since the fragment portrays Seleukos IV as unsuccessful (*ἀπρακτος*) and weak (*ἀσθενής*), as in Appian's account,¹²⁴ this is presumably a Polybian fragment. However, we should note that 'inactivity' seems to be a Polybian *topos* for a bad king; given the juxtaposition in this passage with greed for money, the 'persuasion' of 500 talents ought perhaps also to be read as a generic description of Seleukos' character, and not as literally historical.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, if the fragment is historical, I would be tempted to place it in the same context of intended Seleukid intervention in Asia Minor. However, only the passage preserved in Diodoros demonstrates the active interest of the king. The dispatch of troops would not be surprising: Philip V also had apparently sent help to Prousius I.¹²⁶ It is the participation of Seleukos himself which goes beyond the character of peripheral support. While a payment of 500 talents might persuade Seleukos to send troops to help Pharnakes—perhaps even a considerable (*ἀξιόλογον*) army—it is doubtful whether the Seleukid king would have led the expedition in person if he was only interested in renting out mercenaries for money. At any event, Seleukos' intention to take an army and cross the Tauros (and this is what Diodoros describes) clearly demonstrates Seleukid interest in the affairs beyond the Tauros.

This intended Seleukid support for Pharnakes is the only direct evidence for Seleukid involvement in the wars of Asia Minor after the Peace of Apameia. None the less, we should note the Roman senate's decision to send an envoy as eminent as T. Quinctius Flamininus to both Prousius I and Seleukos IV.¹²⁷ The reasons for the embassy to Seleukos are unknown, and so it cannot be taken as evidence for Seleukid involvement in the war between Prousius and Eumenes. The embassy may have been about different matters altogether; at most, its chronological context—frictions with Philip V and the war between Prousius and Eumenes—could indicate that the Roman senate was concerned about Seleukid involvement in these affairs.

For at least one group in Asia Minor, however, a continued relationship with the Seleukid kings is clear. The Galatians had been

¹²⁴ App. Syr. 66. (349).

¹²⁵ Gera 1998: 102.

¹²⁶ Polyb. 23.1.4; Liv. 39.46.9.

¹²⁷ Polyb. 23.5.1. Livy (39.51.1–12) seems to underline Roman concern by setting the end of Hannibal in this context.

fighting in the Seleukid armies at least since the so-called ‘Elephant battle’ of Antiochos I in the first quarter of the third century.¹²⁸ They were known for their bravery and valour and, most importantly, they also fought in the armies of Antiochos III against Molon (Polyb. 5.53.3) and against the Romans at Magnesia. At Magnesia in particular, the Galatian contingents seem to have been very strong, with Galatian kataphracts on both wings and infantry of Tektosages, Trokmi, and Tolistobogoi on the left wing.¹²⁹ While the Galatians were known for rebelling from their paymasters at times, there is no question that the Seleukid kings were a valuable source of employment for the Galatian tribes in central Anatolia in this period.¹³⁰ Moreover, the presence of Galatian troops in the army of Antiochos III in his war against Molon in the late 220s might further suggest that this relationship was not dependent on Seleukid control of Asia Minor. This is perhaps how we should interpret the presence of Galatians (and Thracians) in the army of Antiochos IV at the parade at Daphne after the king’s retreat from Pelusium.¹³¹ Rather than interpreting them as mercenaries ‘fighting in Galatian fashion’ as suggested by Walbank (*HCP* iii. 450), it is conceivable that just as the economic relationship between Anatolia and northern Syria continued, so too did the flow of mercenaries from Thrace, Mysia, and Galatia.

Apart from direct involvement with the Galatian tribes, Eumenes II must have been concerned about Seleukid diplomatic activity. Perhaps in 177, Perseus received Laodike, the daughter of Seleukos IV, as his bride, and it was in fact the Rhodians who brought Laodike to her new husband.¹³² The Rhodians had acted against the Attalids in the war against Pharnakes, and Seleukos and the Rhodians were apparently on good terms at this point.¹³³ These good relations seem also to have continued after the accession of Antiochos IV.¹³⁴ Does Seleukid

¹²⁸ ‘Elephant Battle’: App. *Syr.* 65 (343); Lucian, *Zeuxis* 9. For the date: Wörrle 1975: 62; cf. Grainger 2010: 80–1 and Coşkun 2011: 89–92. For the settlement: Memnon *FGrHist* 434 F11.6; Strobel 1996: 261. For the relationship: Coşkun 2011.

¹²⁹ App. *Syr.* 32 (163–4); Liv. 37.40.5–14.

¹³⁰ Galatian secession: Trog. *proleg.* 27; *FGrHist* 260 F32.8 (Antiochos Hierax); Polyb. 5.78.1 (Attalos I); cf. Call. *Del.* 171–87 (Ptolemy II).

¹³¹ Polyb. 30.25.5; Mittag 2006: 282–95; cf. Launey 1950 [1987]: I 523.

¹³² Polyb. 25.4.8–10; *HCP* iii. 280–1; cf. App. *Mac.* 11. 2.

¹³³ Polyb. 27.7.5. However, Polybios also suggests a relationship between the Rhodians and Eumenes II: Polyb. 21.46.10. See also Wiemer 2002: 289–94.

¹³⁴ Rhodes received (alongside other cities) benefactions from the king: Liv. 41.20.7; see also Wiemer 2002: 291–2.

activity in international politics and the likelihood of a continued Galatian–Seleukid relationship allow us to draw any conclusions with regard to the Seleukid interest in Asia Minor after the Peace of Apameia? Perhaps not; none the less, the treaty of Apameia did not mean that the Seleukids gave up on Asia Minor or that the emphasis of Seleukid politics changed entirely. For one thing, although the treaty focused on seemingly fixed boundaries, in reality they were less than clear; for another, even if the treaty was understood by all parties in the same manner, the Seleukid kings did not consider themselves bound to follow its stipulations too strictly. As Thonemann has demonstrated in this volume (above), the eastern boundary was particularly ill-defined, in stark contrast to the relatively well-defined western and southern boundaries of the newly extended Attalid state.¹³⁵ The accounts of both Polybios and Livy are corrupt, but the specification of the Tanais river and the ridges of the Tauros (Liv. 38.38.4) as the northern boundary of the Seleukid sphere was extremely difficult to implement. It was arguable where the mountains began and where they stopped. The Seleukid–Attalid conflict over coastal Pamphylia, which was deferred to the Roman senate, surely reflects the imprecision of the eastern boundary, as does Eumenes II's strong affirmation of his control of eastern Phrygia in the Toriaion dossier.¹³⁶ Moreover, the status of Galatia was not entirely clear. The Galatians were not included in the treaty of Apameia. Their exclusion is evident in Polybios' description of the route of Manlius and the *decemviri* in the concluding paragraph of his account of the Apameian settlement.¹³⁷ Moreover, after the wars between Pergamon and Bithynia and Pontos, Galatia was not necessarily part of the Pergamene sphere.¹³⁸ It may, therefore, have been the very vagueness of the treaty of Apameia which enabled trans-Tauric relations to continue.

Furthermore, it appears that the Seleukid kings simply did not observe the treaty in every detail. We should not assume that only

¹³⁵ For the Maeander river as a border, Thonemann 2011a, esp. 45–6, and id., above pp. 3 and 7.

¹³⁶ Pamphylia: Polyb. 21.46.11; cf. Liv. 38.39.17. For the textual problems and ambiguity: Walbank, *HCP* iii. 157–8, 174; Giovannini 1982b; cf. Dreyer 2007: 352 n. 159. Toriaion: see Thonemann, above pp. 5–7.

¹³⁷ Polyb. 21.46.12.

¹³⁸ See Walbank, *HCP* i. 299–300, and Walbank's own sceptical reassessment in *HCP* iii. 212 and 269.

certain parts of the treaty were binding on the successors of Antiochos III, while other clauses lapsed with the death of the king.¹³⁹ Rather, Polybios' narrative implies not only that the Seleukid kings ignored the treaty's stipulations but also that the Roman senate did not immediately react. Most obviously, the Seleukid war elephants, forbidden in the treaty but nevertheless retained, were only hamstrung by a Roman delegation after the death of Antiochos IV.¹⁴⁰ The ten long ships which Seleukos IV offered to the Achaeans also suggest that, despite the burning of the Seleukid war-fleet at Patara in 188, Seleukos IV possessed more long boats than those allowed in the stipulations of Apameia.¹⁴¹

While evidence of Seleukid activity in Asia Minor is limited and direct relations with the Attalid kings are absent, the planned Seleukid support of Pharnakes and the possibility of a continuing relationship with the Galatians, combined with Seleukid diplomacy with Macedonia and Rhodes, suggests that the post-Apameian Seleukid kingdom was not entirely different from that under Antiochos III. Seleukos IV consolidated his kingdom, struck alliances with other kings, and was active in the Greek world. Faced with a potential Antigonid–Seleukid alliance, Eumenes might well have recalled the late third century, when both Antiochos III and Philip V were expanding in Asia Minor.¹⁴² For Eumenes II, the treaty of Apameia was the vindication of a risky policy when he decided to side with the Romans against Antiochos. His decision to step outside of the Seleukid sphere of authority is reflected in the borders of the treaty of Apameia. Yet for the Seleukid kings this treaty did not mean the end of Seleukid Asia Minor or the end of Seleukid influence over the dynasts of the peninsula. The area west of the Tauros was lost, but it had been lost before and it could, in theory, be reclaimed as it had been in the past. Eumenes II must have been aware of this possibility; it is presumably no coincidence that, in the same period as the marriage of Perseus to

¹³⁹ Paltiel 1979: 30–41.

¹⁴⁰ Treaty-clause: Polyb. 21.43.12. Hamstringing: Polyb. 31.2.11.

¹⁴¹ Offer to the Achaeans: Polyb. 22.7.5. Burning of the fleet: Polyb. 21.44.3. It is striking that the number of ships is the same: Habicht 1989b: 339 n. 49; Gera 1998: 101. Nevertheless, we should probably not see this as a Seleukid attempt to rid themselves of old war ships in order to allow the building of newer vessels. For the naval clause and the difficulty of the textual transmission: Polyb. 21.43.13; Liv. 38.38.8; Walbank, *HCP* iii. 159–60; McDonald and Walbank 1969: 30–9.

¹⁴² Cf. Gera 1998: 102–4.

Laodike, the Roman senate asked for an exchange of hostages, and Demetrios, the son of Seleukos IV and future king, went to Rome while Antiochos IV was released.¹⁴³

The murder of Seleukos IV in September 175, the accession of Antiochos IV shortly afterwards, and the survival of Demetrios I set the stage for internal conflicts which would occupy the Seleukid kings for many years after the death of Antiochos IV.¹⁴⁴ The swift accession of Antiochos IV would not have been possible without the support of Eumenes II, as indicated in a Pergamene inscription; however, this Attalid investiture of a Seleukid king did not necessitate a reversal of Seleukid politics.¹⁴⁵ Although Antiochos IV undertook no campaigns beyond the Tauros, he did reappoint Artaxias of Armenia, clearly showing an interest in the northern marches of his kingdom. Antiochos' successor, Demetrios I, tried to make alliances with the kings of Kappadokia, underlining Seleukid interest in Asia Minor.¹⁴⁶

Antiochos IV's successful war against Egypt and his eastern campaign (from which he did not return) do not suggest a lack of interest in his northern borders.¹⁴⁷ After major defeats, Seleukid kings often turned to far-flung parts of their empire. It is hardly accidental that Seleukos III turned west after his father had been unable to affirm his control fully over the Parthians (Polyb. 4.48.6) and, likewise, it is no surprise that Antiochos III turned north after his defeat at Raphia, and east after his defeat at Magnesia. But this focus on different areas did not mean that Asia Minor was out of reach for the Seleukid kings: after all, the Attalids equipped a usurper in Seleukid Syria in c.153 to

¹⁴³ The date of Demetrios' arrival in Rome relies on the presence of Antiochos IV in Athens in the summer of 178: *SEG* 32, 131 with *BE* 1982, 139 and *SEG* 39, 138; Habicht 2000: 246.

¹⁴⁴ Murder of Seleukos IV: Glassner 2004: 4 rev. 9. Antiochos IV's accession: Glassner 2004: 4 rev. 11–12; Mittag 2006: 42–5. It should be noted that the Hellenistic King List from Babylon may give us an accession-date of Antiochos IV which was antedated later. However, since Antiochos IV and the son of Seleukos IV are mentioned as kings in November/December 175, the gap might give credibility to an accession-date soon after the death of Seleukos IV. For the later period, see Ehling 2008; Habicht 1989b: 353–69.

¹⁴⁵ *IvP* 160 = *OGIS* 248; cf. Gera 1998: 112–13, for whom the Attalid investiture of Antiochos IV led to a period of close co-operation. Yet on p. 186 Gera acknowledges that we have no evidence for such interaction.

¹⁴⁶ Antiochos IV and Armenia: Diod. Sic. 31.17a. Demetrios I and Kappadokia: Diod. Sic. 31.28.

¹⁴⁷ Antiochos IV in Egypt: Mittag 2006: 159–224. Eastern campaign: Mittag 2006: 298–327.

oppose Demetrios I and disturb the kingdom.¹⁴⁸ Yet direct evidence of political activity is lacking after the accession of Antiochos IV, and I would argue that Polybios' note on the alliance (*κοινοπραγία*) between Eumenes II and Antiochos IV, voiced in Rome in the context of Bithynian complaints against Eumenes II, derives from the conflict in Asia Minor between Eumenes and Prousius II of Bithynia, and not from any direct Seleukid–Attalid co-operation.¹⁴⁹

Both economically and socially the relationship between the Levant and Asia Minor persisted. The continuing presence of Thracians and Galatians in the Seleukid army has already been noted. Mørkholm suggests that at some point around 170, the coinage of Ariarathes IV of Kappadokia carried the same mint-marks as the Seleukid mint at Soloi.¹⁵⁰ However, it is uncertain whether we should accept his hypothesis that the Kappadokian coins were minted in Soloi,¹⁵¹ or whether there was simply an exchange of controls or mint-markers and local personnel. While we cannot use this as an indication of a political alliance between Antiochos IV and his brother-in-law, Ariarathes IV, it does none the less reflect the close economic connections between the two sides of the Tauros ridge.¹⁵² Similarly puzzling are the strong economic and social relations between the Seleukid kingdom and the cities of Asia Minor. In Teos, a public or private cult for the Seleukid kings continued for most of the second century.¹⁵³ Antiochos IV granted *ateleia*, 'tax freedom', to the city of Miletos for imports into the Seleukid kingdom,¹⁵⁴ and the accumulation of honours from the Greek cities of coastal Asia Minor and mainland Greece, especially Rhodos and Kyzikos, demonstrate the diplomatic activity of the Seleukid king in these areas.¹⁵⁵ The presence of numerous Milesians in the higher administrations of Seleukos IV, Antiochos IV, Demetrios I, and Alexander Balas is thus no exception, but

¹⁴⁸ See above, n. 1.

¹⁴⁹ Polyb. 30.30.4; Liv. *per.* 46; Walbank, *HCP* iii. 455–6; cf. Gera 1998: 185–6.

¹⁵⁰ Mørkholm 1962: 409–10; Mørkholm 1964: 61–2; accepted by Houghton 1989: 26, and the editors of *SC* (see the lemma for *SC* 1374–5). See, however, Simonetta 2007: 41–2, who rejects this hypothesis and places the coin under Ariarathes III.

¹⁵¹ Mørkholm 1964: 61–2.

¹⁵² Cf. Gera 1998: 191; Hopp 1977: 37.

¹⁵³ *OGIS* 246; see Mastrocinque 1984, who argues for a private cult; cf. Piejko 1982, with Muccioli 1992: 45 n. 16. See also the mention of 'King Antiochos' in a second-century sacred calendar from Erythrai: *I.Erythrai* 207.22 and 49.

¹⁵⁴ *SEG* 36, 1046 II.1–7; for references, Mittag 2006: 106 n. 47.

¹⁵⁵ *Syll.*³ 644/5. Date: Habicht 2003: 549.

rather an example of the continuation of the strong economic and social bonds between the two spheres, even after the political end of Seleukid Asia Minor.¹⁵⁶

Evidence of a Seleukid–Attalid relationship after the treaty of Apameia is absent, and sources for active Seleukid politics in Asia Minor are sparse. Nevertheless, links between the two regions are undeniable. I hope to have shown that the evidence does not allow us to conclude that Asia Minor was accepted as ‘beyond the border’ for the Seleukid kings. The kings remained involved in the politics of Asia Minor, and both Eumenes II and Attalos II sent pretenders into northern Syria in order to prevent the Seleukids from expanding their interest beyond the Tauros ridge. Of course, the Attalid rulers were kings in their own territory, all the more so after the Peace of Apameia. Yet if we place the second-century Attalid kingdom in the context of the third-century relationship between the Seleukid kings and the Attalid rulers, we may conclude that the Seleukid kings did not perceive Asia Minor and the Attalid kings very differently from the way they had done back in the third century.

ATTALID RULERS IN A SELEUKID SPACE—CONCLUSION

For much of the Attalid kingdom’s existence, its rulers were incorporated within Seleukid power-structures. The Seleukid kingdom was a heterogeneous entity. In addition to different ethnic bodies, Seleukid territory contained numerous other corporate groups, such as Greek and non-Greek cities, smaller communities as well as *dynasteiai*. Some of these dynasts, including the rulers of Pergamon and the Phrygian Philomelids, were already present before the conquests of Seleukos I, or were confirmed as local power-holders in the wake of the Seleukid conquest. Most local power-holders—the Attalids, the Philomelids, the Teukrids of Kilikia, the dynasts of Persis, and (if we follow Polybios) the Baktrian rulers—were located in strategic

¹⁵⁶ Seleukos IV: II Macc. 4: 4. Antiochos IV: Diod. Sic. 31.27a; *Milet* (1.2) nos. 1–2. Demetrios I: Polyb. 31.13.3. Alexander Balas: *I.Milet* (VI 2) 422; see also Herrmann 1987. For the appearance of coinages of Asia Minor in the Levant, see Meadows and Psoma in this volume.

positions which could enhance the stability of the Seleukid state by functioning as a link between the local communities and the Seleukid kings.¹⁵⁷ This chapter has offered a re-evaluation of the long-standing relationship between the Seleukid kings and the Attalid rulers; this relationship can also serve as a test-case for the incorporation of local power-holders within the Seleukid administrative framework.

The case of Armenia nicely exemplifies the peripheral character of the local dynasts. On his way to the upper satrapies, Antiochos III re-incorporated Armenia into the Seleukid sphere (Polyb. 8.23.1–5). The father of the local dynast Xerxes had at some point stopped paying tribute to the Seleukids, and it was only the presence of the Seleukid king and the size of the Seleukid force which led Xerxes to renew his alliance with Antiochos III. The Seleukid king showed himself as a benefactor by remitting ‘the greater part’ (τὰ πλεῖστα) of the tribute (but not all of it), restoring the dominions to Xerxes and giving him his daughter in marriage. Xerxes, showed himself as a suppliant ruler, paying 300 talents and providing 1,000 horses and 1,000 mules. This short story is indicative of later relations with Armenia: the power-holders after Xerxes seceded from Seleukid control once again after the Peace of Apameia, only to be re-incorporated under Antiochos IV.¹⁵⁸ The dynasts in the Seleukid kingdom, including the Attalid rulers, fulfilled local needs for euergetism and security. Although examples for euergetism beyond the Attalid sphere are difficult to find, a recently published inscription from Baktria gives some indication of other local euergetic activities.¹⁵⁹

My analysis of the Attalid–Seleukid relationship suggests that ‘secession’ is inadequate as a tool for interpreting relations between the Seleukid kings and the Attalid rulers. The early secession of the

¹⁵⁷ Engels 2011: 21–2; Capdetrey 2007: 284–6. The Teukrid priest-dynasts of Uzuncaburç in Rough Kilikia were presumably also part of this group of local power-holders. We do not yet know whether they were already placed in power by Seleukos I, as suggested by Trampedach 1999: 93–110, or later, as suggested by the results of the ceramic survey in Kramer, forthcoming. For a list of dynasts, see Kobes 1996; cf. Billows 1995: 90–107.

¹⁵⁸ Secession: Strab. 11.14.5; 11.14.15. Re-incorporation: Diod. Sic. 31.17a. It is uncertain whether we should interpret the murder of Xerxes by the daughter of Antiochos III as a direct attempt at regime-change: Ioh. Antioch. *Ap.* F75 (Mariev); cf. Schmitt 1964: 28.

¹⁵⁹ The dedication of an altar to Hestia by a certain Heliodotos in honour of King Euthydemos, found in Tadjikistan: *SEG* 54, 1568; see also the *stele* of Sophytos: *SEG* 54, 1569; Bernard, Pinault, and Rougemont 2004.

Attalid rulers does not show the Seleukid kingdom's 'weakness', nor does the late secession of other dynasts show its 'strength'.¹⁶⁰ Local dynasts were an essential part of the Seleukid administration, and their occasional secession was a fairly normal event, as also was the defection of civic elites and local groups. Moreover, local rulers could mint their own coins, and the minting of coinage cannot be used as evidence for the 'independence' of a certain group. Seceding dynasts did not necessarily have to be punished once they were brought back under Seleukid control, as shown by the actions of Antiochos III during his great phase of reconquests.

Interpreted in this light, down to the treaty of Apameia in 188, the Attalid rulers never ceased to be Seleukid dynasts, and this is also how we should interpret the *koinopragia* of 216. The Attalid rulers acted both in their own interest and in the interest of the Seleukid kings by securing the periphery of north-western Asia Minor. The Seleukid loss of Asia Minor in the mid-third century led them to become kings in their own kingdom, which at its peak reached down the coast of Asia Minor to Teos and inland as far as Phrygian Aizanoi.¹⁶¹ Although Attalos I used the weakness of the Seleukid centre to make himself king, one could argue that the kingship of Attalos I and his opposition to Antiochos Hierax tended more to the favour of Seleukos II than against him. From 216 onwards, the Attalid kings could still pursue their own political agenda; they were in a *koinopragia* with the Seleukid king, a reciprocal relationship which was influenced by the inequality of their powers. The Attalid kingdom of the third century was a semi-autonomous kingdom, which fulfilled local functions in the Seleukid periphery as the largest of a number of local rulers.

Eumenes II understood the situation in which he found himself. In the period between his accession in 197 and c.193, he began to use Roman interests to strive for full independence from the Seleukid kings. The failed negotiations between the Roman commissions and Antiochos III led to Rome becoming a new actor in the power-politics of Asia Minor. Eumenes sided with the Romans, thereby earning full independence from the Seleukid rulers. This independence, however, was determined by the space between the two kingdoms. The

¹⁶⁰ For the 'Sick man of Asia': e.g. Will 1979–82; Musti 1984; Wolski 1999. For a revisionist analysis of a strong Seleukid empire: Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Wörrle 2009: 426 n. 76, and Thonemann, Ch. 1 above.

Seleukid kings did not necessarily view the treaty of Apameia in the same light as their Attalid counterparts did. The second-century Seleukid kings might even have thought it possible to reverse the condition of post-Apameian Asia Minor and re-incorporate the Anatolian dynasts under their authority. However, this did not come to pass. Along with the political reconfigurations after the Antigonid defeat at Pydna and the Seleukid withdrawal from Egypt after the day of Eleusis, the Attalid kings played their part in destabilizing the Seleukid state of the later second century and, ultimately, turning the Seleukids back upon themselves.

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What Did the Attalids Ever Do for Us? The View from the *Aerarium*

Philip Kay

In any discussion of the relationship between the Romans and the Attalids, the Roman decision not to annex western Asia Minor after the treaty of Apameia, and to withdraw all troops from the area, must loom large. This is not least because, viewed from a Roman fiscal perspective, it initially appears to have been a very strange move. The area that the Romans left behind had developed trade and communication networks. It had well-established agricultural economies, which probably already had institutionalized methods of taxation, because of their exploitation by the Seleukids, and before that by the Achaemenids. The Attalids appear to have become extremely wealthy by exploiting the area. So, why in the early 180s BC did the Romans not annex and tax the territory? Furthermore, why did they still fail to annex the area in the 160s, when their relations with Eumenes II deteriorated? What does this decision tell us about the way the Romans of the early second century viewed and organized their state finances?

The whole subject of Rome's involvement in Greece and Asia Minor is well trodden and highly contentious territory. Among modern scholars there are sharp differences of opinion concerning the causes of Rome's imperial expansion—between those like Theodor Mommsen, Ernst Badian, and Erich Gruen, who have expounded a doctrine of 'defensive imperialism'; and those like William Harris, who have argued that the most important factors that brought about the wars of the second century were the Romans' desire for the glory

and the economic benefits which warfare brought.¹ At the centre of this debate is the decision by the Romans to withdraw from Asia after Apameia, and to entrust to their allies, Pergamon and Rhodes, ruling authority over the territories to the west of the Tauros mountains, which had been under the sovereignty of Antiochos III.

THE WEALTH OF ASIA

There can be no doubt that the territory that did eventually come under the control of the Roman people, following the bequest of Attalus III in 133, was enormously wealthy. As the province of Asia, it became economically very significant for the Romans. In a speech before the assembled representatives of the Greeks and 'other peoples' in the province of Asia in 41 BC, Marcus Antonius is quoted by Appian as saying that the Romans had freed them from paying taxes to Attalos III, until demagogues (the only real candidates are the Gracchi) appeared on the scene and needed tax revenue:

ὕμᾱς ἡμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, Ἀτταλος ὁ βασιλεὺς ὑμῶν ἐν διαθήκαις ἀπέλιπε, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀμείνονες ὑμῖν ἦμεν Ἀττάλου· οὓς γὰρ ἐτελείετε φόρους Ἀττάλῳ, μεθήκαμεν ὑμῖν, μέχρι, δημοκόπων ἀνδρῶν καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν γενομένων, ἐδέησε φόρων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐδέησεν, οὐ πρὸς τὰ τιμήματα ὑμῖν ἐπεθήκαμεν, ὥς ἂν ἡμεῖς ἀκίνδυνον φόρον ἐκλέγοιμεν, ἀλλὰ μέρος φέρειν τῶν ἐκάστοτε καρπῶν ἐπετάξαμεν, ἵνα καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων κοινωνῶμεν ὑμῖν.²

Greeks! Attalus the king left you to us in his will and immediately we were better to you than Attalus. For we released you from the taxes that you had been paying to him until the action of the demagogues who arose amongst us made taxes necessary. But when they became necessary, we did not impose them upon you according to a fixed valuation, so that we could collect an absolutely certain sum. We required you to contribute a portion of your yearly harvest so that we might also share with you the difficult times.

The main issue for any government or administration facing a large programme of public expenditure is how to raise the income to cover

¹ Mommsen 1920; Badian 1968; Gruen 1984; Harris 1979.

² App. *B Civ.* 5.4.

its cost. On becoming tribune in 123, Gaius Gracchus embarked on a series of economic measures which were both cumulatively very costly and followed a period of exceptional expenditure on the construction both of roads and, in about 125, of Rome's fourth aqueduct, the *Aqua Tepula*. In his speeches, Gaius Gracchus was entirely clear about his objective of raising taxes to facilitate the provision of benefits to the Roman people and to improve the administration of Rome:

*Ego ipse, qui apud vos verba facio ut vectigalia vestra augeatis quo facilius vestra commoda et rem publicam administrare possitis, non gratis prode; verum peto a vobis non pecuniam sed bonam existimationem atque honorem.*³

I myself, who am now recommending to you to increase your taxes in order that you may the more easily serve your own advantage and administer the Republic, do not come here for nothing; but I ask of you not money, but honour and your good opinion.⁴

His programme of public expenditure included not only one-off items such as colonial foundations, public granaries, and road-building but also a number of recurring items. For example, his *lex frumentaria* provided grain to the plebs at a fixed, subsidized price.⁵ Under a *lex militaris*, military clothing would be supplied at the expense of the state.⁶ He passed a law which probably gave back full judicial powers to the agrarian commission so that it could operate effectively again.⁷ The cost of this programme would have been enormous and a new source of income was needed in order to finance it. Gracchus' solution was to turn to the recently acquired province of Asia and to come up with a new, robust method of provincial exploitation through his *lex Sempronia de provincia Asia*.⁸ His introduction of the system of *ensoria locatio* under this law was a forward-looking measure for ensuring that the revenues of Asia would be maximized and available to finance his economic programme. As such, it was the first clearly

³ Gell. NA 11.10.3=ORF⁴ 187.

⁴ Trans. Loeb II 323, slightly revised.

⁵ Livy, *Per.* 60; cf. *Schol. Bob.* p. 135 St; Oros. 5.12; Cic. *Off.* 2.21.72 and Cic. *Tusc.* 3.20.48 call it a *largitio*; App. *B Civ.* 1.21, Plut. *C. Gracch.* 5 and Vell. Pat. 2.6.3 describe it, probably wrongly, as a free gift of grain at public expense.

⁶ Plut. *C. Gracch.* 5; Diod. Sic. 35.25.

⁷ Livy, *Per.* 60; Plut. *C. Gracch.* 5; Cic. *Leg. agr.* 1.21; *De vir. ill.* 65; Vell. Pat. 2.6.3; Crawford 1996: no. 2 (*lex agraria*), l. 6.

⁸ Cic. *II Verr.* 3.12; App. *B Civ.* 5.4; *Schol. Bob.* p.157 St; Diod. Sic. 35.25.

identifiable attempt by an individual Roman magistrate to produce a systematic state budget in support of a large programme of recurring public expenditure. It produced a stable system of taxation, which gave the Romans the ability to budget for large projects at least five years ahead and reduced their dependency on more variable, and less certain, forms of income such as plunder and mining revenues. As we shall see, it contrasts strongly with the Roman approach to state finance at the time of Apameia.

Under the Romans, the taxes from Asia consisted of *portoria*, *decumae*, and *scripturae*.⁹ Some idea of the scale of the revenues that Rome was eventually extracting from the province comes from Cicero's time. Before Pompey's conquests, the regular public revenues were said by Pompey himself (who perhaps had an interest in depreciating them) to be 50 million denarii per annum (8,333 talents) from up to twelve provinces.¹⁰ In 66 BC, in the *De imperio Cn. Pompeii*, Cicero emphasized that Asia provided a large part of the sum:

*Nam ceterarum provinciarum vectigalia, Quirites, tanta sunt ut eis ad ipsas provincias tuendas vix contenti esse possimus, Asia vero tam opima est ac fertilis ut et ubertate agrorum et varietate fructuum et magnitudine pastionis et multitudine earum rerum quae exportentur facile omnibus terris antecellat.*¹¹

For while the revenues of our other provinces, citizens, are barely sufficient to make it worth our while to defend them, Asia is so rich and fertile as easily to surpass all other countries in the productivity of her soil, the variety of her crops, the extent of her pastures, and the volume of her exports.¹²

In the same speech, Cicero describes the Asian taxes as being 'the sinews of the Republic':

*Nam et publicani, homines honestissimi atque ornatissimi, suas rationes et copias in illam provinciam contulerunt, quorum ipsorum per se res et fortunae vobis curae esse debent. Etenim si vectigalia nervos esse rei publicae semper duximus, eum certe ordinem, qui exercet illa, firmamentum ceterorum ordinum recte esse dicemus.*¹³

⁹ Cic. *De imp. Cn. Pomp.* 15.

¹⁰ Plut. *Pomp.* 45.

¹¹ Cic. *De imp. Cn. Pomp.* 14.

¹² Trans. Loeb IX 27, slightly revised.

¹³ Cic. *De imp. Cn. Pomp.* 17.

For the *publicani*, those most honourable and accomplished men, have transferred their businesses and their wealth to Asia; and their property and fortunes ought, in their own right, to be your concern. In truth, if we have always considered our revenues to be the sinews of the Republic, then we shall certainly be right to call the order of men that collects them the mainstay of all the other orders.

In the *De lege agraria*, he again highlights the Asian customs duties as one of the principal sources of Rome's revenue:

*Quid nos portus Asiae . . . quid omnia transmarina vectigalia iuvabunt tenuissima suspicione praedonum aut hostium iniecta?*¹⁴

What help will the ports of Asia bring us . . . or all our overseas taxes, if there is the slightest suspicion of pirates or enemies?

Within forty-five years of the bequest, Asia and Rome were so closely linked financially that Cicero could later say that Mithradates' invasion of the province in 88 had caused a credit crisis at Rome:

*Nam tum, cum in Asia res magnas permulti amiserant, scimus Romae solutione impedita fidem concidisse. Non enim possunt una in civitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere, ut non plures secum in eandem trahant calamitatem. A quo periculo prohibete rem publicam, et mihi credite, id quod ipsi videtis: haec fides atque haec ratio pecuniarum, quae Romae, quae in foro versatur, implicata est cum illis pecuniis Asiaticis et cohaeret; ruere illa non possunt, ut haec non eodem labefacta motu concidant.*¹⁵

For then, when very many people lost large fortunes in Asia, we know that there was a collapse of credit at Rome, because repayments were interrupted. It is indeed impossible for many individuals in a single state to lose their property and fortunes without involving still greater numbers in their own ruin. Defend the Republic from this danger; and believe me when I tell you—what you see for yourselves—that this credit and this system of monies, which operates at Rome in the Forum, is bound up in, and is linked with, those Asian monies; the loss of the one inevitably undermines the other and causes its collapse.¹⁶

Statements such as these would have been pointless, particularly in a rhetorical context, if Asia had not been of great financial and fiscal importance to the Romans. In the early first century AD, Valerius

¹⁴ Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2.80.

¹⁵ Cic. *De imp. Cn. Pomp* 19.

¹⁶ Trans. Loeb IX 31, revised.

Maximus could describe the province as 'the richest and most delightful part of the world'.¹⁷

So, if this territory became so significant for the Romans, that part of it which Eumenes received in 188 is also, a priori, likely to have been important fiscally and economically to the Attalids. Indeed all the indications are that the Attalids were very rich. More than a century after the death of the last member of the dynasty, the poet Horace twice uses the term Attalid to suggest great wealth.¹⁸ Following the bequest in 133, Tiberius Gracchus proposed that τὰ βασιλικὰ χρήματα, Attalos' 'royal monies', should be used to stock the farms of the recipients of public land.¹⁹ According to the elder Pliny, when the Attalid royal treasures were eventually auctioned off in Rome three or four years later, they provoked a major boom in consumerism:

*Romae in auctionibus regiis verecundia exempta est.*²⁰

All modesty entirely disappeared at the auctions of the king's effects at Rome.

The Apameian settlement of 188 may have increased the land area under the control of Eumenes II by as much as ten times.²¹ Additionally, Eumenes received indemnities from Antiochos totalling a little over 477 talents over five years.²² States which formerly paid tribute to Antiochos now had to make payment to Pergamon, which suggests that some forms at least of Attalid taxation were a legacy from the Seleukid administration of Antiochos III.²³ All states under the sovereignty of the Attalid dynasty were required to pay a regular *phoros* to the Attalids, which appears to have taken the form of an agricultural land tax. Appian's report of the speech of Marcus Antonius, quoted above, indicates that this land tax was a fixed sum (τὰ

¹⁷ Val. Max. 4.8.4: *ditissimam atque amoenissimam partem terrarum orbis*.

¹⁸ Hor. *Carm.* 1.1.11–14: *Gaudentem patrios findere sarculo | agros Attalicis conditionibus | numquam demoveas, ut trabe Cypria | Myrtoum pavidus nauta secet mare*. Hor. *Carm.* 2.18.1–6: *Non ebur neque aureum | mea renidet in domo lacunar; | non trabes Hymettiae premunt columnas ultima recisas | Africa, neque Attali | ignotus heres regiam occupavi*.

¹⁹ Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 14.

²⁰ Plin. *HN* 33.149: cf. Varro, fr. 68: *ex hereditate Attalica aulaea, clamides, pallae, plagae, vasa aurea*.

²¹ Polyb. 21.22.15; see Thonemann, above pp. 1–2.

²² Polyb. 21.42.20–1.

²³ Polyb. 21.45.3.

τιμήματα) rather than one that varied from year to year according to the productivity of the land (μέρη τῶν ἐκάστοτε καρπῶν). It is unlikely that the Attalids fixed an arbitrary sum as the *phoros* of individual cities. It is more probable that the *phoros* was reckoned on the basis of the size and fertility of the city's territory, with perhaps one-tenth of the produce of some year serving as the usual norm. For example, the Pisidian city of Amlada paid an annual *phoros* of 2 talents, the revenue for which was derived largely from the production of wine.²⁴ We do not know the total amount of revenue that the Romans or the Attalids obtained from this land tax, but Herodotos tells us that, in the fifth century BC, the Achaemenids were already collecting a total of 1,260 (Babylonian) talents from their three nomes in western Asia Minor.²⁵ Of course, this was a considerably greater area than the enlarged kingdom of Pergamon, but it does give some indication of the scale of the revenues that were possible—perhaps about 700 talents per annum from the area controlled by Eumenes would be a reasonable guess.

In addition to the *phoros*, the citizens of the various towns had to pay some municipal taxes, including a poll-tax.²⁶ A Pergamene document mentions the exemption granted to one of its citizens 'from all taxes of which the city was in control', and a decree of Teos also concerns some land offered to the association of Dionysiac artists which was 'free from the taxes imposed by the city'.²⁷ It is also now clear that the Attalids levied customs duties on imports and exports across its borders by land and sea. Four sections of the *lex portorii*, the 'Customs Law of Asia', refer explicitly to arrangements that had existed under the Attalids.²⁸ Line 27 mentions '[the land] formerly of (the) monarchy'; line 36 refers to pre-existing customs buildings; line 69 refers to cities and tribes which were not subject to Attalos; and lines 67–8 talk of 'the buildings and royal [staging posts] which

²⁴ Strabo, 12.7.2; *OGIS* 751=RC 54, ll. 7–8: ἀπὸ τῶν δύο ταλάντων ἂ τελεῖτε κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν [κου]φίσαι ὑμᾶς.

²⁵ Hdt. 3.90.1–2. It is clear from Hdt. 6.42.2 that this was a land tax.

²⁶ An inscription from 181 BC contains a letter from Eumenes in response to a petition from the village of the Kardakes. It mentions a poll-tax (*συντάξις*) of 4 Rhodian drachmas and 1 obol, payable by each adult citizen (Segre 1938: 190, ll. 10–11). On Attalid taxation, see further the correspondence of Eumenes II with Apollonioucharax in Lydia, Herrmann and Malay 2007: 49–58, no. 32, with the corrections of Thonemann 2011b (and see above, pp. 20–3).

²⁷ *Syll.*³ 1007.20–1; *SEG* 2.580.

²⁸ Cottier *et al.* 2008.

king Attalos the son of Eumenes had for the purposes of exaction of *telos*.²⁹ Again, we have no idea what level of revenue the Attalids could derive from their customs duties, but we can perhaps get a hint of the scale of duties that were available in the Aegean in the first half of the second century. According to Polybios, the harbour duties at the major entrepôt of Rhodes were sizeable: of the order of 165 talents per annum before the Romans granted duty-free status to the port of Delos in 167 BC.³⁰ The economic effect of this comprehensive system of taxation was of course considerable. Eumenes II became, in Hansen's phrase, 'the master builder of Pergamon'.³¹ Polybios says that he turned the few wretched towns which he had inherited from his father into a kingdom which rivalled the greatest contemporary powers.³²

It is possible that an additional indication of the fiscal wealth of the Attalid kingdom may be found in the scale of the coinages which they minted, although big health warnings always have to be issued when dealing with the size of a coinage which, in the absence of mint records, is always difficult to estimate. Elsewhere in this volume, Callataÿ suggests that the issues of wreathed tetradrachms, which began to appear in the coastal cities of Asia Minor in the 180s, were large, on the assumption that approximately 20,000 coins might have been produced off each die.³³ But it may be that, given their intricate design, considerably fewer than that number would have been struck off each die. More credence can perhaps be given to the idea that the less finely minted cistophoric coinage was a very significant one. If Callataÿ and Meadows are correct, then the annual value of minting under the Attalids, from the 160s onwards, as represented by the output of cistophoroi, was higher than the output of both Seleukid tetradrachms and Athenian stephanephoroi.³⁴ This begs the question of why the cistophoroi were minted on such a grand scale, since this was in marked contrast to the level of minting before its introduction. The rate of production of cistophoroi appears to have been six or

²⁹ ἐποίκια [[καὶ σταθμοὺς βασιλικούς οὓς βασιλεὺς Ἀτταλος Εὐμένους υἱὸς πελωνίας χάριν ἔσχ[εν]].

³⁰ Polyb. 30.31.12 with Walbank, *HCP* iii. 459–60.

³¹ Hansen 1971: 106.

³² Polyb. 32.8.3: ταῖς μεγίσταις τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν δυναστειῶν ἐφάμιλλον ἐποίησε τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχήν.

³³ Callataÿ, below pp. 232–6.

³⁴ Meadows, below pp. 199–201; Callataÿ, below pp. 239–41.

seven times greater than the minting of philetairoi during the previous century.³⁵

One explanation of this may be that the Attalids adopted a 'closed' monetary system, along Ptolemaic lines.³⁶ Makis Aperghis has developed a model of the Seleukid royal economy in which his principal assumption is that the Seleukid kingdom monetized its economy because it paid its soldiers and administrators in cash; and so needed to extract taxation in coin from the peasantry.³⁷ In this payment cycle, the peasants obtained the coin by selling produce to the cities where the soldiers and the administrators spent their wages. Aperghis suggests that the Seleukids minted tetradrachms to 'top up' the money supply and keep the cycle going. Now, Aperghis' approach has attracted much criticism, not least over the issue of whether taxation payments in the Seleukid empire were made in silver or in kind.³⁸ But it could provide a model of the system of state finance in the Attalid kingdom, with silver obtained from abroad, for example through customs duties, being re-minted, retained in the Attalid kingdom's closed monetary system, and used to pay not only soldiers but, for example, contractors engaged in the monumentalization of Pergamon. We shall return to this issue later.

ANNEXATION

So, if western Asia Minor was such an enormously wealthy territory, why did the Romans not annex it after the defeat of Antiochos at Magnesia in 189 BC? The ancient sources are not much help. Polybios, followed by Livy, narrates the detailed discussions about the settlement in the form of speeches by Eumenes and the representatives of the Rhodians to the Roman senate. In the whole episode, the only mention of the possibility that the Romans might continue to occupy western Asia Minor comes towards the end of the speech that Polybios puts into the mouth of Eumenes. He is made to say that he very much wants to see the Romans stay in Asia; but that, if the

³⁵ Callataÿ, below pp. 239–40.

³⁶ Ashton, Ch. 7 below.

³⁷ Aperghis 2001: 69, 72; Aperghis 2004: 247–63.

³⁸ Callataÿ 2004; Ma 2007.

Romans choose to leave completely, there is no one to whom it would be more just for the Romans to cede this 'prize of war' than to him.³⁹ The next we hear is that, under the settlement, the Roman senate decides to entrust to Pergamon and Rhodes the ruling authority over most of the Asian states which had been under the sovereignty of Antiochos.⁴⁰ As Strabo suggests, this was presumably on the same principle as it had entrusted the ruling authority over Numidia to Masinissa at the end of the Second Punic war:

τὰ δ' ὅμοια καὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν συνέβη. κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν διὰ τῶν βασιλέων διωκεῖτο ὑπηκόων ὄντων.⁴¹

And the case of Asia was like that of Libya. At the outset it was administered through the agency of kings who were subject to the Romans.⁴²

Eumenes thus acquired ruling authority over the bulk of cis-Tauric Asia Minor. This included the regions of Hellespontine Phrygia, Greater Phrygia, Lykaonia, the Milyas, and Lydia, as well as the cities of Tralleis, Ephesos, and Telmessos, together with Antiochos' holdings in Europe (the Chersonese and the city of Lysimacheia).⁴³ The Attalids had previously lost control of part of Mysia to king Prousius of Bithynia and Rome therefore restored these Mysian states to the Pergamene kingdom. Rhodes received Lykia and Karia south of the Maeander.⁴⁴ Those states which had remained loyal to the Roman cause were allowed to be autonomous and to regain their immunity from taxation.⁴⁵ The lack of Roman contact with Asia Minor thereafter is striking. Following Manlius Vulso's expedition against the Galatians in 188, the entire Roman army and fleet returned to Italy. As far as our sources indicate, no Romans were left behind on Asian soil. No Roman army operated east of the Adriatic again until the start of the Third Macedonian war in 171 BC, and no Roman warships patrolled the eastern Mediterranean. In fact, a new fleet had to be built and old quinqueremes recommissioned for the war against

³⁹ Polyb. 21.21.7–9; cf. Livy, 37.53.25–7.

⁴⁰ The senate's decision: Polyb. 21.24.4–9. The final terms of the treaty of Apameia: Polyb. 21.45; Livy, 38.39; Strabo, 13.4.2; App. Syr. 44.

⁴¹ Strabo, 6.4.2.

⁴² Trans. Loeb III 145.

⁴³ See further Thonemann, above pp. 1–3; Chrubasik, above pp. 105–6.

⁴⁴ Polyb. 21.45.8–10.

⁴⁵ Polyb. 21.45.2–7.

Perseus.⁴⁶ Nowhere in the surviving portions of Polybios or in Livy is a reason given for the failure to annex the province. Polybios calls the transfer of Asia to the Attalids a gift, as do later ancient authors.⁴⁷

From the end of the Second Punic war onwards, the Romans appear to have decided not to annex territory on several occasions when they could have done so, for example in Greece and North Africa. Mommsen, who believed that Roman foreign policy was fundamentally defensive, argued that non-annexation was an important principle of Roman policy down to the destruction of Carthage; the senate preferred to support client states.⁴⁸ Harris, on the other hand, believes that 'the principle of non-annexation is a delusion, as far as the period down to 101 BC is concerned. When it was possible and profitable to annex a territory, annexation was carried out.'⁴⁹ He adds 'when annexation was rejected, it was not because of any general principle, but because of particular down-to-earth considerations of Roman advantage'.⁵⁰ There were three territories which, we can be reasonably certain, were being taxed by the Romans before 180, all of which paid their taxes in the form of agricultural tithes. According to Cicero, the Romans had inherited from Hieron of Syracuse a method of taxation which they referred to as the *lex Hieronica* and which, probably at the end of the third century, they imposed on most of the rest of Sicily, Sardinia, and possibly Corsica.⁵¹ In the case of Sicily, there was a 10 per cent grain tithe, the *decuma*, let out by the praetorian governor himself.⁵²

⁴⁶ Livy, 42.27.1, 43.12.9. Only twenty ships were built, as far as we know, in the ten years following Apameia. They were constructed in 181, according to Livy, 40.18.7–8, and assigned to guard the coasts of Italy; McShane 1964: 156.

⁴⁷ Polyb. 21.45.11; cf. Val. Max. 4.8.4; Vell. Pat. 2.38. In an inscription from the late 180s (*Syll.*³ 630.5–8), the Delphic Amphictyony attributed this Roman generosity to Eumenes' support for the autonomy of Greek cities; but this assertion is more likely to have been a reflection of Eumenes' increasingly successful efforts to present himself as a benefactor of the Greeks rather than of any real motive on the Romans' part.

⁴⁸ Mommsen 1920: I 683–782.

⁴⁹ Harris 1979: 154.

⁵⁰ Harris 1979: 133.

⁵¹ Cic. *II Verr.* 3.14; Cic. *II Verr.* 3.13 states that there were variations in Sicily which depended on the status of each community. Sardinia: Livy, 36.2.13, 37.2.12, 37.50.10, 42.31.8. There is no concrete evidence for the regular taxation of Corsica. Livy mentions exactions of wax when the Corsican states subject to Rome rebelled in 181 BC and again in 173 (Livy, 40.34.12, 42.7.2).

⁵² Grain tithe sold by Sicilian governor: Cic. *II Verr.* 3.151.

As far as Rome's specific failure to annex Asia is concerned, a variety of explanations has been offered, including remoteness and the difficulties of providing garrison armies. The Romans were certainly committed elsewhere. Globally they had thirteen legions in the field in 190 and twelve in 189 and 188.⁵³ But, if John Ma is correct to suggest, elsewhere in this volume, that the Attalid army was relatively small, the Roman commitment to Asia need not have been enormous, if they had stayed.⁵⁴ Furthermore, despite its commitments elsewhere, the Roman army had fought Antiochos and won! For Gruen, the Roman decision to leave Asia is just one more indication that 'the Aegean and Asia simply did not yet command systematic attention in Italy'.⁵⁵ Arthur Eckstein believes it is an example of 'the Roman habit of "smash and leave"', which he believes characterizes Roman foreign policy during this period.⁵⁶ For Harris and Peter Derow, on the other hand, the defeat of Antiochos gave Rome supremacy in Asia Minor and guaranteed its imperial security.⁵⁷ The only thing on which most modern scholars do generally agree is that Rome's intention was to leave Eumenes and Rhodes in charge of permanent buffer states against the Seleukids.⁵⁸

ROME'S FISCAL REQUIREMENTS

Against this background, let us look at the withdrawal of the Romans from Asia through the lens of their fiscal requirements, and specifically their bullion requirements.

To begin with, a number of important considerations need to be emphasized. In the first place, Rome was an intensely militarized society. Rome was at war in every year from 218 to 157, and no political candidate could run for even the lowest public office without having served ten campaigns in the army.⁵⁹ During the first half of the second century, there were only two major items of state expenditure,

⁵³ Brunt 1971: 424.

⁵⁴ Ma, above pp. 59–62.

⁵⁵ Gruen 1984: 568.

⁵⁶ Eckstein 2008: 305.

⁵⁷ Harris 1979: 223; Derow 2003: 65.

⁵⁸ e.g. Harris 1979: 143; Gruen 1984: 549; Eckstein 2008: 333.

⁵⁹ Polyb. 6.19.5.

the military and the construction of utilitarian infrastructure (such as roads and commercial facilities), of which the former was probably by far the more significant.⁶⁰ Expenditure on state administration was not a meaningful factor during the Republic, as there was virtually no state bureaucracy, apart from the tiny staffs supporting the senior magistrates, the law courts, and the treasury. Nor was there any systematic provision of what might be termed 'social services' by the state, before the introduction of the grain subsidy by C. Gracchus.

The average number of legions in the field between the end of the Second Punic war and the end of the Third Macedonian war was 8.7, with, in addition, occasional fleets of anything between 8,000 and 30,000 men.⁶¹ It is possible to produce a very rough estimate of the total cost of Rome's military commitment. If we follow Tenney Frank's calculation that, at the end of the third century, approximately 620,000 denarii paid for the stipend of one Roman legion for a year,⁶² and use Peter Brunt's figures for the number of legions each year,⁶³ we can calculate that, between 200 and 168, the Romans had, on average, to find about 5.4 million denarii or 900 talents per annum to cover the cost of the army's pay alone. In addition to being paid, Roman troops needed to be supplied. Continuous warfare required the procurement of vast amounts of weapons, tents, and logistical equipment, such as pack mules, wagons, and transport ships.⁶⁴ There were other elements of military expenditure too, with fleets of up to 150 quinqueremes being commissioned.⁶⁵ Frank conjectured that the cost of these additional items of military expenditure was equivalent to roughly 50 per cent of the military stipend.⁶⁶ If this estimate is even

⁶⁰ Kay forthcoming.

⁶¹ Brunt 1971: 424–5.

⁶² Basing his estimates on Polyb. 6.39.12, Frank (1933–40: I 76) calculated the annual cost of the stipend of a legion to have been 619,200 denarii (just over 100 talents). Support for this analysis comes from Polybios' statement (at 10.19.2) that, in 210 BC, Scipio took with him to Spain 400 talents, which was probably a year's pay for the four legions there; cf. Brunt 1950: 51.

⁶³ Brunt 1971: 424.

⁶⁴ Polybios states (6.21.6–7 and 6.39.15) that weapons were supplied by the state, but that deductions were made from military pay for food, clothing, and replacement arms. It was not until C. Gracchus' *lex militaris* that the terms of military service were altered so that clothing was also supplied at the expense of the state (Plut. *C. Gracch.* 5; Diod. Sic. 35.25).

⁶⁵ For the war against Antiochos, fifty new quinqueremes were built (Livy, 35.20.12, 35.21.1, 35.24.8, 36.2.15).

⁶⁶ Frank 1933–40: I. 142–4.

remotely correct, it suggests that the total cost of Rome's military effort during this period was, on average, of the order of 8.1 million denarii per annum (1,350 talents).

At the same time, the financial infrastructure of the Roman state was undeveloped. The *aerarium Saturni*, the Roman state treasury, was simply where the bullion, cash, and documents were stored. Two annually elected quaestors were in charge, but they could only make payments when required to do so by law or by *senatus consultum*. Oversight of the state's finances and decisions on the level of coin-production were in the hands of the senate.⁶⁷ Private-sector banks existed, but there was no state central bank. The Roman state only ever borrowed once, and that was from its own citizens, in 210 BC, in the dark days of the Second Punic war.⁶⁸ There was certainly no concept of the regular issuance of government debt and there was no bond market. Unlike, say, the British government, which financed its way through the Napoleonic wars by issuing large amounts of bonds through the Bank of England, the only way that the Roman state could continue to fight its wars was by having enough precious metal coming into the *aerarium* with which to pay its troops.

One may dispute the presence of economic motives in Rome's foreign policy in the second century BC, but the simple fact is that Rome's involvement in warfare during this period would not have occurred on the same scale, or to the same extent, if the money had not been available to pay for its armed forces. Furthermore, the only way that the high rate of expenditure on Rome's military could be financed quickly was by the proceeds of warfare itself: from the bullion obtained by plunder and by charging a defeated enemy for what the Romans claimed were the costs of the war that had just been waged.⁶⁹ In this sense warfare became economically

⁶⁷ Williams 1998: 174.

⁶⁸ Livy, 26.36.

⁶⁹ In the modern scholarship, this type of payment, by a defeated state to its conqueror, is commonly referred to as a 'war indemnity'. But the Latin term, '*stipendium*', was wider in meaning, as Cic. *II Verr.* 3.12 makes clear: *Inter Siciliam ceterasque provincias, iudices, in agrorum vectigalium ratione hoc interest, quod ceteris aut impositum vectigal est certum, quod stipendiarium dicitur, ut Hispanis et plerisque Poenorum quasi victoriae praemium ac poena belli, aut censoria locatio constituta est, ut Asiae lege Sempronia* ('Between Sicily and the other provinces, judges, there is an important difference in the system of land taxation. In the others, either a fixed tax, called a stipendiary tax, has been imposed, as it has been on the Spaniards and most of the Carthaginians, as if it was a reward for victory and a penalty of defeat, or it is let

self-perpetuating. Continuous wars of imperial conquest led to the plundering of conquered territories, which led to the import into Italy of bullion, which in turn led to the financing of further wars. In other words, the prevailing fiscal model for the Romans before 180 BC was to grab as much precious metal as possible through warfare rather than through the regular monetary taxation of annexed territory. One indication of the importance of bullion in Roman fiscal thinking comes from Livy, who gives us some very precise descriptions of the amounts of booty borne in various triumphs. This implies that detailed public records of the amounts captured were maintained. Similarly, the importance of war indemnities is reflected in the detailed accounts of them that are preserved in our sources.⁷⁰

An examination of the record of Rome's acquisition of booty and indemnities during this period is revealing. The Roman state had, in effect, become bankrupt during the Second Punic war. Livy talks about *inopia aerarii* and *penuria argenti* in 214 BC.⁷¹ The bronze coinage saw a significant fall in weight and the silver coinage was debased from about 97 per cent fine down to about 89 per cent, probably in 213.⁷² But during the half century which followed the end of that war, vast quantities of bullion, on a scale which dwarfed anything that had ever occurred previously, came to Rome in the form of booty and indemnities. These inflows meant that within thirty-five years of the end of the Second Punic war—in 167—the financial position of the *aerarium* was such that Rome was able to suspend direct taxes on her own citizens. The relatively precise figures from literary sources for war indemnities, in Table 4.1, total 27,280 talents between 201 and 152. This figure was equivalent to 632 tonnes

out by the censors, as it is under the Sempronian law concerning Asia'). *Stipendium* was a term derived from the words *pendere*, 'to weigh out', and *stips*, a coin. Its original meaning was the regular monetary emoluments paid to serving soldiers: *Hoc ipsum stipendium a stipe dictum, quod aes quoque stipem dicebant . . . Militis stipendia ideo, quod eam stipem pendebant* (Varro, *Ling.* 5.182; cf. Plin. *HN* 33.43; Festus pp. 296–7M; Ulp. *Dig.* 50.16.27; Isid. *Etym.* 16.18.8). Over time, therefore, and by extension, the word *stipendium* appears to have developed from just meaning 'money to pay for the army' into a term for a monetary tax or a war indemnity.

⁷⁰ Scheidel 1996 has issued a salutary warning about the tendency of ancient authors to stylize monetary valuations into conventional figures, but the numbers for booty and indemnities, which are found in Polybios, Livy, and other ancient sources, appear to be of a different order of accuracy.

⁷¹ Livy, 24.18.2, 24.18.10.

⁷² Howgego 1995: 112.

Table 4.1. Indemnities Received by the Romans 201–152 BC (*Amounts stated in talents of silver*)

	Carthage	Macedonia	Boeotia	Sparta	Aetolia	Ambrakia	Syria	Cappadocia	Total
201	200								200
200	200								200
199	200								200
198	200								200
197	200								200
196	200	500	30						730
195	200	50		100					350
194	200	50		50					300
193	200	50		50					300
192	200	50		50					300
191	200	50		50					300
190	200	50		50					300
189	200			50	200	150			600
188	200			50	50		3,000	300	3,600
187	200			50	50		1,000		1,300
186	200				50		1,000		1,250
185	200				50		1,000		1,250
184	200				50		1,000		1,250
183	200				50		1,000		1,250
182	200						1,000		1,200
181	200						1,000		1,200
180	200						1,000		1,200
179	200						1,000		1,200
178	200						1,000		1,200
177	200						1,000		1,200
176	200								200
175	200								200
174	200								200
173	200						1,000		1,200
172	200								200
171	200								200
170	200								200
169	200								200
168	200								200
167–152 p.a.	200 p.a.								3,200
Total	10,000	800	30	500	500	150	15,000	300	27,280

of silver, which was the metal in which these indemnities were mostly paid. Booty is more difficult to quantify, as the record is incomplete. Frank offered a ‘highly hypothetical’ estimate of the value of the booty that came in during the period 200 to 157 BC of a little over 18,000 talents, which gives some indication at least of the scale of the income from this source. If we add this amount to the value of the

indemnities, it suggests that Rome received, over a fifty-year period, nearly 46,000 talents from warfare.

But this remarkable figure obscures as well as illuminates, because the money did not arrive in a regular flow. The Carthaginian indemnity was 10,000 talents, payable in annual instalments of 200 talents over fifty years.⁷³ Philip V of Macedon had to pay 1,000 talents, half immediately and the balance in ten annual instalments of 50 talents;⁷⁴ and there were relatively smaller but still significant indemnities from Sparta, Aitolia, and Ambrakia. Despite these inflows, the first decade following the end of the Second Punic war was clearly a difficult one, characterized by a shortage of funds. No public building or related activities are recorded for the Roman censors of 199 and the censors of 194 and 189 let very few contracts.⁷⁵ In the private sector too there were difficulties. Livy reports that, in 193, the level of private-sector debt was causing problems, with prohibitions against higher interest rates being evaded by lenders transferring loans to *socii*, who were not subject to the same rate restrictions.⁷⁶

But then in 188 something changes. The sum demanded from Antiochos III was a massive 15,000 talents. To put this in some sort of context, it was twice the cost of the single most expensive building project undertaken during the Republic, the 90 km long *Aqua Marcia*, which was constructed in the 140s and whose cost is given by Frontinus (who quotes the late first-century BC antiquarian annalist Fenestella) as 180 million *sesterces*, equivalent to 7,500 talents.⁷⁷ It was three times the amount which our surviving sources suggest was paid in indemnities in the whole of the third century BC (see Table 4.2). It was equivalent to nearly 10 per cent of the bullion that Alexander

⁷³ Polyb. 15.18.7–8; Livy, 30.37.5; Plin. *HN* 33.51 gives 16,000 pounds of silver p.a. (equivalent to 224 talents p.a.); see Table 4.1.

⁷⁴ Polyb. 18.44.7; Livy, 33.30.7; Plut. *Flam.* 9.5; App. *Mac.* 9.3; Livy, 33.30.8 mentions that Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius gave different numbers. It is not clear whether the 200 talents demanded up front at the preliminary peace negotiations (Polyb. 18.39.5–6; cf. Livy, 33.13.14–15) was included in the final settlement of 1,000 talents or was in addition to it. Larsen 1938: 314 assumes the former, but most modern commentators believe the latter. The indemnity was cancelled by the Romans in 190 when Philip proved his goodwill to them (Polyb. 21.3.3, 21.11.9). By this time Philip had probably paid six annual instalments totalling 300 talents in addition to the initial 500 talents.

⁷⁵ Livy, 34.44.4–5, 35.9.1–6, 37.58.2, 38.28.3.

⁷⁶ Livy, 35.7.2–5.

⁷⁷ Frontin. *Aq.* 1.7: *Legimus apud Fenestellam in haec opera Marcio decretum sestertium milies octingenties.*

Table 4.2. Indemnities received by the Romans during the third century BC

Faliscans	293	100,000 <i>aes grave</i> + 1 year's <i>stipendium</i>	= 50 talents?
Hieron of Syracuse	263	100 talents over 20 (?) years (remitted)	75 talents
Carthage	242	1,000 immediately and 2,200 talents over 10 years	3,200 talents
Carthage	238	1,200 talents (immediately?)	1,200 talents
Teuta of Illyria	228	Unknown	100 talents?
TOTAL			4,625 talents

the Great is reported to have captured from the Persian treasuries in Mesopotamia.⁷⁸ More significantly, it was equivalent to the amount required to keep Rome's average deployment of nine legions in the field for about eleven years. Like the Macedonian indemnity, but unlike the one imposed on Carthage, the payment schedule was short: 500 talents were to be paid immediately; 2,500 more upon the ratification of the peace by the senate and the Roman people; with the balance payable in twelve annual instalments of 1,000 talents each.⁷⁹ In addition, Antiochos had to provide 540,000 *modii* of corn, which was enough to feed roughly 14,000 men for a year.⁸⁰

Rome's intentions in setting a long-term payment schedule for Carthage can only have been to emphasize the latter's subservience and to provide a repeated reminder of her defeat.⁸¹ In the case of Antiochos, however, we appear to be dealing with an entirely different circumstance. One obvious explanation here is that the Romans were simply aware that they were dealing with a much wealthier enemy than they had been hitherto, and so demanded that a higher sum be paid over a shorter period of time. When the Romans, at the point when they had just crossed the Hellespont into Asia, received an offer from the Syrian king to pay half the cost of the war, if they halted their advance, they had no hesitation in demanding that he pay the full amount, on the rather spurious grounds that he had started it.⁸² The fiction of course in all this was that these indemnity payments were somehow related to the cost of the war. But, if that was the case, why

⁷⁸ Diod. Sic. 17.80.3; Strabo, 15.3.9; Just. *Epit.* 12.1.1; Callataÿ 1989: 260–4.

⁷⁹ Polyb. 21.17.4–5, 21.42.19; Livy, 37.45.14, 38.37.9, 38.38.13; App. *Syr.* 38; Diod. Sic. 29.10.

⁸⁰ At 6.55 kg per *modius* and 250 kg per person p.a.

⁸¹ Gruen 1984: 293.

⁸² Polyb. 21.14.7.

did the Romans charge the Carthaginians, against whom they had fought a much longer and more devastating war, only two-thirds of what they demanded from Antiochos?

As we have said, it is likely that the main beneficiary of these inflows of bullion was the Roman military. But, in a wider sense, the Antiochos indemnity and the booty which Manlius Vulso brought back from Asia were transforming events. Part of the booty was used to repay an additional tax (Livy terms it a *stipendium*) which had been imposed on the Roman people, possibly in relation to paying the army during the Second Punic war, or perhaps for the war against Antiochos.⁸³ According to Pliny the Elder, there was more money around and levels of ostentatious expenditure rose considerably.

*Populus Romanus stipem spargere coepit Sp. Postumio Q. Marcio cos.; tanta abundantia pecuniae erat.*⁸⁴

The Roman people began to spray their cash around in the consulship of Spurius Postumus and Quintus Marcius. So great was the abundance of money.

The censors of the 180s and the 170s embarked upon a remarkable period of expenditure on utilitarian infrastructure, which would have been unimaginable in the previous century. A culture that is constructing more numerous and more substantial buildings, roads, and aqueducts clearly has a great deal of money. No wonder that Scipio Africanus, when asked in the senate for an account of the moneys which he had received from Antiochos for the pay of his army, before the peace, ripped up his account book in front of the senate and asked why the senators wanted to know how and by whom the 3,000 talents had been spent, but not how and by whom the whole 15,000 talents had been brought in, nor how the Romans had become masters of Asia, Libya, and Iberia:

τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἤρετο πῶς τῶν μὲν τρισχίλιων ταλάντων τὸν λόγον ἐπιζητοῦσι πῶς ἐδαπανήθη καὶ διὰ τίνων, τῶν δὲ μυρίων καθόλου καὶ πεντακισχίλιων ὧν παρ' Ἀντιόχου λαμβάνουσιν, οὐκέτι ζητοῦσι πῶς

⁸³ Livy, 39.7.1–5; Harl (1996: 44) believes that it was a *tributum* levied during the war against Antiochos.

⁸⁴ Plin. *HN* 33.138.

*εἰσπορεύεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐδὲ πῶς τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Λιβύης, ἔτι δὲ τῆς Ἰβηρίας κεκυριεύκασιν.*⁸⁵

Given that the Roman state had secured enough bullion to pay its armies for the foreseeable future and had enough left over to repay an additional levy from its citizens, and to start a major building programme to boot, was there any immediate reason to administer a new territory, particularly when its new buffer state was looked after by a grateful quisling ruler?

OUR MAN IN PERGAMON

Eumenes was indeed grateful. The Toriaion inscription, which probably dates from immediately after the war with Antiochos III, shows that Eumenes was only too well aware that he was entirely dependent on the Romans for his kingdom:

*ἐκτημένον κυρ[ί]-
ως διὰ τὸ παρὰ τῶν κρατησάντων καὶ πολέμῳ καὶ [συν]-
θήκαις εἰληφέναι Ῥωμαίων.*⁸⁶

I have obtained ruling authority, having received it from the Romans who gained power by war and by treaty.

He continued to show a concern to acknowledge the authority of Rome during the twenty years following Apameia. In the context of Rome's reaction to the events subsequent to Messene's secession from the Achaian League, in 184, Polybios writes that:

*[οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι] . . . δυσχεραίνουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ πάντων τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ πάντα πράττεσθαι μετὰ τῆς αὐτῶν γνώμης.*⁸⁷

[The Romans] . . . were displeased if all matters were not submitted to them and if all was not done in accordance with their decision.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Polyb. 23.14.7–11; it was an iconic incident and was retold by a number of later writers: Livy, 38.55.10–12; Gell. NA 4.18.7–12; Diod. Sic. 29.21; Val. Max. 3.7.1.

⁸⁶ Jonnes and Riel 1997 (SEG 47, 1745; *I.Sultan Dağı* 393); Thonemann, above pp. 5–7.

⁸⁷ Polyb. 23.17.4.

⁸⁸ Trans. Loeb V 433.

If Polybios was correct in believing that the Romans wanted everything to be referred to them, then Eumenes played very much by the rules. During this period he consulted the senate on all major problems relating to affairs in Asia Minor and the eastern Aegean. He himself came to Rome in the early summer of 189 to discuss the Asian settlement, the first of three visits which he was to make to Italy.⁸⁹ In 186/5, envoys arrived from Eumenes with the news that Philip V of Macedon had appropriated the Thracian cities of Ainos and Maroneia.⁹⁰ The following year more envoys arrived from Eumenes to discuss the same topic.⁹¹ Some time before 184, war broke out between Pergamon and Prousius I of Bithynia. Details of the war are sketchy, but what is clear is that Eumenes' brother, Athenaios, was sent to Rome to bring charges against Philip on the subject of the Thracian cities and on the help he had sent to Prousius. The senate thanked Eumenes and his brothers profusely (*μεγαλομερώς*) and encouraged them to maintain the same attitude (*ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς αἰρέσεως*).⁹²

Shortly after this, war broke out between Pergamon and Pharnakes I of Pontos, and again we see the same sort of diplomatic traffic continuing. Pharnakes seized the independent Greek city of Sinope and Eumenes' envoys were in Rome, in 183/2, to complain.⁹³ The Romans sent out legates to investigate, but the war continued and, in the winter of 182/1, Eumenes' ambassadors were back in Rome again.⁹⁴ In the end (and without the help of the Romans) a truce was agreed between Pergamon and Pontos. Eumenes decided to send his brothers to Rome (during the winter of 181/0) hoping to put an end to the war.⁹⁵ The Romans were highly appreciative. Attalos, Philetairos, and Athenaios were received in a friendly manner (*φιλανθρώπως*) in private and with even greater warmth (*ἐτι δὲ μεγαλομερέστερον*) by the senate. Gifts were lavished on them. Finally, in 172, Eumenes himself was back in Rome, warning the senate against the ambitions of Perseus.⁹⁶

But what happens when you begin to distrust your quisling ruler?

Meadows argues elsewhere in this volume, on the basis of hoard evidence, that the date of the introduction of the cistophoric coinage should be moved down to the middle of the 160s.⁹⁷ The Attalid

⁸⁹ Polyb. 21.18.1–2.

⁹⁰ Polyb. 22.6.1.

⁹¹ Polyb. 22.11.2.

⁹² Polyb. 23.1.4–7.

⁹³ Polyb. 23.9.1.

⁹⁴ Polyb. 24.1.1.

⁹⁵ Polyb. 24.5.2–3.

⁹⁶ Livy, 42.11.1–3.

⁹⁷ Meadows, Ch. 5 below.

kingdom does not appear to have had significant natural sources of silver;⁹⁸ so if one assumes that one of the principal aims of that coinage was to retain silver within the kingdom, there are two developments which come to mind which may have prompted the launch of a closed currency system at this particular time.

First, there are hints in our sources that the supply of bullion in the east was becoming tighter. Part of the Syrian indemnity was paid late, in 173. Livy makes clear that the whole debt was paid off on that occasion and the assumption is that this was only one instalment, although for all we know it could have been more.⁹⁹ But there are also a couple of texts in *II Maccabees* which hint at the problems that the Seleukid kingdom had had in paying off the indemnity. One passage refers to a *phoros* of 2,000 talents owing to the Romans in 165.¹⁰⁰ It is highly probable that the dating is wrong,¹⁰¹ but it is an intriguing reference to the monetary problems that the payment of the Syrian indemnity was perceived to have caused. According to the author, the Seleukids planned to raise funds for the *phoros* by selling captured Jews into slavery. The second passage also suggests that the Seleukids were short of money and attempted unsuccessfully to raise '400 talents of silver and 200 talents of gold' from the Temple treasury of Jerusalem.¹⁰² Whatever was going on, the Seleukids were clearly having problems with their supplies of silver bullion.

There is also numismatic evidence for a more general problem with the supply of silver, at the time of the Third Macedonian war, which is perhaps to be linked with the drain of bullion in the direction of Rome. The weight-standard of the Macedonian coinage fell by between 7 and 8 per cent and, just before the war, the weight of Seleukid tetradrachms minted at Antioch was reduced by 2 per cent.¹⁰³ To compound the problems with the supply of silver, the Romans, at the end of the war with Perseus, acquired the gold and silver mines of Macedonia which were said to have been a source of enormous revenue (*ingens vectigal*) for the Macedonian kings, and which the Romans immediately proceeded to close.¹⁰⁴ Livy attributes

⁹⁸ The only potential source of silver available to the Attalids would have been in the Troad, but 'the quantity of silver ores available could not vie with the richer deposits in the Tauros mountains' (Jesus 1978: 100). The Tauros mountains were still under Seleukid control.

⁹⁹ Livy, 42.6.6–7. ¹⁰⁰ II Macc. 8: 10.

¹⁰¹ Habicht 1979: 239 n. 10b. ¹⁰² II Macc. 3: 11.

¹⁰³ Howgego 1995: 114. ¹⁰⁴ Livy, 45.18.3–5, 45.29.11.

this decision partly to distrust of the *publicani* and partly to the senate's fear of a Macedonian insurrection funded by the revenues from the mines, if the Macedonians themselves were allowed to exploit them. The mines remained shut for nine years, until reopened in 158.¹⁰⁵ Eumenes may have felt, because of this move and because of the problems that the Seleukids were facing, that supplies of silver in the eastern Mediterranean would contract even further, leading him to introduce a closed monetary system that would conserve his own kingdom's holdings of silver.

The second point is that this was, of course, the period when Eumenes' previously excellent relations with Rome went badly off the rails. In general, at about this time, a significant shift seems to have occurred in Roman policy towards the east.¹⁰⁶ The Romans began to throw their weight around in a way they had not done before the Third Macedonian war. Perhaps this is best exemplified by the behaviour of C. Popilius Laenas, who, in 168, delivered to Antiochos IV a letter from the Roman senate ordering him to put an end at once to the war with Ptolemy. The king asked for time to consider, but the Roman envoy drew a circle round him with a stick and told him to answer before stepping out of it.¹⁰⁷ In the case of Eumenes, the reason for his fall from Roman favour appears to have been that he was suspected of having had secret dealings with Perseus during the Third Macedonian war. Because of this, his brother, Attalus, when he visited Rome in 168, was persuaded by 'certain notable men', as Polybios calls them, to appear before the senate to discuss his seizure of the Pergamene throne.¹⁰⁸ Next, Eumenes himself was rebuffed by the senate shortly after he landed in Italy in the winter of 167/6, on which Polybios comments:

συνηκολουθήκει δὲ καὶ ἕτερον τι πραγματικὸν τούτῳ τῷ διαβουλίῳ. μεγάλου γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐπικρεμαμένου κινδύνου τῇ βασιλείᾳ, προφανὲς ἦν ὅτι διὰ τὸν σκυβαλισμὸν τοῦτον οἱ μὲν τοῦ βασιλέως σύμμαχοι ταπεινωθήσονται πάντες, οἱ δὲ Γαλάται διπλασίως ἐπιρρωσθήσονται πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Cassiod. *Chron. sub anno* 158 bc.

¹⁰⁶ Briscoe 1964.

¹⁰⁷ Polyb. 29.27.

¹⁰⁸ Polyb. 30.1.10: πρὸς ἐνίους τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν συνέθετο.

¹⁰⁹ Polyb. 30.19.11–12.

Another more practical purpose had contributed to this decision. For, as the kingdom of Pergamon was menaced with a great danger from the Galatians, it was evident that, by this insulting rejection, all the allies of the king would be humiliated, and the Galatians would undertake the war with redoubled vigour.¹¹⁰

In 166, envoys of the Galatians, whom Eumenes had finally defeated, came to Rome and the senate granted them autonomy, effectively annulling Eumenes' military success.¹¹¹ In 165/4, we hear of 'certain envoys' from Asian cities who accused Eumenes of making common cause (*κοινοπραγία*) with Antiochos. The senate did nothing, but took note of the stories, entirely distrusting Eumenes and Antiochos.¹¹² In 164, Eumenes' brothers, Attalos and Athenaios, arrived once again and this time successfully defended his name against the charges brought against him by Prousius. But the senate then proceeded to send C. Sulpicius Galus and M'. Sergius to the east, among other things to investigate whether Eumenes was making joint preparations with Antiochos IV for war against Rome.¹¹³ When he reached Sardeis (in Eumenes' own kingdom), Sulpicius even actively solicited complaints against the king.¹¹⁴ The 'baneful suspicion' (*μοχθηρὰ ὑποψία*) which the Romans continued to entertain towards Eumenes until his death could still be referred to by his brother Attalos, who succeeded him to the throne, in an inscription from the mid-150s.¹¹⁵

It is entirely possible, then, that Eumenes felt sufficiently threatened by the change in Roman attitudes after 167 to believe it to be prudent to retain as much silver in his kingdom as possible.¹¹⁶ It may be total coincidence, but it is only after the accession of Attalos II, who enjoyed better relations with Rome, and the reopening of the Macedonian mines in 158, that the majority of the wreathed coinages begin to appear.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁰ Trans. Loeb VI 133, slightly revised.

¹¹¹ Polyb. 30.28.

¹¹² Polyb. 30.30.5: *διαπιστοῦσα καθόλου τοῖς περὶ τὸν Εὐμένην καὶ τὸν Ἀντίοχον.*

¹¹³ Polyb. 31.1.6–8.

¹¹⁴ Polyb. 31.6.1–5.

¹¹⁵ OGIS 314 VI, l. 59=RC 61, l. 14.

¹¹⁶ Kleiner and Noe (1977: 16–17) also date the introduction of the cistophoric coinage to about 166 BC, on the grounds that it makes more sense to place it at a time when Eumenes was on bad terms with the Romans.

¹¹⁷ Attalos appears to have understood only too well that the Romans still wanted 'all matters to be referred to them': *ἐκρινον οὖν εἰς | μὲν τ[ῇ]ν Πρώμην ἀεὶ πέμπειν τοὺς*

ROME'S FAILURE TO ANNEX IN THE 160S

But this raises the further question of why Roman hostility at this time did not translate into war and annexation. Again, part of the reason may have been that the Romans did not have an immediate fiscal need for the riches of Asia.

In fact, the indications are that their state finances in the 160s were very healthy. At the end of the Third Macedonian war, the Romans had seized Perseus' treasure (valued at more than 6,000 talents)¹¹⁸ and enslaved 150,000 Epirotes, who were sold off to raise revenue for the *aerarium*.¹¹⁹ In addition, the Romans imposed a *stipendium* of 100 talents per annum on the Macedonians. They still had 200 talents per annum coming in from Carthage, and these amounts were bolstered by the revenues that they were receiving from Spain. The date at which the Romans began to tax Spain is unknown, but Cicero makes clear that the main tax was a fixed monetary payment (*vectigal certum stipendiarium*).¹²⁰ Harris believes that the start of taxation in Spain can be dated back to the beginning of Roman rule there, but there is no concrete evidence for this.¹²¹ Richardson argues that in Spain before 180, *stipendium* had not developed beyond its original meaning of 'money to pay the army', and that it was levied *ad hoc* and at the instance of the governor.¹²²

The date at which this *ad hoc* collection was replaced in Spain by the *vectigal certum* cannot be established with certainty, but the most likely time is during the reorganization carried out in the governorship of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in Hither Spain in 179. Appian talks of taxes being imposed at the time of Gracchus in the context of the treaty arrangements made with the defeated Celtiberians.¹²³ They would also suit the context of the 'carefully defined treaties' (*συνθήκας*

συνεχῶς ἀναγγελοῦν[τὰς] τ[ὰ] δις τ[α]ζόμενα ('I decided therefore always to send to Rome envoys who would provide constant reports on matters about which we were in doubt'): OGIS 314 VI, ll. 65–6=RC 61, ll. 20–2.

¹¹⁸ Polyb. 18.35.4.

¹¹⁹ Polyb. 30.15; Livy, 45.34.1–6; Plut. *Aem.* 29.4.

¹²⁰ Cic. *II Verr.* 3.12, quoted in n. 69 above.

¹²¹ Harris 1989: 129–30.

¹²² Richardson 1976: 147–9; see n. 69 above.

¹²³ App. *Hisp.* 44: φόρους τοὺς ὀρισθέντας ἐπὶ Γράκχου.

ἀκριβεῖς) that Gracchus is said by Appian to have instituted.¹²⁴ The *stipendium* may have amounted to 600 talents, if we are correct to identify the *phoros* of 600 talents, which, according to Posidonius, was exacted by M. Claudius Marcellus from Celtiberia in 152, with the regular assessment.¹²⁵ In addition to booty and *stipendia*, Spain had silver mines. Cato's enthusiasm for the mineral resources of southern Spain is clear from a passage of Aulus Gellius, who quotes him from his *Origines* talking about 'very fine iron and silver mines':

*Nam cum de Hispanis scriberet qui citra Hiberum colunt, verba haec posuit: 'Set in his regionibus ferrareae, argentifodinae pulcherrimae'.*¹²⁶

For writing about the Spaniards who live on this side of the Ebro, he set down these words: 'But in these districts are the finest iron and silver mines'.¹²⁷

Both Polybios and the archaeological record suggest that, by the mid-second century at the latest, the Romans were mining significant quantities of silver bullion there. From the region around Carthago Nova in south-east Spain, which probably saw the initial focus of Roman mining activity, Polybios tells us that the Roman *dēmos* were receiving 25,000 drachmas per day.¹²⁸ That amounts to about 1,500 talents per annum, or approximately 35 tonnes of silver per annum. And Polybios' evidence now appears to be largely supported by the rates of lead deposition from the second century BC, which have been found in the lakes of Sweden and Russia, in the ice cap of Greenland, and in the peat bogs of Spain and Switzerland.¹²⁹ These suggest that smelting activities from silver and lead mining in Spain during this period were significant enough to create high and rising levels of atmospheric pollution. If we can believe Polybios' figures, then, by the late 150s, the mining activities in Spain alone brought the annual inflow of bullion back up to the levels of the 180s.

In the 160s, therefore, the Romans could have been receiving anywhere between 900 talents' and 2,400 talents' worth of silver bullion annually, depending on when the Spanish mines started to contribute, and there are also a couple of further indications of the

¹²⁴ App. *Hisp.* 43.

¹²⁵ Strabo, 3.4.13 (=Poseidonios *FGrHist* 87 F51).

¹²⁶ Gell. *NA* 2.22.29.

¹²⁷ Trans. Loeb I 191, slightly revised.

¹²⁸ Polyb. 34.9.8–9=Strabo, 3.2.10.

¹²⁹ Renberg *et al.*: 2001; Wilson 2002.

happy state of the *aerarium*. In the first place, it seems unlikely that the Romans would have closed the Macedonian gold and silver mines, which generated 'enormous revenue', if they were in desperate need of cash. Secondly, Pliny the Elder happens to give a detailed account of the holdings of the *aerarium* at an unspecified point in 157, which total the equivalent of about 18 million denarii or 3,000 talents.¹³⁰ This was not a negligible amount; it was enough to pay the cost of six legions, the average military deployment at this time, for three years.

There appears to have been no fiscal imperative in the 160s for the Romans to attack Eumenes or to annex his kingdom.

CONCLUSION

Badian believed that 'the whole myth of economic motives in Rome's foreign policy at this time is a figment of modern anachronism'.¹³¹ Gruen has argued that 'no single decision on eastern affairs exhibits an economic component demonstrable as central or primary . . . The demands of international politics predominated in actions and decisions on the East. Material advantage was a welcome adjunct rather than a central ingredient'.¹³² But the Roman decision not to annex Asia in 188 BC, despite its obvious wealth, becomes more comprehensible when one considers the real financial significance of the settlement with Antiochos. The indemnity more than adequately met Rome's fiscal requirements. It represented an enormous amount of money that would allow the Roman military to operate comfortably for a number of years—to be 'the cops of the world', as Peter Derow memorably put it.¹³³ The Roman fiscal system may have developed during the late Republic to the point where the state's expenditure was financed almost exclusively by the revenues which it received from other states and provinces situated outside Italy, but the prevailing mode of Roman fiscal behaviour during the early years of the second century BC was to grab as much precious metal as possible. As

¹³⁰ Plin. *HN* 33.55; Crawford 1974: 594, 626 n. 1, and 635.

¹³¹ Badian 1968: 20.

¹³² Gruen 1984: 342–5.

¹³³ Derow 2003: 66.

Harris put it: 'The presence of economic motives is not excluded by the fact that the stated reasons of war were of a quite different kind . . . Those who determined Roman policy were thoroughly aware of the economic results.'¹³⁴

Of course, having Eumenes running a buffer-state in Asia suited the Romans just fine, not least because it is not entirely clear how, in 188, the Romans would have done this themselves. The senate did not have a bunch of back-room bureaucrats strategizing and planning the administration of each new territory they captured. When the Romans did become involved in administering an area, it was because it had something they really wanted. And, of course, Sicily and Sardinia both had corn and were relatively close. Spain was different; it offered plunder, and triumphs, and silver mines. Again, all the indications are that, in the 160s BC, the finances of the Roman *aerarium* were in reasonably good shape. But there had been a shift in the senate's attitude towards Eumenes and, viewed from Pergamon, the special relationship between the two states must have looked to be on the verge of collapse. If one combines this consideration with the hints in our sources that the Seleukids were having problems in their treasury and with the Roman closure of the Macedonian mines, there looks to have been sufficient motivation for Eumenes to have instituted a closed monetary system, if his intention, in so doing, was to preserve his own stocks of silver. If Meadows is right to re-date the introduction of the cistophoric coinage to the 160s, it undoubtedly fits the historical context of the 160s better than that of the 180s and 170s BC.

¹³⁴ Harris 1979: 103.

The Closed Currency System of the Attalid Kingdom

Andrew Meadows

In his *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, Michael Rostovtzeff drew attention to three numismatic phenomena of the second century BC, from which he constructed a characteristically bold vision of an economic pact between the Attalid and Seleukid kingdoms.¹ The first of these phenomena was the introduction by the Attalid kings of the cistophoros. In contrast to the earlier royal Pergamene coinage, these new coins bore no portrait, and were struck not on the Attic weight-standard of c.16.80 g, but rather on a new weight-standard of c.12.20 g (Fig. 5.1). The second phenomenon concerned the coin hoards of this period then known from the territory of the Seleukid kings. These, he noted, were dominated by Attic-weight issues of civic mints from western Asia Minor, 'belonging to the Pergamene kingdom or to the sphere of Pergamene political and economic influence'. By contrast, there was virtually no evidence for the circulation of these issues within their area of production. Thirdly, Rostovtzeff noted that there was no evidence that the cistophoroi ever left Pergamene territory. From these observations Rostovtzeff inferred an *entente cordiale* by which the Attalid kings exported silver (in which they were rich) in exchange for trade goods (in which the Seleukid realm was rich) through the mechanism of the 'civic' coinage of the cities where this trade took place. He also

¹ Rostovtzeff 1941: II 655–9.



Fig. 5.1. Cistophoros of Pergamon, Kleiner and Noe 1977: Issue 12, c.160–150 BC. ANS 1951.5.13.

suggested that the Attalid kings sought to impose the cistophoros as the standard silver coinage in western Asia Minor.

There are obvious and major problems with this reconstruction. Rostovtzeff himself was at a loss to explain the mechanism by which the royal silver ended up in ‘civic’ mints to pay for Seleukid goods. Moreover, as others have pointed out, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Attalid kings controlled any silver mines; in fact they probably had none.² None the less, our perception of the underlying phenomena that Rostovtzeff sought to explain has not substantially altered. As others note in this volume, the emergence of new hoard evidence continues to give the impression that the ‘civic’ coinages of western Asia Minor moved in substantial quantities into Seleukid lands.³ The position of the cistophoros as the new royal coinage of the Attalids has been firmly established by the die-study of Kleiner and Noe, and the discussions of various subsequent scholars.⁴ There remains very little evidence for the circulation of the cistophoros abroad, and very little for the circulation of Attic-weight coinage of western Asia Minor at home.

Attempts to explain the patterns of coin production and circulation in the Attalid kingdom during the second century BC have taken on a different emphasis. In recent years it has become conventional to describe the Attalid kingdom after the introduction of the cistophoros as operating a closed currency system. The idea was given its initial form by Henri Seyrig, writing partly in reaction to Rostovtzeff but also while analysing another example of what he considered to be a similar phenomenon at the mints of Byzantion and Kalchedon in the

² e.g. Will 1962: 99–100, n. 48; Seyrig 1963a: 28 (=Seyrig 1986: 32); below n. 7.

³ Callataÿ, pp. 232–6 below; Psoma, Ch. 8 below.

⁴ Kleiner and Noe 1977; Mørkholm 1979a; Le Rider 1989a; Harl 1991.

late third century, when these cities reduced their weight-standard below the Attic weight that was otherwise prevalent. 'The monetary reform that Eumenes II undertook in the kingdom given to him by the Treaty of Apameia offers at least several analogous aspects. . . . On the nature of the economy that Eumenes II sought to impose on his state no written source survives, but we cannot doubt that an economic plan of broad scope determined the organization of the new empire, and the Egyptian experience must have been linked to its establishment. The necessity of these conclusions seems not to have struck historians: they ensue completely, I believe, from study of the coins.'⁵ Subsequently, the nature of the closed currency system has found its most eloquent and detailed exponent in Georges Le Rider, whose masterful contribution of 1989 summarizes thus:

In creating the cistophoros, Eumenes II was inspired by the monetary system that, more than a century earlier, Ptolemy I had established in his lands. . . . In the Attalid kingdom during the period of the cistophoros the overvaluation of the local coinage became considerably more marked: a significant fiduciary value was added to the intrinsic value of the coinage. In my study of the Ptolemaic system I assumed that the state imposed the equivalence of the tetradrachm of Attic weight and the tetradrachm of the Ptolemaic weight, which weighed around 17% less. I also believe that the Pergamene authorities imposed the exchange of an Attic weight tetradrachm against a cistophoric tetradrachm (and, as a result, the exchange of an Attic-weight gold stater for five cistophoric tetradrachms). The overvaluation of the cistophoros, i.e. the proportion of fiduciary value which was attributed to it, therefore reached 25%.⁶

It is but a short step from this reconstruction of the nature of the exchange to suggest, as Seyrig did in the case of Byzantion and Kalchedon,⁷ that the profit that accrued to the Attalid exchequer

⁵ Seyrig 1968: 190–1 (=Seyrig 1986: 222–3).

⁶ Le Rider 1989a: 179–81; cf. Le Rider 1989b. The equivalence of Attic and cistophoric coinages, as Le Rider notes, had already been proposed by Boehringer 1972: 48 and followed by Mørkholm 1982: 301. On the Ptolemaic system see Le Rider 1986b and Callataÿ 2005b.

⁷ Seyrig 1968: 191 (=Seyrig 1986: 223). Cf. Seyrig 1963a: 27–8 (=Seyrig 1986: 31–2): 'if [Eumenes' policy] consisted, as it seems to me, of replacing the open monetary circulation of the Attic tetradrachm with the closed monetary circulation of the cistophoros, then this is not, *prima facie*, the policy one would expect of a state that was too rich in metal.'

might constitute one of the prime motivations for the introduction of the cistophoros. Like the Ptolemaic kings, or the cities of Byzantion and Kalchedon, the Attalids possessed no natural source of silver within their realm. The reduction of the weight of their coinage and the monopolistic imposition of an advantageous exchange rate provided the potential to trim silver from the coin that flowed into their territory.

But there is, it must be admitted, a basic difference between the Attalid kingdom of the second century and the kingdom of Egypt and the cities of Byzantion and Kalchedon. Egypt had grain and a constant flow of merchants to Alexandria to purchase it. Silver coin thus flowed into the city to be milked by the royal mint. Byzantion and Kalchedon sat astride the Bosphoros on one of the key choke points for the transport of grain and other goods out from the Black Sea. Again a massive passing trade putting in at the two cities' harbours guaranteed a throughput of silver to be exploited. But of the main cities that were set to work minting the cistophoric coinage in its early years, just one, Ephesos, was a port, and the remainder were inland at Pergamon, Tralleis, Sardeis, and Apameia. A priori, it seems unlikely that the profits that would stem from a closed currency system and a monopoly on exchange could have been a major motivating factor in Eumenes' decision to initiate the cistophoric coinage. But if this was not the prime motive, how then are we to interpret these issues, and what might be the explanation for the patterns that emerge, as Seyrig put it, 'from study of the coins'?

In what follows I intend to question this reconstruction at a number of levels, and will conclude by suggesting another framework within which we might interpret the actions of the Attalid kings in introducing their new currency system in the second century BC. What will emerge, I hope, is a policy less driven by the desire for commercial exploitation, and more rooted in the geographical, political and military character of the mid-second-century Attalid state.

To understand successfully the revolution that was brought about by the introduction of the cistophoros, it is necessary to know two things: the history of the coinage of the Attalid kingdom before its introduction; and the date of this introduction. The description of the former is a relatively straightforward, if time-consuming matter, and will be undertaken in Part 1 of this paper. The establishment of the date of the introduction of the cistophoros is a far more complex matter, however. As other contributors to this volume note, this has

been a matter of controversy for some years. Rival interpretations in recent years have coalesced around a 'high' dating in the period around the peace of Apameia (188 BC), and a 'low' dating in the 160s, or even the 150s.⁸ In Part 2 of this paper I have returned to this question in some detail, since it seems to me that the evidentiary landscape (essentially in the form of known coin hoards) has changed dramatically since it was last examined in detail, and can now be used to defend a low date. In Part 3 I turn to the specific evidence for the existence of the closed currency system following the introduction of the cistophoros, and shall reconsider the evidence both from production and circulation (hoards). Finally, in Part 4 I shall attempt to draw together the development of the coinage, the evidence from its behaviour, and the broader historical narrative of the development of the Attalid state to offer some suggestions about Eumenes' intentions in setting his monetary policy on such a bold new path.

PART 1: THE PERGAMENE MINT BEFORE THE CISTOPHOROS

Lysimachos

The city of Pergamon fell into the hands of Lysimachos as a result of his defeat of Antigonos Monophthalmos at the battle of Ipsos in 301 BC. It remained in his hands until the arrival of Seleukos I in western Asia Minor during the summer of 282 BC. During this period of twenty years' rule, silver coinage with the types and in the name of Lysimachos was issued at the city. The die-study of this coinage published by Carmen Arnold-Biucchi identifies 16 issues struck from 15 obverse dies in 124 specimens, suggesting that 15–16 obverse dies were originally used to strike this coinage.⁹ This in turn suggests an average rate of obverse die use of c.1.33 per annum.

⁸ For a summary of the high-daters and arguments against, see below n. 106. Against a very low date in the 150s, below p. 177. Note also the summary by Callataÿ, below p. 219 n. 41.

⁹ Arnold-Biucchi 1998. The method used throughout this paper to extrapolate the original number of dies used is the simplified method of Carter 1983. In this case $D = 15.51 \pm 0.50$.

Philetairos (282–263 BC)

Under Seleukid rule, Philetairos issued a series of coins, probably starting shortly after he seceded, along with the city of Pergamon and its treasury, from Lysimachos in 281 BC. This coinage was first studied by Newell in 1936, and his work remains fundamental.¹⁰ He divided the coinage into three series. Series 1, minted just after the capture of Pergamon, consists of tetradrachms with a horned horse on the obverse and an elephant on the reverse, in the name of *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΣΕΛΕΥΚΟΥ* (Fig. 5.2). Three specimens were known to Newell, struck from three dies. Subsequent discoveries have expanded the number of issues from the two known to Newell to three, and the number of dies to four, recorded in ten specimens.¹¹ Newell dated this coinage to the period immediately after the delivery of Pergamon and its treasury by Philetairos to Seleukos in 282 BC, but before the latter's death in c. September 281. Series 2 saw a return to the more conservative types of Alexander the Great, partly in the name of *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ* or just *ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ* (Newell's Group A)¹² and partly in the name of *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΣΕΛΕΥΚΟΥ* (Newell's Group B: Fig. 5.3). Ten obverse dies are now known,



Fig. 5.2. Tetradrachm of Seleukos I, mint of Pergamon, c.282–281 BC. ANS 1967.152.675.

¹⁰ Newell 1936, summarized at Newell 1941: 316–8. Cf. also SC 1.1, pp. 15 and 119–20. The revised die-and-specimen counts given here are based on Meadows (forthcoming).

¹¹ See now SC 1.1–3. For an issue of the same types, but perhaps from a different mint see SC 2 with commentary ad loc. D = 5.57 ± 1.46 .

¹² Newell 1941: no. 1530; Price 1991: no. 1470; SC 306. Two further varieties not known to Newell appear as Price 1991: nos. 1471–2 (SC 307.2 and 307.1) and a third has now surfaced in commerce: CNG Electronic Auction 215 (2009), lot 213.



Fig. 5.3. Tetradrachm of Seleukos I, mint of Pergamon, c.282–281 BC. ANS 1950.113.3.



Fig. 5.4. Tetradrachm of Philetairos, mint of Pergamon, c.280–271 BC. ANS 1967.152.413.

attested by 78 specimens.¹³ Series 3 marks a shift towards the individualization of Attalid coinage, with new types consisting of a portrait of Seleukos I on the obverse and a seated Athena, patron goddess of Pergamon, on the reverse (Fig. 5.4). These coins were now issued in the name of *ΦΙΛΕΤΑΙΡΟΥ*. Eight dies are known from 36 specimens.¹⁴

Newell's dates for Series 2 and 3 were essentially determined by his desire to spread the coinage evenly over the period of Seleukid control of Pergamon following the death of Seleukos. The date at which he placed the break between Series 2 and 3 (274 BC) assumed a similar rate of production of coinage over the whole period, with five issues in the first six years and seven issues in the following ten years. The year 275/4 appealed to Newell as the start date of the Series 3 coinage in the name of Philetairos, since he perceived this as a period of

¹³ $D = 10.40 \pm 0.4$.

¹⁴ An updated die-study of Series 3 is provided by Ingvaldsen 1992.

weakness on the part of Antiochos I, and of opportunism on the part of Philetairos, which conspired to tempt the latter to introduce his own name onto the coinage. Plainly there is (as Newell admitted) little good evidence for the dating of these series, apart from the obvious names that appear on these coins. It seems to me far more likely that the issues in the name of Seleukos (Series 1 and 2B) belong in the lifetime of Seleukos, particularly since they are inscribed with the title *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ*. It is difficult to understand why Philetairos would have continued to issue coinage in the name of King Seleukos after Seleukos had died and been succeeded by his son, Antiochos.

The coins of Newell's Series 1 and 2B were struck from a minimum of 14 dies, which, assuming a production of 20,000 coins per die, could have minted in the order of 190 talents of silver. On this chronology, they would have been produced over the period of perhaps mid-282 down to the death of Seleukos, in late 281. This would constitute a substantial amount of silver being put into circulation in a short space of time, but is far from impossible. We hear, after all, from Strabo that the treasury of Lysimachos at Pergamon had amounted to 9,000 talents.¹⁵ If Philetairos had retained just a fortieth of that, he had sufficient resources to issue this coinage immediately. Series 2A, in the name of Alexander, which Newell placed before the issues in the name of Seleukos, might just as well belong after them, and thus still reflect, as Newell suggested, the period of uncertainty following Seleukos' death. In any case, it is a striking fact that we have no coinage from the Pergamene mint in the name of Antiochos I. When the Alexander coinage ends, the new issues honour Seleukos I with their obverse types, but are in the name of Philetairos himself. The Pergamene coinage never acknowledges the sovereignty of Antiochos.

The question of when Series 3 began can now be approached from a different angle. In a detailed study of the hoard evidence for the subsequent issues of Attalid coinage that bear the portrait of Philetairos ('Philetairoi'), particularly that provided by the Meydancikkale hoard (*CH* VII 80), Le Rider has proposed a significant raising of the chronologies that had previously been accepted (see further below). At the beginning of this coinage, he suggests that the first

¹⁵ Strabo 13.4.1.



Fig. 5.5. Tetradrachm of Philetairos, Group II, mint of Pergamon, c.270–263 BC. ANS 1944.100.43174.

group of Philetairoi (Westermarck's Group II: Fig. 5.5) belong to the second half of Philetairos' rule, ending in 263 BC.¹⁶ Westermarck Group II was struck from approximately 11 obverse dies, and if we combine these figures with those for the other coinage that must have been struck by Philetairos, we can construct the following overview:

Table 5.1. The Coinage of Philetairos, c.301–263 BC.

Coinage	Approx. dates	Obv. dies	Dies per annum
(Lysimachos)	301–282	15	1.33
Newell 1	282–281	5	
Newell 2B	282–281	8+	13+
Newell 2A	280	2+	
Newell 3	280–271	9	1+
Westermarck II	270–263	11	1.4
Total	20 years	31+	1.55

Thus, if Le Rider is correct to assign Westermarck Group II to the second part of Philetairos' rule, then the assignment of Newell 2A and 3 to the first half suggests a fairly steady rate of production throughout the reign, after the initial massive burst of coinage represented by Newell 1A and 2B. It must be admitted that there is much within this scenario that is conjectural, but it does at least

¹⁶ Le Rider in Davesne and Le Rider 1989: 338. The suggestion comes partly as a result of the overall need to raise the chronology of the entire Attalid series, but also on the basis specifically of the Thessaly 1937–8 and Babylonia c.1900 hoards (*IGCH* 168 and 1761), which both suggest that Westermarck Group III had been issued by the mid-third century. Le Rider (*ibid.*) also notes a stylistic similarity between the depiction of Seleukos on Newell Series 3 and Philetairos on Westermarck Group II.

allow the coinage to have been issued under the authority of the men in whose name it is signed. An important result, of course—and this follows as much from Le Rider's redating of Westermarck Group II, as from the proposed rereading of the significance of the legends—is to place the declaration of Attalid independence considerably earlier than is normally assumed.¹⁷ There is, however, no other evidence that bears on this question. The chronology of the coinage must decide it.

Eumenes I (263–241 bc)

Westermarck divided the Philetairoi into seven Groups. Although subsequent discoveries have necessitated the revision of parts of her organization and the dating of these groups, it is none the less helpful to retain them as the building-blocks of the reconstruction of the activity of the Pergamene mint from the death of Philetairos down to 150 bc. In her original study, Westermarck assigned her Groups II and III to Eumenes I. In total, these coins were struck from 30 dies observed in 143 specimens.¹⁸ This suggested a total number of dies of around 33, struck in a period of 22 years, giving a production rate of around 1.5 obverse dies per annum.

However, the re-dating of the Philetairoi by Le Rider has a marked effect on these numbers. As we have already seen, Le Rider plausibly suggested attributing the coinage of Westermarck's Group II to Philetairos, and placing Group III at the beginning of Eumenes I's reign. Further consideration of hoard evidence led him to raise also the dates of Westermarck's Groups IVA, IVB, and V, all of which she had attributed to the reign of Attalos I, into the reign of Eumenes.¹⁹ Using the calculations of Callataÿ (this volume), we may summarize the quantities as in Table 5.2.

¹⁷ See further Chrubasik, above pp. 91–6.

¹⁸ The figures for dies and specimens for Westermarck Groups II–VIB given here and below are those of Le Rider 1992; cf. Callataÿ, Ch. 6 below, Table 6.1.

¹⁹ Le Rider in Davesne and Le Rider 1989: 337. The Zemoun 1924, Tell Halaf 1913, Asia Minor 1950, and Homs 1927 hoards (*IGCH* 458, 1763, 1447, and 1529) all suggest that Group IV had been struck by c.240. The Kirazlı 1939 hoard (*IGCH* 1369), which must have been deposited c.230 bc, contains a worn coin of Westermarck V, suggesting that this small group may also have been struck before the end of Eumenes' reign.

Table 5.2. The Coinage of Eumenes I, 263–241 BC

Coinage	Estimated no. of Dies
Westermarck III	22
Westermarck IVA	40
Westermarck IVB	26
Westermarck V	5
Total	93

The effect of the re-dating of these issues is to increase the amount of coinage we can attribute to Eumenes I by a factor of almost three: 93 obverse dies were used at an average rate of 4.23 dies per annum. The lack of precision with which we can date these groups within the reign of Eumenes prevents us from offering any firm explanations for the significantly elevated size of this king's coinage. No doubt the war Eumenes fought with Antiochos in the 260s created a need for coinage. One wonders also if the tribute payments reputedly made to the Gauls can account for some of this production.²⁰

Attalos I (241–197 BC)

Westermarck assigned to this king her Groups IVA, IVB, V, VIA, and VIB. As we have seen, the first three of these groups are probably to be attributed to Eumenes I. The evidence of the Meydancikkale hoard, deposited c.240–235 BC, now suggests that some at least of Group VIA had been produced by that date, and thus belongs to the beginning of Attalos' reign.²¹ A firm *terminus ante quem* for most of the remainder of Group VI is provided by the Mektepini hoard (IGCH 1410), deposited c.195 BC, which contained extremely fresh examples of some of the last issues of Group VIB. It thus seems clear that Westermarck's Group VIA and most of VIB constitute the whole of Attalos' Philetairos coinage. Its size may be summarized as in Table 5.3. Averaged over the whole of Attalos' reign, the production

²⁰ Livy 38.16.13–14; Mitchell 1993: I 22.

²¹ The evidence is now bolstered by the Thesprotia seizure (CH IX 200), a hoard probably of the mid-220s which contains a Philetairos of Group VIA displaying noticeable wear. Oylum Höyüğü (CH IX 501), deposited c.205–200 BC, also contained an issue of Group VIA in a clearly worn condition.

Table 5.3. The Coinage of Attalos I, 241–197 BC

Coinage	Estimated no. of dies
Westermarck VIA	26
Westermarck VIB	24
Total	50

rate of these coins was little more than one obverse die per annum. However, this is not the whole story for the coinage of Attalos I.

The coinage of Groups VIA and VIB can be further subdivided. For Group VIA, Westermarck recorded 23 obverse dies (nos. 89–111), of which 7 were present in the Meydancikkale hoard (89, 91, 94, 95, 104, 105, and 107). At least one-third of Group VIA had thus been produced by 240–235 BC, but it is impossible to say how much more, since the internal structure of the Group remains unclear. Group VIB, as Nicolet-Pierre has clearly demonstrated, can be broken down into two subgroups VI B1 (obverse dies 112–13, 117–21), and VI B2. The second of these can be isolated clearly thanks to the control-marks it shares with the Alexander coinage minted at Pergamon (compare Figs. 5.6 and 5.7).²² A conspectus of the two coinages is provided in Table 5.4. From the inclusion of the majority of these issues in the Mektepini hoard (*IGCH* 1410) in fresh condition, it is clear that their production must shortly predate 195 BC, and that the most likely circumstance of their issue is the hostilities that broke out between the Attalids and Philip V and Antiochos III at the end of the



Fig. 5.6. Tetradrachm of Attalos I, in the name of Philetairos, Group VI B2, mint of Pergamon, c.205–195 BC. ANS 1967.152.414.

²² Nicolet-Pierre 1989. For the Alexanders, see Kleiner 1971.



Fig. 5.7. Tetradrachm of Attalos I, in the name of Alexander the Great, mint of Pergamon, c.205–195 BC. ANS 1944.100.31392.

Table 5.4. The Group VI B2 Philetairoi and parallel Alexander issues.

Controls	Westermarck obv. die(s)	Kleiner obv. die(s)	Hoards ²³	
Snake + ΔP	122	S, T	M, L	M, S
Palm + ΔI	125, 126	S ²⁴	M, U	U
Star + ΔI	126	S	M	M
Palm + ΔI	127, 125	P, Q	M	
Star + ΔI	124–127	K, O, P	B	M, Q
Bee + ΔI	128	L, N, M, K		M, U, Q
Bee + ΔP	(113) ²⁵ 115	K, J	L	U
Leaf + ΔP		N		M
Bee + ΔP		L		
Club + ΔP	123	R		A
Stylis + ΔP	123		B, P	

third century.²⁶ In addition to these issues, there are also a further 8 Alexander issues listed by Price, following Kleiner, which seem to belong before this phase, but which have no analogue in the Philetairoi of Group VI.²⁷ As Price, following Boehringer, notes, the

²³ M = Mektepin; B = Babylon; A = Ayaz-İn; L = Lebanon; P = Pamphylia 1977; U = Uncertain Find-spot 2000; Q = Quetta; S = Syria 1971.

²⁴ This issue, not in Kleiner, is now attested by Uncertain Find-spot 2000 (CH X 292), no. 85.

²⁵ Not known to Westermarck; subsequently recorded with this obverse die in the Lebanon hoard: Le Rider 1992: 38, no. 18.

²⁶ The appearance of two issues in the Quetta hoard from Arachosia (CH X 275) confirms the picture of Mektepin. This hoard, dated 206 or 200 BC by Miller 2010, also contains Antioch of Antiochos III down to the same issues as Mektepin (SC 1043), and was more probably deposited there in the 190s.

²⁷ Price 1991: nos. 1473–80, following Kleiner 1971 (I–VIII). It is possible that we should add to these the issue represented by Mektepin 276 (struck from Kleiner's obverse O). This coin is considerably more worn than the other Pergamene

evidence of the N.W. Asia Minor 1929 hoard (IGCH 1370) strongly suggests that these earlier Alexanders had been struck before 210 BC, and this now seems confirmed by a revised dating of the Gordion I hoard (IGCH 1406).²⁸ The N.W. Asia Minor Hoard, together with the S.W. Asia Minor c.1900 hoard (IGCH 1317) also provide a *terminus ante quem* for the end of the Group VI B1 Philetairoi of c.210 BC.²⁹ It is possible that these earlier Alexanders, and/or perhaps the Philetairoi of Westermark Group VI B1 are to be connected with expenditure during the conflict with Seleukos III and then Achaïos in the late 220s.

The Alexander coinage adds a further 23 ± 1 dies to the output of the Pergamene mint under Attalos, and brings his average output over the reign to 1.77 dies per annum. Despite the period of conflict that occupied Attalos towards the end of his rule, therefore, monetary production was considerably lower in his reign than in that of his predecessor.

It is also important to highlight here the fact that the Pergamene mint produced two different types of coinage simultaneously. The reason for this was clearly not connected with weight-standards, since both coinages were of Attic-weight. For some reason, the mint found it necessary to produce coins that eschewed the royal type and name of Philetairos. The reason for this remains obscure. It may be that, as Kleiner proposed, these coins were destined to pay a part of the military that preferred the widely accepted Alexander coinage to that of the Pergamene kingdom. Kleiner's suggestion was that this was the Pergamene navy, which was heavily engaged in the conflicts against Philip and Antiochos.³⁰ Yet it is clear that the Alexander coinage began some time before this conflict, and it may be that the reasons are more complex. Whatever the precise reason, the existence of these dual coinages should alert us to the sensitivity of the royal mint to the acceptability of its coinage. It should also warn us that even a ruler as powerful as Attalos I could not simply assume that his own royal coinage would achieve automatic acceptance.

tetradrachms in Mektepinî. Interestingly the specimen in Quetta, struck from the same die, also shows more wear than the other Pergamene coin in that hoard.

²⁸ On IGCH 1370, see Price 1991: 222. For Gordion I, see Meadows 2009a: table 3.

²⁹ IGCH 1370 contained issues struck from Westermark's obverses 119 and 121; the Attalid content of IGCH 1317 ends with an issue struck from obverse 119.

³⁰ Kleiner 1971: 121.

Eumenes II (197–158 BC)

(a) Posthumous Alexanders

The Alexanders studied by Kleiner clearly run in parallel in their later phase with the Philetairoi of Group VI B2 and, like them, stop probably shortly after the deposit of the Mektepiini hoard. In their last years, therefore, they are a coinage of Eumenes II. It is possible, in fact, to add more issues to those assembled by Kleiner, which seem also to postdate Mektepiini. The five issues in question were originally listed by Boehringer, without the benefit of Kleiner's die-study. It was left to Price to separate them and list them as his nos. 1491–5, with the tentative date of c.215–210.³¹ This date is surely too early. Stylistically, the issues seem to belong after Kleiner's sequence, not before. Their controls (Price 1491–2: $\overline{\text{B}}$) link them partly to the end of Kleiner's sequence, and specifically the late issue included in the Ayaz-În hoard c.190 BC,³² as well as (Price 1493–5: *stylis* and M, $\overline{\text{M}}$ and $\overline{\text{M}}$) to the earliest issues of the Group VII Philetairoi.³³ The one other piece of hoard evidence we have for these late Alexanders is the Asia Minor/Pisidia 1963 hoard (IGCH 1411), from which one specimen of Price 1491 derives. This hoard seems to postdate Mektepiini and may be contemporary with Ayaz-În, thereby corroborating the evidence of the latter hoard for the earliest of these five issues having been struck in the late 190s. In the absence of a full die-study, we cannot proceed far in the estimation of the size of this late Alexander coinage. The five specimens listed by Boehringer were struck from five different dies, of differing styles, so we may be justified in proposing a lengthy period for their production. If, as seems to be the case, this coinage provides a bridge between the end of the Philetairos Group VI B2 and the beginning of Group VII, then its duration may be gauged from the likely gap between them. As will be argued below, Group VII is unlikely to have begun before c.180 BC. Therefore, this Alexander coinage is likely to have been the principal coinage produced by the Pergamene kings during the period of their conflict with Antiochos III, and in the subsequent decade of reorganization of the Pergamene kingdom. As we shall see, Alexanders in

³¹ Boehringer 1972: 42; Price 1991: 1491–5.

³² Kleiner 1971: Series XVI.

³³ Nicolet-Pierre 1989: issues 1–2.

general are likely to have formed a large part of the Attalid coin supply during this period.

(b) *Philetairoi*

With the reign of Eumenes we enter the most complex period of production at the Pergamene mint. The majority of Westermark's Group VI had been struck, as we have seen, before 195 BC, but that means that some of the latest issues present in the Mektepinî hoard may belong to the early years of Eumenes II's reign. There are also the two issues linked by Westermark's obverse die 123 (club + ; stylis + ) which were probably struck between c.195 and 190 BC.³⁴ The Philetairoi of Westermark's Group VII (see below, Fig. 5.11) almost certainly begin within the reign of Eumenes. The broad period of their production is provided by the hoard evidence. Group VII is absent from the Mektepinî hoard, so must postdate c.195 BC. It is also absent from two other hoards that date to the late 190s or early 180s, Ayaz-În and Uncertain Find-spot 2000 (IGCH 1413 and CH X 292). This may suggest a gap in production of Philetairoi at the Pergamene mint in the late 190s and/or early 180s. While these hoards provide a clear *terminus post quem* for the beginning of Group VII, a *terminus ante* is far less easy to deduce. The bulk of the hoards in which Group VII has so far come to light date to the period between c.160 and 150 BC. These are presented in probable chronological order of deposit in Table 5.5.³⁵ Considerable progress in discussing the internal chronology of Group VII may be made on the basis of this hoard evidence and with the help of Nicolet-Pierre's re-examination of the Group. Drawing partly on material unavailable to Westermark (principally the Trabzon 1970 hoard), Nicolet-Pierre was able to establish a sequence

³⁴ Neither issue was present in the Mektepinî hoard of c.195, but the former was present in Ayaz-În, which dates to the period c.190–188 BC.

³⁵ Burial dates: Syria, see below; Babylon and Trabzon 1970 (Ordu), see Meadows in Meadows and Houghton 2010: 179 n. 13; Ma'Aret, see Mattingly 1993b; Urfa has a *terminus post quem* of 158/7: Meadows in Meadows and Houghton 2010: 180 n. 19; the first Trabzon hoard contains Athenian New Style down to 154/3 BC, but the Pergamene content is too poorly recorded to be of much help; Asia Minor 1962 hoard, see below; for the evidence of the Pamphylia 1977 hoard, see below.

Table 5.5. Hoards containing Philetairoi of Group VII

Hoard	Approximate Date of Deposit
Pamphylia 1977 (<i>CH</i> IX 294)	180–75 BC
Ma'Aret en-Nu'man (<i>CH</i> IX 511)	162 BC
Syria 1990 (<i>CH</i> VIII 434)	160 BC
Urfa 1924 (<i>IGCH</i> 1772)	Post-158 BC
Babylon 1900 (<i>IGCH</i> 1774)	155 BC
Trabzon 1947 (<i>IGCH</i> 1373)	154/3 BC
Asia Minor 1962 (<i>IGCH</i> 1453)	150 BC
Trabzon (Ordu) 1970 (<i>CH</i> IX 530)	150 BC

of issues. With the subsequent appearance of new hoard evidence, it is possible to suggest minor changes to her sequence of issues (see below n. 38). This proposed revised order is presented in Table 5.6 below.³⁶ More significantly, it is now possible to establish some fairly firmly fixed points in the chronology.

As the hoard evidence for these issues shows, for the early part of the sequence (down to issue 5) we have two clear pegs. Issues 0a and 1 and only those issues appear in the Pamphylia 1977 hoard, and then issues down to no. 5 had been struck by the time of the deposit of the Urfa hoard, which may be as early as 158 BC, but may be later. At the other end of the Group, the coins in the Babylon and Trabzon 1970 hoards, which in the latter case run down to the end of the sequence, are very fresh, suggesting that they had been minted perhaps not long before c.155 and 150 BC respectively, although caution is required. The coins of the Trabzon hoard, both in Boehringer's original publication and in the parcel now in Sinop museum, show a remarkable lack of wear throughout the chronological range of coins contained. So, for example, a coin of the Seleukid king Antiochos IV (175–164) appears absolutely fresh, as do coins of Antiochos V (164–162) and Demetrios I (dated SE 158=155/4). Moreover, in the portion of the hoard now in Sinop the two Philetairoi are from the earliest and one

³⁶ See Nicolet-Pierre 1989. I retain her issue numbers, though have revised her order slightly where dies and die-style permit, in accordance with the new hoard evidence and apparent linkages with the cistophoric issues. Eight issues unknown to Nicolet-Pierre have been added with a suffix 'a' or 'b'.

Table 5.6. Summary of Group VII Philetairoi and parallel Cistophoric issues

	Issue	Westermarck	Hoards ³⁷	Kleiner-Noe	Eumenes
0a	Stylis + A	N1, N2, N3	P, T		
0b	Stylis + AE	N3			
1–2	Stylis + MI/M	N3, 135–7	P		
2a	Stylis + M	137			
3	Torch + M	138–9			
3a	Stylis + M	N4			
4	Torch + M	141			
5	Torch + M	140	U		
5a	Palm + II	140	M		
6	Palm + M	N5			
10	Stylis + M	N6, 142–4	B, M		
11	Stylis + A	146	B		
12	Stylis + M	146–7	B		
13	Stylis + AP	147			x
14	Stylis + AE	147–8, 151	S, AM		
15	Stylis + $\text{E}\Omega$	148–9, N7	S, M		
16	Stylis + AEK	148, 150, 151	S		
16a	Stylis + AE	N7	S		
16b	Stylis + $\text{AE}\Omega$	148	S		
17	Stylis + AEK	N8			
9	Star + M	154, 145, N9	S		
7	No mark	153–4			
8	Thyrus + AE	154	B		
18, 24 ³⁸	Thyrus + AI	152, 129–30	B		?
19	Thyrus + AE	152	T, M ³⁹	1a	
23	Dolphin + $\text{II}\Phi$	N10	T		
25	Dolphin + AE	N11, N12	T	3	
22	Cornucopia + HM	133			
22a	Cornucopia + AB?	133			
20	Dolphin + XVMA	134, N13		23c	
21	Thyrus + A/AA	132–3, N14	AM	24e	?

of the latest issues of Group VII, and yet are in similar condition.⁴⁰ The relative freshness of coins in this hoard sadly cannot be used

³⁷ P=Pamphylia 1977; U = Urfa; B = Babylon; S = Syria 1990; AM=Asia Minor 1962; T = Trabzon; M=Ma-Aret en-Nu'man.

³⁸ Nicolet-Pierre treats these as separate issues, and it is true both that the Thyrus is treated differently on these issues, and that reverses associated with her issue 24 are of her later style. However, since this is the point at which she otherwise suggests the change from the first to second style of reverse takes place (following issue 18), then it seems reasonable to unite these as a single issue, within which reverse dies from a new engraver came into use. Certainly there is clear similarity of obverse style across issues 18 and 24.

³⁹ These provenances were unknown to Nicolet-Pierre. See Arslan and Lightfoot 1999: no. 1004 ,and Mattingly 1993b: no. 177.

⁴⁰ Cf. Arslan and Lightfoot 1999: nos. 1003–4. For the relative chronology of the earlier issue, see below n. 48.

safely as a gauge of chronology. The Babylon hoard is perhaps a little more helpful, with a noticeable though not great difference in wear between the earliest Attalid issues contained, of Group VI B2, and the latest, which is an example of Nicolet-Pierre's issue 24 of Group VII. This gives a firm *terminus ante quem* of 155 BC for part of Group VII, and suggests that Group VII as a whole ended several years after Group VIB.

But the best evidence for the date of Group VII comes now from the Ma'Aret en-Nu'man 1980 and Syria 1990 hoards (*CH* IX 511 and VIII 434). The latter contained coins of Antiochos IV and V in mint state and a single issue of Demetrios I in similar condition. The date of c.160 BC assigned to this hoard in *Coin Hoards* must be right, and fits well with the issue of Myrina in the hoard, which it is now clear is unlikely to have been minted after 160 BC and is similarly fresh.⁴¹ The seven Philetairoi in this hoard, all from the middle part of Nicolet-Pierre's sequence, are also absolutely fresh.⁴² It seems likely that these had been taken out of circulation together shortly before the hoard's deposit. But it is the Ma'Aret hoard that really grabs the attention. On the basis of its Seleukid content this was fairly certainly buried in the latter part of 162 BC. It contained at least six Philetairoi, of which four were of Group VII.⁴³ One of these was a new issue (Palm + II), but which die-links to the earliest part of the Group; one was of Nicolet-Pierre's issue 10 (*stylis* + $A\Phi$), also present in the Babylon hoard of c.155; one, in very fresh condition, was of issue 15 (*stylis* + $\Sigma\Omega$), also present in the contemporary Syria hoard; and the last was of issue 19 (Thyrsus + $\overline{A\Sigma}$), demonstrating that the Thyrsus issues, one of which was probably the earliest present in the Trabzon hoard, had been struck by 162 BC.

As is clear, 80 per cent of the known issues of Group VII predate the deposit of the Ma'Aret hoard in 162 BC. But how far before 162 we can place the beginning of this coinage is difficult to say. It might be tempting to spread these first twenty issues over the entire period between the end of Group VI B2 (c.190 BC?) and the hoard's deposit c.162 BC, and certainly there is some stylistic difference in some of the obverse dies (e.g. of issues 1–6, particularly in the treatment of the

⁴¹ On the chronology of the Alexanders of Myrina, see Meadows in Meadows and Houghton 2010: 181.

⁴² Cf. *CH* VIII, pls. 55, 11–13 and pls. 56, 2–5.

⁴³ Mattingly 1993b: 73–4, nos. 174–7, pls. 17, 176.

hair), that would support detaching them in time from the issues that follow. The 81 surviving coins of the pre-Ma'aret period were struck from 29 dies, giving an estimated original number of dies of 38 ± 2 . If we posit a period of production of c.20 years from c.180–162 BC, then this suggests a strike rate of approximately 2 dies per annum. This is slightly higher than we have seen for the earlier periods of Philetairoi, but is in fact considerably lower than for the cistophoric mint of Pergamon, which averaged 5 cistophoric tetradrachm dies per annum in the period 166–123 BC, and, of course, the combined output of the cistophoric mints, which was in the order of 13 obverse dies per annum.⁴⁴ On this basis, it seems unlikely that we could place the start of Group VII much before c.180, and it might be preferable to make it later.⁴⁵

This proposition in fact finds support in the Pamphylia 1977 hoard. Known only from brief published summaries⁴⁶ and a manuscript list in New York (whence the listing of *CH* X 294), this hoard postdates the end of the Pamphylian Alexanders, which ceased production in 184/3 (Phaselis Year 33), and contained eight coins of Seleukos IV (187–175 BC) of the mint of Antioch. The latest of these was marked with the HP control (SC 1313.6c), which comes comparatively late in the die-sequence of the mint. As Le Rider notes, we cannot be certain of the rhythm of production at the Antiochene mint at this period, but if production was spread evenly throughout Seleukos' reign, then the hoard perhaps closed towards its end in 175 BC.⁴⁷ Price's proposed date for the hoard of c.180–175 BC seems about right. As noted above, the hoard also included two Philetairoi: one of these is a specimen of what seems to be the first issue of Group VII (Nicolet-Pierre—[0a]: stylis + A), the other belongs to the second issue (Nicolet-Pierre 1: stylis + *MI*).⁴⁸ This is clear evidence that

⁴⁴ Callataÿ (this volume), Table 6.8.

⁴⁵ It should be borne in mind that the Philetairoi were not the only Attic-weight coinage in production at Pergamon during the lifetime of Group VII; for the portrait issues of Eumenes II and the Athena Nikephoros issues, both of indeterminate size, see further below.

⁴⁶ *CH* V 43 and VI 34; cf. Price 1991: 62–3.

⁴⁷ Le Rider 1999: 179.

⁴⁸ The position of the new issue with monogram is assured by an obverse die link to Nicolet-Pierre's issue 1: cf. *Rauch* 42 (1989), 3092 and Boehringer 1975: plate 7E (=Nicolet-Pierre 1989: pl. 18, 1).

Group VII had started by 180–175 BC, but may also suggest that it had not started much before that date.⁴⁹

Therefore, we are faced with the probability that there was a gap in the striking of Philetairoi at the Pergamene mint in the 180s, before production resumed c.180–175 BC. As we shall see, there may be other evidence to support such a reconstruction. It is possible that the picture is distorted by a lack of hoard evidence for the 180s and 170s, but there are in fact seven hoards from western Asia Minor unquestionably deposited during these two decades, and which could have contained Philetairoi of Group VII had they existed. Only the latest of them does: Pamphylia 1977.⁵⁰ Nicolet-Pierre notes a stylistic break in the sequence between her issues 19 and 20, which may be indicative of a gap in production within the Group.⁵¹ However, it is only the style of the reverse that changes and this may, as she suggests, be the result simply of a change of die-cutter. Certainly the obverses exhibit no such clear break. In fact, although there are obvious outliers, Group VII exhibits a fair degree of stylistic homogeneity, even when the sequence of die-links breaks down. On the whole, therefore, it seems plausible to suggest that the Group may have begun within the years c.180–175 and continued into the late 160s or early 150s. A *terminus ante quem* for Group VII is provided by the Asia Minor 1962 hoard (IGCH 1453), which was buried c.150 BC. This contained an issue (no. 21: Thyrsus + Δ) not present in the Syria, Babylon or Trabzon hoards, and which we may suggest falls at the end of Group VII. As we shall see below, this place in the sequence fits well the evidence of the cistophori.

Group VII is now known from 96 specimens struck from 37 dies, suggesting a total original number of dies of 50 ± 4 . If production was spread out over the whole period, c.175–150, this suggests an annual rate of production of around 2 dies per annum, which is broadly in line with estimates for earlier periods.

⁴⁹ That Group VII did not start much earlier may also be suggested by the Lebanon 1989 hoard (CH IX 507). This hoard, deposited c.175 BC, contained 4 Philetairoi down to Westermarck Group VI B2, but no Group VII. However, as Le Rider 1992: 45 notes, our knowledge of this hoard's contents may not be complete.

⁵⁰ For a summary of this evidence for Attic-weight hoards see below, Table 5.10. The hoards in question and their find-spots are: IGCH 1411 (Central Asia Minor), 1413 (Ayaz-İn), 1414 (Konya), CH IX 508 (Çeltekt), X 293 (Hocalar), X 292 (Pamphylia?), X 294 (Pamphylia).

⁵¹ Nicolet-Pierre 1989: 208.

(c) Countermarked coinage

As we have seen, there is evidence to suggest a gap in the sequence of Philetairoi between the end of Group VI B2, in the late 190s, and the beginning of Group VII, perhaps c.180 BC, or a little later. This raises the question of what Eumenes was using in place of fresh coin during this period. There are, of course, other periods in the history of the mint when no, or very little coinage was produced, and in the normal run of things it was surely possible for the kingdom to meet its needs for coinage through the cash recovered through taxation. But these were not normal times. The Peace of Apameia, ratified in precisely this period (188 BC), led to a massive expansion of Pergamene territory, and it is difficult to imagine that this arrived without a proportionate increase in expenditure.

Part of the answer to the question may lie in the late Pergamene Alexander coinage considered above in part (a), which seems partially to bridge the gap between the Philetairoi of Groups VI B2 and VII. The remainder of the solution to this problem is perhaps to be found in the phenomenon, long known and previously discussed, of so-called cistophoric countermarking. It must be observed at the outset that this term, now conventional, is a misnomer. The countermarks in question are not cistophoric. They bear no *cista* ('basket'); rather, they consist of a depiction of a bow in case accompanied by the initial letters of (presumably) the countermarking authority (Fig. 5.8).⁵² The bow in case would certainly become the reverse type of the cistophori, but a bow had been present on the reverse of the Philetairoi from the beginning, and a bow in case features on one issue of the pre-cistophoric bronze.⁵³ The evidence for the date of these countermarks was discussed at length by Bauslaugh in 1990, and his conclusions are still broadly valid. It will suffice here to add

⁵² As Le Rider notes, they also differ from the cistophoric coinage in the lack of the wreath found on the cistophoric coins, and in the use of letters for the cities' names, whereas a number of the cistophoric mint names are abbreviated with monograms. Moreover three of the countermarking authorities did not issue cistophoroi (Sala, Toriaion, and *ΕΛΗΣ*), and Stratonikeia only did so under Aristonikos. Le Rider 1989a: 167–8. For the identification of the countermarks, see Thonemann 2008.

⁵³ For the bronze, see e.g. *BMC Aeolis* 68–9; Westermarck 1991: 152, no. 18. The bow, of course, also features by itself as a main type of the early Attalid bronze coinage: Westermarck, *ibid.* nos. 7 and 9.



Fig. 5.8a and b. Tetradrachm of Side in Pamphylia (obverse), with 'cistophoric' countermark of Pergamon, and detail of countermark (x3). Host coin c.205–190 BC, countermark c.188–180 BC. ANS 1984.5.102.

some new material that has subsequently come to light, and consider a slight revision of the chronology of the host coins.

The countermarks occur only on tetradrachms of the four major cities of Pamphylia: Phaselis, Perge, Aspendos, and Side. The first three of these coinages are of posthumous Alexander type and bear dates in local eras. I have recently suggested that these eras began at Perge in 223/2, Aspendos in 213/12 and at Phaselis, less certainly, at around the same time as at Aspendos, perhaps c.216/15.⁵⁴ The latest recorded coins of the three mints to bear an Attalid countermark are as follows:⁵⁵

Phaselis: Year 22=195/4 BC

Perge: Year 27=197/6 BC

Aspendos: Year 28 (UBS 57 [2003] 171)=186/5 BC

It is thus plain that this period of countermarking was taking place in the 180s BC. It may have lasted for a number of years, and one at least of these years must be 186/5 BC or later. It cannot, however, have lasted much beyond the 180s, for two reasons. First, there are at least two recorded examples of 'cistophoric' countermarks overstruck with Seleukid anchor countermarks. The latter seem predominantly to belong to the 170s BC, and provide a *terminus ante quem* for the

⁵⁴ Meadows 2009a. The table at p. 69 of that article gives an unfortunate air of certainty to the era of Phaselis, not intended, nor warranted by the evidence. As Oliver Hoover points out to me (*per epist.*), if the date of the Ayaz-İn hoard suggested in that article is c.190 BC, then the era of Phaselis can have started no later than 216/15. This latter date will be assumed here.

⁵⁵ For an updated summary of the evidence see Callataÿ, Ch. 6 below, Table 6.7.

cistophoric countermarks.⁵⁶ Secondly, the early tetradrachm coinage of Side is divided by the practice of cistophoric countermarking. All issues of this coinage are recorded with countermarks, with the exception of those of the first series in the name of Kleuchares. The latter first appear in hoards of the 160s, but are stylistically close enough to the earlier issues to suggest that the gap between them may not have been long.⁵⁷ Bauslaugh's explanation for these countermarks was that they were used to mark coins taken as part of the indemnity paid by the Seleukid kingdom to Eumenes II. As we learn from Polybios, Antiochos III was ordered by the terms of Apameia to make a single payment of 127 talents, 1,208 drachmas. in lieu of grain, and a further 350 talents over a period of five years.⁵⁸ If this period began in 187, it ended in 183 BC, and comfortably encompasses the likely period of countermarking. As Bauslaugh puts it: 'the countermarks represent a device for placing foreign payments in circulation as they were dispersed to various cities'.⁵⁹ We might add a quantitative observation. The total indemnity payable by the Seleukid kings amounted to 327 talents. At a production rate of 20,000 coins per die, this was equivalent to the output of some 25 obverse dies. If this was placed into circulation in countermarked form over a period of five years, this is equivalent to a mint production of 5 tetradrachm dies per annum. Combined with the actual production of the mint of the last Pergamene Alexanders, this may come close to representing Pergamene expenditure immediately after Apameia.

If this is correct, then an interesting picture emerges of the circulating coinage of the Attalid kingdom during the 180s BC. On the one hand, the kingdom was pushing considerable quantities of (countermarked) foreign Alexander-type coinage into circulation; on the other, it was minting Alexanders of its own at the Pergamene mint. This is a somewhat unexpected picture for the Attalids in the 180s, but against the background of the monetary activity of the cities of

⁵⁶ For the date, cf. Price 1991: 68 and O. Hoover in SC II.2: 157–62.

⁵⁷ For the hoard evidence, see Meadows 2006: 155. The complete absence of Side from the Pamphylia 1977 hoard, buried c.180–175 BC, may suggest that the substantial Kleuchares issues postdate its deposit. The absence of cistophoric countermarks from this same find need not be a source for concern, both for the quantitative reasons cited by Callataÿ, pp. 225–6 below, but also because Pamphylia was not Attalid in the 170s. On this last point, see further below.

⁵⁸ Polyb. 21.43.20–1; cf. Liv. 38.38.14.

⁵⁹ Bauslaugh 1990: 63. For a similar explanation for the function of the anchor countermarks within the Seleukid realm, see Seyrig 1958: 193–7 (=Seyrig 1966: 7–11); cf. Le Rider 2001b: 272.

western Asia Minor in the aftermath of Apameia, this reconstruction looks highly attractive. At numerous mints at precisely this period Alexander coinages were being produced. In some cases these were in places where little or no Alexander coinage had existed before, while in others it simply continued as before. But it was a widespread phenomenon of which the Pergamene royal mint was just one part. So, for example, new or enlarged issues are attested at Alexandria Troas, Assos,⁶⁰ Temnos,⁶¹ Methymna, Mytilene,⁶² Aigai,⁶³ and Samos.⁶⁴ Established series continue at Kyme, Myrina, Kolophon, Erythrai, Magnesia, Miletos, Teos, and Chios.⁶⁵ All these cities are within the immediate orbit of Pergamon, but among them, strikingly, are none of the 'cistophoric' countermarkers. In the cases of Ephesos and Sardeis, cities with strong traditions of minting, this absence is significant.⁶⁶ We may presume that the countermarked Pamphylian coins were serving the purpose that civic Alexander coinages were elsewhere (we shall return to this point below).

(d) Portrait issues

Two examples survive of an Attic-weight portrait coinage in the name of *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΕΥΜΕΝΟΥ*. The obverse bears the diademed portrait of Eumenes facing to the right. The reverse has the types of the standing Kabeiroi within a laurel wreath (Fig. 5.9).⁶⁷ In publishing the

⁶⁰ Price 1592 ff (Alexandria) and Price 1600 ff. (Assos).

⁶¹ Price 1667 ff. The dates provided by Price for the issues have to be substantially modified. See Lorber 2010: 154–5.

⁶² Price 1695–6 (Methymna) and Price 1706 ff. (Mytilene).

⁶³ For an issue of this mint unknown to Price, see Meadows and Houghton 2010: 195, no. A225.

⁶⁴ Price 2451–2.

⁶⁵ Price 1635 ff. (Kyme), Price 1659 ff. (Myrina), Price 1870 ff. (Kolophon), Price 1911 ff. (Erythrai), Price 2057 ff. (Magnesia), Price 2195 ff. (Miletos), Price 2313–4 (Teos), Price 2405 ff. (Chios). On this period of Alexander coinage, see Price 1991: 78–9 and Le Rider 2001a: 40–4: 'l'ensemble de ces monnayages semble loin d'être négligeable' (p. 44).

⁶⁶ Sardeis may have minted briefly within this period. Two tetradrachm and one drachm issues (Price 2692–4) are perhaps to be assigned to the period c.188–180. If the date is correct, this is the exception that proves the rule: these issues are tiny for a major administrative centre such as Sardeis. For discussion of the chronology, see Price 1991: 321. Doubts on a date this late are expressed by Le Rider 2001a: 40.

⁶⁷ The issues have accumulated a healthy bibliography. See e.g. Boehringer 1972: 11–14; Westermark 1981; Bauslaugh 1982; Nicolet-Pierre 1989; Mattingly 1993a and 1993b: 83–4.



Fig. 5.9. Tetradrachm of Eumenes II, mint of Pergamon, c.166–162 BC. BM, 1849-07-17-10.

second known specimen, now in Paris, Nicolet-Pierre pointed out a control link (Stylis + *AP*) from the Eumenes coin to a Philetairos issue of Group VII.⁶⁸ From the evidence then available she posited a date for these parallel issues between 166 and 159 BC. As we can see from Table 6 above, the new hoard evidence and the revised sequence of issues tend to support her conclusion. The issues in question, Nicolet-Pierre's issue 13 (Stylis + *AP*) was struck from a die (Westermark 147) that was also used for issue 14 (Stylis + *ΑΣ*), which was present in the Syria 1990 hoard, buried c.160 BC. Therefore it is now certain that the portrait coins belong within the last few years of Eumenes' reign, around the middle of the Group VII Philetairoi, and shortly before the commencement of the cistophori. In his publication of the Ma'Aret hoard, Mattingly speculated that the new specimen in fact derived from that hoard: it appeared on the market in 1983, three years after Ma'Aret's discovery.⁶⁹ If this is correct, then a *terminus ante quem* of 162 BC is confirmed for this issue. The known coins of this type were struck from two different obverse and reverse dies, and belong to two separate issues. It remains quite uncertain how large this coinage originally was.

⁶⁸ Nicolet-Pierre 1989. The other specimen, acquired by the British Museum in 1849, has a thyrsus as symbol and letters that appear to read *ΑΙΑ* (or *ΑΙΑ*). Nicolet-Pierre associates this with her issue 21 (Thyrsus + *Α*); Boehringer 1972: 12, followed by Mattingly 1993a: 282 and 1993b: 83, and, tentatively, Bauslaugh 1982: 43–4, suggests it should go with issue 18 (Thyrsus + *ΑΙ*). The latter suggestion would make the Eumenes issue more compact chronologically: see above Table 5.6. Certainty is impossible.

⁶⁹ Mattingly 1993b: 83. The coin first appeared in *Leu* 33 (1983), lot 364. Cf. Mattingly 1993a: 281 for the suggestion that the choice of reverse type was occasioned by the death of Evander and the capture of Perseus on Samothrace in 168/7 BC.



Fig. 5.10. Tetradrachm of Athena Nikephoros, reign of Eumenes II, mint of Pergamon, c.180–165 BC. BM, 1975-02-08-1.

(e) Athena Nikephoros

Three specimens survive of this tetradrachm coinage, which is usually attributed to the Pergamene mint (Fig. 5.10). Two of these derive from the Larisa 1968 hoard (*IGCH* 237), one comes from the Ma'Aret hoard. All are in fresh condition and Price and Mattingly have both, in their publications of these hoards, favoured a date in the 160s for this issue, and connected it with the victory of Eumenes II over the Gauls in the mid-160s. Mørkholm, on the other hand, sought to link them with the reorganization of the festival of the Nikephoria in Pergamon in 181 BC, or with one of its subsequent celebrations in 177 or 173 BC. A date range of c.181–165 seems secure.⁷⁰ None the less, it is interesting that this coinage appears not to share any controls with the Pergamene mint. Indeed it bears no controls at all, which may suggest that a different issuing authority or mint is behind its production. The three known specimens are struck from two dies. The original size of the issue is difficult to determine.

PART 2: THE CISTOPHOROS

Date of Introduction

Nicolet-Pierre's re-examination of the structure of the Group VII Philetairoi, together with the new hoard evidence for it, has significant

⁷⁰ Boehringer 1975: 58–9; Mørkholm 1984: 187–92; Price 1989: 239–40; Mattingly 1993b: 83. For a balanced overview, see Le Rider 1973 and 1989a: 175–6.



Fig. 5.11. Tetradrachm of Eumenes II, in the name of Philetairos, Group VII (Dolphin + $\Delta\Sigma$), mint of Pergamon, c.165–150 BC. ANS 1971.260.2.



Fig. 5.12. Cistophoros of Eumenes II, mint of Pergamon, Kleiner–Noe issue 3 (Dolphin + $\Delta\Sigma$), mint of Pergamon, c.165–160 BC. Utrecht (Kleiner and Noe 1977: Pl. I. 9).

implications for our perception of the relationship of the Philetairoi with the cistophoric coinage. When Kleiner gathered the evidence for the early cistophoric coinage in 1977, he was aware of two control links between the Philetairoi and the cistophoroi: Nicolet-Pierre issue 19 and Kleiner and Noe 1a; Nicolet-Pierre issue 25 and Kleiner and Noe 3 (see Figs. 5.11 and 5.12). Nicolet-Pierre was able to determine the existence of two more (see Table 5.6 above).⁷¹ Thus it now seems even more likely that there was a period of overlap of production of the two coinages.

⁷¹ See Kleiner and Noe 1977. Nicolet-Pierre suggested a fifth link between her issue 22 and Kleiner and Noe's issue 31 of Apameia (which was, in fact, struck at Pergamon), but the latter coinage is dated by Kleiner and Noe to 135–133 BC. However, as Ashton (Ashton and Kinns 2004: 105–6) suggests, there may be a case for raising the date of Apameia Series 30 to before 145 BC, which would make Nicolet-Pierre's connection more attractive.

This overlap occurs within Nicolet-Pierre's Philetairos issues 19–25. This part of her sequence is not tightly die-linked internally. However, it does seem to be distinct from the central group of issues (nos. 7–17), which is closely die-linked and, from issues 10–17, shares the control symbol of a stylis. Of this central group of 13 issues (7–17), no fewer than 10 appear in either the Syria or Babylon hoards, deposited c.160 and 155 BC respectively. By contrast the four issues that overlap with the cistophoroi (19, 25, 20, and 21) are not found in either of these hoards. Just one of them (19: Thyrsus + $\boxed{A\Lambda}$) is represented in the Ma'Aret hoard, c.162 BC. This issue is also present in the Trabzon hoard, and three others from this part of Nicolet-Pierre's sequence are likewise present in Trabzon (issues 19, 23, and 25). As we have noted above, there is reason to think that Trabzon was buried slightly later than Syria and Babylon, probably around 150 BC. The relative sequence of these issues seems confirmed, therefore.

But what of the absolute chronology for the beginning of the cistophoric coinage? As we have already noted, the evidence of the Ma'Aret, Syria, Babylon, and Trabzon hoards strongly suggests that the Group VII Philetairoi were still in production in the 160s BC. Some caution is required in using these hoards to derive absolute dates, since all were deposited at some distance from Pergamon. There is the possibility of time-lag between issue and deposit, although this should not be overplayed: coins could travel as quickly as people, and the coins in question were, when we can tell, all deposited in very fresh condition. However, if we assume a lag of between five and ten years across these hoards, we might suggest a date of c.165–160 for the issue of the Philetairoi that overlap the cistophoroi, and thus a similar date for the beginning of the cistophoric coinage. Very specifically, the presence of Nicolet-Pierre issue 19 in the Ma'Aret hoard guarantees that the first cistophoroi had been struck by 162 BC at the latest. This would provide support for Kleiner's supposed start date for the coinage in 166 BC. In any case, the evidence of Ma'Aret surely rules out Nicolet-Pierre's suggestion that the cistophoric coinage belongs to the reign of Attalos II, and began perhaps as late as the decade of 159–150 BC.⁷²

In fact, there may be independent evidence to corroborate a *terminus ante quem* in the 160s. The city of Alabanda in Karia also

⁷² Nicolet-Pierre 1989: 212.



Fig. 5.13. Cistophoric tetradrachm of Alabanda in Karia, Year 14, c.154/3 BC. ANS 1947.999.13.

produced a coinage on the cistophoric weight-standard, but with its own civic types (Fig. 5.13). This coinage is dated on an era that runs from Year 1 to 33. I have suggested elsewhere that this era is that of the freedom of Karia from Rhodian control, and begins in the year 167/6 BC.⁷³ Since it is more likely that Alabanda was responding to Pergamene policy than vice versa, this year probably provides the latest likely date for the start of the Attalid cistophoroi. The hoard evidence, as we have seen, will not allow it to be much earlier, and I shall tentatively here propose 167/6 BC as the likely start date for the cistophoros.

We can develop the picture a little further than this, however, and in doing so test the chronology that has emerged from the hoard evidence so far considered. The four issues that Nicolet-Pierre identified as parallel across the Philetairoi and cistophoroi do not tell the whole story. For, in the case of the cistophoroi, the issues in question are die-linked to a considerably larger group of issues, which must therefore be considered as broadly contemporary. In the case of the first two linked issues, Nicolet-Pierre 19 and 25, the parallel cistophoroi are part of a tightly die-linked group of 8 emissions struck from a total of 16 dies.⁷⁴ Since Kleiner and Noe (1977: 22) were aware of the link of these issues to the Group VII Philetairoi, they placed these at the head of their Pergamene series. With this conclusion there can be no quarrel. The two other links proposed by Nicolet-Pierre were not taken into account by Kleiner and Noe, and are highly

⁷³ Meadows 2008: ch. 5; see also Ashton, below p. 252. It is worth noting also that the Alabandan mint seems at the beginning to have struck Attic- and cistophoric-weight coinage simultaneously.

⁷⁴ Kleiner and Noe 1977: Series 1a–8, with pp. 38–9 for a chart of the die-links. Cf. Table 5.7 below.

explosive. Nicolet-Pierre issues 20 and 21, signed Dolphin + Δ and Thyrsus + Δ respectively, are precisely paralleled in Kleiner and Noe's Series 23 and 24. Series 23 and 24 form part of larger, internally die-linked group that consists of 12 issues struck from 40 obverse dies.⁷⁵ When we examine the connected series as a whole, an interesting pattern emerges that leaves little doubt that this large group must run parallel to the very last Philetairoi. The issues in question are laid out in Table 5.7.

Three issues of Philetairoi are not contained in the Babylon, Syria, or Trabzon hoards, nor are any other issues to which they are die-linked. This looks, therefore, like a group of issues that postdates the deposit of these three hoards. The primary symbols of these three issues are the Cornucopia (issue 22), Dolphin (issue 20), and Thyrsus

Table 5.7. Late Group VII Philetairoi and parallel cistophoric issues and dies compared

N-P iss.	Controls	Westmk dies	Hoards	K-N issue	dies
18, 24	Thyrsus + ΔI	152, 129–30	B		
19	Thyrsus + $\boxed{A\Sigma}$	152	T	1a	1
	Thyrsus			1b	1
	$\boxed{A\Sigma}$			2	2
23	Dolphin + $\Pi\Phi$	N10	T		
25	Dolphin + $\Delta\Sigma$	N11, N12	T	3	3
	Dolphin + $\boxed{A\Sigma}$			3	3, 4
	Palm			4	2, 5
	Club			5	5–7
	Eagle		AM(c)	6	7–11
	Caduceus		AM(c)	7	9–16
	Amphora			8	16–20
	Wreath			20	38
	Ivy leaf			21	38–41
22	Cornucopia + HM	133			
22a	Cornucopia + $AB?$	133			
	Cornucopia			22	41–5
	Dolphin		AM(c)	23a	45–54
	Dolphin + prow			23b	50–1, 55–8
20	Dolphin + ΔIMA	134, N13		23c	58
	Thyrsus		AM(c)	24a	52–4, 59–77
	Thyrsus + prow			24b–c	53, 76–7
	Thyrsus + Δ			24d	77
21	Thyrsus + $\Delta/\Delta A$	132–3, N14	AM(p)	24e	77
	Thyrsus + ME			24f	77

⁷⁵ Kleiner and Noe 1977: 29–33, Series 20–2, 23a–c, and 24a–f.

(issue 21). Turning to the group of cistophoric issues to which they seem to be parallel, we find that the three largest of those parallel issues (Kleiner and Noe Series 22, 23, and 24) have as their primary controls the Cornucopia, Dolphin, and Thyrsus. This fact alone provides strong confirmation that Nicolet-Pierre was correct to link these Philetairoi and cistophoroi.

If we turn to one last piece of hoard evidence, we can reinforce this position still further. The Asia Minor 1962 hoard (*IGCH* 1453) is unique among Greek coin hoards in that it is the only one to contain cistophoroi along with coinage on the Attic weight-standard. The Bithynian and Seleukid coinage in the hoard—including issues of Prusias II (182–149 BC), but none of his successor Nicomedes II (149–c.127 BC), and a dated issue of Demetrios I of SE 162 (=151/0 BC)—strongly suggest a burial date of around 150 BC. Two issues of Group VII Philetairoi were present. One of these was an example of issue 14 (Stylis + $\Delta\Sigma'$) which also occurred in the Syria 1990 hoard, and must therefore predate c.160. The other was an example of issue 21 (Thyrsus + Δ), which is control-linked to cistophoric issue 24. The cistophoroi, on the other hand, caused Kleiner and Noe problems. The Pergamene issues and their condition may be summarized as follows:⁷⁶

Series 6 (eagle): 1 (VF)

Series 7 (caduceus): 1 (F)

Series 11a (torch): 1 (F)

Series 14 (ear of grain): 1 (VF–EF)

Series 23a (dolphin): 2 (VF–EF)

Series 24a (thyrsus): 5 (all from same die pair) (EF)

The condition and die-linkage of the Series 24a issues suggests that they are the latest Pergamene issues in the hoard. Kleiner and Noe (1977: 110–11), however, having assigned a date to these issues of c.150–140, and were forced to explain the apparent different chronology of the Attic and cistophoric components of the hoard by suggesting the hoard was found in Attalid territory, and that the local coins were newest. We do not know the find-spot of the hoard, however, and should in any case be wary of drawing such

⁷⁶ The conditions are as reported in Kleiner and Noe 1977: 109–10, and proceed from F(ine) to V(ery) F(ine) to E(xtremely) F(ine). Autopsy of the coins now in the ANS collection confirms their description.

conclusions based on distance of travel. In the absence of find-spot, a date of c.150 must stand for this hoard. In fact, this date sits well with the other hoard evidence. With Nicolet-Pierre's proposed collocation of the issue 21 Philetairos and the Series 24 cistophoroi (Thyrsus + Δ/Δ), it now appears that the two Attalid components in the hoard, Attic-weight and cistophoric, end at exactly the same point. Moreover, the later Philetairos belongs to the group that also occurs in the Trabzon hoard (see Table 5.7 above), which also seems to have been buried c.150. In the face of these two separate pieces of hoard evidence, Trabzon and Asia Minor, it seems logical to raise the date of the first twenty-four Series of Kleiner and Noe's sequence before 150 BC.⁷⁷

The last two of these cistophoric issues (23 and 24) probably mark the end of the parallel period of striking of the two standards at the Attalid mint, and the Asia Minor hoard gives us a *terminus ante quem* of c.150 BC for a substantial series of cistophori, and Group VII Philetairoi. If all of the issues down to Kleiner and Noe Series 24 had been struck by this point, and that is certainly the import of both die-links and hoard evidence, then this is a total of 78 obverse dies observed in 211 specimens, or an estimated 104 ± 5 dies originally. This is a large amount of coinage. As we have seen above, it is difficult to date the beginning of the cistophori much before 167 BC. Taking the longest possible period, the Pergamene mint alone would have struck an average of 6.1 dies per annum, and now it was just one of five or six mints striking coin for the Attalid kingdom. During the same period the Group VII Philetairoi were being struck too, with a possible strike rate, calculated above, of 2.16 dies per annum. We shall further examine the consequences of the redating of these cistophori below for the overall rate of production below.

⁷⁷ One problematic piece of evidence should be noted, however. The single cistophoros said to have been included in the Larisa 1968 hoard (IGCH 237) belongs to Kleiner and Noe Series 23 of Apameia: see Price 1989: 240. This series is die-linked to Pergamon Series 23 (Pergamon obv. 46 and 54 = Apameia 24 and 28). If the chronology proposed here is correct, the cistophoros in the Larisa hoard will have to be regarded as intrusive, since the hoard cannot be moved as late as 155. Given that the coin in question did not surface in commerce until 11 years after the hoard's discovery, this is not entirely a case of special pleading. Cf. Le Rider 1989a: 167: 'il est plus prudent d'écarter cette monnaie de la discussion'.

The Cistophoros under Attalos II (158–138 BC) and Attalos III (138–133 BC)

As we have seen, the beginning of the cistophoric coinage must belong to the reign of Eumenes II. The cistophoric coinage over the period from its inception down to the end of the royal issues in 133 BC is difficult to date internally. However, if the date of *c.*150 BC for the Asia Minor 1962 hoard (*IGCH* 1453) and the end of the Group VII Philetairoi and their accompanying cistophori is correct, we do have one fixed point in the sequence, which will allow us to gain some impression of relative rates of cistophoric production either side of this date. A further chronological peg is provided by the issues which seem to be associated with the period of turbulence following the death of Attalos III in 133 BC and before the final assertion of Roman control over the province in 129/8 BC.⁷⁸

If these chronological divisions (shown in Table 5.8) are correct, then an interesting pattern emerges. The cistophoric coinage in its initial stages was produced in significantly elevated quantities. In total, over the first 18 years of production the four mints used on

Table 5.8a. Production at the four main cistophoric mints compared

Pergamon				Ephesos				Tralleis				Apameia			
	<i>Issues</i>	<i>d/n</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>Issues</i>	<i>d/n</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>Issues</i>	<i>d/n</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>Issues</i>	<i>d/n</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>Issues</i>	<i>d/n</i>	<i>D</i>
167–150	1–24	78/207	104	1–32	43/165	51	1–38	67/189	88	1–25	41/98	59			
150–133	25–26	10/16	21	33–39	13/67	14	39–41	11/26	16	26–31	7/16	10			
133–129	27–37	33/70	51	40–45	44/108	62	42–47	19/30	42	–	–	–			

Table 5.8b. Average per annum die use

	Pergamon	Ephesos	Tralleis	Apameia	Total
167–150	5.78	2.83	4.89	3.28	16.78
150–133	1.24	0.83	0.94	0.59	3.6
133–129	12.75	15.5	10.5	–	38.75

⁷⁸ On the chronologies of these series see Kleiner and Noe 1977, ad locc. In general I have followed their dating, which is based in part on a series of hoards that seem to be associated with the Aristonikos revolt, notably Yeşilhisar 1963 (*IGCH* 1327), Asia Minor 1928 (*IGCH* 1455), and Şahnalı 1952 (*IGCH* 1328).

average 16.78 obverse dies per annum. In terms of silver coined, this is the equivalent of 12.58 Attic tetradrachm dies per annum or 50 drachm dies. It is possible, of course, that production was not evenly distributed over this period of eighteen years, and that the initial years of production were even more intense than this, and the latter part of this period saw a reduced production. The evidence is not good enough for us to say. What is clear, however, is that this first period of production, however it was spread, marks a huge increase in size over the Attic-weight coinages discussed above in Part 1. This phenomenon will be analysed in more detail in Part 4, below.

It is also clear that the later part of Attalos II's reign and the reign of Attalos III saw a significantly reduced average rate of production. In this period the average total for the four mints is just 3.6 dies per annum (2.7 Attic tetradrachm dies or 10.8 drachm dies). In the last period, which seems to correspond to the period of warfare following the death of Attalos III and the usurpation of Eumenes III (Aristonikos), production rises dramatically. The average number of dies per annum, now representing the production of just three mints, in fact rises tenfold to 38.75 (29 Attic tetradrachm dies, 116 drachm dies).

In the middle period of production, the issue of royal cistophoroi was considerably reduced, at c.11 obverse drachm dies per annum. This seems low, perhaps even by the standards of the pre-Apameian kingdom (cf. Callataÿ, this volume, Table 6.1), but is perhaps to be explained in part by a return to the production of Attic-weight coinage during this period (see below), as well as by the recycling into circulation of the existing large quantities of cistophoroi struck in the initial period of production.

Particularly interesting is the massive surge of production in the period around the Aristonikos revolt. This whole coinage, struck perhaps within a period of five years, consumed some 150 cistophoric tetradrachm dies, or 450 Attic drachm die equivalents. At 20,000 coins per die, this represents the coining of some 1,500 talents. Given that two of the mints concerned are Pergamon and Ephesos, it is difficult to interpret this massive coinage as anything other than the Roman or pro-Roman funding of the war against the pretender.

PART 3: THE EVIDENCE FOR A CLOSED CURRENCY SYSTEM

Production

The detailed examination of the chronology and pace of production of the cistophoros that we have just undertaken is in danger of obscuring a fundamentally important fact about the production of coinage at Pergamon. The mint was producing different types of coinage simultaneously. This was true in the last decades of the third century and the first two of the second century with the parallel or alternating production of Philetairoi and Alexanders. It continued into the 160s with the parallel production of Philetairoi, the portrait tetradrachms, the Athena Nikephoros tetradrachms, and the cistophoroi. This pattern continues after the death of Eumenes II. As we have seen, the hoard evidence firmly suggests that the issue of Group VII Philetairoi continued down into the 150s BC, alongside the cistophoroi at the Pergamene mint, and thus extended into the reign of Attalos II.

In fact, this was not the only Attic coinage that continued in production, and Pergamon may not have been the only royal mint producing it. There are a number of other non-cistophoric coinages that seem likely to be Attalid, and must belong to the period of the 150s or later.

We have already noted the existence of the exceptional Attic-weight portrait coinage of Eumenes II in the 160s. On the reverse of these coins are depicted the Kabeiroi standing facing, each wearing a cloak and holding what may be a spear or a *stylis* (above, Fig. 5.9). As has long been realized, the design recurs on a series of non-portrait wreathed tetradrachms (Fig. 5.14). On the obverse of these latter coins appears a portrait of Demeter and on the reverse the legend reads *ΘΕΩΝ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΩΝ ΣΥΡΙΩΝ* instead of *ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΕΥΜΕΝΟΥ*. Various attempts have been made to connect these two coinages, on the basis that the mint of the non-portrait coin is the island of Syros in the Aegean. Head, for example, suggested that the portrait coin must have been minted on Syros; von Fritze followed him and suggested the occasion of an Attalid expedition to Greece;



Fig. 5.14. Tetradrachm in the name of the Divine Syrian Kabeiroi, uncertain mint, c.145–140 BC. ANS 1978.34.1.

even Newell seems to have been tempted by the idea.⁷⁹ Westermarck dated the portrait coin to around the 190s (on the basis of portrait's perceived age), which led Hansen to suggest a time when 'Eumenes was cruising among the Cyclades'.⁸⁰

As we have seen, the location and date of the production of the portrait tetradrachm have now been firmly established by Nicolet-Pierre as Pergamon and the late 160s. We must now ask whether the 'Syros' issues, with which it seems to be so closely connected, could belong there too. Both the obverse and reverse are clearly appropriate to the Attalid kingdom and the city of Pergamon. The reverse type of the Kabeiroi is obviously appropriate to the Pergamene kings, since it was chosen for the reverse of the only lifetime portrait issue of any Attalid ruler. The reason is not far to seek: as Pausanias tells us, 'the land that the Pergamenes inhabit was, they say, sacred to the Kabeiroi in ancient times'.⁸¹ If this reverse type is indeed a reference to the mythical history of Pergamon, then it is not alone in this region at this time. An interesting cluster of coinages from Aiolis and Ionia, for example, seem to refer to the purported Amazon origins of their cities of origin.⁸² The obverse type too is perfectly appropriate to Pergamon. Demeter had a substantial sanctuary on the acropolis built by Philetairos and his brother in honour of their mother; the sanctuary was

⁷⁹ Head 1881: 89; von Fritze 1904. For Newell's opinion, see the correspondence cited by Hansen 1971: 220 n. 371.

⁸⁰ Westermarck 1961: 40–1; Hansen 1971: 220.

⁸¹ ἦν δὲ νέμονται οἱ Περγαμῆνοί, Καβείρων ἱεράν φασιν εἶναι τὸ ἀρχαῖον (Paus. 1.4.6). For the cult of the Kabeiroi at Pergamon, see Bauslaugh 1982: 47 n. 21 and Hansen 1971: 434–9. For numismatic evidence of the cult of the Kabeiroi at Pergamon during the imperial period, see von Fritze 1910: 63–4.

⁸² See Meadows 2009a.

later embellished in the reign of Eumenes II by his mother, Apollonis.⁸³

Although the circumstantial case for linking the Demeter/Kabeiroi issues with Pergamon is strong, it must be admitted that the legend *ΣΥΡΙΩΝ* remains a puzzle. It certainly can be read as an ethnic suggesting the inhabitants of the island of Syros, but it can also be read as an adjective qualifying *ΘΕΩΝ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΩΝ*. The adjective *Syrios* is, to my knowledge, only otherwise used to qualify a deity in the case of the *Thea Syria*, who is related to the Great Mother, in whom the Attalids certainly took an interest, and who is also connected to the Kabeiroi.⁸⁴ Associations with the Great Mother, with whom the obverse design of the coin ('Demeter') may conceivably be connected, were presumably doubly attractive in the period 160–140, given the role that the king of Pergamon had apparently played in the transfer of the cult of the goddess to Rome during the Second Punic war.⁸⁵ But this is speculation. What seems sure is that this coinage cannot be the coinage of Syros. It was much too large: Nicolet-Pierre and Amandry (1992) have observed 12 obverse dies among 17 specimens, and a further 9 specimens that have come onto the market subsequently add 2 more dies. These numbers suggest an original size of around 24.5 ($\pm$ 4.8) obverse dies, or c.100 Attic drachm dies, or around 320 talents of silver at 20,000 coins per die. This is probably larger than the entire cistophoric output of the mint of Pergamon in the period 150–133 BC (Table 5.8a). If this coinage is to be added to the mint of Pergamon, then it is to this period that it belongs. The hoard evidence, consisting of the Aleppo, Akkar, and Kırıkhan hoards, makes it fairly clear that the Kabeiroi issues were struck in the mid- to late 140s.⁸⁶

Another strong candidate for an Attalid Attic-weight coinage of the 140s can be found in Pamphylia. Following the Peace of Apameia, which set the boundary between the Attalid and Seleukid kingdoms at the Tauros mountains, both sides claimed ownership of the ambiguously situated Pamphylian plain. The matter went to drawn-out arbitration at Rome. The senate's decision is not recorded,

⁸³ Hansen 1971: 237–8 and 446.

⁸⁴ The cult of the Great Mother is well attested archaeologically in the city of Pergamon and its environs: the evidence is collected by Hansen 1971: 438–40.

⁸⁵ On this episode, and Attalid involvement, see Gruen 1990: 5–33.

⁸⁶ *IGCH* 1562, *IGCH* 1559, *CH* X 310. See Meadows in Meadows and Houghton 2010: 183.

although it is often assumed that they declared the Pamphylian cities free.⁸⁷ Irrespective of that decision, Attalid encroachment into the plain undoubtedly occurred. There is a reference to a campaign of Attalos II against Selge, which may have been part of a campaign southwards in the early 150s. Probably one of Attalos' first moves was to found the city of Attaleia, an attractive harbour site, and surround it with city-walls.⁸⁸ By the time of Attalos III's death and the foundation of the Roman province, it appears that the whole of the Pamphylian plain had come under Attalid rule, and was absorbed into the new province of Asia.⁸⁹ It seems, therefore, that we must reconstruct an aggressive policy of the 150s in the region that saw the incorporation of the whole plain into the Attalid state.

No overtly Attalid mint opened in the region; there were no Pamphylian *cistophoroi*. There is, however, a massive and hitherto unexplained coinage that was produced in this region, and which may be a strong candidate for Attalos' Pamphylian coinage. In the last years of the third century and for the first two decades of the second, the city of Side issued a tetradrachm and drachm coinage with the types Helmeted head of Athena on the obverse and a Nike walking left on the reverse.⁹⁰ These issues were signed by a series of magistrates, the last of whom signed himself Kleuch(ares). This phase of coinage was complete by 180 BC, but this is not the end of the story. For, at some point in the decade 150–140 BC, issues in the name of Kleuchares began to be struck again, though with a radically different and easily recognizable style (Fig. 5.15). Clearly this cannot be the same man, and it seems probable that these later, Kleuchares II issues are an imitation coinage, not a true coinage of Side at all. Aside from its imitative nature, the remarkable thing about this Kleuchares II coinage is its size: 75 dies have been recorded by Wolfgang Leschhorn from 836 specimens, suggesting a total size of 75 tetradrachm dies,

⁸⁷ The assumption is made on the basis of the later appearance of Pamphylian ambassadors before the senate in 169 BC and the renewal of '*amicitia*' with them: Livy 44.14.3–4. See e.g. Magie 1950: I 280; and Hopp 1977: 103, n. 250 for a survey of various reconstructions.

⁸⁸ Strabo 14.4.1. Hansen 1971: 178–9; Hopp 1977: 104–6; Allen 1983: 83.

⁸⁹ The Aquillian road built in 129 BC into Pamphylia stretched all the way to Side; and Perge, Magydos, Phaselis, and Side all occur as customs stations in the Tax Law of the Province of Asia (Attaleia is restored). See Mitchell 2008: 188–92.

⁹⁰ For more detailed discussion of the coinages of Side in question, see Meadows 2006. I am grateful to Professor Leschhorn for communicating his die-count to me in advance of its publication.



Fig. 5.15. Tetradrachm with the types of Side in Pamphylia, in the name of Kleuchares, c.160–150 BC. Commerce, from *Coin Hoards IX* 521.

or 300 drachm dies. If this coinage was struck over a period between ten and twenty years, it has a rate of production in the region of 15–30 dies per annum. This is in the same order of magnitude as the cistophoric mint of Pergamon.⁹¹ The attribution of this coinage to the Attalid kings is, of course, circumstantial. None the less, there must have been a significant need for coinage on the part of the kings, particularly to fund the foundation of a major new city, and there is no other coinage produced in the region that could fit the bill. It is also worth noting the remarkable coincidence that the hoard that provides us with the first evidence of the existence of the Kleuchares II coinage is also the only hoard known to contain both Attic-weight and cistophoric coinage: Asia Minor, c.1962 (*IGCH* 1453).

In addition to these two substantial coinages, four more cases can clearly be identified of Attic-weight coinages being produced within cities that were subject to the Attalid king after the introduction of the cistophoros. Ephesos, the site of a cistophoric mint, issued a plentiful coinage of drachms, consuming in total some 70 obverse dies, probably from the last years of the third century down until the middle of the second. Kinns (1999) has established that there was an early phase to this coinage, which was probably complete by c.170 BC. However, there also appears to be a later phase of this coinage. A *terminus ante quem* of c.150 can be proposed with reasonable confidence for the majority of the 10 dies used to strike this phase, but a *terminus post quem* is less certain.⁹² Conceivably this ‘later’ phase also belongs before the advent of the cistophoroi. If it continued afterwards, like the Attic-weight Philetairoi of the Pergamene mint, it was finished

⁹¹ See above, Tables 5.8a and 5.8b.

⁹² Kinns 1999: 77: ‘it certainly would not be justified to assume . . . that they must postdate 170 or 160’.

by 150. The two latest issues of Attic-weight drachms stand the strongest chance of belonging to the period after the advent of the cistophoroi. These are distinguished by the appearance of the ethnic in full (*ΕΦΕΣΙΩΝ*) in place of the abbreviated *E-Φ* of the remainder of the drachms. This is a feature that they share with a rare series of gold drachms, which Jenkins has sought to connect to a gold coinage of Tralleis, which must belong to the cistophoric period, and provides our second example.

Tralleis issued gold coinage only once in its history, with the types of head of Zeus on the obverse and humped bull on Maeander pattern on the reverse.⁹³ Two issues are known, one with controls wreath + thunderbolt, the other with star + eagle. As Jenkins showed, these two issues find parallels in the cistophoric issues of Tralleis of Kleiner and Noe Series 9 and 41. The former belongs with the earliest cistophoric issues of Tralleis, probably in the 160s BC; the latter seems to have been struck after the deposit of the Asia Minor 1962 hoard (*IGCH* 1453), perhaps in the 140s BC. In any case, as has been pointed out by Le Rider, these gold staters provide clear evidence for the use of the Attic weight-standard at a cistophoric mint during the cistophoric period.

The status of Temnos as an Attalid possession after 188 BC seems beyond question, since we have the fragmentary remains of a letter of Eumenes II to the city apparently granting it various concessions (*RC* 48). Throughout the period from the Peace of Apameia down to the 140s BC, Temnos issued a substantial series of posthumous Alexanders. The evidence of the Ma'aret en-Nu'man, Demetrios I, and Gaziantep hoards⁹⁴ shows beyond doubt that these Alexanders were still being minted into the 140s. Here, then, we have a clear case of a subject city issuing coin on the Attic standard after the introduction of the cistophoroi. We should note an important difference between this coinage and the 'imitation' coinage of Side discussed above. The coinage of Temnos was in quasi-continuous production throughout the period c.190–145 BC; there is no gap as at Side. Moreover, the coinage of Temnos is marked with a changing series of monograms and magistrates' names (see Fig. 5.16), indicating that this was a 'living' coinage produced by, one presumes, an active civic

⁹³ Jenkins 1980. Cf. Le Rider 1989a: 172–3; Kinns 1999: 82–3; Thonemann 2011a: 40–1.

⁹⁴ *CH* IX 511, *CH* X 301, *CH* X 308.



Fig. 5.16. Tetradrachm of Temnos in Aiolis, in the name of Alexander the Great, signed by Exenikos and Geitas, c.150–140 BC. ANS 1949.67.1



Fig. 5.17. Tetradrachm in the name of the Artists of Dionysos, mint of Teos (?), c.160–150 BC. Lorber and Hoover 2003.

apparatus; it was not ‘fossilized’ like the posthumous Kleuchares issues of Side.

Another intriguing example is provided by the coinage of the Association of the Artists of Dionysos (Fig. 5.17). The single known specimen was published by Lorber and Hoover, who dated it on the basis of its hoard context to the 150s BC, suggesting that it may have been produced in the context of the foundation of the Attalistai by Kraton of Kalchedon, leader of the Association of the Artists, and a prominent figure at the Pergamene court. At this point in time the Artists were based in the city of Teos, and Lorber and Hoover suggest that the coin was minted there ‘under Pergamene influence’.⁹⁵ In fact, as Lorber and Hoover note, this coinage fits in with the pattern of special Attic-weight issues of the previous decade produced in the name of Athena Nikephoros and Eumenes II, discussed above. We might add that this coin also serves as a potentially interesting

⁹⁵ Lorber and Hoover 2003: 64 and 65 (quotation).

precursor to the Kabeiroi coinage, if the latter is indeed to be regarded as Pergamene. Teos was, of course, firmly subject to the Attalid kings after Apameia. Again, we have a letter of Eumenes II written, in fact, to the Association of Dionysiac Artists concerning their relations with the city (RC 53). So once more, within a subject city, we have evidence for the production of Attic-weight coinage after the introduction of the cistophoroi.

Finally, we might note that many of the cities within the Attalid kingdom seem to have struck bronze coinage.⁹⁶ Bronze coinage is unfortunately difficult to date, and thus it is difficult to survey this area with any specificity, but it is likely that cities were left to their own devices when it came to the production of coins at this low end of the scale.

The pattern of coin production within Attalid territory and subject cities after the introduction of the cistophoros and the supposed creation of the closed currency system is, therefore, far from black and white. We must now ask whether the pattern observable in circulation is any more straightforward.

Circulation

The evidence for the circulation of cistophoric coins during the period of Attalid rule is exiguous indeed. Only two hoards certainly belong to the period before 133 BC, and the find-spot of neither is known. By contrast eight hoards can be fairly confidently attributed to the period of the Aristonikos revolt (133–129 BC), see Table 5.9.⁹⁷

Of the three hoards that might belong to the period of Attalid rule, one (IGCH 1452) contained only cistophoric coinage. However, the other (IGCH 1453) was a mixed hoard, containing both cistophoric and Attic-weight coinage. Since we do not know its find-spot, we

⁹⁶ On this point see Marcellesi 2010: 199.

⁹⁷ Excluded from this table are three cistophoric hoards previously assigned to the second century. CH VIII 447 is dated c.150–100 BC in CH incorrectly. The hoard contained dated issues of Ephesos down to year 67 (68/7 BC): Münzzentrum Köln FPL 41 (1992), nos. 522–5. IGCH 1415 is dated 'Before 133 BC' in IGCH, but contained issues of Apameia with magistrates' names, and must therefore date *after* 133 BC. The mixed Attic/cistophoric-weight hoard IGCH 1340 is dated to the second century in IGCH, but contained issues of Smyrna down to Milne 1928: period XVII, and thus must date to the middle of the first century BC. For a full list of hoards of all periods containing cistophoroi, see Callataÿ (this volume), Annexe I.

Table 5.9. Second-century hoards containing cistophoroi

IGCH/CH	Find-spot	Date of Deposit
1452	Unknown	150–145
1453	Unknown	145–140
1326	Balıkesir	135–130
1327	Yeşilhisar	130
1455	Unknown	128
1328	Şahnalı	128
II 94	'Ionia'	130s?
VIII 437	Unknown	128 ⁹⁸
VIII 446	Polatlı	130
IX 535	Ahmetbeyli	128

cannot be certain of the significance of this: is it evidence for cistophoroi circulating outside of the Attalid kingdom; or for Attic coinage circulating within the kingdom? Given that this hoard constitutes 50 per cent of our evidence, it causes potential embarrassment either to the notion that the Attalid kingdom was a sealed currency zone, or that cistophoroi never left the kingdom.

The six known find-spots of the later hoards are to be used with caution, since they probably belong to a period of conflict, when coins might well move beyond their normal places of currency. But the pattern is perhaps reassuring. Two come from Ionia ('Ionia' and Ahmetbeyli, just to the north of Klaros), two from Mysia (Balıkesir and Yeşilhisar), and one from the Maeander Valley (Şahnalı). Only Polatlı (near ancient Gordion), in Phrygia, is more than 50 miles from a cistophoric mint.

Far more impressive is the evidence from Syria. The turbulent period of the mid-second century has left us with a wealth of hoard evidence from this part of the world. Of the seventy-five hoards listed by Psoma from the period 188–100 BC, not one contains a cistophoros, despite the fact that, as we began by noting, these hoards are otherwise full of issues of Attic weight produced in western Asia Minor.⁹⁹ This absence of evidence must indeed be evidence of absence. Cistophoroi, it seems, could not remain in circulation outside their area of production, unlike the Attic-weight royal and civic issues of Asia Minor.

⁹⁸ The date of 'c.160 B.C.' given in CH VIII is clearly incorrect. The hoard contained issues down to Kleiner and Noe issue 47 at Tralleis and to Year 5 at Ephesos (130/29 BC).

⁹⁹ Psoma (this volume), Appendix I.

Table 5.10. Hoards from Asia Minor, c.200–130 BC

IGCH/CH	Find-spot	Date of Deposit
1317	SW Asia Minor	210–200
1318	Sardeis	200–190
VIII 370	Asia Minor	200–190
IX 505	Karacalar	200–190
— ¹⁰⁰	Unknown	200–190
1410	Mektepini	195
1412	Central Asia Minor	195–185
1411	Central Asia Minor	190–185
1413	Ayaz-İn	190–185
1414	Konya	190–180
IX 508	Çeltek	190–180
X 293	Hocalar	190–180
X 292	Pamphylia?	190–180
X 294	Pamphylia	180–175
VII 105	Konya	175–160
VIII 376	‘Turkey’	175–160
VIII 428	‘Turkey’	
1323	Priene	158
IX 530	Ordu	150
VII 99	Asia Minor	150–140
IX 521	Unknown	150–130
X 304	Çığlık	150–130
1453	Unknown	145–140

But is it the case that these Attic-weight issues circulated abroad only? Again, a detailed look at the hoard evidence for western Asia Minor suggests that the pattern is not as clear as it might seem. Table 5.10 lists the hoards known from this region from around the late third/early second century BC down to the end of the Attalid kingdom. As in the case of the cistophoroi, a clear pattern emerges, but this time inverted.

This list of twenty-three hoards is at first sight more impressive than that accumulated for the cistophori. But it is very heavily skewed. thirteen of these hoards (56 per cent) come from just 20 years (200–180 BC), or just 28 per cent of the period in question. The reason for this is clear enough, since these two decades saw a significant amount of military activity in the region north and west of the Taurus, where the armies of Philip V, Antiochos III, Attalos I, Eumenes II, Rhodes, and Rome were all active. The heavy concentration of hoards in this early

¹⁰⁰ The ‘Antiochos III’ hoard. See Houghton and Lorber 2009.

period is an index of political and economic volatility. The period 180–160 yields just three hoards, and two of these are from the fringes or beyond Attalid territory in Pamphylia and Konya, while the find-spot of the third is unknown. Thereafter, the period c.160–130, which saw the introduction of the cistophoros and the florescence of the wreathed and other civic coinages of western Asia Minor, has left us just six hoards. One of these is from Ordu, far beyond the confines of the Attalid kingdom; another is from Pisidia, at the edge of Attalid territory; and three have unknown find-spots. This leaves just a single hoard securely located within the ambit of the Attalid kings: the famous foundation deposit from Priene.¹⁰¹

Thus, while it is true to say, as some have, that there is little evidence that the civic coinage of second-century western Asia Minor circulated in that area or within the Attalid kingdom, the problem is that there is little evidence *tout court*. The pattern mirrors that discussed above for the cistophoros. We simply do not have the evidence to tell us what silver coins were circulating where, and in what combinations. But this is probably not because they did not circulate there, but rather because we do not have evidence. We must be cautious in the extreme before invoking the hoard evidence to posit a closed Attalid currency system. As we have seen, the evidence of 50 per cent of the known cistophoros hoards from 165 to 133 BC suggests otherwise, as does the evidence of coin production.

PART 4: A CLOSED CURRENCY SYSTEM?

On the chronology proposed here, the royal cistophoroi are a phenomenon of just thirty-five years (167–133), and were minted alongside the Attic-weight Philetairoi perhaps down to the mid-150s. Therefore there were probably only twenty years or so when they constituted the sole ‘royal’ silver coinage. But even after the end of the Philetairoi there is evidence, I have suggested, that coinage on the Attic standard continued to be produced by the Attalid kings or at least within the Attalid kingdom and its subject cities, at the mints of

¹⁰¹ On the circumstances of discovery, beneath the pedestal of the cult statue in the temple of Athena, see Newton 1871.

Tralleis, Ephesos, and Temnos as well as in Pamphylia and at the mysterious mint of the Kabeiroi tetradrachms.

And this, of course, is not the whole story, since we have also to think about the other 'lung', as John Ma (this volume) has termed it, of the Attalid kingdom: the free cities of the coastal regions. As we noted at the outset of this chapter, Rostovtzeff saw in the substantial issues of these cities the hand of the Attalid kings. More recent scholarship has tended to play down his commercial interpretation for the production of these coinages and their movement eastwards into the Seleukid kingdom. Instead a militaristic explanation has become more popular.¹⁰² Whichever of these two explanations may be correct, the underlying assumption of virtually all who have tackled this question is that, despite the fact that a number of the cities in question can be demonstrated to have been free following the Peace of Apameia, the Attalid kings were somehow responsible for the issue of these coins. One of the most compelling reasons for this assumption is the sheer size of a number of these coinages, which appears doubly surprising given that some of the cities involved had issued little or no silver coinage before the 160s–150s.¹⁰³ In the cases of Myrina and Kyme, their wreathed coinages represented, on Callataÿ's figures, and using an average of 20,000 coins struck per die, 87 and 93 talents respectively entering the civic economy per annum for over a decade. The combined total output of just these two mints was probably in the order of 2,600 talents. It is tempting to suggest that, as with the Alexanders of Temnos under the Attalids, or, earlier, the Alexanders of Pamphylia under the Seleucids,¹⁰⁴ we are here dealing with royal 'proxy' coinages, produced in local mints, and perhaps for local purposes, but with royal silver.

The pattern that emerges of the Attalid kingdom after the introduction of the cistophoros is a patchwork of types, denominations, and weight-standards produced in different places at different times, presumably to meet different needs. This pattern is emphatically different from that in Ptolemaic Egypt, where all locally oriented minting activity was extinguished in favour of the royal coinage at a

¹⁰² See Hoover and MacDonald 1999–2000 and now Callataÿ and Psoma (this volume) for fuller discussions.

¹⁰³ For the sizes of the issues involved see the estimates provided by Callataÿ (this volume), esp. Table 6.10.

¹⁰⁴ On these issues and their possible Seleukid nature, see Meadows 2009a.

single mint, where types and weight-standard were centrally dictated. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to read in Attalid policy a practical imposition of a closed currency system on the Ptolemaic model.

This impression is reinforced by the evidence from circulation. Again, comparison with the Ptolemaic kingdom provides a stark contrast. There, the closure of the borders to foreign coinage around the beginning of the third century BC is clearly observable in the hoard evidence. The pattern shifts abruptly from mixed hoards to hoards containing Ptolemaic coins only. For the Attalid kingdom, as we have seen, the comparable evidence is paltry, and in danger of being misread due to misconstrual of Attalid policy. An obvious example of this problem occurs with the Asia Minor 1962 hoard (*IGCH* 1453), which we have discussed at multiple points throughout this chapter. Its contents may be summarized thus.

Prousius I and II of Bithynia: 11 tetradrachms

Eumenes II: 5 Philetairoi

Side: 5 tetradrachms (to Kleuchares II)

Demetrios I of Syria: 8 tetradrachms (mint of Antioch)

Cistophoroi:

Pergamon: 11

Ephesos: 3

Tralleis: 7

Apameia: 1

Clearly this is a mixed hoard. We could assume that the Attalids operated a closed currency system, and reach the conclusion that the hoard must have been deposited outside the Attalid kingdom, but this argument would be entirely circular. If, instead, we make the assumption that the hoard was deposited within the Attalid kingdom, then it becomes evidence that the currency system was not closed at all. Rather, it was similar to the open monetary system that had existed before the introduction of the cistophoros, and which has yielded such mixed deposits as the Pergamon, Edremit, or Sardeis Basis and Pot hoards, which span the period 220–190 BC.¹⁰⁵

The question, then, is with which assumption should we approach this meager hoard evidence? The evidence from production, it seems to me, points powerfully in the direction of an open monetary system.

¹⁰⁵ *IGCH* 1303, 1302, 1300, 1318.

If and when more mixed hoards emerge from the mid-second century it should not surprise us, for this is what the production at the mint of Pergamon and at the devolved centres of Attalid minting suggests we should expect.

If the Attalid monetary system was as flexible and locally directed as I have suggested, the question now must be asked: what was the purpose of the cistophoric coinage within this system? In answering this question, the date of its introduction now becomes crucial. A 'high' date for the introduction (in the 180s) would effectively tie the creation of the cistophoric system to the expansion of the kingdom after the battle of Magnesia and the settlement at Apameia.¹⁰⁶ However, as I have argued above, the hoard evidence seems strongly to suggest that a date in the 160s is more probable. On the reconstruction offered above, the period c.190–165 BC saw a period of expedient reissue of foreign coinage, followed by a period of experimentation at the Pergamene mint. Initially, large amounts of indemnity coinage were pumped, with countermarks, into circulation, and supplemented by Pergamene Alexanders. Once the indemnity funds had dried up, royal coinage in the name of Philetairos was recommenced, and supplemented by Athena Nikephoros and Eumenes II portrait issues. But in the mid-160s a radical decision was taken to devolve coin authorization and production to a group of cities within the kingdom, and to institute at these mints coins of a reduced weight and of a common, non-portrait type. A further innovation was the decision to mint silver coins at denominations below the tetradrachm: the didrachm and the drachm. It should further be noted that this period also seems to have seen the cessation

¹⁰⁶ The bibliography is extensive. The high date has in general been preferred on the basis that Livy refers to booty in the form of cistophoroi reaching Rome in four triumphs in 190, 189, and 187 BC. See Harl 1991 for a thorough discussion. Against the acceptance of this literary tradition note the comments of Thonemann 2008: 49 n. 19. Numismatic argument has essentially focused on the so-called cistophoric countermarks (survey in Bauslaugh 1990; cf. Callataÿ, this volume), which undoubtedly belong to the 180s, but which, I have argued above, do not intersect with the coinage. The strongest case for a date before 181 BC has been made by Ashton 1994 on epigraphic evidence. In a letter of Eumenes II to the governor of Telmessos (Segre 1938: 190–207), dated to Dios of Year 17 (Aug. Sept. 181 BC), he notes an odd sum of 4 Rhodian drachmas and 1 obol for the poll-tax, which seems to equate to a round number in the cistophoric system. However, the inscription provides for the reduction of this tax to 3 drachmas, which is not similarly convertible to cistophoric units of account. The equation of the full tax, though neat, seems to be coincidental.

of royal bronze coinage, which, like the silver, had been struck consistently in the name of Philetairos.¹⁰⁷

The group of cities chosen to authorize this new coinage is an informative place to start to explain this phenomenon. The main mints from the outset, as is well known, were Pergamon, Ephesos, Tralleis, Sardeis, and Apameia. These were joined, within a few years, by Laodikeia, where a short series of cistophoroi were struck c.160–145 on Kleiner and Noe's chronology.¹⁰⁸ More recent research has demonstrated that we must add to this list a group of smaller authorities. A tightly linked group of issues that were assigned by Kleiner and Noe to the mint of Sardeis have been broken out by Le Rider into the coinages of what seem to be four cities in Phrygia: Blaundos, Dionysopolis, Lysias, and, perhaps, Diospolis or Dioskome.¹⁰⁹ One of these cities, Dionysopolis, shares an obverse die with the mint of Pergamon.¹¹⁰ The Pergamene issue is part of Kleiner and Noe's Series 11a, which must have been struck in the late 160s or early 150s, that is to say early in the history of the cistophoros.¹¹¹

In his recent study of the policy of Eumenes II and his relationship with the Galatians, Thonemann has stressed the formative nature of the Attalid defeat of the Gauls in eastern Phrygia in 166 BC. He suggests that the recent threat of Gallic invasion led to a rethink of the organization and defence of this buffer-zone, which resulted in an effective incorporation of a vast rural area into the political structure of the Attalid state through the foundation of a number of new cities: 'it was the Attalids who rolled the urban fabric northwards from the Laodicea–Apamea highway into the plains and valleys of

¹⁰⁷ See Westermarck 1991. The last issues of the royal bronze seem to share some controls with the Philetairoi of Group VIB and the accompanying Alexanders. Thereafter bronze was issued in the name of the city of Pergamon (e.g. von Fritze 1910: pl. 1. 16–17, 22–3), and of the deities Asklepios Soter (e.g. von Fritze plate 1. 1, 12, 15, 18, 24) and Athena Nikephoros (e.g. von Fritze pl. 1. 20–1, 25–7).

¹⁰⁸ Kleiner and Noe 1977: 97–9: the chronology is established on the basis of control-mark similarities with the better-attested mint of Tralleis.

¹⁰⁹ Kleiner and Noe 1977: 79–81, Sardeis–Synnada Series 5–8. The group was reorganized by Mørkholm 1979a: 50–2; for the 'mint' attributions, see Le Rider 1990: 689–700. To these we may now also add the mint of Kormasa in the Milyas: Thonemann 2008: 53–8. However, the date of this issue is likely to be later: Kleiner and Noe 1977: 100–1.

¹¹⁰ Kleiner and Noe 1977: 79, Series 6, 10–e (Dionysopolis) and 26, Series 11b, 24–a (Pergamon).

¹¹¹ The Asia Minor hoard (IGCH 1453) deposited c.150 BC, contained issues down to 24e.

southern Phrygia'.¹¹² The four small cistophoric mints were all situated in precisely this area. On the low chronology for the cistophoros adopted here, the period of issue of these cistophoroi falls squarely into that of the Attalid expansion into this zone. Rather than seeing these as emergency issues, as has been suggested in the past, we might propose that they were connected with the process of foundation: perhaps batches of coins sent out from Pergamon (where they seem to have been minted) to start the work of development of the new civic structures.¹¹³ The experiment of these branch mints was not long-lived, but the expenditure necessary on the part of the king to construct and maintain these settlements will not have been so ephemeral.¹¹⁴ Substantial quantities of cistophoric coinage will have been necessary to fund this programme.

This form of explanation fits well with the nature of the cistophoric coinage that has been outlined by Thonemann above (pp. 30–4). This was a coinage designed to look federal, rather than royal. The king's image was removed in favour of creating the impression of civic unity across clearly defined and identified space. Since the 'mintmarks' that appear on a number of these coinages do not in fact designate sites of production, we might speculate that their inclusion was at least partly an element of the ideological programme. There were also clear practical benefits to this 'pseudo-federal' approach to the coinage, as the contemporary Polybios saw.¹¹⁵ The cistophoric coinage is but a visible and extant part of the broader Attalid policy of infrastructure development in the 160s and 150s.

But there is more to the introduction of the cistophoros than ideology. To understand this, it is necessary to consider this new coinage against the background of Pergamene production established in Part 1 above. On the basis of the chronologies offered there for the production of the Pergamene mint, we may summarize the average annual rate of production in terms of Attic-weight tetradrachm dies as follows:

¹¹² Thonemann 2011a: 171–7 (quotation from 174). The process of Attalid city-creation is clearly exposed in the letters of Eumenes II to Toriaion: Jonnes and Riel 1997 (SEG 47, 1745); *I.Sultan Dağı* 393.

¹¹³ So already Le Rider 1990: 701. For a Gallic war context, see Mørkholm 1979a: 52; Thonemann 2011a: 172–3.

¹¹⁴ As Eumenes writes to Toriaion (*I.Sultan Dağı* 393, ll. 40–2): ἐπειδὴ συνκεχωρήκαμεν ὑμῖν πολιτείαν τε καὶ γυμνάσιον, βουλόμεθα φανερόν ποιῆ[σα]ν τὸ πρό[θυμον] συναύξοντες ταῦτα... 'Since I have granted to you a consituation and a gymnasium, I want to make clear my good will by increasing these gifts...'

¹¹⁵ Polyb. 2.37.8–11, cited above by Thonemann (p. 34).

Lysimachos	1.33 per annum
Philetairos	1.55 per annum
Eumenes I	4.33 per annum
Attalos I	1.77 per annum

To quantify the amount of Attic-weight coinage struck under Eumenes II is less straightforward. At least 7 Alexander dies were used, but probably more. Philetairoi of Group VII, as we have seen, were struck at the rate of 2 dies per annum overall, so perhaps 34 dies belong to Eumenes II. To these we can add at least 2 dies for the portrait issues and 2 more for the Athena Nikephoros coinage. This amounts to a minimum of 45 dies over 40 years, or 1.13 dies per annum. But this makes no allowance for the cistophoric counter-marked issues. If, as estimated above, we assume that these equate to 25 obverse dies of mint output, this raises the figure for overall annual output to at least 1.77 dies per annum. But this is just the Attic-weight coinage. If we add the cistophoric issues attributable to Eumenes II, it changes matters dramatically. The combined production of the cistophoric mints of Pergamon, Ephesos, Tralleis, and Apameia in the period 168–150 BC was 16.78 cistophoric dies per annum. Assuming that these were struck for ten years of Eumenes reign, this adds another 167 dies to the total.¹¹⁶ This now gives a total for Eumenes' reign of 237 dies, and provides us with a figure of 5.92 dies per annum for all issues of the Pergamene state. The comparison between the production rate of Eumenes and his predecessors is presented in Chart 5.1.

Of course, it comes as no great surprise that Eumenes II's reign should have been almost four times more productive than that of his predecessor, given the increased size of his realm. But broken down chronologically, in so far as it can be, it does not seem to be the enlargement of the kingdom *per se* that caused this increase. Rather, it seems to have been the introduction of the cistophoric system. Using the same chronological and quantitative assumptions just outlined, the pattern would be as follows (see Chart 5.2):

¹¹⁶ If we are interested in the amount of silver put into circulation, then we should reduce this sum by 25%, to express the amount in Attic-equivalent tetradrachms. But on the assumption that the cistophoric tetradrachm was worth, within its circulation zone, the equivalent of an Attic tetradrachm, I allow here the full value for these calculations.




Chart 5.1. Per annum rates of coin production, averaged across reigns (4 dr. dies)

197–176 BC	32 dies/22 years	1.45 per annum
175–168 BC	16 dies/8 years	2 per annum
167–158 BC	189 dies/10 years	18.9 per annum

It must be stressed that these figures should not be taken as absolute estimates: the underlying parameters are far too uncertain. However, they are broadly indicative, and demonstrate that the low date for the introduction of the cistophoros implies a huge increase in monetary output on the part of the Attalid state in the 160s BC.

It is tempting to explain this massive initial output of cistophoroi as the result of a re-coinage to replace the circulating Attic coinages as quickly as possible. However, it is difficult to understand why, if that were the case, the Pergamene mint was simultaneously issuing Attic-weight Philetairoi, the very coins it was taking out of circulation. Alternatively, we might suggest that the massive new cistophoric




Chart 5.2. Per annum rates of coin production within the reign of Eumenes II

coinages were instigated in order to make a mass of payments into the new cistophoric area. Once more, we are brought to the fundamental shift in the nature of the Attalid state at this period. Thonemann, in laying out the process of 'state formation' that took place in the Attalid kingdom in the second century BC (above, Chapter 1), has proposed three ways in which the Attalids transformed their kingdom: administrative decentralization; the devolution of large parts of the tributary economy to civic actors; and the promotion of 'consensual' royal ideologies. The cistophoros, it seems, was at once a bearer of this consensual ideology, a self-conscious embodiment of civic presence in the monetary system, but also the economic enabler of this transformation of a rural to a civic state. Such transformation came at a price, and the cistophoros was designed to pay it.

Yet, in the end, we are still left with the question, why reduce the weight-standard? And why just in these cities? I began this chapter by expressing doubt that the main motive could have been profit through monetary exchange. The cities of Dionysopolis, Blaundos, and Lysias were not on the way to anywhere. Nor were they destinations for anyone other than their inhabitants, and consequently there was no great scope for profit in their brief existence as cistophoric centres. Rather, the answer to this question must be sought in two places, both inside and outside the kingdom.

The first answer is obvious. If the king could get away with putting less silver in his coinage, why would he not do so? Lower-weight silver coins are by definition cheaper to produce, and thus less of a burden on the exchequer. Hellenistic kings did not in general massively reduce the weight of their coinages, because they needed to guarantee their acceptability on a broader economic stage than just their own territories. This is undoubtedly the reason, for example, that the Attalid kings were drawn from time to time into the production of Alexander coinages, 'posthumous' coinages of Side or, perhaps, wreathed coinages of Asia Minor. These were all, to use Plato's term, 'Hellenic' coinages, capable of being used abroad.¹¹⁷ In establishing the cistophoric system, Eumenes created the opposite, an epichoric monetary system, designed for use within his kingdom.

The concept of an epichoric system was not new. By the second century BC, many states had, at some point, produced coinage that

¹¹⁷ Plato, *Laws* 742a–b. For discussion of the concepts, see Meadows 2009c.

was designed, through its essentially fiduciary nature, to circulate only within the territory of the issuing state. The most common form of epichoric coinage by the second century BC was bronze. The value of bronze coinage bore only a limited relation to its metallic value, but derived its acceptability rather from the *fiat* of the issuing authority. But epichoric coinage could also be silver, in cases where states took the decision to reduce the weight-standard of their silver coins below that which prevailed outside their territory. This had the effect of creating a zone within which this lower-weight coinage prevailed as the circulating medium. Such, for example, had been the approach of the Rhodian state with the introduction of its plinthophoric coinage in the late 190s. So, too, within the Peloponnese, the 'reduced Aeginetan' standard on which a number of coinages, including that of the Achaian League, were struck likewise served to define a coinage that was struck and circulated only in that region. As with the cistophoric system, such coinages were cheaper to produce and carried with them an ideological message of unity, the latter frequently reflected in their designs.

By definition, the cistophoric coinage was designed to be used only within Eumenes' kingdom, within the new civic structures that formed the building-blocks of the core Attalid kingdom. This epichoric nature explains also the need for smaller denominations than had been issued before, and may also be connected to the disappearance at the same time of the old royal bronze coinage. The structure of the kingdom was changing, politically as well as economically, and the structure of the coinage adapted to the need to make payments at lower levels to individuals who did not intend to export their wealth abroad.

The problem of exported wealth brings us to the other place that we must seek our explanation for the new Attalid policy. As we have seen above, and in the contributions of Callataÿ and Psoma to this volume, there is ample evidence for the movement of Attic-weight silver away from its places of production. The cases of the posthumous second-century Alexanders and the wreathed coinages have featured large in this discussion, although in fact, as Seyrig was at pains to point out,¹¹⁸ this is a long-term phenomenon extending back into the third century. The Attic weight-standard was 'Hellenic', and coinages struck on it were susceptible, indeed designed, to move internationally. The reduction of the weight-standard of the cistophoros had the happy, and surely intended effect of stopping it from leaving the core

¹¹⁸ Seyrig 1963a: 27–8 (=Seyrig 1986: 31–2).

territories of the kingdom. The hoard evidence for this is quite explicit: it did not travel to Syria.

Again, we may perhaps tie this element of the cistophoric system into the date of its introduction. As Kay notes (above, Chapter 4), the first half of the second century BC saw a significant flow of money from the Greek east to Rome, in the form of indemnity payments. The flow of booty to Rome in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian war (171–168 BC) and the closing of the Macedonian silver mines between 167 and 158 BC have been seen by some as creating a shortage of silver in the east, which was in turn the catalyst for the reduction in the weight-standards of the royal coinage in Macedonia and Syria.¹¹⁹ Most recently, Warren has argued that this silver crisis may also have been the background to the introduction of the federal bronze coinage of the Achaian League.¹²⁰ Whether or not we accept the evidence for a silver shortage, it is absolutely clear that the period c.172–164 BC saw major changes in established coinages in Achaia, Macedonia, and Syria. The Attalid kings, to be sure, had never had to pay an indemnity to Rome. However, as Pergamon's relations with Rome worsened in the 160s and 150s, a measure that initially seemed desirable in financial terms may have become imperative.

CONCLUSION

I have argued, on the basis of the hoard evidence, that the cistophoros was introduced by Eumenes II around the year 167 BC. It was not a cuckoo in the nest that ejected all other coinage from the Attalid kingdom, but is rather to be seen as part of a varied assemblage of coinages struck by the Attalid kings for specific purposes in specific places. The cistophoric coinage, I have suggested, was to serve as the epichoric coinage for the new Attalid state that was being created

¹¹⁹ Mørkholm 1982 argues for a radical monetary reform on the part of Antiochus IV. This reconstruction has been demolished by Le Rider 2001b, but it none the less remains the case that the weight of the Seleukid silver was reduced at Antioch under Antiochos IV c.173/2 BC, and then across the whole kingdom under Antiochos V (164–161 BC). For the reduction of the weight of Macedonian silver under Perseus c.172 BC, see Price 1989: 237; Price 1990.

¹²⁰ Warren 2007: 164 and 176–9.

from the 160s BC onwards in inland Asia Minor. This expensive process of state formation serves to explain the initial large size of the coinage. The decision to produce an epichoric coinage, rather than strike more Attic-weight coinage, was influenced in part by prudent fiscal policy, but may also be viewed against the background both of increased political instability and a bullion shortage that gave rise to similar changes in monetary policy elsewhere at the same time.

On this reconstruction, the cistophoros emerges as an ideologically charged, fiscally conservative, pragmatic means of providing a silver coinage to make payments within an economically defined and rapidly developing imperial space. It also slowed the flow of silver from the kingdom to the east. These are surely justifications enough both for its creation and for its continued use in the centuries that followed.

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The Coinages of the Attalids and their Neighbours: A Quantified Overview

*François de Callatay**

The chief aim of this paper, which is all about quantification, is to put the coinages issued by the Attalids themselves in perspective with the many other coin series struck nearby during the same period. A fair number of die-studies have been produced which are of interest for our topic, and these allow us to get a clearer idea of what was ‘abundant’, ‘substantial’ or ‘meagre’.¹ This paper thus takes the form of an overview, trying to take into account recently published material, but without aiming to discuss at length the details of the many chronologies involved (for this, see Meadows, Chapter 5 above; Ashton, Chapter 7 below).

PERGAMENE TETRADRACHMS STRUCK UNDER OR IN THE NAME OF PHILETAIROS

The Attalid kings never struck royal gold issues, silver drachms, or small silver denominations.² The only royal coinage they issued

* I am most grateful to Richard Ashton, John Ma, Andrew McIntyre, Andy Meadows, and Selene Psoma, who generously shared with me unpublished information. Special thanks are due to Richard Ashton and Andy Meadows, who commented on drafts of this paper and kindly saved me from some inaccuracies.

¹ It may be seen as a development of Callatay 1993a: 26–7. The results of the majority of the relevant die-studies, as well as estimates of the original numbers of dies, may be found in Callatay 1997b.

² Le Rider 1992: 234–6; *contra* Seltman 1913.

was silver tetradrachms, and that on a small scale, as demonstrated by the die-studies of Newell and Westermarck. Although it would now be possible to collect much more material than Newell and Westermarck managed to do, these studies none the less offer a firm basis for quantification, with a comfortable ratio of 'number of specimens to number of obverses' ('n/o') (except for Group VII, with a low ratio of 1.94).

The chronology proposed by Westermarck has been slightly revised by Le Rider, thanks to the study of the large Meydancikkale hoard presumed to have been buried in c.235 BC.³ Indeed, while tetradrachms of Group VIA are well documented in the hoard, those of Group VIB are absent. This introduces an imbalance in the numismatic documentation between the periods before and after 235 BC. The question is how long Groups VIB and VII lasted: as late as c.155 BC (as argued by some); or with a much earlier terminal date (as advocated by others).⁴

Table 6.1 takes into account some changes introduced since Westermarck concerning the numbers of specimens (n) and obverse dies (o). It also gives numbers for the issues struck at Pergamon by Lysimachos, as well as for the first issues of tetradrachms produced by Philetairos, following the new dates given by Meadows (Chapter 5 above).⁵ The modified chronology proposed by Meadows creates a first, short phase of abundant monetary production for the years 282–281 BC, followed by nearly two decades of low production. If this is correct, such a pattern of heavy initial activity may find parallels with other Hellenistic royal coinages. When Ptolemy I Soter decided, in 300 BC or shortly after, to create a closed monetary economy, c.200/250 tetradrachm obverse dies were engraved in the space of a few years.⁶ One may think as well of the massive issues of

³ Le Rider 1989a and 1992. On the hoard (*CH* V 41), see Davesne and Le Rider 1989: 334–40.

⁴ On this question, see below. Strangely enough, specimens of Group VIB are nearly absent from recent auction sales (e.g. not a single coin is recorded in the online sales archive www.coinarchives.com).

⁵ For a similar internal comparison of the Attalid coinages, see Le Rider 1989a: 183–4.

⁶ Not c.3,000, as argued by Davesne. Yearly O (drachm): c.200. See Callatay 2005b: 124–5; Le Rider and Callatay 2006: 228–9.

Table 6.1. Royal Pergamene tetradrachms from Lysimachos to Eumenes II

Coinages	o	n	n/o	O (Carter)	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Lysimachos (c.287/6–282)	15	123	8.20	15.5	62.0	15.5
Philetairos—Newell I and II (c.282–281) ⁷	12	41	3.42	14.8	59.2	29.6
Philetairos—Newell III (c.280–271) ⁸	8	36	4.00	9.1	36.4	3.6
Philetairos—Group II (c.270–263)	10	47	4.70	11.2	44.8	5.6
Eumenes I—Group III (c.263–241) ⁹	20	96	4.80	22.4	89.6	(17.0)
Eumenes I—Group IVA (c.263–241)	35	132	3.77	40.2	160.8	(17.0)
Eumenes I—Group IVB (c.263–241)	20	59	2.95	25.6	102.4	(17.0)
Eumenes I—Group V (c.263–241)	5	30	6.00	5.4	21.6	(17.0)
Attalos I—Group VIA (c.241–235)	23	103	4.48	26.1	104.4	17.4
Attalos I—Group VIB (c.235–189)	18	50	2.78	23.7	94.8	2.1
Eumenes II—Group VII (c.180–165) ¹⁰	37	96	2.59	50.5	202.0	13.5
Total (c.287/6–165)					978.0	8.0

(Lysimachos = Arnold-Biucchi 1998; Philetairos = Newell 1936 and 1941: 316–18 [Philetairos Group I]; Philetairos to Eumenes II = Westermark 1961)

lifetime Alexanders, especially in the Macedonian mint of Amphipolis (c.1,000 obverses), or of the city of Rhodes after the synoecism in 408 BC (Yearly O (drachm): c.18).¹¹ However, the relative abundance of this first phase must not disguise the limited amount of silver converted into coins. Even with the high average of 30,000 coins per obverse die, the 30 or so obverses struck between 287/6 and 281 (Lysimachos + Newell Series I and II) make no more than 600 talents of silver, to be compared with the 9,000 talents kept by Lysimachos in the treasury at Pergamon (Strabo 13.4.1).

⁷ Newell Series I ('Horned horse/elephant') is extremely rare (5 specimens for 3 [?] obverse dies: see SC I: 15).

⁸ The additions made by Ingvaldsen (1992: 176–8) do not modify the estimate (41 tetradrachms for 8 obverse dies).

⁹ Numbers and dates for Groups III–VIB are those given by Le Rider 1992: 240–1.

¹⁰ See Meadows, above, Ch. 5 (pp. 164–9). Westermark knew 35 dies for 59 coins.

¹¹ Ashton 2001a: 92 (Rhodes).

Table 6.2. Size of some royal and dynastic silver issues in number of obverse dies for Attic drachms

Coinages	O (Drachm)	Number of years	Yearly O (Drachm)
Tetradrachms of Alexander (c.332–290)	c.12,000	42	c.285.7
Tetradrachms of Ptolemy II at Alexandria (285–246)	c.5,148	39	c.132.0
Drachms of Alexander (c.332–290)	c.3,300	42	c.78.6
Ptolemaic tetradrachms at Alexandria (127–97)	c.2,280	30	c.76.0
Tetradrachms of Demetrios Poliorketes (c.306–287)	c.916	19	c.48.2
Macedonian silver coins of Philip II (c.359–315)	c.1,969	44	c.44.7
Tetradrachms of Antiochos III (223–187)	c.1,600	36	c.44.4
Tetradrachms of Seleukos IV (187–175)	c.400	12	c.33.3
Tetradrachms of Nikomedes III–IV (c.128–74)	c.1,800	54	c.33.3
Tetradrachms of Mithridates Eupator (c.97–64)	768	33	c.23.3
Silver coinages of Mausolos (c.377/6–353/2)	c.450	24	c.18.8
Silver coinages of Idrieus (c.351/0–344/3)	c.120	7	c.17.1
Silver coinages of Pyrrhos (280–276)	c.64	4	c.16.0
Tetradrachms in the name of Philetairos (c.280–165)	c.857	115	c.7.5

(see Callatay 2005a: 87 [improved])

But the main point of interest is the low yearly productivity for the entire period (c.280–165 BC). With c.7.5 equivalent of obverse dies for Attic drachms per year (856.8/115), this is about 1/17 of what Ptolemy II Philadelphos was able to strike in the mid-third century BC and less than 1/5 of what Antiochos III regularly issued at the end of the third and start of the second century BC. As illustrated by Table 6.2, Attalid averages come well behind other recorded silver coinages for fourth-century and Hellenistic kings or rulers.¹² This low production is amply confirmed by the circulation pattern: 2 per cent for the Attalid tetradrachms in the large Meydancıkkale hoard (60 out of 3,057 Attic-weight tetradrachms), 1.4 per cent in the Tell Halaf

¹² For a comparison with the production of civic mints at the same period, see below, Tables 6.11–13.

hoard (5 out of 352), and so on.¹³ This paucity is also illustrated by the hoard found in the official excavations of the Asklepieion at Pergamon itself: only 2 Philetairoi out of 22 Attic tetradrachms.¹⁴

The weight-standard of the Attalid tetradrachms is also low: most coins weigh between 16.60 and 16.99 g, well below the contemporary Seleukid or Alexander tetradrachms (16.90–17.09 g). Moreover, the distribution of the weights is less accurate than for the Alexanders, which would conceivably have suggested something like a closed circulation system, if this hypothesis was not entirely ruled out by the hoard evidence.¹⁵ The re-dating of the first groups of Philetairoi (down to VIA) by Le Rider has not been seriously contested. But what about the latest issues? It very much depends on the ongoing debate about the date of the first cistophoroi (see below). Different scenarios may be proposed, which all try to relate the creation of the cistophoric coinage, coinciding with the latest issues of Philetairoi (Group VII) (though there is room here for a series of parallel issues of these two coinages) to the date of the so-called cistophoric countermarks. In these different scenarios, the countermarks could be (a) contemporaneous with the first issues of cistophoric tetradrachms; (b) immediately before (five years?); or (c) well before.

From a quantified point of view, it must be noted that the adapted chronology as advocated by Le Rider for Group VIB of the Philetairoi (235–189 BC) creates a significant decline in production for the second part of the reign of Attalos I (yearly $O = 2.1$, to compare with $c.17$ for the three decades before).¹⁶ If, in addition, one hypothesizes a high chronology for the introduction of the cistophoroi ($c.185$ BC), Group VII is now compressed into a very short period of time (defined here as 189–185 BC), with a tremendous increase of production during these four years (yearly $O = 60.2$ [240.8/4]). The comparisons given in Table 6.2 make such a hypothesis very unlikely.

A more even distribution is proposed by Meadows in Chapter 5 above. A close examination of the hoard evidence leads him to

¹³ Le Rider 1992: 241; Le Rider and Olçay 1989.

¹⁴ Boehringer, in Ziegenaus and de Luca 1968: 132–4.

¹⁵ Le Rider 1992: 242–3; and Marcellesi 2008: map 2.

¹⁶ François Queyrel has recently and characteristically argued that we should recognize the portrait of Attalos I in some obverses of the Philetairoi, as well as in the Herakles depicted on contemporaneous Alexanders (Queyrel 2003).

Table 6.3. Pergamene tetradrachms under or in the name of Philetairos (summary by reigns—as proposed by Meadows)

Coinages	o	n	n/o	O (Carter)	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Philetairos (c.282–263) ¹⁷	30	124	4.13	34.7	138.8	7.3
Eumenes I (c.263–241) ¹⁸	80	317	3.96	93.6	374.4	17.0
Attalos I (c.241–189)	41	153	3.73	48.6	194.4	3.7
Eumenes II (c.180–150)	36	70	1.94	60.2	240.8	8.0
Total (c.282–150)					948.4	8.1

propose an interruption of roughly a decade (c.189–180 BC?) between Group VIB and Group VII of the Philetairoi. Group VII would have been issued over a period of approximately thirty years (c.180–150 BC), with, as a consequence, an unimpressive yearly average (converted into Attic drachms) of c.8.0, similar to the average attained for the entire sequence of Philetairoi (c.282–150 BC = 8.1).

If, following Meadows, we opt for a date as late as 165 BC for the introduction of the cistophoric coinage, we are left with a kingdom whose territory, population, revenues, and expenditures were considerably enlarged, without consequences for the size of its monetary production for more than twenty years.

To be sure, a yearly average of c.2 obverse dies for tetradrachms (8.1 equivalent obverse dies for drachms—a result we may push to 9.5 if we favour the high chronology for the start of the cistophoric coinage of 182/1 BC) would not have allowed the Attalids to pay large expenses in fresh coins. To take one more time the usual estimates of 20,000 coins per obverse die and a yearly pay of 200 drachms per soldier (which is certainly not too generous), it would have allowed them to pay some 850 annual military wages.¹⁹

John Ma (Chapter 2 above) has very usefully gathered the evidence for the Attalid army. Although numbers are scanty, it seems that this army never exceeded 12,000 men, including all kinds of forces (levies, auxiliaries, and mercenaries), while the fleet counted c.30–50

¹⁷ Newell Series I ('Horned horse/elephant') is extremely rare (5 specimens for 3 [?] obverse dies: see SC I: 15).

¹⁸ Numbers and dates for Groups III–VIB are those given by Le Rider 1992: 240–1.

¹⁹ 8.5 (equivalent of obverse die for Attic drachms) $\times$ 20,000 (coins per obverse die) = 170,000 drachms/200 (yearly pay of a basic soldier) = 850.

heavy well-equipped warships (*tetreres*). To pay a full year of such forces in fresh coins, meaning a minimum of 480 talents,²⁰ would have required at least the use of 36 obverse dies for tetradrachms. Our numismatic record does not support such a hypothesis. On the contrary, Table 6.3 shows that the *total* number of Philetairoi struck over the first twenty years of Attalid independence (c.282–263 BC) was in the range of these *annual* needs (34.7).

Clearly, the Attalids had many garrisons and employed substantial amounts of mercenaries during the third century BC.²¹ We are informed about the garrisons of Lilaia (c.208 BC), where c.40 per cent of the troops seem to have been mercenaries, and Tralles (third century BC) with a list of 44 names likely all to be mercenaries, while an inscription from Philetaireia is illuminating about the modalities of the contract passed between Eumenes I and his mercenaries.²²

Crete was a major source of supply for mercenaries, as several inscriptions have revealed. The honorific decree of Aptera for Attalos (II better than I) is further evidence for the fact.²³ Several symmachic treaties must be understood in this general context, too, as the treaty between Attalos I and the Cretan city of Malla (last years of the third century) or the symmachic treaty passed between Eumenes II in 183 BC with thirty Cretan cities.²⁴ In addition, we are informed by Diodoros that Eumenes II was reputed to behave correctly with his mercenaries (Diod. Sic. 31.14).

But, in the absence of quantified evidence, it is safer not to speculate about the total number of mercenaries employed by the Attalids. The presumption is that, as for the Seleukid kings,²⁵ the yearly

²⁰ With the very low value of 200 drachms per soldier (2,400,000 drachms = 400 talents) + 2 talents per warship (80 talents).

²¹ Sion-Jenkins 2001: 22–3; Ma, Ch. 2 above.

²² Lilaia: *FD* III 4, nos. 132–5. Tralleis: *I.Tralleis* 33. Philetaireia: *OGIS* 266. On Aigina, which belonged to the Attalids from 209 to the end of the dynasty (133 BC), see Doyen 2007: 102–3.

²³ Kreuter 1992. Aptera: *OGIS* 270.12–13 (156 BC).

²⁴ Malla: Ducrey and van Effenterre 1969; Ducrey 1970; Doyen 2007. Eumenes II: *I.Cret.* IV 179, B = *Syll.*³ 627.

²⁵ We know that there were 7,500 mercenaries, out of a total of 62,000 men, in the army of Antiochos III. To pay these 7,500 men in fresh tetradrachms supposed the engraving of at least c.19 obverse dies (7,500 × 200 [admittedly a low average] = 1,500,000 drachms [250 talents]/80,000 [20,000 × 4 drachms] = 18.75). However, the average yearly number of new obverse dies under the reign of Antiochos III was about 11.

monetary production of Philetairoi would have been insufficient to pay in fresh coins these mercenaries only.

ALEXANDERS OF THE LATE THIRD/BEGINNING OF THE SECOND CENTURY BC

To be sure, Philetairoi were not the only 'royal' issue struck at Pergamon under the Attalids. The last years of the third century BC were characterized by a revival of 'Alexander' tetradrachms in many mints, a phenomenon clearly linked with the Syrian and Macedonian wars of the period. As shown by Table 6.4, several die-studies have been published concerning these late Alexanders, including those issued at Pergamon. It must be noted that contemporary Alexander tetradrachms were issued by certain other mints for which we are still awaiting die-studies. However, as documented by the Gaziantep hoard, these were produced in smaller quantities.²⁶ The exception is the large mint of Aspendos, for which McIntyre is currently producing a die-study. To compare the quantities of the different Pamphylian Alexanders recovered in relevant Syrian hoards, Aspendos comes first, before Perge and Phaselis (see Table 6.5). Considering the hoard evidence, it is likely that c.100 obverse dies were used for the mint of Aspendos, which is also the result obtained by Boehringer, who counted a total of 101 obverse dies.²⁷ It should further be noted that the Phaselis Alexanders are currently under revision by McIntyre and that a substantial part of what has previously been attributed to Phaselis may be re-assigned to other mints. Taken together, these late Alexanders form a large coinage, struck in much higher quantities than the issues in the name of Philetairos themselves (38.0 to compare with the 2.1 of Group VIB [c.235–189 BC]). The yearly average for the Alexanders of Pergamon alone (6.3 [c.205–190 BC]) may have partly compensated for the weak production of Philetairoi during the same period (2.1). It will be noted that the Alexanders of Pergamon and the Philetairoi of Group VIB were issued on roughly

²⁶ Alexandreia Troas, c.189–180; Kolophon, c.200–190; Phokaia, c.210–190; Nisyros, c.201, Side (one coin known: Seyrig 1963b: pl. VI.6). Gaziantep hoard: Meadows and Houghton 2010.

²⁷ Boehringer 1999: 67.

Table 6.4. Civic Alexanders in Asia Minor (c.210–190 BC)

Coinages	o	n	n/o	O (Carter)	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Pergamon Alexander tetra. (c.205–190) ²⁸	20	75	3.75	23.7	94.8	6.3
Mylasa Alexander tetra. (c.210–190) ²⁹	5	15	3.0	8.4	33.6	0.8
Chios Alexander tetra. (c.202/1–190)	14	96	6.86	14.8	59.2	4.9
Rhodes Alexander tetra. (c.205–190) ³⁰	36	160	4.44	40.9	163.6	10.9
Perge Alexander tetra. (223–191)	73	361	4.95	81.2	324.8	10.2
Termessos Major Alexander tetra. (205–203)	1	16	16.0	1.0	4.0	1.3
‘Phaselis’ Alexander tetra. (c.216–183)	58	337	5.81	62.8	251.2	7.9
Aspendos (c.213–185)	–	–	–	(c.100)	(c.400)	(c.14.3)
Total (c.223–188)				(332.8)	1331.2	(38.0)

(Pergamon and Rhodes = Kleiner 1971; Mylasa = Delrieux 2007b; Chios = Bauslaugh 1979; Perge = Colin 1996; Termessos Major = McIntyre 2006; Phaselis = Heipp-Tamer 1993 and Metcalf 1994: 43)

the same basis (extrapolated number of obverse dies [O/Carter] = 23.7 in both cases), but during a much shorter period of time for the Alexanders (fifteen years [c.205–190 BC], to compare with forty-six years [c.235–189 BC]).

It remains to explain to what purpose these Alexanders were struck. Different commercial explanations have been put forward by Rostovtzeff, Seyrig, Boehringer, and Le Rider in the case of the Pamphylian issues.³¹ Boehringer argued for a special trade convention between these cities and the Seleukid power, while Le Rider

²⁸ On the date of the Alexanders struck at Pergamon, see Ashton 2004: 94–5 (with references to earlier literature, including Boehringer 1972: 41–4 and 1974: 16–17).

²⁹ The catalogue of Delrieux is divided into two phases: (a) c.210–c.190 BC (10 coins) and (b) c.188–c.170 BC (5 coins). But these two groups are linked by the obverse die no. 4 (Delrieux 2007b: 254–7).

³⁰ Ashton 2004 demonstrated that the first two issues of Kleiner (struck by only one obverse die) have to be dated well before the others, in the 220s.

³¹ Rostovtzeff 1939; Seyrig 1963b; Boehringer 1972: 52–68; Le Rider 1972: 257 (‘les villes de Pamphylie jouèrent alors un rôle commercial important. Il faut croire que les Pamphyliens allaient chercher des produits orientaux en Syrie et les payaient en espèces pamphyliennes, puis les vendaient pour la plus grande partie en Asie Mineure occidentale . . . Cet épisode commercial pamphylien’); Le Rider 2001a: 43–6.

Table 6.5. Some hoard evidence for Pamphylian Alexanders (c.223–181) and tetradrachms of Side

Hoard	Aspendos	Perge	Phaselis	Side	Total
<i>IGCH</i> 1318 (Sardes, c.190)	6	6	1	13	60
<i>IGCH</i> 1410 (Mektepini, c.190)	39	35	17	4	752+
<i>IGCH</i> 1411 (central Asia Minor, c.190)	3	7	3	3	c.400
<i>IGCH</i> 1413 (Ayaz-In, c.190–188)	13	11	11	34	170+
<i>IGCH</i> 1537 (Kosseir, c.190)	3	3	4	9	82+
<i>IGCH</i> 1546 (Aleppo, c.170)	10	5	2	2	35+
<i>IGCH</i> 1542 = <i>CH</i> IX 528 (Ain Tab)	48	33	18	0	c.200
<i>IGCH</i> 1547 (Khan Cheikoun, c.165)	25	28	18	22	103
<i>CH</i> VI 37 = <i>CH</i> VII 98(Ma'Aret en-Nu'man, c.162)	71	63	57	38	
<i>Sub-total A</i>	218	191	131	125	
<i>IGCH</i> 1773 (Tell Kotchek, c.150)	20	7	15	3	604+
<i>CH</i> IX 517 (Anatolia, c.150)	118	44	68	13	379+
<i>CH</i> IX 527 = <i>CH</i> X 308 (Gaziantep, c.143)	44	14	21	23	1,916
<i>Sub-total B</i>	182	65	104	39	
Total	400	256	235	164	

(Bauslaugh 1990: 52; Metcalf 1994: 49; and Meadows and Houghton 2010: 178–80)

attributed these abundant issues of Alexanders to the spirit of enterprise of Pamphylian bankers.³² For Seyrig, followed by Le Rider, there was a hierarchy among Attic-weight tetradrachms circulating on Seleukid territory: Seleukid tetradrachms came first, then the Alexanders, and at last the other tetradrachms.³³ Such a hierarchy, with slightly different values for each type of coinage, would have explained why it was advantageous for the cities of western Asia Minor to strike Alexanders. These commercial views, in line with those developed by Rostovtzeff, bring Seyrig to claim that these cities were involved in ‘une industrie de la monnaie’ (‘a coining industry’).³⁴

³² Boehringer 1972: 67; Le Rider 1972: 258.

³³ Seyrig 1958: 193 (= Seyrig 1966: 7); Seyrig 1973: 87–8; Le Rider 2001a: 52–3.

³⁴ Le Rider has commented: ‘Je comprends cette expression de la façon suivante: les villes en question se seraient efforcées de produire en vue du commerce avec le royaume séleucide autant d’alexandres qu’elles pouvaient, pour obtenir le profit monétaire qu’apportait la cotation favorable de ce numéraire. Cette motivation, à mon avis, non seulement aurait développé l’activité émettrice de ces ateliers, mais aussi, probablement, aurait orienté un plus grand nombre de commerçants vers le royaume séleucide’ (2001a: 53).

That statement not only conflicts with a dogma of the Primitivists/Substantivists dear to Hasebroek and Finley, namely that cities, seen as political bodies, rarely dealt with imports (above all in case of cereal shortages) and never with exports. But it is also contradicted by modern research. As convincingly demonstrated by Meadows, Pamphylian Alexanders, just like the other issues of Alexander tetradrachms, were struck to match military expenditures. Since the pivotal dates of these coinages were linked with Seleukid armies operating in the area, Meadows is not afraid to call them 'quasi-Seleukid coinages'.³⁵

TWO ISSUES OF ATTIC TETRADRACHMS STRUCK AT PERGAMON AFTER 188 BC (MEDUSA/ATHENA NIKEPHOROS AND HEAD OF EUMENES II/KABEIROI)

In addition to the Philetairoi of Group VII, two other issues of Attic tetradrachms, hence perhaps intended for external use (Le Rider 2001a: 38 n. 3), were struck at Pergamon after 188 BC. Neither seems to have been of any great significance in terms of abundance (although the die-study provides no clue to estimate the original production, their absence or extreme rarity in the many large hoards of the time makes it unlikely that they were produced on a large scale) but are of extraordinary iconographic interest.

The issue with the personal portrait of Eumenes II is known thanks to two coins from different dies, with a set of control marks shared by some Group VII Philetairoi (Nicolet-Pierre 1989: Issue 13).³⁶ This issue is likely to have been struck in the years 166–159 BC (which implies a low chronology for this Group VII), and it may well be that one of the two specimens comes from the Ma'Aret hoard buried in 162 BC, allowing us to date the issue to c.165.³⁷

³⁵ Meadows 2009a. Other Alexanders: Picard 1982. Indeed, the first issue at Pergamon in 223 BC may be linked with the expedition of Seleukos III against Attalos I, the beginning of coinage at Aspendos in 213 BC with the capture of Achaïos at Sardis, etc.

³⁶ The two coins are: (1) London, BM, inv. 1849; and (2) Paris, BnF (= *Leu*, Sale 33, 1983, 364). See Westermarck 1981; Bauslaugh 1982; Nicolet-Pierre 1989; de Chaisemartin 1993; Mattingly 1993a; Queyrel 1999.

³⁷ Mattingly 1993b: 83; Le Rider 1989a: 176; Le Rider 2001a: 50–1.

The issue with the 'Head of Medusa/Athena Nikephoros' is generally assigned to Pergamon, despite the lack of any control mark, which in itself is unexpected for Pergamon. Known from three specimens (two obverse dies), this issue has been dated to 181, on the assumption that it marks the celebration of the Nikephoria or, later, to mark the celebration of the victory of Eumenes over the Galatians in 168.³⁸

CISTOPHORIC COUNTERMARKS AND THE DATE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CISTOPHORIC COINAGE

At some point after the treaty of Apameia (188 BC), the Attalid kings produced an entirely new coinage, sometimes qualified by the Moderns as the ugliest Greek coinage ever produced. It represents on the obverse an open *cista mystica*, hence its name of cistophoric ('cista-bearing'), and on the reverse a bow case flanked by two entwisted serpents as well as the initials of mints, most of them easily recognizable.³⁹ It seems that, with this coinage, Eumenes II installed a closed monetary economy: inside the Attalid kingdom, every merchant or foreigner was forced to traffic with these cistophoroi, which had the value of Attic tetradrachms but only 3/4 of their weight (12.6 g instead of 16.8 g). Hence large profits accrued to the king (see below for an estimate) which, in good economic theory, implies that the king was also able to keep prices low enough inside his kingdom to attract foreign merchants, despite the unfavourable but compulsory exchange of currency. If we may freely speculate about the revenues these cistophoroi brought to the royal treasury, we could hypothesize that, with a benefit of one drachm on the exchange of each cistophoric

³⁸ The three coins are: (1) Paris, BnF (15.90 g, 1 h [from the Larissa or Sitichoro hoard: *IGCH* 237]; see Le Rider 1973: 66; Le Rider 1989a: 175); (2), London, BM ([from the Larissa or Sitichoro hoard]; see Price 1989: pl. 55); and (3) *Leu*, Sale 7, 9 May 1973, 207 (16.08g–12h; see Le Rider 1973: 68) = Copenhagen ([from the Ma'aret en-Nu'man hoard]; see Mørkholm 1984). See Le Rider 1973 (who gives two dates: 181–168/7 BC or before 189 BC); Le Rider 1989a: 174–6; Le Rider 2001a: 51; Mørkholm 1991: 172. For the iconographic type, see Faita 2001.

³⁹ On the types of the cistophoric coinage, see now Kosmetatou 1998 and Szaivert 2008; Thonemann, above pp. 30–4.

tetradrachm, this currency could have made nearly 2,000 talents profit for the Attalids from the beginning to 133 BC ($567 \times 20,000 = 11,340,000$ drachms = 1,890 talents).

Specialists disagree about the date of the introduction of the cistophoric coinage. Astonishingly, the range of advocated possibilities spreads over more than three decades (c.192–155 BC).⁴⁰ While recent literature may have given the impression that the high chronology (in the 180s) was now favoured by a majority of scholars,⁴¹ Meadows argues in Chapter 5 above, using hoard evidence, for a much lower chronology, with a start-date in the 160s. Several external categories of evidence help us to fix the chronology.

Four varieties of Philetairoi (classified as the last issues of Group VII) have the same set of ‘monogram + symbol’ as the earliest issues of cistophoroi.⁴² This seems to indicate that both coinages were struck in parallel for a time (on this, see Meadows, Chapter 5 above). The Ma’Aret hoard, certainly buried in 162 BC, contains one such Philetairos sharing its monogram and symbol (Issue 19: $A\Sigma$ + thyrsus) with the first cistophoric issues, thus providing a firm *terminus ante quem* for the introduction of the cistophoric coinage. How long this coin took to travel from Pergamon to Syria is open to speculation, but it looks unlikely that the cistophoric coinage could have begun after 166 BC.

On the other hand, two coinages, namely the civic tetradrachms of Side and the Pamphylian Alexanders struck at Perge, Aspendos, and

⁴⁰ Crawford 1985: 158 (‘at some point between 180 and 160’). On the literature concerning the cistophoric coinage, see Kienast 1961.

⁴¹ For the high chronology, see Ashton, Ch. 7 below; Seyrig 1963a (188 BC); Boehringer 1972: 21, 40–6 (shortly after 190–188 BC); Le Rider 1972: 256 n. 1 (180–170 BC); Mørkholm 1979a: 47–50 (179–172 BC); Waggoner 1979: 8 (criticizing Kleiner and Noe 1977); Allen 1983: 112–13 (before 190 BC); Price 1989: 233 (before 180); Le Rider 1989a: 169 (between c.185–180 and c.175–170 BC); Bauslaugh 1990: 61–4 (183–180 BC); Ashton 1994 (before 182/1 BC); Ashton 2001a: 94 (end of the 190s? BC); Harl 1991 (before 190 BC); Le Rider 2001a: 37 n. 2; Szaivert 2005. For a late date of introduction, see Noe 1950; Kleiner 1971: 117; Kleiner 1972: 17 n. 1 (166 BC); Boehringer 1975: 57–9 (166 BC); Kleiner 1980: 45–8 (166 BC); Szaivert 1983 (after 168 BC); Nicolet-Pierre 1989: 212 (159–150 BC).

⁴² See Nicolet-Pierre 1989: 208–9. (1) $A\Sigma$ + thyrsus (Nicolet-Pierre 1989: Issue 19; Kleiner and Noe 1977: Issue 1a). (2) $A\Sigma$ + dolphin (Nicolet-Pierre 1989: Issue 25; Kleiner and Noe 1977: Issue 3). (3) MA + dolphin (Nicolet-Pierre 1989: Issue 20; Kleiner and Noe 1977: Issue 23c). (4) ΔA + thyrsus (Nicolet-Pierre 1989: Issue 21; Kleiner and Noe 1977: Issue 24e). It looks odd that Kleiner and Noe classified the varieties 3 and 4 later in their chronological sequence (Issues no. 23c and 24e). On this, see also Le Rider 1989a: 171–2.

Phaselis, were punched by the so-called cistophoric countermarks. These countermarks depict a bow case (the reverse type of the cistophoroi)⁴³ as well as the initials of what are clearly mints, all located within the boundaries of the new Pergamene kingdom after Apameia. Out of the twelve sets of letters indicated on these countermarks, seven fit with early cistophoric mints (Pergamon, Ephesos, Tralleis, Sardeis, Apameia, Laodikeia, and Adramytteion), while two more are for mints known to have issued cistophoroi later (Synnada and Stratonikeia).⁴⁴ Robert Bauslaugh has devoted a special study to these countermarks (gathering 151 instances, among which some are uncertain), to which whom we may now add some others.⁴⁵ With perhaps c.150 obverse dies (in the absence of a die-study, this number is no more than a best guess),⁴⁶ the civic coinage of Side looks more abundant than the coinages of Aspendos, Perge, and Phaselis. It was also far more heavily punched with cistophoric countermarks than the Pamphylian Alexanders (121 to 23: see Table 6.6).⁴⁷ As noticed by Bauslaugh, there is a general but imperfect correlation between the number of countermarks for each mint (with Sardeis and Pergamon at the forefront: see the last column of Table 6.6) and the size of their cistophoric coinages.⁴⁸ So, despite the size of its cistophoric coinage, Ephesos is only documented by 3 countermarks. It is all the more

⁴³ Meadows (above, p. 170) astutely argues that this is a 'misnomer', since it is not proved that these countermarks were necessarily applied once the cistophoric coinage already existed.

⁴⁴ For the three remaining ones—*TOP* (Toriaion), *ΣΑΑΗ* (Sala), and *ΕΛΗΣ*(?)—see Thonemann 2008.

⁴⁵ On this, see Mowat 1906; Rostovtzeff 1939: 294; Seyrig 1958: 187–8 (= Seyrig 1966: 1–2); Boehringer 1972: 46; Le Rider 1975: 43–4; Kleiner 1980: 49; Leschhorn 1989: 23–42; Metcalf 1994.

⁴⁶ The large hoard of 560 Sidetan tetradrachms (n) buried after 150 BC (Meadows 2006) and published by Leschhorn 1989 (*CH* IX 521) enables us to distinguish 218 obverse dies (o). With a ratio 'n/o' of 2.57, the original number of obverses is estimated at 299.3 by the simplified formula of Carter 1983. But part of this huge production was issued after 188, as proven by the presence of the Kleuchares II issues, which were never countermarked. This group alone would have required c.80 obverse dies (75 dies for 836 coins in the database of W. Leschhorn: information from A. Meadows). For the late phases of this coinage, which was still produced in the first century BC, see Arslan and Lightfoot 1999: 35–6; Meadows 2006.

⁴⁷ See Leschhorn 1989 (64 of 560 autonomous Side tetradrachms countermarked [11.4%]); Arslan 1997 (6 of 33 Side tetradrachms countermarked [18.2%]); Büyükyörük 2001. Other countermarks were applied to the Pamphylian Alexanders found in the east (Helios head and anchor are the most frequent: on this, see Metcalf 1994: 44–7).

⁴⁸ Bauslaugh 1990: 49.

Table 6.6. Summary of the identifiable cistophoric countermarks

	Side	Aspendos	Perge	Phaselis	Total
Sardeis	29	4	2	–	35
Pergamon	28	2	1	4	35
Apameia	20	6	–	–	26
Tralleis	13	2	2	–	17
Adramytteion	6	–	1	1	8
Laodikeia	7	1	–	–	8
Synnada	5	1	–	–	6
Stratonikeia	5	–	–	–	5
TOP	4	–	–	–	4
Ephesos	2	–	1	–	3
Sale	2	–	–	–	2
Total	121	16	7	5	149

(Bauslaugh 1990, Metcalf 1994, Meadows 2009a: 78 n. 55; and info. A. McIntyre)


tempting to detect here a careful and systematic plan, related to the introduction of the cistophoric coinage itself.⁴⁹

Andrew McIntyre observes that the ratio of cistophoric countermarks decreases as one travels west, with the highest result (c.11.4 per cent) obtained for Side. This is true if we look at the absolute numbers of countermarks (16 for Aspendos, 7 for Perge, and 5 for Phaselis). In the cases of Perge and Phaselis, we have modern monographs which provide us with two useful figures: the total number of tetradrachms and the number of those which have been countermarked. It turns out that the proportion of countermarked Pamphylian Alexanders is 2.0 per cent for Perge (7 coins out of 344) and 1.8 per cent for Phaselis (5 coins out of 274).⁵⁰ We may also proceed in a different manner, comparing the number of known countermarks (even those not quoted in the relevant monographs) to the estimated number of dies. This procedure gives the following results: 0.16 for Aspendos (16 countermarks for c.100 obverse dies), 0.09 for Perge (7 countermarks for c.80 obverse dies), and 0.16 for Phaselis (5 countermarks for c.30 obverse dies, rather than 63: see above).⁵¹ Map 3 gives for each

⁴⁹ 'By comparison [sc. with the anchor countermarks], the Pergamene countermarking reflects higher control and accountability and more limited scope' (Bauslaugh 1990: 51).

⁵⁰ The numbers do not support the idea that Phaselis behaved differently from Perge (and Aspendos?), with proportionally fewer Alexanders countermarked (Meadows 2009a: 78–9).

⁵¹ Incidentally, this is not without interest for calculations of survival rates. If, as hoards seem to indicate, cistophoric countermarks were applied on c.1.8% of all the Pergean and Phaselite Alexanders, and we postulate an average productivity for each obverse die of 20,000 coins, the following ratios emerge: 1 to c.4,120 for Perge



Map 3. Side, Aspendos, Perge, and Phaselis and their estimated production of tetradrachms (c.220–180 BC)

Pamphylian mint the estimated volume of coins produced, expressed in equivalent of obverses for Attic drachms. In addition, and despite the smallness of the samples, it may well be the case that cistophoric countermarks were not applied randomly whatever the mint: it seems that the Alexanders of Aspendos were primarily countermarked by Apameia, while those of Phaselis were mainly countermarked by Pergamon (see Table 6.6).

As Pamphylian Alexanders are dated, they allow us to define a *terminus post quem* for these countermarks.⁵² With new chronologies and material in mind, we can produce the following table.⁵³

(1,600,000 coins [80 × 20,000] / [7 / 0.018]), and 1 to c.2,200 for Phaselis (600,000 [30 × 20,000] / [5 / 0.018]). A similar ratio of 1.8% would give 1 to c.2,100 for Aspendos (2,000,000 [100 × 20,000] / [17 / 0.018]). Again, put into perspective, the global likelihood of these numbers is satisfying (see Callataÿ 2005a).

⁵² Bauslaugh 1990: 52.

⁵³ On the question of their chronology, see Boehringer 1972: 55–68; Boehringer 1999; Mørkholm 1978; Price 1991: 346–8; Heipp-Tamer 1993: 68–71; Colin 1996: 31–3; McIntyre 2007; Meadows 2009a.

Table 6.7. Cistophoric countermarks on dated Pamphylian Alexanders (cols. 2–4); yearly production as attested by number of recovered coins (n) as well as recorded obverse dies (o) + number of attested countermarks with the anchor and the head of Helios (cols. 5–6)

Years	Perge (223/ 2–191/0)	Aspendos (213/2–185/4)	Phaselis (216/5– 184/3)	Perge (o/n)– Anchor/Helios	Phaselis (o/n)– Anchor/Helios
211/0	–	3 (Sar)	–	(2/17)–0/0	(2/8)–4/0
210/209	–	–	7? (Per) ⁵⁴	(4/12)–1/0	(2/5)–2/0
209/8	–	5 (Per)	8 (unc)	(2/8)–1/0	(1/9)–5/0
208/7	16 (Adr)	–	–	(7/26)–8/0	(3/20)–9/2
207/6	–	–	–	(3/17)–4/0	(5/14)–4/2
206/5	–	8 (Tra, Sar)	–	(3/28)–6/2	(2/15)–8/1
205/4	19 (Tra)	–	–	(2/14)–0/0	(8/21)–14/2
204/3	–	–	–	(5/21)–6/0	(3/6)–3/0
203/2	–	11 (Sar, Apa) ⁵⁵	14 (Per, Per)	(2/21)–6/1	(2/21)–12/1
202/1	22 (Sar, Sar)	12 (Per?) ⁵⁶	–	(4/10)–2/1	(1/6)–2/0
201/0	–	–	–	(4/16)–4/0	(1/5)–4/1
200/199	24 (Eph) ⁵⁷	14 (Lao)	–	(3/20)–7/0	(1/9)–3/0
199/8	–	–	–	(4/19)–5/0	(3/8)–2/0
198/7	–	16 (Tra) ⁵⁸	–	(2/22)–15/1	(2/5)–1/0
197/6	27 (Per, Tra) ⁵⁹	–	–	(2/13)–3/0	(1/0)–0/0
196/5	–	18 (Apa) ⁶⁰	–	(3/17)–4/0	(1/3)–1/1
195/4	–	19 (Syn)	22 (Per, Adr)	(2/26) ⁶¹ –1/0	(2/15)–8/0
194/3	–	–	–	(2/2)–1/0	(2/9)–3/0
193/2	–	–	–	(2/6)–3/1	(4/17)–8/1
192/1	–	–	–	(3/10)–2/0	(1/9)–5/1
191/0	–	23 (Apa, Sar)	–	(1/9) 3/1	(3/14)–6/1
190/189	XXX	24 (Apa, Apa) ⁶²	–	XXX	(0/0)–0/0

(continued)

⁵⁴ Sale CNG E230 (March 2010) 109 (information McIntyre).

⁵⁵ SNG München 664 (Meadows 2009a: 78 n. 55).

⁵⁶ SNG Berry 325 (information McIntyre).

⁵⁷ SNG Turkey 1, 34 (information McIntyre) = sale Triton III, 1999, no. 387.

⁵⁸ Sale Gorny (21 March 1982) 14 (information McIntyre).

⁵⁹ Sale CNG 72 (2006) 370 (Meadows 2009a: 78 n. 55 [attributed to year 23]).

⁶⁰ Sale Lanz 62 (1992) 378.

⁶¹ Numbers are tricky for Perge: it would be misleading to estimate the production from the number of surviving coins, which collapse after year 29 (195/4 BC). An entirely different picture emerges from the number of obverses and the ratio 'number of coins/number of obverses' (pace Boehringer 1972 and Le Rider 1972: 254–5).

⁶² Sale Lanz 62 (1992) 379 and Lanz (26 Dec. 1983) 174 (information McIntyre). At some point during year 24 at Aspendos (Oct. 190/Oct. 189), a major innovation occurred, with the introduction of yearly symbols. It is all the more tempting to link this with some measures related to the battle of Magnesia.

Table 6.7. Continued

Years	Perge (223/ 2–191/0)	Aspendos (213/2–185/4)	Phaselis (216/5– 184/3)	Perge (o/n)– Anchor/Helios	Phaselis (o/n)– Anchor/Helios
189/8	XXX	–	–	XXX	(1/5)–5/0
188/7	XXX	Apa ⁶³	–	XXX	(0/0)–0/0
187/6	XXX	–	–	XXX	(1/4)–3/0
186/5	XXX	28 (unc.) ⁶⁴	–	XXX	(1/7)–6/0
185/4	XXX	–	–	XXX	(1/3)–2/0
184/3	XXX	XXX	–	XXX	(1/6)–3/0
183/2	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX
Total	7	17	6	(62/344)–84/7	(55/244)–124/13

(Bauslaugh 1990: 46; Metcalf 1994: 47; Meadows 2009a: 78 n. 55)

Robert Bauslaugh thought that cistophoric countermarks were applied c.188–183 BC.⁶⁵ The latest occurrence we have is on an Alexander struck at Aspendos during the 28th year of the local era, corresponding to the year October 186/September 185 BC. This is very useful, but does not give us either a strict *terminus post quem*, since it leaves open the possibility that these countermarks were applied for a period of several years before 186 BC, or a *terminus ante quem*, since there is no reason to doubt that these countermarks were also applied later.

Let us admit first that it is difficult to determine how long this process took. The number of Pamphylian Alexanders that were countermarked, both in Perge and Phaselis, seems to be less than 2 per cent of the total. We are here much in need of a die-study of the countermarks themselves but, even without, we may speculate on the total number of coins countermarked. If we estimate the volume of the three mints as c.210 obverse dies (c.100 for Aspendos, c.80 for Perge, and c.30 for Phaselis), this gives a total production of c.4,200,000 tetradrachms, assuming that each obverse die had an average productivity of 20,000 coins. Taking as valid a proportion of 2 per cent of countermarked coins (although it is likely to be less),

⁶³ This countermark belongs to the Gaziantep Hoard and is now kept in the Gaziantep Museum (Augé et al. 1997: 75 no. 114; Meadows 2009a: 78 n. 55; Meadows and Houghton 2010: 179, nr. B1428).

⁶⁴ Sale *UBS* 57 (15 Sept. 2003) 171 (unidentifiable mint under an anchor countermark—information McIntyre).

⁶⁵ Bauslaugh 1990: 64.

this would give a total of c.84,000 countermarked Alexanders. Concerning Side, if we retain the proportion of c.11.4 per cent of cistophoric countermarks,⁶⁶ it is likely that the number of countermarked 'civic' tetradrachms was c.342,000 or not far distant ($150 \text{ dies} \times 20,000 = 3,000,000 \text{ coins} \times 0.114$). All in all, we would be dealing with a total number of some 426,000 applied cistophoric countermarks, which corresponds to 284 talents. This result is not far from the indemnity of 350 (+ 127) talents which Polybios informs us that Antiochos III had to pay Eumenes II over five years after the treaty of Apameia.⁶⁷ From a quantified point of view, it is thus tempting to link the cistophoric countermarks with the penalty due to Eumenes, all the more so since cistophoric countermarks only appear on the coinages described by Meadows as 'quasi-Seleukid'.⁶⁸

At this point, the most likely chronology would appear to be the following: (a) the cistophoric countermarks in c.188–183 BC; (b) the start of the cistophoric coinage in c.183 BC; (c) the end, some years later (178 BC?) of the Philetairoi, which had been struck for a period in parallel with the first cistophoric issues. But in addition to the objections to this chronology made by Meadows in relation to the date of the final group of Philetairoi, we may add some others.

First, the Pamphylian hoard 1977 is likely to have been buried c.180 BC (it includes a tetradrachm of Phaselis dated to the Year 33 = 184/3 BC), and certainly no later than 175 BC.⁶⁹ However, despite its size—76 Pamphylian Alexanders, consisting of 20 from Perge down to Year 33, 28 from Phaselis down to year 33, and 28 from Aspendos down to Year 26—it does not include a single instance of a cistophoric countermark.⁷⁰ This is none the less not too disturbing, since, as we saw, only c.1.8 per cent of the Pamphylian Alexanders were countermarked, which means that, on a strict proportionality, the

⁶⁶ CH IX 521; see above.

⁶⁷ Polyb. 21.43.20–21. My calculations look similar to those offered by Bauslaugh (1990: 58 n. 51), who, starting from a supposed average productivity of 10,000 countermarks per die, estimates that c.75 dies would have been necessary to strike 477 talents, i.e. 715,500 coins, in five years.

⁶⁸ Meadows 2009a.

⁶⁹ CH V 43 and VI 34.

⁷⁰ I am grateful to Andrew McIntyre for this information. This is not exactly in line with the statement of Bauslaugh, who argues that the Pamphylia hoard supports his view for dating the cistophoric countermarks to the years 188–183 BC (Bauslaugh 1990: 63).

Pamphylian hoard ought to have included only 1.37 countermarked tetradrachms.

More importantly, we fail to observe any increase in the number of countermarks over the years. Quite the contrary: in the case of Phaselis, no less than eleven years (and 74 coins in the catalogue of Heipp-Tamer) have to be placed after the last recorded countermark (Year 22), and a similar pattern is observed for Perge (six years and 67 coins as recorded by Colin after the latest countermarks of Year 27). It very much appears as if these countermarks were applied once these Pamphylian Alexanders were largely mixed in circulation. Even if our samples are meagre, it is worth noticing the absence of correlation between the occurrences of countermarks and the volume of the issues. This is especially conspicuous for Phaselis.

Some of these cistophoric countermarks were themselves countermarked by an anchor. This type of countermark is attested in the Latakia hoard, buried in 169 BC, which thus seems to give us a *terminus ante quem* for the cistophoric countermarks.⁷¹

Another question is whether these countermarks prove that cistophoroi were already being struck at the time they were applied, or whether we can defend the idea—as Meadows does in this volume—that we are dealing with two separate phenomena. The general assumption is that the cistophoric countermarks were applied in order to accept Attic weight tetradrachms into Attalid circulation during the years following the introduction of the cistophoroi: ‘the earliest purpose of cistophoric countermarks would have been to validate foreign coins of heavier weight circulating in the area in order that the latter might serve as necessary bullion before the new domestic coinage had been minted in sufficient quantity’.⁷² However, many questions are left open. Even if we endorse the idea that the cistophoric countermarks are linked to the silver indemnity paid by the Seleukids after Apameia,⁷³ it remains necessary to explain why it was felt useful to add the initials of the mints. Above all, why countermark Attic tetradrachms at all, i.e. full-weight coins corresponding to the value of

⁷¹ Seyrig 1973: 55; Leschhorn 1989: 40.

⁷² Waggoner 1979: 9 n. 6. See also Seyrig 1973: 35–6; Le Rider 1975: 43 n. 87a; Le Rider 1989a: 168–9; Thonemann 2008: 48–9.

⁷³ Polyb. 21.43.20–1: an initial indemnity of 127 talents 1,208 drachms to be completed with 350 talents within the next five years.

the light-weight cistophoroi? Meadows observes that the mints whose initials were put on the countermarks are precisely those, such as Ephesos or Sardeis, which refrained from striking Alexanders at a moment when nearly every city in Asia Minor did so. This suggests that there may have been a large-scale agreement between the Attalids and the cities, with consequences for cities located outside the boundaries of the Pergamene kingdom.

At this point, the safest statement we can make about the introduction of the cistophoroi is that it cannot have happened after 162 BC (Ma'Aret hoard),⁷⁴ and is unlikely to have happened before 186 BC (Year 28 at Aspendos). I would have a preference for a more restricted period of c.180–170 BC.

If this is correct, it would be sufficient to break the link made by many between the treaty of Apameia and the creation of the cistophoric coinage. Several years, and perhaps a whole decade or even longer passed in between. And for that period, we are left with an expanded territory, meaning normally the immediate capacity to raise more taxes and revenues (not to take into account the indemnity to be paid by the Seleukids), but with no increasing of the monetary production.

As for the cistophoroi, we are fortunate to have a die-study for the issues struck before the Romans. Table 6.8 retains the dates proposed by Kleiner and Noe for each major mint.⁷⁵

Spread over some forty-three years (c.166–123 BC), these cistophoric issues correspond to a yearly average expressed in equivalents of obverses for Attic drachms of 51.9. Even following a high chronology for the start of the series (e.g. 186–123 BC), the yearly average would still be as high as 35.4 (2,232.2/63). These averages are considerably higher than those obtained for the Philetairoi (see Table 6.1: 8.0), and are in the same range as those reached by the Seleukids (see Table 6.2).

This leaves us in no doubt that the cistophoric coinages were highly controlled by the Attalid kings and were not, as sometimes argued,

⁷⁴ The first epigraphic evidence for cistophoroi comes later, at Delos, in c.150 BC (*I.Délos* 1422—see Robert 1951: 167; Le Rider 1989a: 163 n. 1).

⁷⁵ On minor mints, see Le Rider 1990; Le Rider and Drew-Bear 1991; Thonemann 2008. Le Rider insists on the paucity of these minor mints (15 coins and 3 obverse dies for those discussed in 1990: 701).

Table 6.8. The cistophoric coinages (c.166–123 BC)

Coinages	o	n	n/o	O (Carter)	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Eumenes III–Aristonikos (c.132–130) ⁷⁶	5	32	6.40	5.3	21.2	7.1
Pergamon cistophoroi (c.166–123)	120	299	2.49	167.5	670.0	20.3
Apameia cistophoroi (c.166–123)	48	116	2.42	68.2	272.8	8.3
Ephesos cistophoroi (c.166–128)	100	342	3.42	121.6	486.4	12.8
Laodikeia cistophoroi (c.160–145)	4	21	5.25	4.4	17.6	1.2
Sardeis-Synnada cistophoroi (c.166–128)	22	55	2.50	30.7	132.8	3.5
Tralleis cistophoroi (c.166–128)	97	247	2.55	133.8	535.2	14.1
Tralleis half-cistophoroi (c.166–128)	20	30	1.50	48.1	96.2	2.5
Total cistophoroi (c.166–123)					2,232.2	51.9

(Kleiner and Noe 1977)

a truly civic coinage.⁷⁷ The amount of die-sharing between mints strongly points to a single minting place for issues allegedly coming from different mints, or alternatively to a transfer of dies between mints, as was clearly the case with the travelling mint of Aristonikos.⁷⁸ The fact that the mint of Tralleis was in charge of nearly all the fractions points too in the direction of a general policy established at a higher level. At least, with three ‘mints’ presenting a yearly average superior to 10 (20.3 for Pergamon, 14.1 for Tralleis, and 12.8 for Ephesos), we are dealing with monetary issues apparently too big to be civic. Compare these figures with the data on civic mints in Table 6.11: c.9.5 for Rhodes (c.408–190 BC), c.4.1 for Miletus (c.259–190), c.2.8 for Alabanda (c.197–100 BC), etc. None the less, we may introduce some flexibility in this scenario: cities may have negotiated in some way with the Attalids, as proposed by Le Rider

⁷⁶ On Eumenes III–Aristonikos, see Robinson 1954; Kampmann 1978; Adams 1980; Bussi 1997.

⁷⁷ Crawford 1985: 159; Le Rider 1989a: 185; *contra* Szaivert 1983.

⁷⁸ Single minting place: Kleiner and Noe 1977, supported by Kinns 1986b: 164. Die-transfer: Mørkholm 1979b. Cistophoroi of Pergamon are linked to Sardeis, Synnada, Apameia, ‘KOP’, and Basileus Aristonikos.

who, with others, points out that Ephesos was certainly responsible for monetary issues of Attic weight-standard under Attalid rule.⁷⁹

Rome too may have interfered in this process, as illustrated by overstrikes. Out of the 7 identifiable types overstruck with cistophoric types of Ephesos (5 occurrences) and Tralleis (2 occurrences), 5 are for Macedonian First Meris tetradrachms and 2 for tetradrachms with Thasian types,⁸⁰ both coinages struck for the Romans in Macedonia. Moreover, these overstrikes occur only with specific issues,⁸¹ which all belong to the same period, the years before the end of the Attalid kingdom (c.155–139 BC).⁸² Considering the nature of the overstruck coinages, and the unlikelihood that these coinages ever circulated within the Attalid kingdom, it seems logical to postulate that Romans were responsible for having provided the bullion for these specific issues of cistophoroi.⁸³ Put into perspective, this dispatch of silver is all the more fascinating, since recent research has pointed out other similar bullion transfers. We can tentatively reconstruct the following attractive sequence: (a) in 154 BC, silver was provided by Prousius (and the Attalids) to Aiolian and Ionian cities for their wreathed coinages (see below); (b) in 145–140 BC, silver was provided by the Romans to the Attalids from their Macedonian controlled coinages; and (c) in 123–120 BC, Athenian issues of tetradrachms were brought to Macedonia by the Romans.⁸⁴

At last—and most astonishingly in my mind—past literature has never addressed the simple but challenging question: in what kind of currency did Eumenes II and his successors defray their military expenditures? John Ma calculates that the Attalids were involved in twenty-four conflicts, meaning perhaps fifty years of campaigning in 144 years (277–133 BC). The ratio of conflicts strongly arose after Apameia: c.13 years out of 99 before (277–189 BC); c.23 years out of 43 afterwards (188–145 BC). Because of the

⁷⁹ Le Rider 1989a: 187–9; Kinns 1999. Crawford 1985: 160: ‘The whole monetary history of Ephesus in this period should caution against any facile linking of freedom and the production of silver coinage.’

⁸⁰ *CH* II 94, fig. 11.

⁸¹ 2 for Ephesos: star and laurel branch (c.150–140 BC), *K* and Artemis (c.140/139 BC); 1 for Tralleis: filleted tripod (c.155–145 BC).

⁸² It should be noted that, since the weight differs between cistophoroi and Attic tetradrachms, these overstrikes required that the weight of the Macedonian or Thasian tetradrachms be reduced by one quarter.

⁸³ Callataÿ 2011: 68–9.

⁸⁴ Callataÿ 1991–1992 and Meadows 2002b.

Attalid closed monetary economy—but here we have to be cautious not to over-interpret the hoard evidence, which is not as strong as it is sometimes considered to be—cistophoroi have been mainly considered in a trade or commercial context, all the more since they appear at first sight to be civic coinages.

I seriously wonder if a significant part of this coinage was not struck for military expenditures too, a suggestion reinforced by the rhythm of production as described in this volume by Meadows and the strong correlation between the heavy last pre-Roman issues and the war against Aristonikos. For the sake of argument, let us make a rough calculation: suppose that, for the period 188–133 BC, the average level of the Attalid army (combining peacetime and wartime) was 5,000 men (well below the 12,000 guessed as a maximum by Ma) and that all these men were badly paid at the rate of 200 drachms per year. This means an absolute minimum of 55 million drachms, which represents 9,166 talents (a result which gives us a vivid idea of what Lysimachos or Philetairos could have done with the similar amount kept in their treasury at Pergamon), or the use of 687.5 obverse dies for cistophoric tetradrachms. To be more realistic, we can easily double these numbers. Now, the entire production of cistophoroi before 133 BC may be estimated to have required *c.*568 obverse dies. Certainly we ought not to confuse military annual expenditures with cumulative monetary production, since it is unlikely that soldiers were paid only with fresh coins, but we have to recognize that the Attalid army represented an enormous cost. We have also to take into account the fact that most conflicts and wars sustained by the Attalids after Apameia were conducted on their own territory, be it against external threats (184–182 BC: Prousius I; 180–179 BC: Pharnakes and the Galatians; 168–165 BC: the Galatians; 156–154 BC: Prousius II; 149 BC: Prousius II), which sometimes led to Pergamon itself being besieged, or against internal rebels (as with the city of Selge). Hoards of cistophoroi found within the large Attalid kingdom may not necessarily have belonged to traders, and some of them are likely to be connected with military events, as in the cases of the two Phrygian hoards of Polath (*CH* VIII 446) and Afyon Karahisar (*IGCH* 1415) and the anomalous *IGCH* 1453, which included 57 cistophoroi mixed in with 11 tetradrachms of Prousius, 8 of the Seleukid king Demetrios I (as well as 5 ‘quasi-Seleukid’ tetradrachms of Side) and 5 late Philetairoi.

Anyhow, we need to consider carefully how unlikely it is that all the royal issues (Philetairoi) before 188 BC should be attributed to the need to cover military expenditures (and even so, their production would not be sufficient), while considering all the royal-civic coins (cistophoroi) minted after Apameia as motivated by trade.

THE POST-APAMEIAN ALEXANDERS (c.188–160 BC)

Many cities of western and southern Asia Minor either continued striking or started to strike Alexander tetradrachms after 188 BC. These include Aigai (c.188–160 BC), Alabanda (c.172–162), Antiocheia on the Maeander (c.190–170), Assos (c.188–160 BC), Chios (33 obverse dies), Erythrai (1 or 2 obverse dies), Kyme (c.170–151 BC), Methymna (c.188–180 BC), Miletos (c.190–165 BC), Myrina (c.188–160 BC) and Temnos (c.162–143 BC) and even possibly Pergamon.⁸⁵

In itself, this phenomenon is odd since, after Apameia, Rome took severe steps to control or forbid the recruitment of mercenaries. It would then appear logical to have observed a decreasing of the Alexanders as the favourite currency for mercenaries. This presumption remains so far difficult to substantiate, since few die-studies have been done for these post-Apameian Alexanders, which appear in many hoards (as in the Gaziantep hoard). However, Meadows' recent study of Alabanda shows that no fewer than 40 obverse dies for Alexanders were engraved there during the years 185–170 BC, while this number is about 45 for Chios during the years 190–160 BC.⁸⁶

The Gaziantep hoard, buried in 143 BC, thus surely after the end of the Alexanders, gives a large-scale picture of what was circulating at that point.⁸⁷ Out of 1,916 coins, 339 are Alexanders, among which those from Alabanda are the most numerous with 110 coins, followed by Temnos (86), with all the others following well behind: 15 for Kyme, 14 for Mytilene, 12 for Myrina, 7 for Chios (which is curiously under-represented here), and so on. If we exclude the pre-Apameian

⁸⁵ Aigai: Meadows and Houghton 2010: 169. Chios: Bauslaugh 1979. Erythrai: Kinns 1980: nos. 276–80. Temnos: Meadows and Houghton 2010. Pergamon: Meadows, Ch. 5 above.

⁸⁶ Alabanda: Meadows 2008. Chios: Bauslaugh 1979.

⁸⁷ *IGCH* 1542; Meadows and Houghton 2010.

Table 6.9. A comparison between pre- and post-Apameian Alexanders

Coinages	o	n	n/o	O (Carter)	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Alabanda Alex. Series III (c.185–170)	40	635	15.88	40.0	160.0	11.1
Chios Alexanders (c.190–160)	33	86	2.61	45.0	180.0	6.0
Post-Apameian Alex. (c.188–160)	c.150	–	–	c.150.0	c.600.0	21.4
Pre-Apameian Alexanders (c.223–188)	–	–	–	332.8	1,331.2	38.0

(Alabanda = Meadows 2008; Chios = Bauslaugh 1979 and Meadows 2008; pre-Apameian = Table 6.4)

Alexanders (79 for Aspendos, Perge, and Phaselis), Alabanda represents *c.*46 per cent of the total (110 out of 240). The Ma'aret en-Nu'man hoard, buried a generation earlier in 162 BC, offers a different pattern. Most of the 263 Alexanders were struck before Apameia (with 182 coins for Aspendos, Perge, and Phaselis); only 60 Alexanders look post-Apameian, and none are to be attributed to Alabanda.⁸⁸

All in all, we should be tempted to estimate all the post-Apameian Alexanders as representing the equivalent of *c.*150 obverses for tetradrachms (*c.*600 equivalent of obverses for Attic drachms). If this is right, this would correspond to a clear decline of production over the period *c.*188–160 BC (Table 6.9).

THE WREATHED COINAGES (*c.*154–135 BC)

Around the middle of the second century BC, a fair number of cities in Asia Minor—but none of those that issued cistophoroi at this period—started to strike tetradrachms with different types for each city, but whose reverses were all surrounded by a wreath; hence their generic name of ‘wreathed coinages’. These coinages, which did not last long, were massively exported to the Near East (they have been

⁸⁸ CH VI 37 = VII 98 = VIII 433. Temnos: 10; Miletos: 8; Chios 7; Myrina: 6; Mytilene: 6; Kyme: 4; Alexandria Troas: 3; Assos: 3; Pella: 1; Samothrake: 1; Teos: 1. See Mattingly 1993b; Le Rider 2001a: 55–6.

Table 6.10. The wreathed coinages (c.154–135 BC)

Coinages	o	n	n/o	O (Carter)	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Aegai tetradrachms (c.151–143)	36	4	9.00	4.1	16.4	2.1
Kyme tetradrachms (c.155–143)	79	537	6.80	83.6	334.4	27.9
Herakleia tetradrachms (c.140–135 ?)	25	117	4.68	28.1	112.4	22.5
Lebedos tetradrachms (c.140–135 ?)	8	53	6.63	8.5	34.0	7.2
Magnesia tetradrachms (c.150–140)	36	242	6.72	38.2	152.8	15.2
Myrina tetradrachms (c.160–143)	97	415	4.28	111.2	444.8	26.2
Smyrna Tyche/ <i>ΣΜΥΡΝΑΙΩΝ</i> (c.150–143)	13	71	5.46	14.2	56.8	8.1
“Syros” tetradrachms (c.140–130?)	13	18	1.38	37.2	130.0	13.0
Technitai of Dionysos (c.155)	1	1	1.00	?	?	?
Total (c.154–135)					1,281.6	67.4

(Aigai = Callataÿ 1993b: 38; Herakleia = Callataÿ 1993b: 38 (not Lavva 1993); Kyme = Oakley 1982; Lebedos = Amandry 1989; Magnesia = Jones 1979; Myrina = Sacks 1985; Smyrna (Tyche/*ΣΜΥΡΝΑΙΩΝ*) = Callataÿ 1993b: 38; Smyrna (Tyche/Lion) = Callataÿ 1993b: 39; ‘Syros’ = Nicolet-Pierre and Amandry 1992 + Callataÿ 1993b: 39; Technitai of Dionysos = Lorber and Hoover 2003)

found in great numbers in hoards buried in north-western Syria). We do have die-studies for nearly all of them; meanwhile recent research allows us to propose refined chronologies.⁸⁹


There can be no reason to doubt that these wreathed coinages were produced in massive quantities over a relatively short period. The most up-to-date chronologies assume an early start at Myrina in c.160 BC (but see below for a probable later start-date in 154 BC, for historical reasons), and suggest that some cities were still striking in 135 BC. This slightly expands the period of striking to around 25 years, in contrast with the 10–20 years argued for in the recent past.⁹⁰ None the less, a comparison of the yearly averages obtained by several cities with the numbers provided on Table 6.11 (below) leads to the feeling that these wreathed issues were too abundant to be ordinary civic issues. Hence the notion that the silver for these issues must have been provided by the Attalids.⁹¹

If, as on Map 4, we compare the mints which were responsible for the cistophoroi with those responsible for the wreathed coinages,

⁸⁹ See Meadows and Houghton 2010.

⁹⁰ Ten years (c.155–145 BC): Le Rider 2001a: 50.

⁹¹ Rostovtzeff 1939; Kinns 1987: 107.



Map 4. Cistophoric mints and mints which produced wreathed tetradrachms, with their total productions estimated in equivalent of obverses for Attic drachms.

both in terms of location and volume, it looks like a co-ordinated phenomenon, Ephesos being the only coastal mint to strike cistophoroi. Today, most scholars agree that the wreath was simply a fashionable type without any explicit political meaning, and that these coinages were not intended to replace the Alexanders, which were not officially taken out of circulation.⁹²

Again, the massive presence of such coinages some thousands of kilometres to the east has been explained in various ways. Trade has been considered as the explanation by most modern commentators, with Seyrig and Le Rider at the forefront.⁹³ But, as argued by Psoma

⁹² *Contra* Boehringer 1972: 38–9; Giovannini 1978: 94–5 and 101–2; Giovannini 1982a. See Mørkholm 1980; Picard 1982: 249–50; Le Rider 2001a: 54. For a general presentation of these coinages, see also Gerin 1989.

⁹³ Seyrig 1973: 76 ('les nouveaux envahisseurs du marché'); Jones 1979; Sacks 1985: 26–9; Le Rider 2001a: 54–8. Amandry is more prudent (1989: 7, 'pour des raisons qui nous échappent').

in this volume (Chapter 8), and already by Hoover and McDonald, such a commercial explanation is hardly compatible with a cessation around 140 BC.⁹⁴ To this question—what commercial reason could there have been for cities under Attalid control to have stopped their large ‘civic’ issues around 140 BC?—we may add another one, which to my mind is still more destructive for the ‘trade’ explanation. What commercial reason could have impelled a city like Lebedos, which had never struck coinage before, suddenly to embark on such a spectacular monetary venture? The same question is valid for cities with a numismatic past: why did Myrina (111 obverses) or Kyme (84 obverses) suddenly decide to strike on an unprecedented scale? In addition, there is no correlation between the size of these wreathed coinages and the supposed commercial importance of the cities concerned, which again points to a phenomenon highly controlled at a higher level.⁹⁵

The military explanation seems preferable. Many authors have related how, in 153 BC, Alexander Balas was helped by Eumenes II in his seizure of the Seleukid throne from Demetrios I.⁹⁶ We are even informed about a certain Herakleides, who recruited mercenaries at Ephesos in this context.⁹⁷ We also know that at the conclusion of the war between King Prusias II of Bithynia and the Attalids (helped by the Romans), which ended with the defeat of Prusias in 154 BC, Prusias was required under the peace settlement to deliver twenty ships to Eumenes, as well as 500 talents within twenty years.⁹⁸ Prusias was also required to give 100 talents to the cities of ‘Methymna, Aigai, Kyme and Herakleia’.⁹⁹ It is hard not to connect this list of cities with the cities that started at the same moment to strike wreathed tetradrachms, even if the quoted amount of 100 talents looks here—a true exception to the rule!—substantially inferior to the wreathed monetary issues we are dealing with (8 obverse dies are enough to monetize 100 talents).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Psoma, Ch. 8 below; Hoover and McDonald 1999–2000.

⁹⁵ Callataÿ 1991: 79.

⁹⁶ See Psoma, below pp. 276–7.

⁹⁷ Polyb. 33.18.13–14.

⁹⁸ Kinns 1986b: 169; Psoma, below pp. 282–9.

⁹⁹ Polyb. 33.13.8.

¹⁰⁰ $8 \times 20,000 = 160,000$ tetradrachms = 640,000 drachms = 106.7 talents.

In Syria itself, as demonstrated by Duyrat, we do observe a remarkable twofold concentration of these hoards which include massive amounts of wreathed tetradrachms. Chronologically, the hoards are concentrated in the 140s BC, forming one of the two hoarding peaks for the region (the other is linked with Alexander the Great, a century and a half before); geographically, most of these hoards have been found in a narrow area in northern coastal Syria, south of Antioch, the very region where Alexander Balas landed and fought against Demetrios I.¹⁰¹ Again, such a restricted area of circulation would be difficult to explain for commercial reasons.

COMPARISONS WITH OTHER SILVER CIVIC COINAGES

Several die-studies allow us to compare the estimates obtained for the royal issues with what was attained by neighbouring Greek cities at the same period (Table 6.11). Not surprisingly, civic coinages are rarely to be compared with royal issues in terms of scale. With a yearly production of *c.*19 equivalent of obverse dies for Attic drachms, Rhodes (*c.*250–190 BC) stands well ahead of Alabanda (4.3), the Lykian League (3.5), Miletos (2.1), Phaselis (1.5), Ephesos (1.4), and Kos (1.3). A yearly average of 2 means that no more than 40,000 drachms ($2 \times 20,000$) were monetized every year, which is less than 7 talents or—to take the usual transcription—the possibility of paying in fresh coins fewer than 200 unskilled workers (at 1 drachm per day and 200 days a year). For cities like Miletos and Ephesos, reputed to have a population greater than 100,000 at the end of the Hellenistic period, this is a very low result indeed, which—taken as such—does not in itself suggest a particularly high level of monetization, as has sometimes been intuitively advocated for this period.

¹⁰¹ Duyrat 2011. *IGCH* 1556: northern Syria; *IGCH* 1557: Teffaha, *c.*20 km east of Tartus; *IGCH* 1559: Akkar, *c.*45 km south-west of Homs; *IGCH* 1560: Ghonsle, *c.*15 km. east of Baniyas; *IGCH* 1562: Aleppo; *IGCH* 1567: Baarin, *c.*15 km. south-east of Massyaf.

Table 6.11. Estimated monetary volumes for contemporaneous cities and leagues

Coinages	o	n	n/o	O (Carter)	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Total Ephesos bee drachms (c.202–150?)	70 ¹⁰²	590	8.43	72.2	72.2	1.4
Magnesia didrachms 10.9 g (c.210–200)	5	14	2.80	6.6	17.1	1.7
Miletos total Period IV (c.259–246)	–	–	–	–	59.8	4.6
Miletos total Period V (c.225–190)	–	–	–	–	222.0	6.3
Miletos total Period VI (c.175–86/5)	–	–	–	–	89.1	1.0
Total Miletos (c.259–86/5) ¹⁰³	–	–	–	–	370.9	2.1
Alabanda Series I–II (c.200–190)	3	85	28.33	3.0	12.0	1.0
Alabanda Series III Alex. (c.170–152)	40	635	15.88	40.0	120.0	6.7
Alabanda Series IV (c.145–140) ¹⁰⁴	7	67	9.57	7.0	28.0	5.6
Alabanda Series V ‘cisto.’ (c.167–134)	22	42	1.91	37.5	112.5	3.4
Total Alabanda (c.197–133)					272.5	4.3
Hydisos hemidrachms c.2.2 g (c.150?)	3	15	5.00	3.3	1.7	?
Stratonikeia drachms 3.0 g (c.130–90)	2	8	4.00	2.3	1.6	
Stratonikeia hemidrachms 1.5 g (c.130–90)	62	305	4.92	69.1	24.7	0.6
Total Stratonikeia (c.130–90)					26.3	0.7
Mylasa tetra. (c.246–230 ?)	5	12	2.40	7.1	28.4	1.8
Mylasa ps.-Rhodian drachms (c.165–130)	107	619	5.79	115.9	60.7	1.7
Mylasa ps.-Rhodian hemidr. (c.166?)	41	135	3.29	50.4	14.4	?
Kos Issue XI 6.5 g (c.280–250)	11	90	8.18	11.4	17.6	0.6

(continued)

¹⁰² Kosmetatou 1996 (in an unpublished article) came to different numbers (102 obverse dies for 456 coins). Preference is to be given to the thorough study of Kinns 1999, which included more material and postulated fewer dies.

¹⁰³ The evidence gathered by Deppert-Lippitz has been considerably enlarged by Kinns (1986a and 1998).

¹⁰⁴ 67 coins instead of 63 in Meadows 2008.

Table 6.11. Continued

Coinages	o	n	n/o	O (Carter)	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Kos Issue XII 3.0 g (c.280–210)	33	189	5.73	35.8	25.6	0.4
Kos Issue XIII 1.3 g (c.280–210)	39	261	6.69	41.4	12.8	0.2
Kos Issue XIV 15.1 g (c.280–250)	16	142	8.88	16.4	59.0	2.0
Kos Issue XV 6.6 g (c.250–240)	7	18	2.57	9.6	15.1	1.5
Kos Issue XXIII 3.1 g (c.180–170) ¹⁰⁵	16	28	1.75	30.2	22.3	2.2
Kos Issue XXIV 1.5 g (c.180–170)	14	20	1.43	37.2	13.3	1.3
Kos tetrobols 2.1 g (c.145–88)	110	216	1.96	182.0	91.0	1.6
Total Kos (c.280–88)					256.7	1.3
Rhodes (c.250–230)	–	–	–	–	396.0	19.8
Rhodes (c.230–205)	–	–	–	–	246.0	9.8
Rhodes (c.205–190)	–	–	–	–	482.0	32.1
Total Rhodes (c.250–190)	–	–	–	–	1,124.0	18.7
Rhodes Plinthophoric 2.8 g (c.185–84)	829	1,583	1.91	1,411.9	941.3	9.3
Rhodes post-plintho. 4.2 (c.60–25?)	120	427	3.56	144.2	144.2	4.1
Lykian League drachms (c.167–77)	201	307	1.53	467.1	312.0	3.5
Phaselis staters 10.3 g (c.250–221)	35	126	3.60	41.9	102.8	3.5
Phaselis staters 11.1 g (c.167–130)	21	52	2.48	29.4	77.7	2.1
Total Phaselis (c.250–130)¹⁰⁶					180.5	1.5
Perge tetra. Artemis Series I (c.200–190)	7	42	6.00	7.5	30.0	3.0
Perge tetra. Artemis Serie II (c.170–100)	20	41	2.05	31.8	127.2	1.8
Total Perge (c.200–100)	–	–	–	49.3	157.2	1.6

(Ephesos = Kinns 1999; Magnesia = Kinns 1989; Miletos = Deppert-Lippitz 1984; Kinns 1986a; Kinns 1998; Alabanda = Meadows 2008; Hydisos = Delrieux 2007a; Stratonikeia = Meadows 2002a; Mylasa = Delrieux 1999; Ashton 1992; Ashton 1999; Kos = Ingvaldsen 2002; Kroll 1964; Rhodes = Ashton 2001a: 92; Jenkins 1989 [plinthophoric]; Ashton and Weiss 1997 [post-plinthophoric]; Lykian League = Troxell 1982; Perge = Colin 1996)

¹⁰⁵ Höghammar 2007 has published preliminary die-studies for four Koan silver issues struck from c.200 onwards (using only the evidence of a few major coin cabinets): Issue A (9 coins, 7 obverses), Issue B (1 coin), Issue C (8 coins, 6 obverses), and Issue D (9 coins, 5 obverses).

¹⁰⁶ Not taking into account the Alexanders (similarly for Perge).

ENLARGING PERSPECTIVES

We can now compare the many coinages treated in this quantitative survey. Table 6.12 sums up the main conclusions, with slightly adapted chronologies, in relation to the arguments presented in this paper. The date of 175 BC adopted for the start of the cistophoroi, and 170 BC for the end of the Philetairoi, are nothing more than compromises between high and low chronologies. They have nothing to recommend them in themselves, but adopting a mean value will protect our general yearly estimates from being too seriously affected by future developments of the current controversy.

These comparisons reserve a couple of surprises. During the first century of Attalid rule (c.273–170 BC), the Philetairoi were indeed produced on a small scale, approximately 6.5 times less than the annual production of cistophoroi over the course of the following century, before and after the legacy of Attalos III in 133 BC (c.170–67 BC). This statement holds true whatever the precise chronology adopted for the introduction of the cistophoroi. Incidentally, the range of the difference (7.8 before Apameia, c.53.1 after) is roughly in line with the increase of either territory or population for the Attalid kingdom after 188 BC.¹⁰⁷ Another surprise is the tremendous amount of tetradrachms with a wreath on their reverse struck by cities around the mid-second century BC. The chronology is debated, and it may well be that these coinages were issued in less than the span of nineteen years here adopted; either way, they were for a period a bigger coinage than the cistophoroi themselves. Finally, many readers may be astonished to learn that the Attalid cistophoroi were for a century a coinage struck in higher volumes than the Athenian stephanephoric tetradrachms which were supposed to have invaded the markets everywhere (even though, in absolute terms, more Athenian tetradrachms were eventually issued).

To go further, Table 6.13 is an attempt to quantify, every fifty years from 250 BC to 100 BC, how some major Hellenistic coinages evolved, putting the Attalids in the broad perspective of the Hellenistic world. This is part of a larger project which aims to quantify all

¹⁰⁷ See Thonemann, Ch. 1 above, pp. 1–2.

Table 6.12. Comparisons of the main results with the late cistophoroi (c.133–67 bc) and Athens (c.180–45 bc)

Coinages	Years	O (drachm)	Yearly O (drachm)
Philetairoi (c.282–165)	117	916	7.8
Pre-Apameian Alexanders (c.223–189)	34	1,331	38.0
Post-Apameian Alexanders (c.188–160)	28	600	21.4
Early cistophoroi (c.175–133)	42	2,232	53.1
Wreathed coinages (c.154–135)	19	1,459	76.8
Late cistophoroi (c.130–67)	63	3,200	50.8
Athens (c.180–45)	135	5,328	39.5

(Philetairoi = Table 1; pre-Apameian Alexanders = Table 4; post-Apameian Alexanders = Table 9; cistophoroi = Table 8; wreathed coinages = Table 10; late cistophoroi = Kleiner 1979 [Apameia], Callatay 1997a: 160–79 [Ephesos] and 1993a: 39–40; Athens = Thompson 1961 and Callatay 1993a: 33)

Greek coinages from their very beginnings to the end of the Hellenistic world.

The Ptolemies come first with a yearly average in Attic drachms of 100 or more obverse dies. The Seleukids come next with a total production which seems to remain stable around 40 obverse dies per year.¹⁰⁸ In other words, with a long-lasting average of 50 obverse dies per year, the cistophoric coinage represents a higher annual monetization in terms of value (and let us recall that this value is here established as equal with an Attic tetradrachm) than that which was achieved in the Seleukid kingdom. Considering differences of areas and revenues, this comes as a surprise too.

I would make only two brief general comments. First, the general coherence of this table is a powerful argument for the value of this kind of calculation: everything seems proportionate to what we might expect. The absence of any absurd result (which, at this stage of the evidence, would certainly happen if the average productivity per die differed significantly from one place to another) is very encouraging for the trustworthiness of the entire set of data. Secondly, the general trend (Table 6.13, last row: total) is one of growth over time. As the evidence gathered here includes many of the most substantial coinages of the period (Ptolemies, Seleukids, Attalids, Athens,

¹⁰⁸ Antioch, first just one mint among several others, played a major role from Antiochos IV onwards.

Table 6.13. An essay in quantifying (in yearly average of the equivalent of obverse dies for Attic drachms) the evolution of some Hellenistic major silver coinages (250–100 BC)

Coinages	250 BC	200 BC	150 BC	100 BC
Attalid kings	17.0	3.7	51.9	50.8
Wreathed tetradrachms (c.155–140)	–	–	76.8	–
Late Alexanders (c.210–190)	–	38.4	–	–
Seleukid kings	(c.30?)	44.4	c.60	42.4
Ptolemaic kings	132.0	(c.100?)	(c.100?)	76.0
Pontic kings	–	1.6	–	21.3
Bithynian kings	–	(c.10?)	c.20.0	31.8
Cappadocian kings	–	–	–	5.1
Rhodes	19.8	32.1	7.8	7.8
Miletos	4.6	6.3	1.0	1.0
Alabanda	–	1.0	6.2	–
Athens	low	low	27.7	56.1
Total	203.4	237.5	342.0	292.3

(see above, Tables 6.2 and 6.11, Callataÿ 1993a; Callataÿ 2005a; Le Rider and Callataÿ 2006: 226–30 [Ptolemies and Seleukids]; Houghton 1991: 80 [late Seleukids]; Houghton 2002: 15 [Seleukids, c.150 BC])

Rhodes, minor Hellenistic kingdoms), it is likely that this trend is indicative of what really happened. In other words, missing issues are plentiful (especially Macedonia and the Thracian area), but it is less and less likely that they could carry enough weight to modify the general tendency. This tendency undermines the otherwise attractive idea that the Romans seized and brought to Rome a substantial part of the monetized metal circulating in the Hellenistic world: this notion is simply not supported by the quantitative data.¹⁰⁹

ANNEXE I: HOARDS OF CISTOPHOROI

IGCH 352 = *CH* II 125 Hierapytna (Crete), 1933 (30 cistophoroi + 40 Athens)

IGCH 1326 Balikesir (Mysia), 1958, c.133–130 BC (c.100 cistophoroi—New York 28)

¹⁰⁹ Callataÿ 1993a: 44–6. There is some regrettable confusion between the statement in Callataÿ 1993a: 45 ('voilà ce dont on doutera': *i.e.* that 1,000 tons of silver, out of 3,000, quitted the Hellenistic world to reach Rome) and what can be read in the general conclusion of the book, where the authors endorse the idea (Callataÿ et al. 1993: 91–3).

- IGCH* 1327 **Yeşilhisar (Mysia)**, 1963, near Savaştepe, c.130 BC (14 cistophoroi—Istanbul 100)
- IGCH* 1328 **Sahnali (Karia)**, 1952, near Dalama, c.130–125 BC (18 cistophoroi—Ankara)
- IGCH* 1340 **Smyrna (Ionia)**, 1865, second century BC (40 tetra. and 3 dra. of Smyrna + some cistophoroi—dispersed)
- IGCH* 1358 = *CH* V 52 **Karacebey (Mysia)**, 1929, ancient Miletropolis, c.75 BC (271 cistophoroi [Ephesos to year 56 and Tralleis to year 9]—Istanbul)
- IGCH* 1359 **Çesme (Ionia)**, 1960, anc. Erythrai, c.70–65 BC (4 cisto. of Pergamon [80–67 BC] + 15 dra. Chios, 14 stephanephoroi Athens, 2 imit. Athens, 1 late Lysimachos [Byzantion], 1 tetra. Mithradates VI, 1 tetra. Nikomedes II—Boston 38)
- IGCH* 1383 = *CH* II 113 **Giresun (Pontos)**, 1933, c.77 BC (3 cistophoroi [Ephesos, Pergamon, Apameia], 22 tetra. Mithradates VI, 18 Athens, 7 tetra. Nikomedes II–IV, 3 dra. Cappadocian kings, 2 tetra. Antiochos VII—Istanbul)
- IGCH* 1415 **Afyon Karahisar (Phrygia)**, 1876, c.133 BC (120+ cistophoroi [10+ Apameia, 110+ unc. mints])
- IGCH* 1452 **Asia Minor**, c.1876, c.150–145 BC (54 cistophoroi—dispersed)
- IGCH* 1453 **Asia Minor**, c.1962, c.150–140 BC (57 cistophoroi + 11 tetra. Prusias I and II, 8 tetra. Demetrios I, 5 tetra. Side, 5 tetra. Eumenes II)
- IGCH* 1455 **Asia Minor**, c.1928, c.125 BC (158+ cistophoroi—New York 65 and London 16)
- IGCH* 1456 **Asia Minor**, 1971, c.105–100 BC (9+ cistophoroi—casts at the ANS)
- IGCH* 1458 **Asia Minor**, 1955 or earlier, c.100 BC (43+ cistophoroi—New York 43)
- IGCH* 1459 **Asia Minor**, c.1935, c.95 BC (130+ cistophoroi—New York 24)
- IGCH* 1460 **Asia Minor**, 1970, c.95–90 BC (30+ cistophoroi—New York 30)
- IGCH* 1461 **Asia Minor**, 1966, c.88 BC (26+ cistophoroi—casts at the ANS)
- IGCH* 1462 **Asia Minor**, 1961, c.85–80 BC (25+ cistophoroi—casts at the ANS)
- IGCH* 1464 **Asia Minor**, 1971, c.50–40 BC (29+ cistophoroi—casts at the ANS)

- IGCH* 1466 Asia Minor, before 1722, first century BC (10 cistophoroi—Oxford)
- IGCH* 1467 Asia Minor, 1968, first century BC (c.200 cistophoroi—dispersed)
- IGCH* 1746 = *CH* I 105 **Sarnakonuk**, 1945, 31 BC (15 cistophoroi + 215 Roman denarii, 58 Seleukids, etc.)
- CH* II 94 Ionia, 1974, mid-second century BC (50+ cistophoroi).
- CH* VIII 437 Unknown find-spot, 1982, c.160 BC (42+ cistophoroi [all first series of K and N]—BM 2)
- CH* VIII 446 **Polath (Phrygia)**, 1985, near Ankara, c.150–140 BC (37 cistophoroi—Ankara)
- CH* VIII 447 Unknown find-spot, ?, c.150–100 BC (50+ cistophoroi—dispersed, see *Münzzentrum Köln* 41, Aug. 1992, nos. 500–50)
- CH* VIII 521 **East coast of Antikythera**, 1976, c.75–50 BC (36 cistophoroi [31 Pergamon to 67 BC] + 3 bronzes Ephesos—Athens)
- CH* VIII 525 Asia Minor, 1991/1992, c.65 BC (cistophoroi—dispersed, see *Münzzentrum Köln* 41, Aug. 1992)
- CH* VIII 526 Unknown find-spot, 1990, c.65 BC (c.98 cistophoroi—dispersed)
- CH* VIII 536 = IX 568 **Pergamon (Mysia)**, 1987, c.50 BC (65 cistophoroi [17 Ephesos and 48 Pergamon]—Pergamon)
- CH* VIII 537 Unknown find-spot, 1986, after 48 BC (65+ cistophoroi—dispersed, see *Lanz* 36, 21 April 1986)
- CH* IX 524 Unknown find-spot, 1999 or earlier, mid- to late second century BC (cistophoroi—Uşak)
- CH* IX 535 **Ahmetbeyli (Ionia)**, anc. Kolophon, 1973, c.120 BC (25 cistophoroi—Izmir)
- CH* IX 558 **Gridia (Chios)**, 1959, c.75 BC (2 cistophoroi [Pergamon] + 14 dra. Chios, 1 Athens and 1 Roman denarius [RRC 340])
- CH* IX 560 Unknown find-spot (**Mysia**), 1993 or before, c.70 BC (177 cistophoroi [140 Laodikeia, 29 Apameia, 8 Tralleis]—Private coll. New York)

Mixed hoards (chronological order)

- IGCH* 1340 **Smyrna (Ionia)**, 1865, second century BC (40 tetra. and 3 dra. of Smyrna + some cistophoroi—dispersed)
- IGCH* 1453 Asia Minor, c.1962, c.150–140 BC (57 cistophoroi + 11 tetra. Prusias I and II, 8 tetra. Demetrios I, 5 tetra. Side, 5 tetra. Eumenes II)

- IGCH* 1383 **Giresun (Pontus)**, 1933, c.80 BC (3 cistophoroi [Ephesos, Pergamon, Apameia], 22 tetra. Mithradates VI, 18 Athens, 7 tetra. Nikomedes II–IV, 3 dra. Cappadocian kings, 2 tetra. Antiochos VII—Istanbul)
- CH* IX 558 **Gridia (Chios)**, 1959, c.75 BC (2 cistophoroi [Pergamon] + 14 dra. Chios, 1 Athens and 1 Roman denarius [*RRC* 340])
- IGCH* 1359 **Çesme (Ionia)**, 1960, anc. Erythrai, c.70–65 BC (4 cisto. of Pergamon [80–67 BC] + 15 dra. Chios, 14 stephanephoroi Athens, 2 imit. Athens, 1 late Lysimachos [Byzantion], 1 tetra. Mithradates VI, 1 tetra. Nikomedes II—Boston 38)
- CH* VIII 521 **East coast of Antikythera**, 1976, c.75–50 BC (36 cistophoroi [31 Pergamon to 67 BC] + 3 bronzes Ephesos—Athens)
- IGCH* 352 = *CH* II 125 **Hierapytna (Crete)**, 1933, c.44–42 BC (30 cistophoroi + 43 Athens, 200 Roman denarii, etc.)
- IGCH* 1746 = *CH* I 105 **Sarnakonuk**, 1945, 31 BC (15 cistophoroi + 215 Roman denarii, 58 Seleukids, etc.)

Hoard with known provenance and buried before 130 BC (chronological order)

- IGCH* 1340 **Smyrna (Ionia)**, 1865, second century BC (40 tetra. and 3 dra. of Smyrna + some cistophoroi—dispersed)
- CH* VIII 446 **Polath (Phrygia)**, 1985, near Ankara, c.150–140 BC (37 cistophoroi—Ankara)
- IGCH* 1415 **Afyon Karahisar (Phrygia)**, 1876, c.133 BC (120+ cistophoroi [10+ Apameia, 110+ unc. mints])
- IGCH* 1326 **Balikesir (Mysia)**, 1958, c.133–130 BC (c.100 cistophoroi—New York 28)
- IGCH* 1327 **Yeşilhisar (Mysia)**, 1963, near Savaştepe, c.130 BC (104 cistophoroi—Istanbul 100)
- IGCH* 1328 **Sahneli (Caria)**, 1952, near Dalama, c.130–125 BC (18 cistophoroi—Ankara)
- CH* IX 535 **Ahmetbeyli (Ionia)**, anc. Kolophon, 1973, c.120 BC (25 cistophoroi—Izmir)

The Use of the Cistophoric Weight-Standard Outside the Pergamene Kingdom

There is as yet no consensus on the date of introduction of the cistophoroi, which has of course a significant bearing on the present paper, and is worth discussion here. Until recently opinion had been hardening among numismatists in favour of a high date for the start if not in the late 190s BC as proposed by Kenneth Harl, then at least in the 180s perhaps in a reorganization after the Peace of Apameia, as proposed by Henri Seyrig, Georges Le Rider, Martin Price, Le Rider, and Callataÿ, and most recently by Selene Psoma. However, Andrew Meadows in the present volume reexamines the hoard evidence, and concludes that a low date is more likely, perhaps in the early 160s, close to the date of 166 adopted by Kleiner and Noe. He comes to a view similar to that of Hélène Nicolet-Pierre in 1989, though he discounts a date as late as 159, to which she was tempted.¹ Callataÿ in the present volume is inclined to accept Meadows' proposal. The evidence from which Meadows argues mostly concerns the representation in hoards of Attic-weight Philetairoi struck with the same control marks as certain Pergamene cistophoroi. It is certainly troubling for those who argue in favour of a high date, but it is far from conclusive, for the hoard record is not comprehensive and some of the known hoards may have been inadequately recorded or suffered contamination. Moreover, there are several objections to the low date.

First, a cistophoric tetradrachm of Apameia from relatively late in the sequence established by Kleiner and Noe is reported, on reasonably good authority, to have occurred in the Larisa (Thessaly) 1968 hoard, which was concealed in the early to mid-160s. This led Price to push the start-date of the cistophoroi back to 180 or earlier.²

Secondly, a well-known letter sent in 182/1 by Eumenes II to his governor in Telmessos mentions that the Attalid poll-tax payable there amounted to the curious sum of 4 Rhodian drachms and 1 obol. In this enclave of Attalid territory acquired after the Peace of Apameia and surrounded by Rhodian lands it would be natural to pay taxes in the Rhodian currency most commonly used in the region. In 182/1 it is virtually certain that a 'Rhodian drachm' would have been a plinthophoric drachm, weighing about 3.05 g, and 4 drachms plus 1 obol would come to 12.6 g of silver, precisely the weight of a cistophoric tetradrachm, which, one might conclude, must by then have been in existence.³ The alternative explanation that this sum was at the time regarded as 3 Attic-weight drachms is improbable given the complete absence of denominations lower than the tetradrachm from the Philetairic series: for payment of a kingdom-wide tax regarded as 3 Attic drachms one should surely have expected the state to strike a stock at least of drachms on that standard.

Thirdly, one might cite the episode in which countermarks in the form of a bow in case and abbreviations of the names of most of the cities which issued cistophoroi were applied to Attic-weight tetradrachms from Pamphylian cities. The latest datable coin to which such a countermark was applied belongs to 186/5, and the countermarking exercise, whatever its purpose,⁴ is thus usually dated to the

² *IGCH* 237; Price 1989: 240.

³ Ashton 1994; Austin 2006: no. 238; *TN* II no. A7. For the considerable number of Rhodian coins in the Archaeological Museum at Fethiye (Telmessos) and circulating in Lykia, see also Ashton 1998a: 43, and below.

⁴ The simplest explanation for the cistophoric countermarks is that they allowed foreign Attic-weight tetradrachms to circulate at par with the royal Attic-weight tetradrachms (the Philetairoi), their owners paying a small fee for the privilege. It is unlikely that the countermarks were applied to allow Attic-weight tetradrachms to circulate within the Pergamene kingdom at par with the cistophoric tetradrachms: the difference in weight is simply too great—the Alexander tetradrachms would lose over a quarter of their value inside the kingdom, and they would surely have been consigned to the melting-pot or exported outside the kingdom; see also Harl 1991: 276, 284. For the same reason it is equally implausible that 'On the frontiers of the Attalid kingdom one silver Attic weight tetradrachm was most probably exchanged for one silver *cistophorus* with a 25% gain, just as in Ptolemaic Egypt' (Psoma 2009:

180s, though Callataÿ argues above for a later date. To support his low dating of the start of the cistophoroi, Meadows is obliged to divorce these countermarks from the cistophoroi, and to explain them as a means of validating foreign Attic-weight currency for use within the kingdom at a time, in the 180s, when on his hypothesis the only locally struck silver was in the form of Alexander tetradrachms, which are now very rare (5 specimens known from 5 obverse dies: see p. 163 above). But the countermarking phenomenon seems too rare to bear this interpretation (only 149 identifiable examples: Callataÿ, above p. 221, Table 6.6), and the coincidence of cities applying the countermarks and cities signing the cistophoric coinage seems too marked.⁵

Fourthly, unless the cistophoroi began at least as early as the 180s, one is hard-pressed to find a convincing amount of Attalid coinage, notwithstanding the Alexanders and the countermarking operation, to service the needs of the newly and hugely expanded kingdom.

Finally, and more controversially, there are the four well-known references in Livy to cistophoroi in Roman triumphs in 190, 189, and 187. Livy makes an explicit distinction between coinage of cistophoric weight and coinage of Attic weight on display, and his figures are remarkably precise, having the air of being drawn ultimately from official records: what Seyrig calls 'l'impressionnante minutie de Tite-Live'.⁶ Those favouring a later date for the introduction of the

170–1, apparently following Le Rider 1989a: 181). The Ptolemaic case requires caution. First, although there seems no doubt that from the third century only Ptolemaic coinage was legal tender in Egypt and that imported foreign coinage was restruck, the direct evidence (*P.Cair.Zen.* I.59021 = *TN* 496, dated 258/7 BC) relates only to gold coins, and we do not know what mechanism or *agio* was applied to foreign silver; if Attic-weight tetradrachms had to be exchanged for Ptolemaic at par, the 3 g difference in weight (17%) was less than the difference between Attic and cistophoric tetradrachms. Second, a merchant arriving in Egypt, especially if he came by sea, would have far fewer opportunities to use his Attic tetradrachms at or close to their silver value than would a merchant arriving in the Pergamene kingdom with its plethora of states using Attic currency within and near its borders. Third, it may be that the lower cost of living in Egypt offset the pain of the exchange loss, which may not have been the case in the Pergamene kingdom (Le Rider 1986b: 46). See in general Le Rider 1986b: 39–51.

⁵ Bauslaugh 1990; Meadows, above pp. 170–3; Callataÿ, above pp. 219–27. Meadows, above p. 170, relates the bow-in-case of the countermarks to the bow symbol in the right reverse field of the Philetairoi, but the similarity is slight, and the bow-in-case resembles far more closely the reverse type of the cistophoric tetradrachms.

⁶ Seyrig 1963a: 24 n. 1. Livy 37.46.3 (in the triumph of Glabrio in 190: 113,000 Attic-weight tetradrachms and 249,000 cistophoroi); 37.58.4 (Regillus in 189: 34,200

cistophoroi have, of course, provided explanations for the Livian references, for example Livy's inaccuracy in numismatic matters elsewhere; the ease with which he may have anachronistically borrowed the term from the cistophoroi circulating in Asia in his own day; or, the currently favoured explanation, Seyrig's inherently improbable suggestion that, for Livy, 'cistophorus' simply denoted any coinage which was not of Attic weight.⁷ Such explanations are of necessity special pleading, and it should be noted that had the Livian references applied to events just a couple of years later they would have caused no eyebrows to be raised: it would seem cavalier to dismiss without further ado and by default evidence which in other circumstances would be regarded as of prime importance.

The principal obstacle to accepting Livy's references as they stand used to be the presence in the important 1956 Mektepihi hoard of 14 Philetairoi from Westermarck's penultimate Group VI and none from her final Group VII, suggesting strongly that Group VII was struck after c.190, the date hitherto assigned to the hoard's burial.⁸ Since the last of the Group VII Philetairoi overlap the earliest cistophoroi at Pergamum, the latter could not have been struck until a few years later. However, more recently, Meadows' convincing revision of the date of the Mektepihi hoard to c.195 means that there is room for Group VII between its burial and the end of the decade, close to where Westermarck had originally placed it (197–c.190).⁹

Apart from Meadows' arguments from hoards in the present volume, the principal current argument against acceptance of Livy is the fact that the first issues of cistophoroi at Pergamon and

Attic-weight tetradrachms and 132,300 cistophoroi); 37.59.3–5 (Scipio Asiaticus in 189: 224,000 Attic-weight tetradrachms and 321,070 cistophoroi); 39.7.1 (Vulso in 187: 127,000 Attic-weight tetradrachms and 250,000 cistophoroi). It is worth noting that Livy mentions only Attic-weight coins and no cistophoroi among silver coins on display at the triumph of Nobilior in 187, perhaps because the victories celebrated, over the Aitolians and Kephallenia in western Greece, had no connection with Pergamene forces or Asia Minor (39.5.14–15).

⁷ See in general Kleiner and Noe 1977: 10–18. See Briscoe 1981: 363 *ad* Livy 37.46.3, 'an annalistic anachronism', but for counter-examples of Livy's reliability in numismatic matters, see Harl 1991: 290. Seyrig's explanation (1963a: 24 n 1) was followed by *TN* II: 204 under no. 355 (though implicitly contradicted on 224–5 under no. 420), and, in more elaborate form, by Psoma 2009: 170–6.

⁸ *IGCH* 1410. Philetairoi: Westermarck 1961.

⁹ Olcay and Seyrig 1965: 14, 29–30; Kleiner and Noe 1977: 15, 22; Meadows 2009a: 66–7.

Ephesos, and to a lesser extent those of Tralleis, Sardeis, and Apameia, share some stylistic idiosyncracies which suggest that they may be contemporary, whereas the last four cities were subject to Antiochos III until his defeat at Magnesia in late 190.¹⁰ Nevertheless, it would be feasible to argue that Eumenes II began to mint cistophoroi at Pergamon in 192 or 191, and sent Glabrio his 249,000 cistophoric tetradrachms as an unattested subsidy before or after the victory over Antiochos III at Thermopylai in 191 which earned Glabrio his triumph in 190; or, alternatively, that Glabrio's cistophoroi were part of the booty from Antiochos III's camp in Greece, which Antiochos III may have earlier acquired from Asia Minor. Secondly, Ephesos and Tralleis were among the first cities to surrender to Scipio after the battle of Magnesia and the senate in Rome already in 189 BC had agreed that Antiochos' former possessions north of Karia should be assigned to Eumenes.¹¹ Hence, one can argue that at least some of the cistophoroi struck in the name of cities other than Pergamon began as early as this.¹²

On balance, I am therefore inclined to accept a high date for the start of the cistophoroi, in the late 190s or the 180s, and the following paragraphs are drafted on that assumption. However, as we shall see, the conclusions do not have to be radically modified in order to fit the requirements of a later introduction.

Very few examples of cistophoric tetradrachms and their fractions from the time of the Attalids are known to have been found outside the boundaries of the kingdom: they would, of course, have fared ill against the Attic-weight coinage which prevailed outside the kingdom. There is a single cistophoric tetradrachm, and that plated, in the museum at Fethiye/Telmessos on the coast between Karia and Lykia, but Telmessos was in any case an enclave granted to the Attalids by the Peace of Apameia and surrounded by Rhodian lands.¹³ We noted above a single cistophoric tetradrachm reported in the 1968 Larisa hoard buried in the early to mid-160s (which also contained two Pergamene Attic-weight tetradrachms).¹⁴ The huge

¹⁰ Kleiner and Noe 1977: 41–2, 60, 86–7.

¹¹ Livy 37.45.1; Polyb. 21.24.7.

¹² See also Harl 1991: 285. Thonemann's characterization of Harl's arguments as 'incoherent' is unduly harsh (2011a: 170 n. 104).

¹³ The plated tetradrachm was recorded in 1992–3, when John Casey and I worked on the ancient coins in the museum.

¹⁴ *IGCH* 237; Price 1989: 239–40.

numbers of cistophoroi reported by Livy in Roman triumphs in 190, 189, and 187 can hardly represent evidence of their circulation in mainland Greece: if the references are not anachronisms (on which see above), these cistophoroi may have formed part of financial aid given to the Roman commanders by Eumenes II, and to have been treated more like bullion. Even after the kingdom became the Roman province of Asia, very few of the later cistophoroi are found outside the province.¹⁵ All this seems to chime with an initial impression that the cistophoric coinage had remarkably little influence on the coinages of states that bordered on the kingdom; little attempt was made to imitate its types, and very little imitation of its weight-standard has been detected.

Within the Attalid kingdom only Ephesos among the former city-states is known to have struck both cistophoroi and autonomous coinage in local types on the Attic weight-standard, although it is possible that the rare cistophoroi of Smyrna antedate the end of the kingdom and thus complement that city's Attic-weight Homer-type silver (the latter continued in any case until the first century).¹⁶ No examples are known of cities within the kingdom striking coinage of cistophoric weight but with autonomous, local types. However, in the first half of the first century, after the kingdom had been converted into the Roman province of Asia, this phenomenon is known in two very rare and isolated cases. Magnesia on the Maeander struck a remarkable issue of didrachms, known in just two die-duplicate examples weighing 6.04 and 5.92 g, with a right-facing bust of Artemis on the obverse, and on the reverse a stag grazing to right on a strip of Maeander pattern, with a star above its back. The grazing stag and star are otherwise unknown at Magnesia, and Philip Kinns has recently noted the similarity with Mithradatic coinage both struck in the Pontic region and by Mithradates VI at Pergamon around 88–85. He uses other numismatic and epigraphic evidence to corroborate this date.¹⁷

¹⁵ Rare exceptions include three examples in the 1933 hoard from Giresun=Kerasos-Pharnaakeia, Pontos (Kleiner 1974), and around 90 mostly proconsular cistophoroi in *IGCH* 352 from Hierapetra, Crete; there is a hoard of 10 late Pergamene cistophoric tetradrachms, and a single such coin, in the archaeological museum of Kos (information from Vassiliki Stefanaki). See also Callataÿ 1997a: 174 n. 34.

¹⁶ Ephesos: Kinns 1999, esp. 81–2. Smyrna: Kinns 1987: 107–8.

¹⁷ Kinns 2006, discussing the then unique didrachm weighing 6.04 g. The second example was offered in auction by G. Hirsch (Munich) 256 (5.v.2008), 223. Following normal Hellenistic practice, cistophoric fractions—didrachms and drachms—weigh

Secondly, Alexandria Troas in 69/68 struck Attic-weight tetradrachms with types head of Apollo l./statue of Apollo Smintheus, signed by a certain Diophanes; at the same time it struck an issue of tetradrachms with the same signature and types (though with a dotted border on the obverse and a laurel border on the reverse, both features unique in the series), but with noticeably smaller diameter and lower weight: the only specimen known weighs 12.11 g, and it is difficult to interpret this as other than a tetradrachm of cistophoric weight.¹⁸ There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of any of these three coins, but they are extraordinarily rare, and one can only suggest that the unusual combination of local types and cistophoric weight undermined confidence in their respective issues, driving them out of circulation and into the melting-pot.

Outside the kingdom instances of the *direct* influence of the cistophoric standard on local coinage are also rare. Two issues of silver from Byzantion, both now known in only one specimen, have been very tentatively identified as didrachms of cistophoric weight. The first, with types head of Poseidon left/prow left, with signature *EIII ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΥ*, weighs 5.67 g (pierced). The second has the types head of Athena profile left/cow standing left, with signature *EIII ΔΙΟΚΑΕΙ(. . .)*, and weighs 5.88 g. Schönert-Geiss suggested that the first was an octobol of Attic weight and the second a didrachm of cistophoric weight. In the latest study of the mint, Marinescu suggests that they may be minted to the same standard, whether Attic, cistophoric, local or something else. He dates the first to about 195 and the second to about 175. It would be rash to base much on two coins of such ambiguous weight-standard, but, if they were of cistophoric weight, and if Marinescu's dates were approximately correct, they would provide some weak evidence for an early introduction of the cistophoric system.¹⁹

less than their theoretical weight, presumably to reflect the proportionately higher cost of producing them when set against the cost of producing tetradrachms. Thus the cistophoric didrachm weighs around 6.15 g and the drachm around 3.05 g, against 12.6 g for the tetradrachm: see Kleiner and Noe 1977: 17, 128–9.

¹⁸ Callataÿ 1997a: 152, D10/R2 and pl. 39. I am grateful to Philip Kinns for directing my attention to this coin and to the didrachms of Magnesia on the Maeander.

¹⁹ Schönert-Geiss 1970: 64–5 and 137 no. 1043 (also citing a second example of unknown weight in a Bulgarian publication); 74 and 147 no. 1251 (weight given as 5.96 g in error). Marinescu 1996: 383–4 and 456–7.

Silver coins aiming at a weight-standard of about 12.2 g were struck at Alabanda in a series bearing letter dates from 1 to 33, probably in the period from the early 160s to the 130s BC. Their types are on obverse a head of Apollo profile right, and on reverse Pegasus galloping right surrounded by a laurel wreath, Series 5 in Meadows' classification.²⁰ These coins could have passed for tetradrachms on the cistophoric standard employed in the Attalid kingdom just across the Maeander to the north. However, a smaller denomination accompanied them with types head of Apollo profile right on the obverse and a tripod in a laurel wreath on the reverse, and with the same letter dates. They weigh around 7.8–8 g; there seems little doubt that they represented didrachms and that the larger coins were also regarded as tridrachms on a local, presumably Attic, standard. The reason for the adoption of this highly unusual didrachm/tridrachm system was presumably to facilitate exchange with cistophoroi. This didrachm/tridrachm coinage was fairly large with an estimated total of 112.5 drachm-equivalent obverse-dies, or an average consumption of about 3.4 such dies a year.

At Stratonikeia, something similar happened. The first, very rare, issues of the city are represented by a unique coin apparently struck to the weight of a (light) cistophoric tetradrachm, accompanied by drachms (four known) weighing about a third of that. The unique tetradrachm/tridrachm and the drachms both have as types a head of Zeus on obverse and a standing figure of Hekate on the reverse; the reverse of the tetradrachm/tridrachm is surrounded by a wreath, as on the tridrachms of Alabanda. The date of these coins is hard to determine with any precision, but may well fall in the same bracket as the tridrachms and didrachms of Alabanda. The production of both sets of coins may perhaps have been encouraged by the ending of Rhodian control over Karia in 166.²¹

At Euromos, north-west of Mylasa, there may be a trace of a similar process. A unique Hellenistic drachm in a private collection has on obverse a laureate head of Zeus right, and on reverse an eagle standing right on a groundline with wings spread, with the letter M below right and the ethnic *EYPΩMEΩN* above; the

²⁰ Meadows 2008: 163–79, esp. 168–9 (weights) and 178 (dates); *BMC Caria* 2–3, nos. 10–11.

²¹ For Stratonikeia, see Meadows 2002a: 80 (Group 1) and 98–101.

whole reverse type is enclosed in a laurel wreath.²² Weighing 3.57 g and resembling in general appearance the drachms of Stratonikeia, it is not unlikely that this coin is the only known drachm on a local, presumably Attic, weight-standard like the drachms and didrachms of Alabanda and Stratonikeia. One might speculate that didrachms on the same standard and tetradrachms on the cistophoric standard worth three epichoric drachms remain to be discovered.

At Kibyra there is a series of tetradrachms and drachms, both of cistophoric weight, with the head of the hero Kibyras on the obverse, sometimes with a wreathed border, and a horseman on the reverse (e.g. *SNG von Aulock* 3700–3718). Their dates are not yet fixed, but they may perhaps be assigned roughly to the mid-late second century to judge from an apparently Kibyran countermark with a horseman and a date (*KF*) applied to an Alexander tetradrachm of, interestingly enough, Alabanda, from the early 160s.²³ Although this Kibyran coinage of cistophoric weight, especially the tetradrachm denomination, is comparatively rare, it features a considerable number of issue-marks on the reverse, and may originally have been quite extensive. The purpose of the horseman countermark remains unclear, but it is worth noting an apparently earlier Kibyran countermark featuring a zebu butting right (the reverse type of the major bronze coinage of Kibyra in the second century) and exergual letters *KI*. The only example known was applied to an early Athena/Nike Attic-weight tetradrachm of Side, and is dated to the first third of the second century by Helmut Schubert; he suggests that such countermarked foreign coins were withdrawn from circulation and melted down when the city began later to strike its own cistophoric-weight coinage.²⁴

It is also possible that a series of cistophoric-weight tetradrachms was struck at Alinda at some point in the second century. Only two specimens are known: one in the British Museum; the other in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris, both from members of the Whittall family of Smyrna. The obverse type is a head of young

²² Ashton 2003a: 35–6.

²³ Meadows 2008: 146, 149–50; the countermarked coin is *SNG Berry* 319 = *ANS* 1965.77.2.

²⁴ Schubert 1998: 593–8. Note also a third countermark of Kibyra, a helmeted head with *KI* behind and *B* below, applied to an Alexander drachm of unknown variety and date: Imhoof-Blumer 1901: 251 no. 7; the coin is there said to be in Munich, but cannot be found in *SNG Munich*.



Fig. 7.1. Alinda, tetradrachm (?) of cistophoric weight (?). 7.11 g, 12 h, 22 mm. BM 1915.4.8.1 (R. J. Whittall); Hill 1917: 15.



Fig. 7.2. Alinda, tetradrachm (?) of cistophoric weight (?). 6.72 g, 12 h, 26 mm. Paris, BnF 68; Waddington 2118; ex 'Whittall'.

Herakles in lion-headaddress profile right, and on the reverse is a naked Herakles standing with a club in one hand and the pelt of the Nemean lion in the other, all in a wreath (Figs 7.1 and 7.2). Both specimens are badly chipped and weigh respectively 7.11 g and 6.72 g (a curious and unexplained similarity): it is of course impossible to be sure, but it is not unlikely that the full weight of the original specimens approached 12 g, the same as the weight of the tetradrachms/tridrachms of Alabanda (or perhaps c.8 g, like the Alabandan didrachms). The two states are, of course, neighbours and lie just south of the Maeander, the boundary of the Attalid kingdom. One should also note that the British Museum coin bears the letter *gamma* to the left of Herakles on the reverse, and there is a letter in the same place on the Paris coin, probably a *stigma*: they may well have adopted the same 1–33 (at least) era used at Alabanda. A further argument in support of this hypothesis is the issue of roughly contemporary bronzes of Alinda with head of Herakles on obverse and Herakles' club surmounted by

the pelt of the Nemean lion, all in a wreath, on the reverse (SNG *Copenhagen* 17). The reverse type is thus the same as that of the obverse of the Attalid cistophoric didrachms and drachms, and the wreath on the reverse recalls that around the reverse of the Alabandan cistophoric-weight tridrachms.

Again, one might suggest that another coinage has an indirect connection with the cistophoric weight-standard. Oinoanda, on the borders of northern Lykia struck an isolated series of didrachms on the Attic standard. For many years only a single example was known, but a recent hoard of about 100 specimens showed clearly that the series as a whole was struck from 4 obverse and 9 reverse dies, and divided into three issues marked by the letters *A*, *B* and *T* on obverse or reverse; die-flaws show that the issues were struck in alphabetical order. I have tentatively suggested that they may have been struck in the years immediately after the Peace of Apameia under the terms of which this region passed under the control of the Attalids.²⁵ The unusual denomination of an Attic didrachm could be explained as an attempt to reconcile the Attic-weight Seleukid and Alexander-type coinages, which had hitherto dominated in the region, with the new cistophoric coinage; three of the new didrachms being equivalent in weight to two cistophoric tetradrachms, just as seems to have happened at Alabanda and elsewhere. *Faute de mieux*, I suggested that the coinage may have been used to finance the new walls of the city, which seem to have begun construction at about this time, though the output of 4 obverse dies would have been far too small to finance more than a fraction of such a massive enterprise, which must have been largely paid for in other currency. Although the area of Oinoanda was nominally under Attalid control after 188, there does not seem to be much evidence for an Attalid presence specifically there during this period, and no finds of cistophoric coinage; but further to the east and north in the Milyas, there is good evidence for Pergamene control and influence in the second century, summarized recently by Thonemann, who also proposes that a very rare issue of cistophoric tetradrachms with the ethnic *KOP* may been issued at around this time at Kormasa on the border of Sagalassos in Pisidia.²⁶ Callataÿ has, however, detected some Roman features on the Oinoanda

²⁵ Ashton 2005a.

²⁶ Thonemann 2008: 53–8.

didrachms and proposed that they were struck a century later as a levy paid to Murena during his conquest of the area in the late 80s BC. The fabric and style of the coins seem to me too early for this late date, but if there has to be a Roman connection, one might perhaps associate the didrachms with the expedition of Manlius Vulso in 189 BC; if that were so, it might constitute another weak argument in favour of an early date for the introduction of the cistophoric system.²⁷

Finally, a perhaps more far-fetched instance. In the first half of the second century, probably in the early 180s, Mylasa inaugurated a lengthy series of pseudo-Rhodian drachms having as obverse type a head of Helios with eagle superimposed on the right cheek, and on the reverse a rose, initially without any inscription but later with an increasingly complex variety of letters and monograms, mostly dividing the series into annual and often monthly issues. Some years after the inception of the coinage, when month-abbreviations had been added to the reverses, tetradrachms were struck with types rose on obverse and eagle on reverse. Their recorded weights are: 9.60, 9.55, 9.51, 9.42, 9.41, 9.37, 9.32, 9.25, 9.19, 9.17, 9.14, 9.09, 8.99, 8.96, 8.91, 8.86, 8.67, 8.57, and 8.32 g.²⁸ The weights are thus widely and quite evenly spread between 8.3 and 9.6 g, with a bias towards the upper end of the range, suggesting that a weight of around 9.3–9.5 g was the aim. The anepigraphic drachms seem to have been struck at a standard of about 2.4 g, before a reduction to about 2.2 g for the rest of the series when the tetradrachms were struck;²⁹ this would correspond to the normal Hellenistic practice whereby lower denominations tended to weigh less than their theoretical weight (see n. 17 above). The primary purpose of the tetradrachms was clearly to act as a larger denomination for the far more common drachms, but one may very speculatively wonder if their weight was also designed to fit in with the weight of cistophoric tetradrachms at a ratio of 3:4. Whatever the

²⁷ Callataÿ 2008a. I also argued (2005a: 74–7) that a series of bronze coins with types head of Hermes/standing Ares and reverse legends *O/A* and *O/B* should be assigned to Oinoanda and associated with the didrachms marked *A* and *B*. Callataÿ 2008a: 208 was not convinced, but Side Archaeological Museum has a bronze coin of the series with reverse legend *O/I*, which helps to confirm the attribution (photograph recently supplied by Tolga Tek).

²⁸ For the drachm and tetradrachm series as a whole, see Ashton 1992, with Ashton and Reger 2006 for supplementary material and pre-185 inception date. The number of known tetradrachms has been greatly augmented by recent material on the market.

²⁹ Ashton 1992: 21.

value of this tentative suggestion, it has no bearing on the date of the introduction of the cistophoroi, since the precise date of the Mylasan tetradrachms cannot yet be precisely determined.

All in all, this is a slender haul of coinages apparently or possibly following or adapted to the cistophoric standard. In fact, however, one wonders if the standard, or something close to it, was in use throughout south-west Asia Minor through the medium of several other epichoric coinages, some large, some small, during most of the second century and the first part of the first. These coinages were based on a drachm varying in weight, according to mint, from just over 3 g to around 2.8 g, close to the weight of the cistophoric drachm. The coinages concerned are the plinthophoric drachms and accompanying hemidrachms of Rhodes, Kos, Stratonikeia, Kaunos, Keraunos, and the Lykian League, as well as some tetradrachms and didrachms of Phaselis. One might object that, although the adoption of the cistophoric standard by cities like Alabanda can be explained by their geographical proximity to the Attalid kingdom, it is less obvious why states further afield should have made an effort to adapt their coinages to a currency which never or rarely appeared in their area, and was issued by a kingdom to which they owed no allegiance. The answer may be twofold. First, they will have seen the at least temporary advantage of saving silver by using for domestic purposes a currency based on such a lightweight drachm rather than on an Attic drachm of c.4.25 g, which, mostly in the form of tetradrachms, dominated the international market. Secondly, they will all, or most, have taken their cue from Rhodes, which issued the earliest and most important of these coinages. Rhodes was the leading economic power in inland Karia and along the coast of Karia and Lykia, both before and after her humiliation in 166 BC.³⁰ It would be natural for smaller powers to adapt their coinages to the Rhodian, not only in their weight standard, but also in several cases by adoption of the plinthophoric format, with its shallow square incuse on the reverse.

The Rhodian plinthophoric drachm, with types a radiate head of Helios profile right on the obverse, and a rose within a shallow square incuse (the *plinthos*) on the reverse, was struck to a weight-standard of about 3.05 g; this represented a reduction compared with the

³⁰ For Rhodes' continued prosperity after the disaster of 166, see, for example, Finkielsztejn 2001: 202–3; the abundance of Rhodes' plinthophoric coinage throughout the second and early first centuries is not in doubt: see Jenkins 1989.

immediately preceding didrachms and tetradrachms, which were based on the traditional Rhodian drachm of about 3.35 g. It seems to have been introduced in about the mid-190s, and, following an idea first proposed by Allen, I have suggested that both Rhodian plinthophoroi and, a little later, Pergamene cistophoroi may have been a response to the shortage of silver occasioned by the war which they fought on the same side against Antiochos III: the Rhodian plinthophoric drachm weighed about the same as the cistophoric drachm.³¹

A decade or two after the introduction of the Rhodian plinthophoric drachms, the mint introduced an equally prolific series of accompanying hemidrachms with a radiate head of Helios three-quarter facing right on the obverse, and the rose in shallow square incuse on the reverse; their weights are slightly under half those of the drachms. Both denominations continued in production until the early first century, maintaining the same standard of about 3.05 g for the drachm, and are found abundantly throughout Karia and Lykia. In the 80s BC, probably as a result of the war against Mithradates VI, their standard was drastically reduced. As Callataÿ's comparative tables have shown (237–8 above), this was a large coinage struck from an estimated total of 941 drachm-equivalent obverse dies, at an average rate of about 9 dies a year.

The first Rhodian plinthophoroi seem to have been imitated by Kos early on with some rare plinthophoric drachms depicting a head of young Herakles profile right on the obverse and a crab and club in the shallow square incuse on the reverse, and following the Rhodian weight-standard.³² These Koan drachms were accompanied by hemidrachms with a laureate head of Apollo profile right on the obverse and a cithara on the reverse, but without the shallow square incuse.³³ These two issues represented a fairly small production, with an

³¹ For a study of the Rhodian plinthophoroi, see Jenkins 1989. For the weight of the drachm, see the tables in Ashton 1994: 59. For their date of introduction, see Ashton 2001a: 89, 93–4, and Meadows 2009a: 61–8 (Meadows' redating of certain important hoards of Alexander tetradrachms from c.190 to the mid-190s allows the same to be done for the first plinthophoroi, which share moneyers with the Rhodian Alexanders and the last autonomous coinage in the pre-plinthophoric format). For the possibility that the cistophoroi were introduced in the late 190s, see above; after the war against Antiochos III had ended the plinthophoric and cistophoric coinages would have gone their separate ways for they are never found together in hoards.

³² *BMC Caria* 205, nos. 117–18.

³³ *BMC Caria* 210, nos. 165–8.

estimated total of about 35 drachm-equivalent obverse dies, used at an average rate of perhaps 3.5 a year.³⁴

Four further silver coinages seem to have copied the shallow square incuses of the Rhodian plinthophoroi.

Stratonikeia struck a series of rare drachms, with a head of Hekate profile r. on the obverse and Nike in a shallow square incuse on the reverse, apparently to the standard of the Rhodian plinthophoric drachm, and a more abundant series of accompanying hemidrachms, with a head of Zeus profile r. on the obverse and an eagle in a shallow square incuse on the reverse. These began after the end of Rhodian control of Karia—Meadows has suggested the 140s or the 130s—and continued until the early first century. They are struck to the full Rhodian standard and are found hoarded with Rhodian plinthophoric drachms.³⁵ They were struck from an estimated total of about 25 drachm-equivalent obverse dies, at an average rate of perhaps under 1 a year.

Secondly, there are the rare plinthophoric drachms of Kaunos, probably struck after the city's liberation from Rhodes in 167/6 to a standard only slightly lower than that of the Rhodian plinthophoroi. Their types are a head of Zeus profile r. on obverse and a winged thunderbolt in a shallow square incuse on reverse; they are accompanied by hemidrachms, weighing rather less than half, with types head of Athena profile r. on obverse and a sword in scabbard (not in a shallow square incuse) on reverse. This too is a relatively small coinage, a total of perhaps 45 drachm-equivalent obverse dies, but probably struck over quite a short period, to judge from the uniform lack of wear on coins belonging to most issues of the drachm series in a recent hoard.³⁶

Thirdly, Keramos struck some drachms and hemidrachms with types, respectively, head of Zeus profile right/eagle in shallow square incuse, and young male head profile right/facing head of bovine in shallow square incuse. These very rare coins fall well short of the Rhodian plinthophoric weight-standard, for no drachm seems to be

³⁴ For these issues, see Ingvaldsen 2002: 153–60 and 363–7, dating them c.180–170 bc. Head in *BMC Caria* separates the drachms from the hemidrachms, but Ingvaldsen shows conclusively that they belong together. In a forthcoming paper, Kerstin Höghammar will argue that the two issues are a little earlier than the dates proposed by Ingvaldsen.

³⁵ Meadows 2002a: 80–91, 101–7. The hoard is *IGCH* 1357.

³⁶ For this coinage, see Ashton 1999; for the recent hoard of drachms, see *NC* 2010: 426 no. 57.

recorded above 2.51 g and no hemidrachm above 1.21 g. They have not been subjected to a die-study, but their rarity suggests a very small emission, introduced perhaps in imitation of the plinthophoroi of Stratonikeia.³⁷

Fourthly, the Lykian League struck a plentiful series of plinthophoric drachms, with a head of Apollo right on the obverse and on the reverse a kithara in a shallow square incuse (hence the designation kitharephoroi used in inscriptions).³⁸ They seem to have been introduced around the middle of the second century or in its third quarter, and continued until well into the first century.³⁹ Their weight-standard is a little lower than that of the Rhodian plinthophoric drachms.⁴⁰ In the first century they were accompanied by hemidrachms with a head of Artemis profile right on the obverse and a quiver in a shallow square incuse on the reverse. This substantial coinage consumed an estimated total of 312 drachm-equivalent obverse dies, struck at an average rate of perhaps 4 or 5 a year. Rhodian plinthophoric coinage is often found in Lykia, and there is good evidence that Rhodian and Lykian plinthophoroi circulated together at par on the market, at least for informal purposes. They have been found hoarded together, and most of a recently published deposit of coins from the Letoon near Xanthos comprise Rhodian and Lykian League plinthophoric silver coins, with the Rhodian coinage in significantly greater number (85 against 5).⁴¹ There are large numbers of both Rhodian and Lykian League plinthophoroi in the archaeological museum at Fethiye/Telmessos on the Karian/Lykian border: in 1992/93 it contained 110 Rhodian plinthophoric drachms and hemidrachms (plus 61 drachms in the Kargı hoard = *CH* 8 no. 415), and 191 Lykian League plinthophoric drachms and hemidrachms. However, a well-known inscription of the mid-second century from the Letoon

³⁷ Spanu 1997: 31–4, 45–6 nos. 1–7. Some of the Zeus/eagle drachms are so low in weight that Spanu regards them as hemidrachms (nos. 6–7), but it is unlikely that drachms and hemidrachms would have exactly the same types, and no. 7, at 1.55 g, would be implausibly heavy. Further material in Ashton 1998b: 48–9.

³⁸ *TN* nos. 342–3.

³⁹ For a detailed study of the Lykian League coinage, see Troxell 1982; for the date of introduction of the silver coinage, see Ashton 2005b: 88–9, and Meadows in Ashton and Meadows 2008: 131–2; for the date of the end of this coinage, see Meadows, *ibid.* 113–16.

⁴⁰ See weight-tables in Troxell 1982: 34–5.

⁴¹ Hoard: *CH* 4, 72, and 78, with Meadows 2002a: 128–9; Letoon deposit: Marcellesi 2007, and Meadows in Ashton and Meadows 2008: 112, 129–32.

regulating a dispute between Termessos/Oinoanda and Tlos stipulates that an indemnity of 25 talents is to be paid in 'new Rhodian plinthophoric money', which seems to mean silver coinage (or bullion) weighing the equivalent of 25 talents of uncirculated, full-weight Rhodian plinthophoric drachms.⁴² Thus, although for small-scale informal purposes Rhodian plinthophoric drachms and Lykian League kitharophoroi probably exchanged at par, when large sums and official calculations were involved it seems to have been recognized that the slightly higher standard of the Rhodian plinthophoroi was the yardstick to be used.⁴³

Finally, we may consider the second-century coinage of Phaselis in Lykia. In the second half of the third century, Phaselis had struck staters with types prow/stern.⁴⁴ They aim at a weight-standard of about 10.3–10.4 g, which Heipp-Tamer regards as a 'mixed' standard designed to facilitate exchange against coinage of both Attic and Ptolemaic weight. In fact they are better explained as double sigloi on a slightly reduced version of the old Persian standard, which Pamphylian cities had used routinely in earlier centuries, and which enjoyed a revival in the third and second centuries at several states along the western and southern coasts of Asia Minor.⁴⁵ In c.213/12 Phaselis initiated a large series of dated Attic-weight Alexander tetradrachms, which ceased in the late 180s.⁴⁶ Whatever the international purpose of these Alexanders, one can well imagine the lighter Persian-standard staters being struck for local use. Then, in the period c.167–130, Phaselis struck a new series comprising tetradrachms of Attic weight with types head of Apollo left/Athena Promachos on a prow, alongside apparent staters with types head of Apollo right/Athena Promachos on

⁴² Ashton 2005b.

⁴³ In similar vein, we have seen from the letter of Eumenes II in 182/1 that the Attalid annual poll-tax in Telmessos was set at 4 Rhodian drachms and 1 obol, precisely the weight of a cistophoric tetradrachm reckoned in Rhodian plinthophoric drachms. For the purposes of an official calculation of the poll-tax, one would expect the sort of precision implied by the formula 4 drachms and 1 obol. But the extra obol is only 4% of the total, and one can readily imagine that, if cistophoric drachms had circulated in the everyday market in Telmessos (there is no evidence that they did), in practice they would have exchanged at par with Rhodian or Lykian League plinthophoric drachms. Imprecision at the mint and wear and tear will often have reduced the weight of many silver coins by 4% and more.

⁴⁴ Heipp-Tamer 1993: Series 8.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Ashton 2007: 57–8, with references.

⁴⁶ Heipp-Tamer Series 9; Meadows 2009a, esp. 67–8, 78–9.

a prow, and halves with types prow/Athena Promachos.⁴⁷ The 'staters' seem to aim at a standard of about 11.5 g and their halves at slightly less than half that, and the odd thing about this apparently epichoric standard is that it is *heavier* than the preceding Persic-epichoric standard of about 10.4 g. It is normal for weight-standards to decline over time, and an increase usually indicates a change of standard. Heipp-Tamer's suggestion (1993: 82–3) that the staters and half-staters on this new local standard also represented 16 and 8 obols on the Attic standard of the contemporary tetradrachms does not carry conviction. More plausible is Meadows' idea (2009a: 79 and n. 56) that the coinage of Phaselis in the mid-second century was accommodated to the plinthophoric standard, the staters and half-staters passing as tetradrachms and didrachms. Many non-Rhodian plinthophoric drachms weigh around 2.8 or 2.9 g, and a tetradrachm on the same standard would weigh around 11.5 g. The tetradrachms and didrachms may have taken their cue from the plinthophoric drachms of the Lykian League to the west, or else from the first 'Pseudo-League' drachms (i.e. those omitting the *ΛΥΚΙΩΝ* ethnic) struck by Phaselis itself and neighbouring Olympos, probably in the second half of the second century: the weights of these drachms, although widely spread, suggest a standard of about 2.7–2.8 g.⁴⁸ Alternatively, Rhodian commercial influence along the coast of Lykia is well attested, and this may have encouraged adoption of the new weight-standard by Phaselis, itself a mercantile city heavily dependent on sea trade, and originally a Rhodian colony to boot.

The Phaselitan staters and half-staters formed a fairly modest coinage—an estimated 78 drachm-equivalent obverse dies struck within thirty or forty years.

Further to the east, the major Pamphylian minting cities of Side, Aspendos, and Perge show no sign of adopting the cistophoric, plinthophoric, or indeed any other epichoric standard. In the later third and early second centuries, all produced large numbers of Attic-weight tetradrachms in the form of Alexanders in the case of Aspendos; Alexanders and Attic-weight coins of local type in the case of Perge; and in the case of Side a very few Alexanders but a large

⁴⁷ Heipp-Tamer Series 10, emissions 1, 2, and 3. The Attic-weight tetradrachms are now extremely rare, and it is not unlikely that the proportionately lighter-weight 'staters' and halves drove them out of circulation by the operation of Gresham's Law.

⁴⁸ Troxell 1982: 34–5, 63–6, 72–3.

Attic-weight coinage with local types (Athena/Nike). The Athena/Nike Sidetan tetradrachms continued to be struck in large quantities during the second and into the first century BC; they are found all over Asia Minor and the east, and seem to have circulated as a quasi-international currency like the Alexanders. Perge also produced silver with local types on the Attic standard, though in limited quantity, down to the second half of the second century.⁴⁹

If the above pattern is valid, we may suggest that, in those few instances where the cistophoroi and their weight-standard had a direct influence on the autonomous coinage of neighbouring states (Byzantion, Alabanda, Alinda (?), Euromos (?), Mylasa (?), Kibyra, the first issues of Stratonikeia), no attempt was made to copy the types or format of the original, except for the frequent presence of a wreathed border on one side or the other. Nor is there any adoption of the plinthophoric format. By contrast, in those instances which were by hypothesis influenced by the Rhodian plinthophoroi, a *plinthos* is always found on the drachm denomination (Kos, Stratonikeia's second phase of coinage, Kaunos, Keramos, the Lykian League including the drachms of Phaselis and Olympos). It is less easy to reproduce clearly types within a *plinthos* on smaller silver coins, and the device was not used on the corresponding hemidrachms of Kos and Kaunos, though it was on the hemidrachms of Stratonikeia, Keramos, and the Lykian League—and of course of Rhodes itself.⁵⁰

Finally, I suggested earlier that, if the late date, say the early 160s, for the introduction of the cistophoroi proved to be correct, the modifications which this would necessitate to the thesis presented above would not be that great. The only coinages among those

⁴⁹ For the Alexanders of the three cities, see Price 1991: 353–66 and Meadows 2009a; for the autonomous silver coinage of Perge, see Colin 1996: 36–47; for Side, see, for example, Meadows 2006.

⁵⁰ By contrast, ancient technicians had no difficulty in reproducing clear types within a *plinthos* on still smaller bronze coins: the format was adopted for small (10–12mm) bronzes of Rhodes itself, Aphrodisias, Kaunos, Keramos, Stratonikeia, Kos, the Lykian League, Kibyra, and Telmessos, and on rare 19mm bronzes of Halikarnassos (SNG Copenhagen 379–80). The *plinthos* may also have been difficult to achieve successfully on coins of much larger size. So, for example, it was avoided on some large (c. 25mm) bronzes struck to accompany or replace plinthophoric drachms and hemidrachms during Mithradates VI's siege of Rhodes in the 80s (Ashton 2001b), and on the 'tetradrachms' and 'didrachms' of Phaselis, discussed above.

already discussed which appear certainly to antedate the 160s are the plinthophoric issues of Rhodes and Kos. The Rhodian coinage is large in scale, an annual average of around 9 or 10 obverse dies for the entire century or so of its existence, and the coins are found all round the coasts of Karia and Lykia, and often in the interior. If the Attalids were seeking to save money in the early 160s, they had before them the example of a widely accepted and highly successful light drachm of a weight which would allow them to save some 27 per cent of the weight of the Attic standard which they had used hitherto. The influence of the cistophoroi would then account for the use of their standard at Alabanda, Stratonikeia, Kibyra, and perhaps elsewhere, including Byzantion (though, as we have seen, the dates of *c.*195 and *c.*175 suggested by Marinescu for the two putatively cistophoric didrachms of that mint constitute a weak argument for an earlier date for the cistophoroi), while the continuing influence of Rhodes would have caused the adoption of the plinthophoric/cistophoric standard elsewhere in Karia and Lykia.

War or Trade? Attic-Weight Tetradrachms from Second-Century BC Attalid Asia Minor in Seleukid Syria after the Peace of Apameia and their Historical Context

Selene Psoma

The main question I shall try to answer in this paper is why and how Attic-weight tetradrachms from the mints of western Asia Minor came to arrive in large numbers in Seleukid Syria after the Peace of Apameia (188 BC). In the past, several different theories have been advanced to explain this phenomenon: a lack of silver in the Seleukid kingdom and a sort of ‘entente cordiale’ with the Attalids (Rostovtzeff); monetary and commercial union, and Roman initiative (Boehring); the cities’ wish to show their loyalty to the Romans (Giovannini); the cities’ attempts to find new markets after the introduction of the cistophoric coinage (Jones); different reasons for different destinations (Oakley); commercial movement (Sacks and Amandry); the coinages were minted under Attalid supervision to serve the Attalids’ need for money in their relations with the outside world (Kinns); and the Seleukid kingdom remained the principal commercial partner of the cities of Asia Minor (Le Rider).¹ Most of

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¹ Rostovtzeff 1939; Boehring 1972: 31–9; Giovannini 1978: 41–3, 61–3; Jones 1979: 90–100; Oakley 1982: 19–20; Sacks 1985: 26–9 and Amandry 1989: 7; Kinns 1987: 107; Le Rider 2001a: 56–9. See also Marcellesi 2010: 193–206. *Auditor et altera pars*: Kinns 1980: 264; Hoover and MacDonald 1999–2000: 115–16; Callataÿ in the present volume.

these coinages are primarily known to us from hoards that were buried in Seleukid Syria. In the first part of my paper I present the evidence from hoards dated after 188 BC, and the coinages from western Asia Minor found in these hoards.² In the second part of the paper I argue—following Kinns, Hoover and MacDonald, and others—that the Attalids were directly responsible for bringing these coinages to Seleukid Syria. In the third part I offer an explanation of how these coinages became Attalid money in the first place, and place them in the framework of the relations of the Attalid kings with the free and autonomous cities of western Asia Minor.

Hoards buried in the Seleukid kingdom between the beginning of the third century BC and the early second century BC contain numerous different coinages, all on the Attic standard: Alexanders issued by the Macedonian kingdom and cities of mainland Greece and Asia Minor; tetradrachms struck in the name of Lysimachos; Philetairoi, coins of the kings of Bithynia; and, of course, coins minted by the Seleukids themselves.³ One should recall that the Seleukid kingdom at this time included parts of Asia Minor. Le Rider proposed a convincing explanation for the presence of all these different coinages on the Attic standard in hoards buried in this part of the Seleukid kingdom, pointing to the open monetary policy of the Seleukids, which was based on the use of the Attic weight-standard.⁴

As a result of the Peace of Apameia in 188, the Seleukids lost control of Asia Minor. Nevertheless, Attic-weight currency minted

² For hoards buried in Syria, see Duyrat 2011: 417–31.

³ See Appendix I, p. 294.

⁴ Le Rider 2001a: 52: 'Les Séleucides, à la différence des Ptolémées, conservèrent pour leurs monnaies en métal précieux l'étalon attique d'Alexandre. D'autres états voisins ayant opté aussi pour cet étalon, une vaste zone où étaient frappés des numéraires de même poids se trouve constituée. A l'intérieur de cette zone, le royaume séleucide tient au III^e siècle une place dominante, du fait de son immensité, de sa richesse et de sa puissance. Les espèces qui y circulaient nous sont connues grâce à de nombreux trésors monétaires. Ceux-ci comprennent, outre des monnaies royales séleucides, des monnaies au nom et aux types d'Alexandre et de Lysimaque, des monnaies des rois de Pergame et de Macédoine, des monnaies de cités à types personnels. Il apparaît que ces divers numéraires (de poids attique) entraient sans formalité dans le royaume et servaient aux transactions aussi bien publiques que privées. En outre, ceci est plus surprenant, les monnaies royales séleucides sont très souvent minoritaires dans les trésors; elles en sont parfois même absentes. Pendant longtemps, les tétradrachmes au nom et aux types d'Alexandre jouèrent un rôle prépondérant. Le témoignage concordant des trésors atteste, nous l'avons vu, qu'elles y étaient acceptées dans les transactions, sans avoir besoin d'être échangées contre les monnaies de Séleucos ou d'Antiochos.'

by issuing authorities of western Asia Minor continued to arrive in Seleukid Syria in large quantities. The presence of Seleukid regal issues in these hoards enables us to distinguish three chronological groups of hoards buried between 188 BC and the end of the Seleukid dynasty:⁵

- (a) In the first group, we have hoards buried before 160 BC (listed in Group I of Appendix I below)
- (b) In the second group, hoards buried before 140 BC (listed in Group II of Appendix I)
- (c) In the third group, those buried after this date (listed in Group III of Appendix I).

HOARDS BURIED FROM 188 TO 160 BC

In the first group were included some late posthumous tetradrachms of Lysimachos, tetradrachms of Mithridates III of Pontos, of the Seleukids (down to Demetrios I), of Prousius II of Bithynia (183–149 BC), of Philetairos Group VII,⁶ of Eumenes II, and of Ptolemy II or III. We also have Alexanders, a very few lifetime issues from Syrian mints, and otherwise mainly posthumous issues: apart from small quantities of Alexanders from mainland Greece, Samothrake (172–168 BC) and Herakleia Pontike (c.200 BC), we find a significant number of late posthumous Alexanders from Erythrai (188–170 BC), Klazomenai (180 BC), Kolophon (180 BC), Magnesia on the Maeander (188–170 BC), Chios (190–165 BC), Antiocheia in Karia (190–180 BC), Alexandreia Troas (189–180 BC), Assos (188–160 BC), Myrina (post-188 BC), Kyme (post-188 BC), Temnos,⁷ Methymna (215–200 BC, 188–170 BC), Mytilene (post-188 BC), Pergamon (c.200 BC), Miletos (190–165 BC), Smyrna (c.200 BC), Ephesos (200–190 BC),⁸ Teos (post-188), Mylasa (210–170 BC), Alabanda

⁵ According to Duyrat 2011: 418, 122 hoards for the second century BC.

⁶ For the dates of Group VII, see Le Rider 1989a: 169–72; Meadows, above pp. 164–9; Callataÿ, above pp. 208–12.

⁷ Price 1991: 240–3 (188–170 BC). But for a later date for the Alexanders of Temnos, see Lorber 2010, following Metcalf 1994 and Metcalf 1998.

⁸ Attic drachms were issued by Ephesos from 202 to 150 BC: Kinns 1999.



Fig. 8.1. Attic-weight tetradrachm in the name of Athena Ilias, after c.166 BC. ANS 1945.33.5.

(172–162 BC),⁹ Rhodes (201–190 BC),¹⁰ Phaselis (down to Year 33: 186/5 BC), Perge (down to Year 33: 189/8 BC), Aspendos (down to Year 31: 182/1 BC), and Arados (245–166 BC).¹¹ There is also a group of coins on the Attic standard struck with civic types by the cities of Alabanda, Miletos, Mytilene, Kos, and Side, including drachms of Ephesos and Arados (down to Year 95: 165/4 BC).¹² In these hoards we also find tetradrachms of Athena Nikephoros, dating from the 160s (see above, Fig. 5.10), and tetradrachms of Athena Ilias (Fig. 8.1), for which too a start-date in the 160s has been proposed.¹³

⁹ Callataÿ, above pp. 00–00, based on Meadows 2008.

¹⁰ Price 1991: I 317–19; Mattingly 1993b: 76; Le Rider 2001a: 39. For the earliest series of Alexanders issued by Rhodes, see Ashton 2004: 94–7.

¹¹ For the eras of Perge, Aspendos, and Phaselis, see Meadows 2009a. For Arados, see Duyrat 2003.

¹² Alabanda: Meadows and Houghton 2010: 203–4; Callataÿ, above pp. 237–8, based on Meadows 2008. Miletos: Kinns 1998. Mytilene: Mattingly 1993b: 81, 84. Kos: Ingvaldsen 2001, cf. Ashton 1998c. Side: Meadows 2006; Meadows 2009a: 79–81. Ephesos: Kinns 1999. Arados: Duyrat 2005: 70, Series V (Bust of Poseidon/Zeus; 174/3 BC, Attic weight); 82–103, Series VII (Bust of Tyche/Nike; 138/7–44/3 BC, reduced weight); pseudo-Ephesian drachms, 73–81, Series VI (172/1–111/110 BC, reduced Attic weight).

¹³ For the tetradrachms of Athena Nikephoros, the *terminus ante quem* of the 160s is provided by the presence of two specimens in the Sitichoro, Thessaly, hoard (IGCH 237) of c.165 BC (Price 1989: 239–40) and of one specimen in the Ma’Aret en-Nu’man hoard (CH IX 511; Mattingly 1993b: 83). A date in 181 BC was proposed by Mørkholm 1984, while M. J. Price connected this coinage with the war of the 160s against the Galatians (Price 1989: 239). For the beginning of the series in the name of Athena Ilias, see Meadows 1998: 44 n. 27; Mattingly 1990: 71 n. 15.

HOARDS BURIED BETWEEN 160 AND 140 BC

In hoards of the second group (Appendix II, below), the presence of tetradrachms of Demetrios I (162–150 BC), of Alexander I (152–145 BC), of Alexander I and of Cleopatra Thea (150–145 BC), of the first reign of Demetrios II (146–138 BC) and of Antiochos VI (144–142 BC) points to their burial in the years before 140 BC. Other Attic-weight tetradrachms found in these hoards were minted by Demetrios Poliorketes, Antigonos Gonatas, Lysimachos, Prousius I and II of Bithynia, and Perseus of Macedonia. In these hoards were also found: Alexanders issued by Kyme, Temnos, Chios, Alabanda, Aspendos, Miletos, Methymna, Byblos; drachms of Ephesos and Arados; and Attic-weight tetradrachms issued with civic types of Kyzikos,¹⁴ Alabanda, Mytilene, Miletos,¹⁵ Alexandria Troas, the first Macedonian *meris*, and Athena Ilias. In hoards buried in Seleukid Syria during this period we find also Philetairoi (Group VII) and rare tetradrachms with the portrait of King Eumenes II (above, Fig. 5.9).¹⁶

What is new in the hoards of this second group are the New Style tetradrachms of Athens and also tetradrachms on the Attic standard struck with civic types by Klazomenai (Fig. 8.2);¹⁷ those in the name of the Megaloi Theoi of Syros (or Syria: above, Fig. 5.14);¹⁸ and the Attic-weight tetradrachms struck with a heavy wreath on the reverse by the Aeolian cities of Aigai, Kyme (Fig. 8.3), and Myrina (Fig. 8.4),

¹⁴ Kyzikos in Mysia began issuing Attic tetradrachms with its own types before 160 BC: Le Rider 2001a: 42; Meadows and Houghton 2010: 180 with n. 15. For the circulation of the Attic tetradrachms with civic types, see Meadows and Houghton 2010: 179–80.

¹⁵ Around 160 BC, Knidos and Miletos issued tetradrachms on the same standard: Le Rider 2001a: 42. Miletos continued also issuing its civic coinage on the local standard until 120 BC or later. For Miletos see Deppert-Lippitz 1984: 105–9, 185–6 (175–160 BC); Kinns 1998. For its later issues, see Kinns 1998: 183.

¹⁶ For the coin portrait of Eumenes II see Nicolet-Pierre 1989; Le Rider 1989a: 176; Meadows, above pp. 173–4.

¹⁷ The second known specimen of this enigmatic tetradrachm, bearing the legend *Διὸς Σωτήρος Επιφανοῦς*, from the Tartous, Syria, 1987 hoard (CH VIII 471), buried c.120 BC, carried the abbreviated ethnic *Κλαζο(μενίων)* under the exergual line. For the earlier attribution to Smyrna, see Seyrig 1971; Le Rider 2001a: 42; cf. Callataÿ 1997c: 84. For the dates of this coinage, see Meadows 2009b; for the interpretation of this coinage as another ‘*panegyris*-coinage’ (see below), see Bouley 2009.

¹⁸ For an attribution to Syros, see Nicolet-Pierre and Amandry 1992. See also the doubts of Meadows and Houghton 2010: 183, and the date they propose based on hoard evidence (after 143 BC); and see now also Meadows, above pp. 184–6.



Fig. 8.2. Attic-weight tetradrachm of Klazomenai, c.160 BC. ANS 2008.30.1.



Fig. 8.3. Attic-weight 'wreathed' tetradrachm of Kyme, c.160–145 BC. ANS 1948.19.1171.



Fig. 8.4. Attic-weight 'wreathed' tetradrachm of Myrina, after 160 BC. ANS 1944.100.44235.

and the Ionian cities of Magnesia on the Maeander, Herakleia on Latmos, Smyrna, and Lebedos (Figs. 8.5–8.8).¹⁹ These so-called

¹⁹ Aigai: Amandry 1989. Kyme: Oakley 1982; van Bremen 2008: 362–9. Myrina: Sacks 1985. Magnesia: Jones 1979; Kinns 1989. Herakleia: Lavva 1993; Kinns 1998; Meadows and Houghton 2010: 182. Smyrna: Milne 1914; Milne 1927. Lebedos: Amandry 1989; Meadows and Houghton 2010: 183. Kolophon and the Karian cities of Myndos and Antiocheia also struck Attic-weight tetradrachms with civic types with a wreath on the reverse: Le Rider 2001a: 43.



Fig. 8.5. Attic-weight 'wreathed' tetradrachm of Magnesia on the Maeander, c.155–145 BC. ANS 1976.247.28.



Fig. 8.6. Attic-weight 'wreathed' tetradrachm of Herakleia on Latmos, c.150–145 BC. ANS 1967.152.443, ex Aleppo 1930 Hoard (*IGCH* 1562).



Fig. 8.7. Attic-weight 'wreathed' tetradrachm of Smyrna, c.165–145 BC. ANS 1967.152.450.

wreathed coinages, the coinage of Klazomenai, the coinages with civic types of Alabanda, Mytilene, Miletos, Alexandreia Troas, Kos, and Side were all minted by autonomous and free cities of Asia Minor, most of which had issued Alexanders earlier in the second century BC, in the years following Apameia.²⁰

²⁰ On the status of these cities, see Allen 1983: 98–121 and his list of independent, 'gift' and 'tributary' cities at 110–11. See also Hopp 1977: 53–5; Hansen 1971: 95–6. For the Alexanders, see Le Rider 2001a: 39–40.



Fig. 8.8. Attic-weight 'wreathed' tetradrachm of Lebedos, c. 160–140 BC. ANS 1967.152.444 ex Aleppo 1930 Hoard (IGCH 1562).

As we have seen, Le Rider explained how the Attic-weight coinages of the cities of Asia Minor were able to circulate within Seleukid Syria: quite simply, because they were issued on the Attic weight-standard. The next question which arises is: how did they travel from Asia Minor to Syria? The two possible explanations are trade and war.

TRADE?

Trade may have brought at least some of the Attic-weight currencies from western Asia Minor to Seleukid Syria both before and after Apameia. Le Rider believed that the Seleukid kingdom remained the principal commercial partner of the cities of Asia Minor throughout this period. For centuries, trade never stopped between these areas.²¹ After the introduction of the new light-weight cistophoric coinage at some point in the decades after Apameia (see further below), Attic-weight currency would presumably have been exchanged at the frontiers of the Attalid kingdom, and for each Attic-weight tetradrachm, merchants would have received a cistophoros.²² When merchants travelled to Seleukid Syria they would have brought with them the Attic-weight tetradrachms from the different issuing authorities, all situated in western Asia Minor.²³

²¹ Aperghis 2004: 74–8.

²² Le Rider 1989a: 179–85.

²³ For the use of Attic-weight currency by the Attalid kings after Apameia, see Le Rider 1989a: 177–9.

Another of the main channels of circulation for Attic-weight tetradrachms was undoubtedly the *panegyreis* ('festival markets'), which occurred everywhere in the Greek world. Among the Attic-weight tetradrachms imported to Syria were those in the name of Athena Ilias (above, Fig. 8.1), issued by a confederation of cities in north-west Asia Minor, which all participated in the *panegyris* of the goddess at Ilion (Ilion, Parion, Assos, Dardanos, Lampsakos, Abydos, Kalchedon, Myrleia).²⁴ From Seleukid Syria also comes a tetradrachm on the Attic standard in the name of Athena Nikephoros (of Pergamon: above, Fig. 5.10), and another struck by the Dionysiac Artists based at Teos (above, Fig. 5.17).²⁵ Following Bogaert, I have elsewhere proposed that these Attic-weight currencies, in the name and types of the god in honour of whom the *panegyris* was celebrated, were the only legal currency (*dokimon nomisma*) that could be used for large-scale transactions at these annual fairs.²⁶ These coins would also have served the growing demand for currency resulting from the organization of the *panegyris* (the festival and the fairs).

It was at these big annual fairs that people could buy slaves, animals, and luxury objects.²⁷ We learn from an inscription from Magnesia on the Maeander that the impressive victim (*ταῦρος ὡς κάλλιστος*) had to be bought by the *oikonomoi*, 'those currently in office and those who are appointed each year for the *panegyris*'.²⁸ Epigraphic evidence from contemporary Asia Minor reveals the significance of Attic-weight currency for big transactions of this kind during religious festivals. In the mid-second century decrees for Archippe from Kyme, the price of a sacrificial victim is calculated in Attic drachms;²⁹ the payment could well have been made with the contemporary Attic-weight wreathed tetradrachms that the city of

²⁴ For these coinages, see Psoma 2007; Psoma 2008. For the coinage and the confederacy of Athena Ilias, see Knoepfler 2010.

²⁵ See previous note.

²⁶ Bogaert 1968: 297. For *dokimon nomisma*, see Picard 1984; Knoepfler 1987: 235–41; Knoepfler 1989: 213–17; for *episemon nomisma*, see also Martin 1991. *Contra* Martin: Psoma 2011a. For the organization of the *panegyris*, see Chandezon 2000.

²⁷ Chandezon 2000.

²⁸ *I.Magnesia* 98: οἱ ἐνεστηκότες καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ καθιστάμενοι... ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει ἐκάστου ἔτους.

²⁹ For the date of these inscriptions, see van Bremen 2008: 362–9. For monetary units in the decrees for Archippe, see Picard 2007; Psoma 2009; Appendix III below.

Kyme issued around 150 BC (above, Fig. 8.3).³⁰ In *leges sacrae* and other religious documents emanating from the sanctuary of Asklepios of Kos all sums are calculated in drachms in the name of Alexander.³¹ If Attic-weight currency was needed for use at the *panegyris*, we can thus better understand the reasons a number of free cities of Asia Minor and Eumenes II issued Attic-weight currency: namely for commercial transactions, whether through big fairs or otherwise, with the outside world. Part of this 'outside world' was the Seleukid Kingdom where Attic-weight currency circulated and was the *dokimon nomisma* from the late fourth century onwards. From the big annual fairs of western Asia Minor, the Attic-weight currencies would have found their way to Seleukid territory through commercial routes still in use today.³² These coins could have reached Delos (although we have no evidence), Thrace, and also mainland Greece, as is revealed by the two Athena Nikephoros tetradrachms of the Sitichoro hoard.³³

One problem with this hypothesis is that the patterns of monetary circulation in Seleukid Syria changed radically c.140 BC.³⁴ After this date the hoards contain mainly Seleukid silver and some local coinages.³⁵ How should we explain this sudden break in imports of Attic-weight silver coinage from Asia Minor? One explanation could be that the cities of Asia Minor (Myrina, Kyme, Aigai, Herakleia, etc.) simply stopped minting coins. However, this hypothesis is not really supported by the evidence: there are several other silver coinages being minted by cities of Asia Minor in this period, but these do not circulate in Seleukid Syria.³⁶

³⁰ For this coinage, see van Bremen 2008: 362–9. The dates proposed by van Bremen are confirmed by the 'Demetrios I hoard' and also other hoards: Lorber 2010.

³¹ *I.Cos* ED 2B, l. 8 (*diapraphe* concerning the priesthood of Asklepios, Hygieia, and Epiona, III BC); *I.Cos* ED 42, ll. 3, 5–8 (dedications of priests, III–II BC); *I.Cos* ED 82, ll. 6, 25–73 *passim* (*diapraphe* concerning the priesthood of Zeus Soter and Athena Soteira; for a date after 150 BC, see Habicht 2004: 66).

³² Le Rider 2001a: 53.

³³ For this hoard, see Price 1989.

³⁴ The specimens from western Asia Minor in hoards buried after 140 BC in Seleukid Syria are few, and must have arrived in Seleukid Syria much earlier. See below, Appendix I Group III.

³⁵ The other coinages that are to be found in hoards buried between 140 and c.100 BC are stephanephoroi of Athens, Alexanders from western Asia Minor and Pamphylia, and drachms of 'Ephesos'. See below, Appendix I Group III.

³⁶ According to Knoepfler 2010, the Confederacy of Athena Ilias continued to strike tetradrachms. These are not found in hoards in Seleukid Syria after 140 BC. For Meadows and Houghton 2010: 195, this coinage dates between 175 and 155 BC.

Hence perhaps a better way to explain the arrival of Attic-weight Asia Minor coinages in Syria would be to place them in the context of relations between the Attalids and Seleukid Syria. In 139 BC Attalos II died. His nephew, Attalos III, seems to have kept himself busy until his death in 133 BC by executing all his predecessors' associates.³⁷ At his death, he bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans.³⁸ Thus, we could argue, there may have been effectively no Attalid interest in Seleukid Syria after the death of Attalos II, and this could be connected to the sudden decline in the movement of silver from Asia Minor to Syria. That brings us to the relations between these two dynasties after the Peace of Apameia, which are key to my explanation.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ATTALIDS AND THE SELEUKIDS FROM APAMEIA TO THE DEATH OF ATTALOS II

Literary sources and inscriptions show that the Attalids intervened several times in the politics of the Seleukid dynasty during the period 180–140 BC.³⁹ It was with the support of Eumenes II of Pergamon that Antiochos IV seized the throne and proclaimed himself co-regent for the infant Antiochos V in 175 BC.⁴⁰ Appian (*Syr.* 45) describes the manner of Antiochos IV's succession to Seleukos IV. From an Athenian inscription we learn that Antiochos IV was established at Athens in the early 170s, and it was at Athens that he learned about the death of Seleukos IV.⁴¹ An Athenian honorary decree for Eumenes II provides information about the collaboration of the king with his brothers, and—most interestingly for our

³⁷ Savalli-Lestrade 2001.

³⁸ Will 1979–82: II 416–19.

³⁹ Will 1979–82: II 303–6.

⁴⁰ For the numismatic evidence, see Le Rider 1986a.

⁴¹ Tracy 1982: 60–2, no. 3; *BE* 1982, 139. Antiochos IV lived in Rome from 189 BC (*Livy* 42.6.9); he was exchanged in 178/7 BC for Demetrios, son of Seleukos IV, and was at Athens later that year: see also Ehling 2008: 119 n. 61. For the military help of Eumenes II to Antiochos IV, see *IvP* 160 (= *OGIS* 248); for the road to Tarsos through Lykaonia see Robert, *OMS* IV 251. For these events see also Le Rider 1986a; Chrubasik, above pp. 114–15.

purposes—their efforts to establish Antiochos IV on the Seleukid throne.⁴²

It may well have been Attalid interventions of this kind which lie behind the arrival of Attic-weight currency in Seleukid Syria before 140 BC. Following Hoover and MacDonald, it is tempting to explain the Attic-weight currency as part of the financial and military support known to have been provided by Attalos II to Alexander I Balas.⁴³ Polybios (followed by other authors) describes the way the usurper Alexander Balas came to power.⁴⁴ It was in 153/2 that Alexander, ‘an obscure man of uncertain origin’ (*homo ignotus et incertae stirpis*), pretending to be a *nothos* of Antiochos IV, invaded the ‘ancestral’ kingdom with Attalid help and support and became king at Ptolemais.⁴⁵ We learn from Polybios that although he was not given financial help by the Roman senate, he was granted by them ‘authority to go home to regain his father’s throne (τὴν πατρῶαν ἀρχὴν)’.⁴⁶ Soon afterwards, says Polybios, Herakleides of Miletos, a ‘bitter foe’ of Demetrios I, ‘availing himself of this permission, at once began to hire mercenaries and summoned to his aid a number of distinguished men. On arriving at Ephesos he occupied himself with preparations for his enterprise.’ We should recall that Ephesos was a city of the Attalid kingdom.⁴⁷ The fact that the majority of hoards of Group II were found in northern Syria, in the area of Antiocheia and Apameia where we know Balas to have operated, also supports the idea that the arrival of these coinages in Syria is connected in some way to Balas’ invasion.⁴⁸

⁴² *IvP* 160 = *OGIS* 248. For the Attalids and Athens, see Habicht 1990. It is against this historical background that we can also explain the extensive anchor-counter-marking of posthumous Alexanders of Aspendos, Perge, and Phaselis, along with the autonomous Attic-weight tetradrachms of another Pamphylian city, Side. Pamphylia appears to have fallen within the Pergamene sphere of control after the Peace of Apameia: Hoover, *SC* II, Appendix 4a, II 157–93.

⁴³ Hoover and MacDonald 1999–2000.

⁴⁴ Polyb. 33.15.1–2, 33.18.5–14; Diod. Sic. 31.32a; App. Syr. 67; Livy, *Per.* 52; Strabo 13.4.2; Just. *Epit.* 35.1.5–11. Cf. I Macc. 10: 1–50; Joseph, *AJ* 13.2.14 (35–61). See also Will 1979–82: II 373–6; Ehling 2008: 145–54.

⁴⁵ Polyb. 33.18.13–14; Livy 52.22. See also Hopp 1977: 79–85 (‘Die Inthronisation des Alexander Balas’); Ehling 2008: 149 with n. 23 for the meaning of ἐβασίλευσεν ἐκεῖ (I Macc. 10: 1).

⁴⁶ Ehling 2008: 147 with n. 312.

⁴⁷ Polyb. 33.18.14, trans. by Paton. For Ephesos, a gift city to Eumenes II after the Peace of Apameia, see Allen 1983: 110, 114–7.

⁴⁸ See now Duyrat 2011: 425.

King Attalos II could well have assisted Alexander with troops and money. The passage of Polybios mentioned above provides evidence for the way Herakleides collected troops in Asia Minor to send military assistance to Balas. Following Hoover and MacDonald, I propose that the silver coinage from western Asia Minor found in north-Syrian hoards, Alexanders and some other coinages for the earlier group (188–160 BC) and Alexanders and autonomous issues for the later group (160–140 BC), should be understood as Attalid financial support of this kind. To help the pretenders, the Attalids also used the tetradrachms in the name of Athena Ilias and the few strictly ‘Attalid’ Attic-weight coinages (Athena Nikephoros of Pergamon, the Dionysiac Artists of Teos, and the tetradrachms of Eumenes II).⁴⁹ Just like the Dionysiac Artists, mercenaries required Attic-weight currency, the international currency *par excellence* in Asia Minor during the Hellenistic period.⁵⁰ Payment for the mercenary army of Alexander Balas is, in my view, the best explanation for the presence of this Attalid money in hoards of (predominantly) northern Syria.

In support of this view, we know that Eumenes II used the Attic weight-standard for payments abroad in other cases: the 120 talents that he promised to the Achaians in 185 BC must have been on the Attic standard,⁵¹ and epigraphic evidence from Delphi dated 160/159 BC mentions the 3 talents and the 30 minas the king offered to the city of Delphi.⁵² For these gifts, he can only have used money on the Attic standard, whether in the form of coinage of non-Attalid mints that had entered the royal *gaza* or of his own currency on the Attic standard.⁵³ There would be nothing surprising about an Attalid monarch doing the same in support of Balas.

⁴⁹ See also Le Rider 1989a: 177–9. For the coinage of the Dionysiac Artists, see Lorber and Hoover 2003.

⁵⁰ For mercenaries, see Le Rider 1989a: 177–9. For the Dionysiac Artists, see Psoma 2007.

⁵¹ Polyb. 22.7.3, cf. Diod. Sic. 29.17; Walbank, *HCP* iii 187–8.

⁵² *FD* III.3 237, ll. 6–7; III.3 239, l. 11 (160/59 BC). Cf. Knoepfler 1997: 50.

⁵³ See also Callataÿ, above pp. 207–18.

HOW DID THE COINAGES OF THE AUTONOMOUS CITIES BECOME ATTALID MONEY?

We have now seen that the Attalids intervened in Seleukid politics and that the Attalids used Attic-weight currencies for payments abroad. This raises two questions. (1) How did the Alexanders and the coinages with civic types of the autonomous cities of Asia Minor, as well as those in the name of Athena Ilias, become Attalid money? (2) How did these coins travel together with genuine 'Attalid' coinages (the Athena Nikephoros of Pergamon, the Dionysiac Artists of Teos, the tetradrachms of Eumenes II) to Seleukid Syria?

To answer these questions, we need first to describe the new monetary policy introduced by Eumenes II after Apameia. At some point before 163 BC, Eumenes II introduced the so-called *cistophoroi*, struck by cities that were part of the Attalid kingdom, with new types and on a reduced weight-standard (above, Fig. 5.1).⁵⁴ However, cities such as Smyrna and Ephesos, which belonged to the kingdom, and religious associations, such as Athena Nikephoros and the Dionysiac Artists, continued to issue Attic-weight currency as before. Eumenes II also struck *Philetairoi* of Attic weight (Group VII) and a small coinage on the Attic standard with his portrait on the obverse and the *Dioskouroi* on the reverse (above, Figs 5.11 and 5.9).⁵⁵ We know that the Attalids used Alexanders for payments at Delphi, and they must have used all other Attic-weight currencies available when making payments abroad.

There were thus two aspects to the monetary policy of Eumenes II: *cistophoroi* for use within the Attalid kingdom; and Attic-weight coins for relations with the outside world, from which the *cistophoroi* were excluded.⁵⁶ This monetary policy is similar, *mutatis mutandis*, to that of the kingdom of Egypt under the Ptolemies, and also to that of the 'old kingdom' of Macedonia under Antipater and his son,

⁵⁴ For the date of the introduction of the *cistophoroi*: Le Rider and Callataÿ 2006: 183 with n. 1 (c.185 BC); Ashton 2001a and Ashton 2003b: 135 (c.190 BC); Meadows, above pp. 175–81 (160s BC); Callataÿ, above pp. 219–27 (180–170 BC); Ashton, above pp. 245–9 (180s BC). For the iconography, see Thonemann, above pp. 30–4.

⁵⁵ For a date c.166 BC for the portrait coins of Eumenes II, see Mattingly 1993b: 83–4.

⁵⁶ Hoards with *cistophoroi*: Callataÿ, above, Ch. 6 Annex I.

Kassandros.⁵⁷ Thus, in the years following Apameia, the Attic-weight civic coinages, the *panegyris* coinages (Athena Nikephoros and Dionysiac Artists) of the same weight and the few royal issues also on the Attic standard 'represent the currency used by the Pergamene kingdom in overseas transactions'.⁵⁸ It is in this way that we propose to answer the second question posed above.

Because the autonomous cities that issued the Alexanders (and, later, the wreathed coinages) were not part of the Attalid kingdom and did not pay taxes to the king, their coinages on the Attic standard may have arrived in the royal *gaza* by means of exchange. After the introduction of the cistophoroi, the Attic-weight coinages of the Greek cities would necessarily have been exchanged by their owners for cistophoroi whenever they undertook commercial activities within the Attalid kingdom.⁵⁹ Like the kingdom's coinages on the Attic standard, the Attic-weight coinages of the Greek cities were then used by the Attalid monarchs for transactions abroad. If we assume that after the introduction of the cistophoroi, Attic-weight tetradrachms were regularly being exchanged for cistophoroi on the frontiers of the Attalid kingdom, it is easy to understand how these coins could have become Attalid money.⁶⁰

The next question is: why then did the free cities of Asia Minor strike Attic-weight currency at all, first Alexanders and then coinages with their own types? One could regard this as normal behaviour for free cities of western Asia Minor, which continued to need a regular supply of coin in a period when currency on the Attic standard, i.e. the Alexanders that had monopolized numismatic circulation in Asia Minor from the 330s onwards, was tending to die out everywhere.⁶¹ The honorary decrees of Kyme for Archippe noted the use of the contemporary Attic currency for payments abroad, in fairs or elsewhere: 70 Attic drachms were offered by Archippe for the purchase of the ox for sacrifice. Significantly, the ox was to be bought at a fair or

⁵⁷ For the Ptolemies, see Le Rider and Callataÿ 2006: 99–103. For Macedonia under the Antipatrids, see Le Rider 1993a.

⁵⁸ Kinns 1987: 108 stressed the civic character of the cistophoroi. See also Szaivert 1983; Thonemann, above pp. 30–4; Meadows, above pp. 199–204; Callataÿ, above pp. 227–31.

⁵⁹ Le Rider 1989a: 179–85.

⁶⁰ Le Rider 1989a.

⁶¹ Le Rider 1986b. Several cities issued Alexanders after Apameia: see below, and Callataÿ, above pp. 231–2.

outside the territories of the city; this must be the reason why the contemporary international currency issued by the city is mentioned.⁶²

This 'commercial' explanation is perfectly sufficient for the years preceding the introduction of the *cistophoroi*, i.e. before (probably) the 160s. However, if we extend this argument to the years following the adoption of the new monetary policy of Eumenes II, it is hard to explain why the Attic-weight currencies with civic types were all so short-lived, most of them being minted for a decade or less (and mentioned epigraphically only in the Kymaian decrees for Archippe), while commercial activities between the autonomous cities and the cities that previously belonged to the kingdom, their neighbours, continued unbroken after 140 and also after 133 BC.⁶³ The civic coinages that found their way to Seleukid Syria before 140 BC should therefore be approached from a different perspective: that of the wider history of western Asia Minor after the Peace of Apameia.⁶⁴

ASIA MINOR AFTER APAMEIA

By the Peace of Apameia, the Romans granted freedom to those cities of Asia Minor that had remained free during the Antiochene war, had not followed the Seleukids and had opened their doors to the Romans.⁶⁵ The two partners of Rome, Rhodes and the Attalid king, received all the provinces that the Seleukids lost. Lykia and Karia up to the Maeander were given to Rhodes.⁶⁶ The rest was given to King Eumenes II: the Chersonesos of Thrace and the European coast of the Propontis, Hellespontine Phrygia, Mysia, Lydia, Phrygia, Lykaonia,

⁶² Psoma 2009, and see below, Appendix III.

⁶³ For the coins of Athena Ilias, see above, nn. 13, 24, and 36. The Attic-weight tetradrachms of other cities of north-west Asia Minor (Kyzikos, Tenedos) continued to be issued, but these had a different area of circulation and so did not reach Syria: Callataÿ 1998; Meadows and Houghton 2010: 180, 185.

⁶⁴ Hoover and MacDonald 1999–2000: 115–16.

⁶⁵ Literary sources: Polyb. 21.24.7–9; 21.46.2–7; Diod. Sic. 29.14; App. *Syr.* 44; Livy 37.52–6; 38.39.5; cf. Livy 37.55.7–56.6. For the different traditions in Polybios and Livy, see Bickerman 1937, followed by Walbank, *HCP* iii 167–8 and Will 1979–82: II 227–8.

⁶⁶ Polyb. 21.46.8; Walbank, *HCP* iii 170–1.

Pisidia, and Pamphylia.⁶⁷ Pamphylia was a problem and the senate did not come to a decision about it.⁶⁸ Eumenes II also gained Mysia (Phrygia Epiktetos), which Prousius I of Bithynia had previously conquered.⁶⁹ The Romans guaranteed Prousius the security of his kingdom in order to obtain his neutrality, but this Roman decision created problems between Prousius and the Attalids.⁷⁰ The war of Prousius I and his allies, Hannibal, the Gauls, and Philip V (c.186–183 bc), ended with a peace that granted the disputed area to Eumenes.⁷¹ The war with Pharnakes I of Pontos (182–179 bc) followed and was another Attalid success.⁷² After Pydna, ‘at the moment of the fall of the Macedonian monarchy’ (Will), the *patres* refused to receive Eumenes II when he asked for their help against the Galatians; his last victorious war against the Galatians (168–166 bc) brought him nothing but glory and the Galatians, once more after Roman intervention, were granted their independence.⁷³ When Demetrios I became king of Syria, the situation changed dramatically and in 158/7, the year of Eumenes’ death, the senate received Attalos II and was ready to support the Attalids again.⁷⁴

During the reign of Attalos II, with the Galatians having been granted their independence by Rome in 166, the main problem for the Attalids was Prousius II of Bithynia and his efforts to expand his kingdom.⁷⁵ War between Prousius II and Attalos II began in 159. Attalos was supported by Ariarathes V of Cappadocia, Mithridates III of Pontos, and Rhodes. Prousius II was for all three the common enemy. Polybios gives a full account of this war, the diplomatic efforts of the Attalids, the atrocities committed by the king of Bithynia, and

⁶⁷ Polyb. 21.46.9–10; Walbank, *HCP* iii 171–4.

⁶⁸ Polyb. 21.46.11–12; Walbank, *HCP* iii 174.

⁶⁹ Polyb. 21.46.10; Will 1979–82: II 228.

⁷⁰ Will 1979–82: II 224–38.

⁷¹ Will 1979–82: II 286–7; Chrubasik, above p. 108.

⁷² Will 1979–82: II 288–90; Chrubasik, above pp. 108–10.

⁷³ Will 1979–82: II 291–2.

⁷⁴ Will 1979–82: II 285–93. For the date of Eumenes’ death, see Petzl 1978: 264–7; Habicht 1989b: 334.

⁷⁵ At the beginning of his reign (182 bc), Prousius II was an ally of Eumenes II during the war against Pharnakes of Pontos (c.182–179 bc): see Will 1979–82: II 290. He renounced this alliance with the Attalids after his wedding to the Macedonian princess Apama, sister of Perseus c.178/7 bc: Will 1979–82: II 259–60, 290. For Prousius’ efforts to expand his kingdom, see Will 1979–82: II 381–2.

the reaction of the senate.⁷⁶ The cities of the Attalid kingdom, and some free Greek cities and sanctuaries were among his victims. The war ended with Roman intervention in 154. Under the terms of the peace treaty, as recounted by Polybios, 'Prousius was to hand over at once twenty decked ships to Attalos, and to pay him five hundred talents in twenty years, each keeping the territory that was theirs before they entered on hostilities. Prousius also undertook to repair the damage he had done to the territory of Methymna, Aigai, Kyme and Herakleia, paying a hundred talents to those cities.'⁷⁷

During this period of near-continuous wars of the Attalid kings with Prousius I of Bithynia (186–183), Pharnakes I of Pontos (182–179), the Galatians (168–166), and Prousius II of Bithynia (159–154), the autonomous and free cities of western Asia Minor must have been anxious for their future. The Attalid king was the most important power north of the Maeander and could thus provide precious help in case of attack. As we have seen, Prousius II plundered the territories of the free cities and was afterwards obliged to pay them war indemnities. Polybios' account of the obligations of Prousius II at the end of the war towards the Attalid king and the cities noted above may point to an alliance or a sort of coalition between the Attalid king and the free cities concerned. A dedication to Zeus and Athena Nikephoros on a *bathron* found at Pergamon made by King Attalos and *those* who campaigned with him against Prousius may also provide some evidence for this alliance (*IvP* 225).

This was not the first time that Greek cities of Asia Minor had collaborated with the Attalid king against external threats: at the end of the war between Pharnakes I of Pontos and Eumenes' allies in 179, among those included in the peace treaty were the autonomous cities of Kyzikos and Herakleia Pontike, who may have provided military help to Eumenes II.⁷⁸ One also recalls the coalition of Attalos I with a

⁷⁶ Polyb. 32.15–16; 33.1–2; 33.7; 33.12–13. See also App. *Mith.* 3; Diod. Sic. 31.35; Trog. *Prol.* 34.

⁷⁷ Polyb. 33.13.6–9, trans. by Paton: ὥστε παραχρήμα μὲν εἴκοσι καταφράκτους νῆας ἀποδοῦναι Προυσίαν Ἀττάλῳ, πεντακόσια δὲ τάλαντα κατενεγκεῖν <ἐν> ἔτεσιν εἴκοσι· τὴν δὲ χώραν ἀμφοτέρους ἔχειν ἣν καὶ πρότερον εἶχον, ὅτ' εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐνέβαινον. διορθώσασθαι δὲ Προυσίαν καὶ τὴν καταφθορὰν τῆς χώρας τῆς τε Μηθυμναίων καὶ τῶν Αἰγαιέων καὶ τῆς Κυμναίων καὶ Ἡρακλειωτῶν, ἑκάτον τάλαντα δόντα τοῖς προειρημένοις.

⁷⁸ Polyb. 25.2.13. Mesembria of Thrace and the Tauric Chersonese were also included in the treaty between Pharnakes I and Eumenes II. Although Polybios did not mention which party these cities took (see Walbank, *HCP* iii 273), the treaty

number of cities of the area after the war against Achaïos: Kolophon, Smyrna, Phokaia, Kyme, Aigai, Temnos, and Teos.⁷⁹ The cities of Ilion, Lampsakos, and Alexandria Troas received special treatment for their assistance during this same war.⁸⁰

Eumenes II does not appear to have championed the freedom of the Greek cities of Asia Minor before the senate during the negotiations at Rome. For the Attalid king, the freedom of the cities of western Asia Minor was likely to lead to the creation of a Rhodian protectorate: 'For such is the nature of things: thinking that they owe their freedom to Rhodes, they will be nominally the allies of the Rhodians, but in reality ready to obey all their orders, feeling indebted to them for the greatest services'.⁸¹ In fact, the role which Eumenes feared that the Rhodians would play was actually adopted by his own dynasty in western Asia Minor between Apameia and the end of his brother's reign. Circumstances turned the king and his brother to share similar fortunes with the free cities of western Asia Minor, in the face of various external attacks and common enemies.⁸² Eumenes II became the benefactor *par excellence* of the Greeks of Asia Minor. According to the decree with which the Ionians voted honours for Eumenes II, the king put all his efforts into the wars against the barbarians and did his best for the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and the Attalid kings consistently presented themselves—not without good reason—as the champions of the Greeks against the barbarians.⁸³ The free and autonomous cities of Asia Minor in crucial moments of their history seem not to have had any other choice than to adopt a kind of *symmachia* or coalition with the kings of Pergamon.

between Pharnakes and the Chersonese (*IOSPE* I² 402) reveals that these cities suffered attacks of Pharnakes I.

⁷⁹ Polyb. 5.77.4–6.

⁸⁰ Polyb. 5.78. For an alliance between the free cities of Asia Minor and Attalos I, see McShane 1964: 65–91.

⁸¹ Polyb. 21.19.10, trans. by Paton. *Contra* Bickerman 1937: 234, who believes that this and the Rhodian speech are invented by Polybios, see Walbank, *HCP* iii 112 and Will 1979–82: II 228: 'leur substance exprime au mieux les intérêts et les ambitions des deux alliés de Rome'.

⁸² For the war against Prousius II: Habicht 1956; Will 1979–82: II 381–2.

⁸³ *OGIS* 763 (Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 349–53, no. 285); Thonemann, above pp. 35–8.

Literary sources and inscriptions provide evidence for the relations between the Attalids and the free cities of western Asia Minor.⁸⁴ It is not a coincidence that friendly relations and the generosity of the Attalids were often directed towards cities that had issued Alexanders during the second century BC, and which went on to mint the silver coinages that served Attalid policy in the Seleukid kingdom after the Peace of Apameia.

This policy of friendship and benefactions goes back to the founder of the dynasty, Philetairos. In the region of Aiolis, both Philetairos and his adopted son and successor, Eumenes, made dedications of land to the local Apollo *Chresterios* at Aigai.⁸⁵ During the 270s, 'it was thanks to Philetairos that Kyme preserved her democracy'.⁸⁶ Philetairos also donated shields to the city of Kyme, and the city celebrated a festival called the *Soteria* and *Philetaireia*.⁸⁷ From an honorary decree of Kyme for a citizen of Taras, Epigonos son of Damokrates, we learn about a local festival in honour of Attalos I.⁸⁸ Temnos is also mentioned as an ally of Attalos I, and the city later received subsidies from Eumenes II.⁸⁹ During military operations against Attalos II, and after the atrocities committed in the sanctuary of Asklepios at Pergamon and the sanctuary of Artemis at Hieria Kome, Prousius II plundered and then set fire to the *temenos* of Apollo Kynneios, which was in the territory of Temnos.⁹⁰

Further north, in the Troad, Alexandreia Troas, together with Lampsakos and Ilion, remained loyal to Attalos I during the war against Achaïos.⁹¹ From Ilion comes a dedication of Attalos II for

⁸⁴ Evidence is scarce for a number of them: Herakleia by Latmos and Methymna were autonomous in 154 BC (Polyb. 33.13.8) but we have no other information about them. For Klazomenai, Kolophon, Kyme, Mylasa, Miletos, Chios, Smyrna, Erythrai, and Phokaia see Polyb. 21.46.4–8 (treaty of Apameia).

⁸⁵ OGIS 312; Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 285–6, nos. 251–2, with bibliography and discussion. For Eumenes, I see Malay 1999: no. 3 (SEG 49, 1746). Cf. also Schalles 1985: 33–6.

⁸⁶ Hamon 2008: 105.

⁸⁷ Manganaro 2000; Fröhlich 2004.

⁸⁸ Petzl and Pleket 1979 (SEG 29, 1216).

⁸⁹ Attalos: Polyb. 5.77.4–5 (together with Kyme, Smyrna, Phokaia, Aigai, Teos, and Kolophon); see Walbank, *HCP* iii 168. Eumenes: Welles, *RC* 48.

⁹⁰ Polyb. 32.15.12; Robert 1937: 90–110, based on a decree of Temnos replying to one of Smyrna.

⁹¹ Polyb. 5.78.6. Lampsakos became Attalid after the war of Attalos I against Hierax (Polyb. 4.78.7).

his late brother, Eumenes II.⁹² A letter of an Attalid king mentions the purchase of land by the king from the temple of Athena and previous benefactions (oxen and drivers) to the sanctuary.⁹³ To the south, in Ionia, Chios received money from Attalos I to build its walls and also 'for the heating of the gymnasium'.⁹⁴ In the response of Attalos I to a letter sent to him by the citizens of Magnesia on the Maeander asking for recognition of their festival of Artemis Leukophryene, there is mention of 'the benefactions (*euergesiai*) performed by me towards the *dēmos*'.⁹⁵ From Samos, we have a dedication by Attalos II of a statue of Philopoimen, son of Andronikos, *stratēgos* and *epi tēs sphragidos*.⁹⁶ At Kolophon (Nova) there were statues of Queen Apollonis and her sons.⁹⁷ Kolophon also honoured Athenaios and Philetairos, the brothers of Eumenes II and Attalos II, and received various benefactions from the Attalids.⁹⁸ In the honorary decree for Menippos from Kolophon, which dates c.133 BC, there is also mention of 'royal banquets for the *neoi* and *presbyteroi*'.⁹⁹ Finally, in Karia, Eumenes II sent letters to Kos and Iasos asking them to recognize the Nikephoria of Pergamon.¹⁰⁰ There is evidence for donations to the *gymnasium* of Kos by Attalos I, Eumenes II, and Attalos II, and also for honours and festivals for the Attalid kings.¹⁰¹

Eumenes II and his brothers had particularly strong ties with Kyzikos, in coastal Mysia; most obviously, Apollonis, the queen mother, an exemplum of *philostorgia* and of all other family qualities, was a native of Kyzikos.¹⁰² However, relations between Kyzikos and

⁹² *I.Ilion* 41 (Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 283–4, no. 249).

⁹³ *I.Ilion* 42 (RC 62); See also *I.Ilion* 43, decree for an Attalid?

⁹⁴ Maier 1959–61: no. 51 (Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 255–9, no. 231): εἰς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς καῦσιν τὴν ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ.

⁹⁵ *I.Magnesia* 22 (Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 320–1, no. 272): τῶν [ὑπ'] ἐμοῦ γεγενημένων εἰς αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν δῆμον) εὐ[εργε]σιῶν.

⁹⁶ *IG XII* 6 1, 469 (Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 259–60, no. 232). For Philopoimen, see Savalli-Lestrade 1996: 166–8. For his father Andronikos, see Savalli-Lestrade 1996: 158–66.

⁹⁷ Gauthier 2006.

⁹⁸ Gauthier 2006, esp. 494 (*palaistra*). See also Robert and Robert 1989: 99–100.

⁹⁹ *SEG* 39, 1244 II.46–8 (Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 303–4, no. 262a): βασιλικά δαίπνα τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις.

¹⁰⁰ Welles, RC 49–50.

¹⁰¹ *I.Cos* ED 45 (Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 251–4, no. 225).

¹⁰² Polyb. 22.20.1: Κυζικηνή ἦν. For the very scarce presence of Attic weight tetradrachms of Kyzikos in hoards buried in Syria, see Meadows and Houghton 2010: 180. For Apollonis, see also Thonemann, above pp. 39–42.

the Attalids pre-date the wedding of Apollonis with Attalos I. The city received various benefactions from Philetairos and honoured him with a festival, the *Philetaireia*.¹⁰³ Kyzikos was also included in the peace treaty between Eumenes II and Pharnakes of Pontos.¹⁰⁴ After the end of the war with Prousius I, in the course of which many battles were fought in the area of Kyzikos, King Eumenes II and his brother, 'placing their mother between them and taking both her hands, went round the temples and the city (Kyzikos) accompanied by their suites'.¹⁰⁵ Finally, a decision of Attalos III concerning the priesthood of Dionysos Kathegemon at Pergamon in 135 BC is known to have been communicated to the city of Kyzikos.¹⁰⁶

In 167 BC, during the war against the Galatians, Eumenes II presented himself to the *koinon* of the Ionians as the 'common benefactor of the Greeks, (who) faced many great battles against the barbarians, displaying all zeal and care to make sure that the inhabitants of the Greek cities should always live in peace and enjoy the best state of affairs'.¹⁰⁷ The king's letter was erected at Miletos, the most significant city of the *koinon*. Miletos was an autonomous city and it was 'at Miletos that Eumenes II was almost certainly called a god in his lifetime'.¹⁰⁸ Eumenes II was further honoured by the city and might have erected a new gymnasium.¹⁰⁹ We learn from a decree from the sanctuary of Apollo Terminus that Eumenes II also received a cult at neighbouring Myous.¹¹⁰

The Attalids were probably involved in significant building programmes in different cities of western Asia Minor: the north and south porticos of the agora at Assos; the temple of Apollo Smintheus

¹⁰³ OGIS 748 (Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 272–4, no. 241). For the *Philetaireia*, see Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 274, no. 241.

¹⁰⁴ Polyb. 25.2.13.

¹⁰⁵ Polyb. 22.20.4–5, trans. by Paton: ἄγοντες γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν μέσσην αὐτῶν τὴν μητέρα περιήσαν τά θ' ἱερὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν (sc. τὴν Κύζικον) μετὰ τῆς θεραπείας.

¹⁰⁶ *IVP* 248 = OGIS 331; Hamon 2004.

¹⁰⁷ OGIS 763, trans. by Austin 2006: 416–18, no. 239: κοινὸς εὐεργέτης τῶν Ἑλλήνων . . . πολλοὺς μὲν καὶ μεγάλους ἀγῶνας ὑπέστη πρὸς τοῦ[ς] βαρβάρους, ἅπασαν σπουδὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν ποιού[με]νος ὅπως οἱ τὰς Ἑλληνίδας κατοικοῦντες πόλε[ις] διὰ παντὸς ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ τῇ βελτίστῃ καταστάσ[ει] ὑπάρχωσιν.

¹⁰⁸ Allen 1983: 114 with n. 148.

¹⁰⁹ *Milet I* 9, no. 307, with Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 349–56. See also *I.Milet* (VI 3) 1039 (Herrmann 1965a: 71–96).

¹¹⁰ *I.Milet* (VI 3) 1040 (Herrmann 1965a: 96–117; Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 356–7, no. 287).

at Alexandria Troas; perhaps the temple of Athena at Ilion; buildings of the agora and porticos at Aigai; the temple of Dionysos at Teos; and the *stadium* at Miletos.¹¹¹ The links of the Attalids with the cities of western Asia Minor may also, finally, be illustrated by their personal ties with significant citizens of various cities. For Attalos I we have information about Diaphenes son of Polles; from Temnos, for Eumenes II about Athenaios son of Meidias; from Kyzikos, Philtes son of Hippolochos, also from Kyzikos, and about a citizen of Myrina.¹¹²

Although *eunoia* accrued from *euergesia*,¹¹³ this policy of the Attalids towards the cities of western Asia Minor did not automatically make the cities their allies. Miletos and Herakleia by Latmos, in a convention signed by both c.180 BC, stressed that 'the two *dēmoi* will do nothing that is opposed to the alliance with the Rhodians'.¹¹⁴ After Apameia, those cities that were declared free and autonomous, such as Miletos and Herakleia by Latmos, were keen not to create problems for the big powers of the area, in order that they could ask for their help and collaboration in an emergency. Several such cases of emergency occurred in the course of the half-century between Apameia and the late 140s, bringing the cities into an effective coalition with the Attalid king. In order to meet the financial obligations resulting from their alliance with 'the common benefactor of the Greeks', they first continued issuing Alexanders and subsequently, after 160 BC, turned to new civic types. This money was then used to promote the Attalids' policy towards the Seleukid kingdom, i.e. to provide help to Antiochos IV and his presumed son, Alexander Balas.

The Greek cities seem to have had nothing against this policy of the Attalids towards the Seleukids. Antiochos IV was a benefactor to several of the cities. An honorary decree for the Milesian Eirenias (dating before 167 BC), who persuaded king Eumenes II to make various donations to the city of Miletos, also mentions the *ateleia* of

¹¹¹ Bringmann and von Steuben 1995: 496–7, nos. 434–5 (Assos); 498, no. 436 (Alexandria); 280–1, no. 245 [A] (Ilion); 499–502, nos. 439–42 (Aigai); 504–5, no. 445 (Teos); 516, no. 459 (Miletos).

¹¹² Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 123–4, no. 1 (Diaphenes); 129, no. 11 (Athenaios, a cousin of Eumenes II and Attalos II); 138, no. 23 (Philtes; for another friend from Kyzikos, see 141, no. 27); 142, no. 28 (Myrina).

¹¹³ See Mittag 2006: 103, with n. 36.

¹¹⁴ *Milet I* 3, 150, ll. 35–6: *μηθὲν ὑπεναντίον πρασσόντων τῶν δήμων τῇ πρὸς Ροδίουσιν συμμαχίαι.*

all products that were exported from Miletos to the Seleukid empire.¹¹⁵ The decree notes that this *ateleia* was granted to the city by Antiochos IV. To Antiochos IV, too, was dedicated the new *bouleuterion* of Miletos, built by two important Milesian brothers, Timarchos and Herakleides.¹¹⁶ After the death of Antiochos IV, Timarchos was prominent in opposing Demetrios I, and after Timarchos' death, his brother Herakleides continued to create problems for the line of Seleukos IV, this time with the help of Attalos II, by bringing Alexander Balas to Syria.¹¹⁷ Timarchos and Herakleides may have been honored with gilded statues at Miletos, as were Eirenias and Eumenes II.¹¹⁸ Other prominent Milesians in the Seleukid court were Apollonios, son of Menestheus, his sons, and Antigonos, the navarch of Alexander I Balas.¹¹⁹

Another city that received gifts from Antiochos IV was Kyzikos. The king donated to the *prytaneion* of Kyzikos 'golden dishes for one table', which has been considered as a 'directly "political" dedication'.¹²⁰ It has been assumed that Antiochos also offered *ateleia* to this city, whose close links with the Attalids have already been emphasized. Eumenes II and Antiochos IV seem, therefore, in many cases to have had links with the same cities.¹²¹

This network of friendly relations with the Attalids, royal *euergetiai*, and military protection, helps to explain how the silver coinages of the free cities of western Asia Minor became Attalid money. With these coinages the autonomous cities paid for the friendship and the protection of the Attalid king, and thus served the king's policy and

¹¹⁵ *I.Milet* (VI 3) 1039, II.1–6.

¹¹⁶ For Timarchos, see *RE* VI A, cols. 1237–8 (Timarchos 5); for Herakleides, *RE* VIII, cols. 465–8 (Herakleides 32). See also Herrmann 1987: 86–7, 171–2; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 56–7, no. 55; 63–4, no. 62. For the *bouleuterion*, see *Milet* I 2, nos. 1–2.

¹¹⁷ See Will 1979–82: II 377–9.

¹¹⁸ van Bremen 2008: 373. Eirenias: Herrmann 1965a: 73–96; Attalid donations to Miletos: Kleine 1986: 129–40.

¹¹⁹ Herrmann 1987: 175–9; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 41–2, no. 42 and 49, no. 48 (Apollonios); 59, no. 57; 65–6, no. 64; 68–9, nos. 67–9 (sons). For Antigonos, see Herrmann 1987: 183–9; Ehling 2008: 149 with n. 324.

¹²⁰ Livy 41.20.7: *vasa aurea mensae unius*; Mittag 2006: 110, '... direkt "politische" Stiftung'.

¹²¹ Mittag 2006: 112: 'weitgehende Übereinstimmung zwischen den Stiftungen der beiden befreundeten Könige zeigt die geographische Verteilung der beschenkten Städte und Bünde'. It is worth mentioning that the *oikonomos* of Archippe of Kyme, Helikon, son of Apollonios, seems also to be connected with Seleukid Syria, as he came from Antiocheia by Daphne: van Bremen 2008: 374 with n. 66.

interests. The silver paid as an indemnity by Prousius II at the end of the war with Attalos II may have enabled Methymna, Aigai, Kyme, and Herakleia to mint Attic-weight tetradrachms in the 150s and 140s, but cities clearly also found other sources of precious metal for their coinages in order to satisfy the needs of their royal neighbours, protectors, and benefactors.

A PARALLEL CASE: INNER THRACE IN THE SECOND AND FIRST CENTURIES BC

Coins from Thasos and Maroneia buried in hoards found in inner Thrace provide a helpful parallel to the coins of the free cities of Western Asia Minor buried in Syria. In both northern Syria during the years 188 to 140 BC and inner Thrace after 150 BC, we find numerous hoards containing coins minted by free and autonomous cities on the Attic standard: in Syria, cities of western Asia Minor; and in Thrace, predominantly Maroneia and Thasos (Figs. 8.9–10; although other issuing authorities also appear, such as the first Macedonian *meris*, Aesillas the *quaestor*, and Athens).¹²²

Some scholars have proposed that these Attic-weight tetradrachms from Thasos and Maroneia arrived in inner Thrace through trade.¹²³ However, a better explanation is that Maroneia and Thasos were making payments to the Romans, who then brought these coins to



Fig. 8.9. Attic-weight tetradrachm of Maroneia, after 146 BC. ANS 1966.75.67 (SNG Burton Berry 496).

¹²² Psoma 2011b.

¹²³ Picard 2001, with previous bibliography.



Fig. 8.10. Attic-weight tetradrachm of Thasos, after 146 BC. ANS 1966.75.86 (SNG Burton Berry 521)

inner Thrace during their campaigns there.¹²⁴ The Romans would therefore have played the same role in bringing these Attic-weight tetradrachms of Thasos and Maroneia to inner Thrace as the Attalids played in bringing the coins of western Asia Minor to northern Syria.

The political context is once again relevant to the argument. Maroneia was declared free and independent by the Roman senate in 167 BC, and a peace treaty between Maroneia and Rome was concluded afterwards.¹²⁵ Maroneia remained a faithful ally of Rome, as is revealed by the decrees that the Maroneians erected in the sanctuary of the Great Gods of Samothrake during the reign of Claudius.¹²⁶ The first of these decrees reports the destruction of the city because of its friendship with Rome.¹²⁷ The destruction of Maroneia should probably be dated to the Mithradatic wars. During this period Maroneia minted the most important part of its silver coinage on the Attic standard, as a contribution towards Rome's expenses for the campaigns of Sulla and L. Hortensius in Thrace.¹²⁸

There is similar evidence for Thasos, also a free city. The liberation of Thasos and the whole area previously occupied by Philip V dates from summer 196 BC.¹²⁹ Although literary sources are silent, we learn from inscriptions that Thasos suffered during the war against

¹²⁴ Callataÿ 1998; *IThrAeg* 327; Callataÿ 2008b; Psoma et al. 2008: 178–82; Psoma 2011b, esp. 167–8.

¹²⁵ Diod. Sic. 31.8.8; Livy 45.29.5–6. Treaty: *SEG* 35, 823; *IThrAeg* E168 for full bibliography and discussion.

¹²⁶ *IThrAeg* E180, fr. A, l. 8. For the *editio princeps*, see Clinton 2003; Clinton 2004, and cf. Wörle 2004; Thornton 2007.

¹²⁷ *IThrAeg* E180, fr. A, ll. 9–11.

¹²⁸ Psoma et al. 2008: 179–80.

¹²⁹ Polyb. 18.48.

Mithradates because of her alliance with Rome. A letter of Sulla to the city of Thasos, dating to his second consulate, announced to the Thasians a *senatus consultum* which made special provisions for the territories of Thasos on the mainland that were occupied by Thracians.¹³⁰ The letter also mentions prisoners who had been carried off by these Thracians during the war against the Romans. A letter subsequently addressed to the Thasians by Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, proconsul of Macedonia (81–78 BC), concerns this same *senatus consultum* announced by Sulla to the Thasians.¹³¹ Dolabella's letter also mentions the territories to be handed over to Thasos by the Thracians, and the serious difficulties faced by Thasos during the war against Mithradates because of her alliance with Rome. The mention of *exeleutheroi* in a contemporary Thasian inscription suggests the liberation of slaves during a military emergency, which could be the Mithradatic wars.¹³² The close ties of Thasos with the Romans are also revealed by a series of honorary decrees for the Thasian Dionysodoros, son of Pempidas. The decrees come from the cities of Assos and Lampsakos in Mysia, and Rhodes in Karia.¹³³ From the Rhodian decree we learn that Dionysodoros, the *proxenos* of the city of Rhodes, helped the Rhodian ambassadors to meet the proconsul L. Aurelius at Amphilopolis.

This epigraphic evidence from Maroneia and Thasos, combined with the new chronology of the Attic-weight coinages from these two cities, suggests that the bulk of both coinages ought to be explained in relation to their friendship with Rome during the Mithradatic wars.¹³⁴ Neither city had issued Alexanders during the Hellenistic period; these were their first issues of tetradrachms on the Attic standard. These tetradrachms never seem to appear in Aegean

¹³⁰ Dunant and Pouilloux 1958: 37–45, no. 174 (*RDGE* 20).

¹³¹ Dunant and Pouilloux 1958: 45–55, no. 175 (*RDGE* 21).

¹³² Dunant and Pouilloux 1958: 35–7, no. 173.

¹³³ Assos: Dunant and Pouilloux 1958: 21–3, no. 170. Lampsakos: Ibid. 23–6, no. 171. J. Treheux (followed by Dunant and Pouilloux) proposed connecting the decrees from Lampsakos either to its implication in the scandal caused by Verres at Lampsakos in 79 BC (Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.63–9) or to the situation in spring 74 BC, when the rest of the Pontic army sought refuge in Lampsakos after the disaster they had suffered at Kyzikos. When they evacuated the city, they took with them the whole population of Lampsakos (App. *Mithr.* 331–2). Rhodes: Dunant and Pouilloux 1958: 26–35, no. 172. These events probably date to 69/8 BC, and should be linked with the special privileges offered to Rhodes by Sulla.

¹³⁴ See above, n. 124.

Thrace;¹³⁵ instead, they travelled to the north and formed part of hoards buried north of the Rhodopi mountains.¹³⁶ The beginning of these coinages antedates the arrival of the Pontic armies: the early issues date from the late second century BC, and should probably be associated with the situation in Thrace during that time. The relevant literary sources and inscriptions record that the Roman army had to confront successive attacks by local tribes in Thrace throughout this period.¹³⁷

Meadows has proposed a similar explanation for the presence of Pamphylian Alexanders (of the cities of Perge, Aspendos, and Silyon), the Alexanders and autonomous coinage of Side, and the Alexanders of the Aradian Peraia in the kingdom of the Seleukids. These coinages were found in hoards buried in Syria, Diyarbakir, Gordion, Asia Minor, Pergamon, Oylum Höyük, Laodikeia ad mare, Mektepini in Phrygia, Sardeis, Pisidia, etc. Meadows proposed that these coins were issued between 223/2 and c.197–195 BC during a period of heightened Seleukid military activity in Asia Minor.¹³⁸

We can now venture a conclusion. A large proportion of the Alexanders and the Attic-weight coinages with civic types issued by independent cities of western Asia Minor in the mid-second century BC reached Seleukid Syria as Attalid money. Both Antiochos IV and Alexander Balas, a creation of Attalos II, received Attalid help, money, and troops.¹³⁹ It is not a coincidence that most of the hoards that contain these coinages were found in the areas where Alexander I and later, under Antiochos VI, Diodotos Tryphon fought.¹⁴⁰ Attalid money and help may have continued to arrive in Syria during the late 140s, when Tryphon, in charge of the boy king Antiochos VI

¹³⁵ There is only one tetradrachm of Thasos at the Museum of Komotini. It was found at Orestiada and may be ascribed to the wider zone of circulation of this currency in inner Thrace. See Psoma *et al.* 2008: 180 with n. 126.

¹³⁶ For Maroneia, see Schönert-Geiss 1987: 96–108; *CH* VIII 496; IX 268, 271, 325–6, 328. For Thasos, see Prokopov 2006: 13–58, 335 (map) and 215–66 for the 334 hoards.

¹³⁷ Papazoglu 1978: 58–67, 174–83, 284–304, 314–45, 408–30. See now Picard 2009: 489–93.

¹³⁸ Meadows 2009a.

¹³⁹ Ehling 2008: 152–3.

¹⁴⁰ Operations of Tryphon under Antiochos VI and murder of Antiochos VI: Ehling 2008: 165–79. For Tryphon after the death of Antiochos VI: Ehling 2008: 180–2.

(144–142 BC), campaigned against Demetrios II.¹⁴¹ In fact, we can better understand the decision of Diodotos Tryphon to bring back to Syria the very young son of Alexander I if we assume that the Attalids were behind him.¹⁴² After the murder of the baby king, Tryphon countermarked the latest of these coinages: Lebedos, Herakleia by Latmos, and the coins struck in the name of the Syrian Gods.¹⁴³ The Athenian silver coins that subsequently replaced these Asia Minor coinages in Syrian hoards for a while could be explained in a similar manner: after the capture of his brother Demetrios II by the Parthians, Antiochos VII Sidetes, based on Rhodes, planned his way back to Syria.¹⁴⁴ He finally succeeded in 138/7 BC, and defeated the usurper Tryphon.¹⁴⁵

We can thus follow Philip Kinns' analysis of the second-century Attic-weight coinages of western Asia Minor and their function: 'there is a ready explanation if the Attalids were behind them: these tetradrachms may be an expression of their mutual obligations'.¹⁴⁶ Coinage appears once more to have had a purely financial and utilitarian function, and to have been closely linked to political events. One wonders whether we can extend this explanation to the Alexanders struck by these autonomous cities in earlier periods. Was this a development that occurred only in the second century BC, under Roman pressure,¹⁴⁷ or did it begin much earlier, under Alexander the Great? In the latter case, it might help to explain the very large number of mints that struck coinages in his name before and after his

¹⁴¹ He was proclaimed king at Apameia: Diod. Sic. 33.4; Joseph, *AJ* 13.144; cf. Strabo 16.2.10. For operations at Chalkis and then Antiochea, see Ehling 2008: 166. Tryphon destroyed Berytos (Strabo 16.2.19) and also operated in Rough Kilikia: Ehling 2008: 169. Coins in the name of Antiochos VI were issued in Tarsos and Mallos: SC II, I 321–2, nos. 1996–8.

¹⁴² See also Diod. Sic. 33.28a on the golden Nikai of 10,000 gold staters that Tryphon offered as a gift to the senate after having murdered the boy king: the gift was received in the name of the late monarch. See Ehling 2008: 181.

¹⁴³ Meadows and Houghton 2010: 157. For the murder of Antiochos VI by Tryphon: Ehling 2008: 178–9.

¹⁴⁴ Ehling 2008: 186–9. Antiochos VII landed with his fleet in Seleukeia Pieria after the invitation of Cleopatra Thea (Joseph, *AJ* 13.222). He then moved to Antiocheia (I Macc. 15: 10).

¹⁴⁵ App. *Syr* 359: *σὺν πόνῳ πολλῷ*; Ehling 2008: 190–1. Tryphon first moved to the Phoenician coast and then to Ptolemais and Orthosia.

¹⁴⁶ Kinns 1980: 264. See also *ibid.* p. 232: 'the wreathed tetradrachms of Kolophon are close in style and types to Myrina's wreathed tetradrachms... the connexion to Myrina raises doubts as to whether the issue was actually struck at Kolophon'.

¹⁴⁷ Picard 1982.

death.¹⁴⁸ It could also help to explain the use of civic mints for coinages struck with the types and names of his successors and later generations of Hellenistic monarchs.¹⁴⁹ In that case, the significant change in the second century BC would be that the cities chose to fulfil their duties towards the Attalid kings or the Romans by striking Attic-weight coinages not in the form of Alexanders, but with their own types. There may, of course, be some very practical explanation for this shift. Alternatively, it may be yet another illustration of one of the central ideological features of the Hellenistic *polis*—what Louis Robert, commenting on the honorary decree of Sestos for Menas (which mentions the civic coin-types of Sestos, the ‘*poleōs charaktēr*’), once called ‘la fierté civique’.¹⁵⁰

APPENDIX I: HOARDS BURIED IN SELEUKID SYRIA BETWEEN 188 BC AND 100 BC

Group I: Hoards buried in Seleukid Syria 180–160 BC with silver coinages from Asia Minor

- CH X 295, Beqa’ valley, Lebanon, 1995, 170–160 BC: Alexanders
 CH X 297, Unknown Find-spot, 2004, 169 BC? Alexanders, Antiochos III, Seleukos IV, Antiochos IV
 CH X 298, Qal’at el-Moudiq, Apameia region, Syria, before 1996, 165 BC: Lysimachi, Eumenes I, Seleukos I, Antiochos II, Antiochos Hierax, Antiochos III, Seleukos IV, Antiochos the son of Seleukos IV, Antiochos IV
 IGCH 1546, Aleppo (Beroea, Kyrrestike), 1931, 164 BC: Alexanders, Side, Antiochos IV
 CH I 77, Syria, before 1960: 170/160 BC: Alexanders
 IGCH 1548, N. Syria, 1912, 160 BC: Alexanders, Lysimachos, Miletos, Antiochos IV, Antiochos V
 CH IX 511 (CH VI 37, VII 98, VIII 433), Ma’aret en-Nu’mān, Syria, 1979, 163/2 BC: Alexanders, Prusias II, Philetairos (Group VII), Eumenes II,

¹⁴⁸ See Le Rider 1998. For Descat 2010, the term *argyria symmachikon* of inscriptions of Miletos and Kolophon between 320 and 310 BC refers to the coinage of Alexander III. I think that this is untenable and prefer the explanation proposed by Meadows 2011: 292–3.

¹⁴⁹ Chrysafis and Psoma (forthcoming).

¹⁵⁰ Robert, *OMS* VI 125–35. One should also note that this civic pride is expressed in the relatively humble late second-century BC bronze coinage of Sestos: von Fritze 1907.

Ptolemy II or III, Lysimachi, Athena Nikephoros, Mytilene, Kos, Side, Ephesos, Arados, Seleucids to Antiochos V.

IGCH 1772, Edessa, mod. Urfa, Mesopotamia, 1924, 185–160 BC: Alexanders, Lysimachi, Antigonos Gonatas and Doson, Seleukids to Antiochos III, Prousius I, Eumenes II, Kyme, and Athens

IGCH 1774, Babylon, 1900, 161 BC: Alexanders, Lysimachos, Samothrake, Eretria, Athens, Mithridates III, Kyzikos, Eumenes II, Alexandria Troas, Athena Ilias, Mytilene, Kos, Side, Seleukos II, Antiochos IV, Demetrios I
CH VIII 434, Syria, 1990, 160 BC: Alexanders, Lysimachi, Philetairoi (Group VII), Antiochos V, Demetrios I

CH IV 55, Near East, 1977, 160 BC: Alexandria Troas, Athena Ilias, Samos, Antiochos IV

IGCH 1544, Latakia (Laodicea ad mare, Seleukis), 1759, 160 BC:¹⁵¹ Alexanders, Mithridates III, Lysimachos, Alabanda, Side, Arados, Athena Ilias, Seleucids to Antiochos IV

Phoenicia, Palaistina

CH IX 507, Lebanon, 1989, 175 BC: Lysimachi, Philetairoi (Groups III–IV), Antiochos I

CH IX 510, Lebanon, 1997, 165 BC, Ephesos, Arados

Group II: Hoards buried in Seleukid Syria between 160–140 BC with silver coinages (Alexanders and civic types) from western Asia Minor

Hellenistic Syria, North Phoenicia, and Mesopotamia

CH X 301, Unknown Find-spot 2002 ('Demetrios I' hoard), 151/50 BC: Alexanders, Prousius I, Antiochos III, Seleukos IV, Antiochos IV, Antiochos V, Demetrios I, Orophernes, Athens, Arados, Athena Ilias, Parion, Myrina, Kyme, Tenedos, Klazomenai, Ephesos, Miletos, Alabanda, Kos, Phaselis, Side¹⁵²

IGCH 1773, Tell Kotchek, 1952, 150/c.142 BC: Alexanders and Side¹⁵³

IGCH 1550, east of Tartous (Antarados), 1941, 150 BC: Myrina, Kyme, Aigai, Magnesia

IGCH 1552 (CH I 75; CH IX 513), Arab el Mulk (anc. Paltos), Seleukis, 1940, 150 BC: Antiochos III, Ephesos, Arados

CH VII 100, Near East, 1965–6, mid-second century BC: Alexanders

CH V 46, Iraq, 1970: 150 BC: Alexanders, Antiochos V, Demetrios I, and Alexander I

¹⁵¹ Mattingly 1993b: 82–3, 85–6.

¹⁵² Lorber 2010: 153–72.

¹⁵³ Ibid.: 155.

- CH VIII 459, Lebanon, 1985?, 145 BC: First *meris* of Macedonia, Myrina, Athens New Style, Ptolemaic, Antiochos IV, Demetrios I, Alexander I Balas
- IGCH 1547, Khan Cheikhoun (Apameia, Seleukis), 1940, after 150/c.142 BC: Alexanders, Side
- IGCH 1559, Akkar, c.45 km south-west of Homs (anc. Emesa), Seleukis, 1956, c.150–142 BC: Alexanders, Aigai, Kyme, Myrina, Herakleia, Magnesia, Smyrna, 'Syros', Alexander I¹⁵⁴
- IGCH 1560, Ghonsle, c.15 km east of Balanaia, Seleukis, 1955?, 148–147 BC: Aigai,¹⁵⁵ Kyme, Myrina, Magnesia, Herakleia, Smyrna, Demetrios I, Alexander I
- IGCH 1556, N. Syria, Caiffa, 1906, 146/5 BC¹⁵⁶: Myrina, Kyme, Magnesia, Alexanders of Temnos, Demetrios I, Alexander I, Demetrios II
- CH X 308, CH IX 501 (Gaziantep) and 527 (London Group), Gaziantep, 1994, 144/3 BC: Alexanders, Demetrios Poliorketes, Perseus, Macedonia first *meris*, Prousius II, Lysimachi, Athens, Prousius II, Kyzikos, Parion, Alexandreia Troas, Athena Ilias, Aigai, Kyme, Myrina, Klazomenai, Magnesia, Miletos, Smyrna, Alabanda, Side, Seleukos I, Seleukos IV, Antiochos IV, Antiochos V, Demetrios I, Interregnum, Alexandros I, Demetrios II, Antiochos VI
- IGCH 1557, Teffaha, c.20 km east of Antarados, 1954, 143/2 BC:¹⁵⁷ Alexanders of Alabanda, Temnos, and Aspendos, Myrina, Kyme, Alexander I, Demetrios II
- CH X 310 (CH I 87; II 90; CH VIII 460) Kirikhan, Cilicia, 1972, 143/2 BC: Alexanders, Athens, 'Syros', Aigai, Kyme, Myrina, Herakleia, Lebedos, Magnesia, Smyrna, Alabanda, Prousius II, Demetrios I, Alexander I, Alexander I and Cleopatra Thea, Demetrios II, Antiochos VI¹⁵⁸
- CH VIII 461, Unknown, 1986, 140 BC: Myrina, Kyme, Smyrna, Athens, Demetrios I, Seleukid gold?
- IGCH 1561, Latakia (Laodicea ad mare, Seleukis), 1950, 140 BC: Alexanders of Alabanda, Miletos, and Temnos, Lysimachi, Alexander I Balas
- IGCH 1562, Aleppo (anc. Beroia), Kyrrestike, 1930, 138 BC: Alexanders, Antigonos Gonatas, Prousius I, Alabanda, Kyme, Myrina, Herakleia, Magnesia, Lebedos, 'Syros'

¹⁵⁴ Lorber 2010: 156 from Akkar as provenance.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.: 157; no mention of Aigai.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.: 157.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.: 157.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.: 157.

Phoenicia, Palaistina

IGCH 1593, Ras Baalbek ? Koile Syria, 1957, 143/2 BC: Athens, Aigai, Kyme, Myrina, Magnesia, Smyrna, Demetrios I, Alexander I, Demetrios II, Ptolemy VI

CH IX 531, Yatta, Hebron, 1978/9, 140 BC: Arados, Alexanders, Ptolemy VI

**Group III: Hoards buried 140–100 BC with silver
coinages from western Asia Minor**

Hellenistic Syria, north Phoenicia, and Mesopotamia

IGCH 1549, Syria? 130 BC: Athens

CH IX 532, Unknown Find-spot, 1997 or earlier, 130 BC: Ephesos, Arados, Antiochos IV, Alexander I, Antiochos VII

CH VIII 467, Unknown Find-spot, 125 BC: Ephesos, Arados, Demetrios I, Alexander I, Demetrios II

CH X 322 (CH VIII 471), Antarados (Tartous), 1987, 120 BC: Alexanders, Athens, Byzantion, Mytilene, Klazomenai, Smyrna, Alexander I, Demetrios II, Tryphon, Antiochos VII, Demetrios II (second reign), Alexander II Zabinas, Cleopatra Thea and Antiochos VIII, Diodotos I of Bactria,

IGCH 1542 (CH IX 528), Ain Tab, Doliche, Kommagene, Gaziantep, 1920/1, 140–120 BC: Alexanders¹⁵⁹

CH IX 517, East Anatolia, 1991, 150–100 BC: Alexanders,¹⁶⁰ Side

CH X 326 (CH VIII 476), Bassit, post-118 BC: Alexanders of Temnos and Alabanda, Antiochos VIII

IGCH 1567, North Syria, south-east of Massyaf, 110 BC: Myrina, Kyme, Smyrna, Eukratides, Demetrios I, Antiochos IX

IGCH 1568, Kessab, area of Seleukeia Pieria, Seleukis, 110 BC: Athens, Phraates II and Seleukids from Demetrios I to Antiochos IX

CH VIII 478, Adana, 110 BC: Athens

IGCH 1780, Tell-Ahmar, between Hierapolis in Kyrrhistike and Edessa of Mesopotamia (at the crossing of Euphrates), 1929, 110–105 BC: Athens and Seleukids to Antiochos IX

CH IX 541, Unknown Find-spot, before 1980, late II BC: Alexanders of Perge and Side, Antiochos VIII

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.: 155; Metcalf 1994: 53; Metcalf 1998.

¹⁶⁰ Lorber 2010: 155; Metcalf 1994: 19–53.

APPENDIX II: ATTIC-WEIGHT TETRADRACHMS
OF CITIES OF WESTERN ASIA MINOR IN
HOARDS BURIED IN SELEUKID SYRIA
AFTER THE TREATY OF APAMEIA (188 BC)

Group I

Alexander III: Pergamon (205–190 BC), Herakleia Pontike (200 BC), Smyrna (200 BC), Megalopolis, Mylasa (post-200 and 185–170 BC), Miletos (190 to post-180 BC), Chios (190–165 BC), Mytilene (post-188 BC), Myrina (post-188 BC), Kyme (post-188 BC), Teos (post-188 BC), Ephesos (188 BC), Erythrai (188–170 BC), Magnesia on the Maeander (188–170 BC), Assos (188–170 BC), Methymna (188–170 BC), Alexandria Troas (188–170 BC), Kolophon (180 BC), Klazomenai (180 BC), Antiocheia (180 BC), Alabanda (172–162 BC), Samothrake (168 BC), Temnos (162–143 BC), Sinope, Samos, Rhodes, Messene, Herakleia by Latmos, Phaselis (213/12–185/4 BC), Aspendos (213/12–185/4 BC), Perge (223/2–191/0 BC)

Mattingly 1993b; Le Rider 2001a; Meadows 2009; Lorber 2010; Meadows and Houghton 2010

Lysimachos	Mørkholm 1991
Antigonos Gonatas and Doson	Mørkholm 1991
Eumenes II (160s)	Le Rider 1989a
Mithridates III (Pontos, to 183 BC)	Mørkholm 1991
Philetairos (Group VII)	Le Rider 1989a
Seleukids (to Demetrios I)	SC I; SC II
Prousius II (182–149 BC)	Mattingly 1993b
Mytilene (before 160)	Mattingly 1993b
Alabanda (150–145)	Meadows 2008
Kos	Ingvaldsen 2001
Miletos	Kinns 1998
Ephesos	Kinns 1999
Side (post-203 BC)	Meadows 2009a
Arados (to 165/4 BC)	Duyrat 2005
Athena Nikephoros	Price 1989
Athena Ilias	Meadows 1998; Knoepfler 2010
Eretria	Mørkholm 1991
Samos	Barron 1966
Parion	Meadows 1998
Tenedos	Callataj 1998
Samothrake	Schönerer-Geiss 1996
Phaselis	Heipp-Tamer 1993

Group II

(For Alexander III, Lysimachos, Athena Ilias, Alabanda, Mytilene, Miletos, and Ephesos, see Group I)

Prusias I and II	Mørkholm 1991
First <i>meris</i> (both types: post-168 BC)	Mørkholm 1991
Athens (post-164 BC)	Lewis 1962
Kyzikos (post-160 BC)	Meadows and Houghton 2010
Klazomenai (175–150 BC)	Boulay 2009; Meadows 2009a
Alexandreia Troas (beg. 160s BC)	Meadows 1998
Wreathed tetradrachms of:	
Aigai	Amandry 1989
Kyme	Oakley 1982; van Bremen 2008
Myrina	Sacks 1985
Magnesia	Jones 1979; Kinns 1989
Smyrna	Milne 1914, 1927, and 1928
Herakleia by Latmos	Lavva 1993; Kinns 1998
Lebedos	Meadows and Houghton 2010
‘Syros’	Meadows and Houghton 2010

APPENDIX III: A NOTE ON THE ‘STATERS’ OF ARCHIPPE

There is more evidence for the close links between the Attalid kings and the free and autonomous cities of Asia Minor in the honorary decrees of Kyme for Archippe, daughter of Dikaiogenes.¹⁶¹ Among other benefactions the decrees mention the gift of Attic drachms for the ox, of silver staters, and of staters, ‘*chalkou*’.¹⁶² The Attic drachms refer to currency on the Attic standard that was issued during this period by Kyme and the other cities of western Asia Minor. Riet van Bremen has very convincingly shown that the decrees and the city’s coinage with civic types were contemporary.¹⁶³ The Attic tetradrachms of Kyme were struck with an Amazon’s head on the obverse, and a horse and a cup in a heavy wreath on the reverse. These were the types (without the wreath) of the city’s staters of c.10 g that were minted under Antiochos II.¹⁶⁴ The term stater in the decrees of Archippe may

¹⁶¹ SEG 33, 1037–41; *I.Kyme* 13 I–V.

¹⁶² See above, n. 26.

¹⁶³ van Bremen 2008: 362–9.

¹⁶⁴ Control linked to issues of Antiochos II produced at Kyme (compare *BMC Aeolis* 58 with SC I 503). I owe this information to Andy Meadows.

function as a reference to those.¹⁶⁵ Alternatively, it may refer to cistophoroi.¹⁶⁶

If cistophoroi are meant, the links between the Attalid kings and the free and autonomous cities of Asia Minor would turn out to be far more significant than previously thought. As well as being a highly planned monetary policy introduced by the Attalid king, the use of cistophoroi as legal currency in these cities would also be related to political geography, among other things. Tracing the frontiers of the Attalid kingdom after Apameia is a difficult task. Most of the free cities were enclaves in the territory of the kingdom, and, conversely, several cities of the kingdom were isolated among free cities. Interaction between both seems relevant and is also apparent in the end of these coinages, the increased popularity of cistophoroi, and the creation of a much wider monetary zone reserved for their circulation.¹⁶⁷

For other references to staters in inscriptions from Asia Minor after 188 BC, see also (1) a decree on the establishment of Asklepieia, Lampsakos, Mysia, II BC: staters, drachms, and obols (*ILampsakos* 9, ll. 6 (drachms and obols), 31, 59 (staters); and (2) a decree of Kyzikos, Mysia, II BC (*CIG* 3658, ll. 8–9: 100 staters; cf. *SEG* 47, 2270; Thomasson 1997: 177).¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Psoma 2009.

¹⁶⁶ Psoma, unpublished poster (2007), XIII International Congress of Greek Epigraphy (Oxford).

¹⁶⁷ See Callataÿ, above Ch. 6; Ashton, above Ch. 7.

¹⁶⁸ Mention of staters also in: (a) the honorary decree for Lykaithion, daughter of Aristokleidas, Knidos, Karia, ad I–II (*IKnidos* 74, l. 6); (b) an inscription in Aiolic dialect from Assos of Hellenistic (?) date (*I.Assos* 6a, l. 6: '[not] later than 150 BC'); (c) list of penalties, Ilion, time of Augustus: staters (*IIlilion* 65, ll. 5, 8, 11, and 13); (d) decree of Kyzikos ratifying the setting up in public of a statue of Kleidike, daughter of Asklepiades, by the *hieropoioi* and the priestesses of Mother Plakiane (*CIG* 3657: ad 54); (e) the speech of a *prytanis* from Ephesos, Ionia (*IEphesos* 1201A, l. 10); (f) a sacred law of early imperial date (Nero?) from Miletos (*Milet* I 3, 134, l. 28; for the term *ἑποί* used 'dans les formules prévoyant une amende', see Robert 1951: 136–8; (g) a fragmentary inscription from Chios of imperial (?) date (McCabe, *Chios* 547).

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